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This project is the first large-scale and systematic effort to bridge the fields of commons 
research and biomedical ethics, with the aim of furthering key debates in both areas of 
inquiry. The aims and contributions of the project are twofold.  
First, I argue that commons research is valuable to bioethics, because it provides 
a language to talk about health care institutions. I critically discuss commons research’s 
main conceptual tools in the context of health care: the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework, the design principles of successful commons, parallel 
experimentation, and polycentric governance regimes. This conceptual apparatus can 
help to advance longstanding arguments in biomedical ethics, particularly when it comes 
to the challenge of governing scarce resources. The project contributes to two arguments 
in particular: (1) I explore the possibility of a tragedy of the health care commons, 
providing arguments in favor of such a tragedy, and considering objections against it. (2) 
I integrate commons research with Norman Daniels’ theory of justice for health care and 
the accompanying Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R) approach, arguing that 
commons institutions are particularly suitable to put Daniels’ approach into practice. 
Second, I provide a philosophical and normative analysis that advances NIE and 
commons research. My contributions are the following: (1) I critically discuss the concepts 
of institution, organization, and common-pool resources. (2) I provide the most detailed 
analysis of the design principles of successful commons institutions available in the   
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literature. (3) I relate the commons to the pluralist tradition in liberalism to show the role 
they can play in safeguarding free health care systems. (4) I assess Ostrom’s proposal to 
develop polycentric governance regimes in the context of health care. Beyond 
philosophical reflection on the commons, biomedical ethics can further undertheorized 
areas of commons research, particularly the development of a theory of justice for the 
commons. I argue Daniels’ theory of justice for health care can supply such an account, 
and show the A4R approach can be conceptualized as design principles for the 
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IMAGINING THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS 
 
“The common day and night – the common earth and waters, 
Your farm – your work, trade, occupation, 
The democratic wisdom underneath, like solid ground for all.”1,2 
- Walt Whitman - 
“[T]he problem of limiting care in a fair and socially  
acceptable way is arguably the most important   
– and divisive – issue facing the design of  
medical delivery systems in the next century.”3 
- Norman Daniels and James Sabin - 
 
0.1 IT’S THE INSTITUTIONS, STUPID!4,5  
In the first issue of the Journal of Institutional Economics (2005), philosopher John Searle 
observes, “Given the centrality of institutional phenomena, it is somewhat surprising that
                                                          
1 Walt Whitman, The Complete Poems (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 565. 
2 Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval quote Whitman in the opening pages of their book 
Commun. (Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, Commun. Essai sur la Révolution au XXIe 
Siècle (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2014), 9.) 
3 Norman Daniels and James Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
[2002] 2008), 2. 
4 Sven Steinmo and Jon Watts, “It’s the Institutions, Stupid! Why Comprehensive Health 
Insurance Always Fails in America,” Journal of Health, Politics, & Law 20, no. 2 (April 1995). 
5 The title of Steinmo and Watts’s paper is a reference to, and variant of, the phrase “It’s 
the economy, stupid!” The catchphrase, coined by campaign strategist James Carville, 
became popular in the aftermath of Bill Clinton’s successful presidential campaign against 
George H.W. Bush. 
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institutional economics has not always been at the center of mainstream economics.”6 
Searle’s observation certainly applies to ethical and philosophical reflections on health 
care. Institutions are central to health care, among others, to the management of scarce 
health care resources, but they receive little attention in biomedical ethics and the 
philosophy of health care. Whenever bioethicists and philosophers do acknowledge the 
central importance of institutions, the concept of “institution” is usually treated as given 
and the role of institutional phenomena remains undertheorized. Recent developments 
in economics provide the opportunity, and the theoretical apparatus, to reflect on the 
institutions of health care in ways that move forward key debates in biomedical ethics.   
0.1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
Institutions figured prominently in economics during the first decades of the twentieth 
century, but their position as a focus of economic inquiry waned with the rise and 
dominance of the neoclassical synthesis, which combines neoclassical economics with 
Keynesian economics, and relies heavily on economic models and advanced 
mathematical methods.7 The revaluation of institutions in economics is a relatively recent 
occurrence, as is evidenced by the publication date of the first issue of the Journal of 
Institutional Economics (2005) in which Searle’s paper, cited above, appeared. 
An initial surge of interest in institutions occurred during the first half of the 
twentieth century, with such thinkers as Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, and John 
                                                          
6 John Searle, “What is an Institution?” Journal of Institutional Economics 1, no. 1 (June 
2005): 2. 
7 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 131-132. 
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Dewey; themselves drawing on political economy with its roots in moral philosophy. The 
names of the most prominent political economists whose work served as the basis for 
these early institutional thinkers sound familiar to philosophers’ ears: Adam Smith, John 
Stuart Mill, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx. Around World War II, 
however, institutional economics quickly became marginalized as the neoclassical 
synthesis with its quantitative methods rose to become the dominant approach in 
economics, condemning institutionalism to a role as a minor heterodox school challenging 
the mainstream economic consensus, at least for a while. Orthodox economics forgot 
about the institutions (Institutionsvergessenheit).8  
All of that changed toward the end of last century, with a resurgence of interest 
in the importance of institutions for economics, among others, because the shortcomings 
of neoclassical economics’ mathematical models were becoming apparent.9 The research 
                                                          
8 The term “Institutionsvergessenheit” is more than a superficial allusion to Martin 
Heidegger’s concept of “Seinsvergessenheit.” Heidegger’s claim that Western philosophy 
has forgotten about being is analogous to the argument that mainstream economics has 
forgotten about institutions, both the rediscovery of being and of institutions require a 
radical rethinking of metaphysics and economics respectively. Institutions-vergessenheit 
was coined by Erik Gawel, even though it is unclear whether he intended to reference 
Heidegger’s concept. (Erik Gawel, “Institutionentheorie und Unweltökonomik. 
Forschungsstand und Perspektiven,” Zeitschrift fur angewandte Umwelforschung 8 
(1996): 11.) 
9 To give an example, the influential work of psychologist Daniel Kahneman on human 
decision-making challenged the assumption of human rationality in modern economic 
thought, earning him the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (shared with 
experimental economist Vernon L. Smith). Institutional economists are sympathetic to 
the analysis of human psychology offered by Kahneman. (Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, 
Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux , 2011).) Ostrom, for example, stresses 
the limits of human rationality. Moreover, she shows in her experimental research and 
field work that human beings are not only the self-interested maximizers of neoclassical 
economic models, but can also behave as cooperative satisficers.  
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of the so-called “new institutionalists”10 resulted in a slew of Nobel Memorial Prizes in 
Economic Sciences: Ronald Coase (1991), Douglass North (1993), Oliver Williamson 
(2009), and Elinor Ostrom (2009). The product of their work, and that of countless others, 
served as the basis for a new school of economic thought: New Institutional Economics 
(NIE).11 Still a minor current within economic research, NIE is sometimes presented as an 
alternative to mainstream economics,12 but any economic “Theory of Everything”13 would 
have to integrate institutional thought with the neoclassical synthesis.14 NIE and orthodox 
economics should be regarded as supplements for one another rather than substitutes.15 
 
                                                          
10 In the literature, the first wave of interest in institutions is called “old institutionalism,” 
and the more recent surge of interest is labeled “new institutionalism.” The peculiar term 
“institutionalist” is commonly used for representatives of both movements, for example, 
in the Encyclopædia Britannica’s entry on institutional economics. (Encyclopædia 
Britannica, s.v. “Institutional Economics,” last modified June 14, 2016, https://www. 
britannica.com/topic/institutional-economics.) 
11 Robert Goodin provides a philosophical overview of NIE. (Robert Goodin, “Institutions 
and Their Design,” in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert Goodin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).) 
12 Claims that NIE in general and commons research (Ostrom) in particular represent a 
paradigm shift in economics can also be situated in this context. (Among others, see: 
Derek Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom. Commons, Contestation and 
Craft (New York: Routledge, 2014), 191; Massimo De Angelis and David Harvie, “The 
Commons,” in The Routledge Companion to Alternative Organization, eds. Martin Parker 
et al. (Abington: Routledge, 2014), 289.) As these claims often go unargued, and given the 
philosophical significance of the concept “paradigm shift” (Thomas Kuhn), the defense or 
refutation of these assertions is beyond the scope of this project.  
13 The term “Theory of Everything,” often abbreviated as ToE (or TOE), refers to the 
hypothetical all-encompassing theory in physics that can fully explain and link together 
all physical phenomena. Some economists dream of a similar all-encompassing theory in 
economics that would be able to explain and relate all economic phenomena. 
14 Of course, the proposed integration is an oversimplification, as a new synthesis would 
plausibly have to accommodate other economic schools of thought (e.g., evolutionary 
economics, Austrian school, post-Keynesian economics). 
15 North, Institutions, 135. 
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0.1.2 NIE, BIOETHICS, AND PHILOSOPHY 
The revival of institutionalism in economics provides bioethicists and philosophers with 
an opportunity and, more importantly, with a new theoretical toolbox to reflect afresh on 
the role institutions play in health care and medicine. There has been a long and steady 
interest in health care institutions,16 but the theoretical apparatus to analyze and reflect 
upon them has been lacking.17 I briefly highlight two prominent examples. First, Edmund 
Pellegrino and David Thomasma point out the need for an ethics of health care 
institutions in their work A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice (1981). In a chapter 
titled Social Ethics of Institutions, they write, “institutional ethics […] has not yet occupied 
the professional ethicist to a significant degree, [but] is essential to address the moral 
agency of hospitals and care teams.”18 Second, the opening sentence of Norman Daniels’s 
influential work Just Health Care (1985) reads, “This book is about justice in the design of 
a health-care system.”19 Daniels argues institutions are central to any solution to the fair 
                                                          
16 That being said, the level of interest in health care institutions should not be 
exaggerated either. As Andrew Cassels notes in the context of health care reform, 
“Institutional issues tend to be ignored because they are regarded as messy and difficult.” 
(Andrew Cassels, Perspectives on Health Sector Reform (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 1993), 6.) Cassels’s remark is also applicable to ethical and philosophical 
reflection on health care institutions in general. NIE promises to make institutional issues 
a bit less messy, or at least to make them approachable in a systematic manner. 
17 Around the turn of the century, HEC Forum drew attention to the development of an 
organizational ethics of health care, among others, under the influence of a call for papers 
by George Khushf, who became the editor of a section of the journal dedicated to 
administrative and organizational ethics (see also 4.7 Toward an Ethics of Health Care 
Institutions). (George Khushf, “Administrative and Organizational Ethics: Announcing a 
New Section and a Call for Papers,” HEC Forum 9, no. 4 (December 1997).)    
18 Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice. 
Toward a Philosophy and Ethic of the Healing Professions (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1981), 244. 
19 Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), ix. 
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allocation of health care resources and the purpose of any theory of justice in health care 
is to inform the design of health care institutions.20 While both examples acknowledge 
the central importance of institutions, neither is entirely successful in bringing their 
institutional arguments to fruition.21 For one, Pellegrino, Thomasma, and Daniels struggle 
with the concept of “institution.” They primarily understand and use the notion in the 
everyday meaning of the term, i.e., referencing concrete organization. Institutionalists, 
however, conceive of the concept as an abstract set of rules.22 The everyday and the 
technical sense of the concept are closely related and easily confused, even in the NIE 
literature. In fact, the persistent ambiguity surrounding the notion of institution is one of 
the main criticisms of NIE. Part of this project’s contribution to NIE is to attempt an 
explanation of the nontrivial distinction between organization and institution from a 
philosophical perspective (see 0.5.1 Institution and 0.5.2 Organization). For now, it is 
worth noting I will try to be consistent in my use of the term institution to refer to abstract 
                                                          
20 Daniels highlights the key role institutions and institutional design play in the allocation 
of health care resources numerous times, especially early on in the work. (Daniels, Just 
Health Care, ix-xi, 1-4, 8-10, 41, 45, 47-48, 95, 99-100, 102.) For a detailed discussion of 
Daniels’s treatment of institutions, see 4.4.1 Daniels the Institutionalist. 
21 Daniels, for example, focuses heavily on the role of institutions and their design in the 
preface and opening chapter of Just Health Care, but does not develop his arguments 
about the central importance of institutions further. One explanation is Daniels lacks the 
theoretical machinery to develop his institutional argument further. Then again, Daniels 
may not have considered it his task to discuss the in-and-outs of institutions and their 
design, instead focusing on the development of a theory of justice in health care, at least 
in Just Health Care. I will argue the accountability for reasonableness approach Daniels 
later develops in collaboration with James Sabin can be interpreted as an exercise in 
institutional design, even if the approach is not presented as such (see 4.4.1 Daniels the 
Institutionalist). 
22 At times, Daniels uses the notion of institution in the same way, i.e., referencing an 
abstract set of rules rather than a concrete organization. 
7 
 
sets of rules, while I reserve the term organization to refer to concrete health care 
organizations (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, Kaiser Permanente, Prisma Health, urgent care 
clinics, group practices, medical schools).23 
Of course, the proverbial “giants of bioethics” cited in the previous paragraph 
wrote in the early days of the institutionalist revival and long before NIE gained any 
prominence, so they cannot be blamed for lacking the theoretical apparatus to develop 
their visionary ideas about health care institutions more systematically. To date, NIE 
remains relatively little known outside its own field, something this project seeks to 
remedy by providing some of the bridgework between NIE and biomedical ethics broadly 
conceived, tying the latter in with a fast-developing field of economic research rooted in 
institutional practice. Ultimately, the integration of bioethics and NIE may result in a full-
fledged ethics of health care institutions (see 4.7 Toward an Ethics of Health Care 
Institutions). While the development of such an ethics is beyond the scope of the current 
dissertation, I supply and advance some of the tools that may be of help to realize such a 
project (see 2. Ostrom’s Black Bag), and apply these tools to Daniels’s work on the fair 
allocation of health care resources (see 4. A4R in Practice). 
 NIE is particularly well suited to be incorporated in ethical and philosophical 
inquiry. Catherine Lawson is one of the few academics who has identified and explored 
                                                          
23 To say I “try” to use the terms consistently may seem weak, but the terms can be quite 
difficult to keep apart. After all, it is possible to think of concrete organizations in terms 
of abstract sets of rules (i.e., institutions), and at times institutions can be identified with 
concrete entities (e.g., the United States government as the state). The sections below 
discuss these intricacies in more detail (see 0.5.1 Institution and 0.5.2 Organization).   
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the relationship between bioethics and institutional economics,24 albeit first-wave 
institutional economics rather than NIE.25 In a paper titled The Second Stage of Bioethics 
and Institutional Economics (1998), she discusses some of the reasons institutionalism is 
valuable to biomedical ethics. First, Lawson points out, “the dominant position of ethical 
inquiry within institutionalist economics, as well as the institutionalist understanding of 
ethics as both social process and individual behavior, renders it of greater value than 
conventional economic theory to bioethicists searching for useful insights into the world 
of business and economics.”26 Second, she believes institutionalism can provide a 
counterweight to and escape from the “individualistic bias” 27 in biomedical ethics. Lastly, 
Lawson rightly highlights the central importance of economics to health care, arguing 
economics should be at the center of any reflection on health care, but bioethicists and 
philosophers are ill prepared to engage in matters of economics.28 In comparison to so-
called “cliometric economics,”29 NIE offers a more easily accessible and readily applicable 
conceptual system to reflect upon institutional, organizational, and economic issues in 
health care. 
                                                          
24 Unfortunately, Lawson’s contribution is limited to just one paper, possibly because her 
work came too soon, and thus did not profit from the surge of interest in institutionalism. 
25 Of course, this raises the question whether Lawson’s argument are also applicable to 
NIE? Without going into detail, I believe they are. After all, NIE builds on many of the first 
institutionalists’ ideas (e.g., Commons is an important influence on Ostrom).  
26 Catherin Lawson, “The Second Stage of Bioethics and Institutional Economics,” Journal 
of Economic Issues 32, no. 4 (December 1998): 985. 
27 Lawson, “The Second Stage of Bioethics,” 987. 
28 Lawson, “The Second Stage of Bioethics,” 988. 
29 The term “cliometric economics” is used to reference orthodox economics with its 




 At the same time, NIE can benefit from entering into a dialogue with bioethics and 
philosophy. First, philosophical reflection can elucidate some of the key concepts of 
institutionalist economics, among others, the ambiguous distinction between institutions 
and organizations. More generally, philosophers can aide in the process of critically 
reflecting on the assumptions, methods, and arguments of a nascent branch of economics 
(see 2. Ostrom’s Black Bag).30 Second, and closely related to the previous point, ethicists 
and philosophers can bring a normative perspective to the table that is notably absent 
from NIE, despite the field’s emphasis on rules (see 0.5.3 Rules), which are normative. The 
prescriptive nature of institutions as sets of rules is assumed, and thus undertheorized. A 
possible explanation is that, even though NIE is an alternative to orthodox economics, the 
field is still within the discipline and represents biases in economics at large, for example, 
a preference for empirical research and for mathematical methods.31 As a result, 
                                                          
30 In commons research in particular, the figure of Ostrom still looms large (see 0.1.3 
Ostrom and the Commons), as anyone who has ever attended the biannual meeting of 
The International Association of the Study of the Commons (IASC) can attest. As the 
founder of commons research, Ostrom’s writings weigh heavily on current work in the 
field. While Ostrom’s influence is understandable, given her brilliance and the field’s 
indebtedness to her, it risks stifling critical reflection within commons research.  
31 A few remarks are in place: First, economists’ predilection for empirical research should 
not be exaggerated either, as one can just as easily accuse economists of an overreliance 
on theoretical models. As I argued above, the inability of neoclassical models to 
successfully explain real-world economic phenomena is one of the reasons for the rise of 
heterodox economic schools in the first place (see 0.1.1 A Brief History of Institutional 
Economics). Regardless, normative analysis is absent from both empirical and theoretical 
economics. Second, Ostrom’s preference for mathematical methods and empirical 
research is especially apparent in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources (2006). 
Finally, it is worth noting the central importance of normative analysis and moral 
philosophy in the work of the earliest modern economists (e.g., Smith, Mill). While 
economics has returned to political economy in some ways (e.g., the emphasis on 
institutions), the moral component has not been recovered.  
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normative analysis is largely absent from NIE in general and commons research in 
particular, a lacuna that bioethics and philosophy can fill. 
 My work bridges NIE and philosophy, with a focus on Ostrom’s work on the 
commons and Daniels’s theory of justice for health care (see 4. A4R in Practice). More 
generally, my project sits at the intersection of economics and philosophy, highlighting 
ways in which these fields can interface fruitfully with each other. Since this dissertation 
is the first large-scale, systematic effort to provide such bridgework, the project as a 
whole is an important contribution both to philosophy of health care and to NIE. 
0.1.3 OSTROM AND THE COMMONS 
NIE is a large, growing, and diverse area of inquiry.32 To give an example, the work of the 
aforementioned Nobel laureates, who laid much of the basis for current research, must 
be situated within NIE, but the overlap between their research agendas is nonetheless 
limited, as is the degree to which they draw on one another’s work.33 As a result, there 
are numerous ways to explore the relationship between NIE and biomedical ethics, all of 
which may be valuable and fruitful avenues of inquiry. Since this project developed from 
an interest in the allocation of health care resources, Ostrom’s research on the commons 
forms the basis for the present research. In her work, Ostrom discusses institutional 
arrangements that allow for the cooperative governance of scarce resources, among 
others, developing tools enabling resource users to do so successfully (see 2. Ostrom’s 
                                                          
32 As Robert Goodin puts it, “’new institutionalism’ is not one thing but many.” (Goodin, 
“Institutions and Their Design,” 2.) 
33 To give an example, Ostrom and North, the institutionalists whose work I am most 
familiar with, reference each other’s research only a handful of times. 
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Black Bag). As such, commons research may be able to help averting a so-called “tragedy 
of the health care commons” (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons). Despite 
the focus on Ostrom, the project provides an introduction to the key ideas of NIE, of which 
Ostrom and North are preeminent representatives, and their application to bioethics and 
philosophy of health care. At the same time, the project is an invitation to other 
researchers to further explore the relationship between NIE and biomedical ethics (see 
0.4 The Double Aim of the Project). 
0.2 MARKET AND STATE: FALSE DICHOTOMY  
Ostrom outlines her research program by situating her work vis-à-vis a useful fiction: the 
market-state dichotomy. In the opening chapter of Governing the Commons (1990), she 
argues that decisions about the “right” governance model for the management of scarce 
resources oftentimes are presented as a choice between the institutions of market 
(privatization) and state (Leviathan).34,35 Ostrom then introduces her own work on 
commons institutions as an alternative to the classical policy prescriptions of market and 
state (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons).36  
The dichotomy is a useful fiction precisely because it allows Ostrom to position 
her work in relation to the institutions of market and state, as is evidenced by the title of 
her Nobel Prize lecture, titled Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of 
                                                          
34 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 8-15. 
35 For more on Hobbes’s influence on Ostrom, see 3.4.1 Rationalism, Pluralism, and 
Freedom. 
36 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 15-21. 
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Complex Economic Systems (2009).37 However, the dichotomy is not just some theoretical 
construct Ostrom uses to introduce and situate the commons. On the contrary, the 
institutions of market and state are time-honored and influential policy prescriptions for 
solving a host of institutional challenges, including the governance of scarce 
resources.38,39 The dominance of market and state institutions, and their successful track 
record, explains how the concept of the dichotomy originated in the first place, a point I 
return to shortly.40 Ostrom acknowledges the central importance of the dichotomy, and 
recognizes the strength of the institutions of market and state as policy prescriptions, 
provided these institutional solutions are developed in sufficient detail. All too often, 
however, market and state are used as “metaphors,”41,42 but used in this manner they are 
                                                          
37 Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex 
Economic Systems,” The American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June [2009] 2010). 
38 The adjective “time-honored” is appropriate because the institutions of market and 
state are self-reinforcing over time. The well-known phenomenon of path dependence 
applies to institutions (see 4.3.1 Market and State Experiments and 5.8.1 Path 
Dependence).  
39 Garrett Hardin, for example, proposes either privatization (market) or a Leviathan 
(state) to solve the tragedy of the commons (see 1.3 The Tragedy of the Commons). 
40 Moreover, the dichotomous contrast between market and state usually arises in certain 
particular contexts (e.g., tragedy of the commons, prisoner’s dilemma, and collective 
action) that elicit a stark contrast between these classic policy prescriptions. (Ostrom, 
Governing the Commons, 2-7.) 
41 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 21. 
42 Ostrom’s use of the word “metaphor” to characterize the use of market and state as 
policy prescriptions is in need of further explanation. She discusses the “metaphorical use 
of models” in the context of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons (see 1. The Tragedy of the 
Health Care Commons), the prisoner’s dilemma game, and Olson’s logic of collective 
action. Ostrom argues these three models have often served as the basis for policy 
prescriptions, “but those attempting to use these models as the basis for policy 
prescriptions frequently have achieved little more than a metaphorical use of the 
models.” She continues, “When models are used as metaphors, an author usually points 
to the similarity between one or two variables in a natural setting and one or two variables 
in a model. If calling attention to similarities is all that is intended by the metaphor, it 
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deficient solutions to complex issues.43,44 This explains why Ostrom warns and argues 
against the dichotomy as an over-simplification throughout her oeuvre,45 repeatedly 
                                                          
serves the usual purpose of rapidly conveying information in graphic form.” The three 
aforementioned models have often been used for a different purpose, however, namely 
to “invoke an image of helpless individuals caught in an inexorable process of destroying 
their own resources.” (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 7-8.) Policymakers use the 
models, or popularized versions thereof, to show the same processes occur in all settings, 
“an empirically incorrect inference.” (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 9.) Ostrom then 
applies the same notion of metaphor to policy prescriptions. Market and state can be 
employed as metaphors in order to convey information, to make institutional problems 
discussable. But the concepts are often used as vacuous policy proposals to rouse the 
members of the polity (e.g., the use of the dichotomy in political discussions surrounding 
health care in the United States). The concepts must be given content in order for them 
to be valuable as policy prescriptions. As Ostrom puts it, “Many policy prescriptions are 
themselves no more than metaphors. Both the centralizers and the privatizers frequently 
advocate oversimplified, idealized institutions – paradoxically, almost “institution-free” 
institutions.” (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 22.)  
43 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 23. 
44 The criticism that metaphors make for poor policy solutions does not only hold true for 
the institutions of market and state, but also for the commons, as long as these 
institutional arrangements are presented and used as adequate off-the-shelf solutions to 
real-world resource management problems. Ostrom seems to acknowledge the fact the 
criticism applies to the commons by discussing the problem of using policy prescriptions 
as metaphors after briefly introducing the commons as “an empirical alternative,” even 
though her main targets are market and state. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 18, 21-
23.) 
45 A good example is the following: “The Earlier World View of Simple Systems: In the mid-
twentieth century, the dominant scholarly effort was to try to fit the world into simple 
models and to criticize institutional arrangements that did not fit. […] A. Two Optimal 
Organizational Forms: The market was seen as the optimal institution for the production 
and exchange of private goods. For nonprivate goods, on the other hand, one needed 
“the” government to impose rules and taxes to force self-interested individuals to 
contribute necessary resources and refrain from self-seeking activities. Without a 
hierarchical government to induce compliance, self-seeking citizens and officials would 
fail to generate efficient levels of public goods, such as peace and security, at multiple 
scales (Hobbes [1651] 1960; W. Wilson 1885). […] This dichotomous view of the world 
explained patterns of interaction and outcomes related to markets for the production and 
exchange of strictly private goods (Alchian 1950), but it has not adequately accounted for 
internal dynamics within private firms (Williamson 1975, 1986). Nor does it adequately 
deal with the wide diversity of institutional arrangements that humans craft to govern, 
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stressing the need to move past “slogan words.”46 Moreover, and maybe more 
importantly for Ostrom’s project, the clout of the dichotomy makes it seem like no other 
institutional solutions are even a possibility. Despite these criticisms, Ostrom’s work is 
bound and defined by the dichotomy. In turn, the dichotomy exerts a profound influence 
on my project. Thus, before continuing, the market-state dichotomy must be explored in 
some more detail in order to gain a better understanding of Ostrom’s work and of the 
arguments that are to follow. Several key points from the discussion of market and state 
carry over to the next section on the commons (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons). It is 
worth noting that a systematic and critical discussion of the institutions of market, state, 
and, to a lesser extent, commons is absent from the commons literature. Therefore, the 
following analysis of these concepts contributes to commons research. 
 For the sake of the upcoming arguments, I construe the institutions of market and 
state as ideal types. As such, they are never fully realized in the world of “concrete 
institutions,” i.e., organizations. However, all market and state organizations share 
certain features, which I discuss below, with market and state institutions respectively. 
Particular organizations can have a varying number of characteristics in common with the 
ideal-type institution (see also 0.5.2 Organization). To give an example, the New York 
Stock Exchange more closely approximates the ideal of the market than the Health 
Insurance Marketplace (healthcare.gov), but both are instances of market organizations 
                                                          
provide, and manage public goods and commonpool resources.” (Ostrom, “Beyond 
Markets and States,” 409-410.) 
46 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 181. 
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and share certain features which are associated with the market as an institutional ideal 
(e.g., reliance on competition).47,48 
All real-world organizations combine features of the institutions of market and 
state. Hence, scholars often talk about the market-state continuum rather than the 
market-state dichotomy.49 Indeed, many organizations also possess characteristics of 
commons institutions, even if those features are not always recognized. The health care 
system of the United States illustrates how market, state, and commons function as ideal-
type institutions as well as the reality of the organizational mix. Even though the American 
health care system is often typified as market-based, relying primarily on private initiative 
(e.g., Aetna, Tenet Healthcare Cooperation), over half of each health care dollar in the 
United States is spent by what are usually regarded to be state organizations (e.g., 
Medicare, Medicaid). Thus, both market and states as ideal types are represented in the 
health care system. Moreover, changing the scale from the health care system as a whole 
down to individual health care organizations,50 the ideal types are simultaneously present 
in virtually all health care organizations. To give a concrete example, the Centers for 
                                                          
47 Moreover, while organizations share characteristics with the institutional ideal type, 
they can display these features to a varying degree. For example, while managed 
competition (i.e., competition mediated by top-down rules) is a characteristic of both the 
New York Stock Exchange and the Health Insurance Market Place, competition is freer 
(i.e., less heavily regulated) in case of the former. 
48 As I mention below, the Health Insurance Marketplace is run by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, a state organization, making healthcare.gov a good 
example of a hybrid organization. 
49 The market-state continuum plausibly can be conceptualized both at the abstract, 
institutional level and at the concrete, organizational level (see 0.5.1 Institution and 0.5.2 
Organization). 
50 Changes of scale figure prominently in Ostrom’s work. She talks about changes in the 
“level of analysis” (see 0.5.1 Institutions).  
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Medicare and Medicaid Services, a state organization par excellence, designed and 
oversees the Health Insurance Marketplace provisioned by the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA).51 In short, the dichotomy oversimplifies a complex reality of mixed organizations,52 
but that does not mean the dichotomy is useless. The concept captures certain features 
of institutions and organizations, allowing researches and policymakers alike to discuss 
and address institutional challenges, which is precisely the way Ostrom uses the 
dichotomy.53 However, that brings to the forefront the following issue: what are the 
defining features of the institutions of market and state? After all, they are broad 
concepts and different people could be using them in different ways. To say the 
institutions of market and state exist on a continuum does not resolve the issue, but 
makes it even more poignant, because without defining features it becomes difficult to 
place organizations on the continuum and to discuss their relative performance (see 0.3 
A Third Way: The Commons).54  
                                                          
51 The law’s full name is Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), often shorted 
to the Affordable Care Act, and nicknamed Obamacare. 
52 As Robert Evans notes in the context of health care reform: “State and private 
institutions have always interpenetrated each other, to the extent that in most national 
systems it is often difficult, and inherently arbitrary, to classify a particular institution as 
“public” or ”private.” In reality, there is a continuum along the line from civil service at 
one end, to the privately owned, strictly for-profit corporation at the other. Most health 
care, in most countries, is provided by people and organizations that fall into neither 
category.” (Robert Evans, “Going for the Gold: The Redistributive Agenda behind Market-
Based Health Care Reform,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law 22, no. 2 (April 
1997): 430.) 
53 See also footnote 42. 
54 The market-state continuum can be conceptualized both at the abstract, institutional 




Researchers and policymakers working with the dichotomy often assume an 
understanding of the institutions of market and state. While mostly everyone has some 
intuitive comprehension of the concepts, which testifies to the strength and influence of 
the dichotomy, upon closer scrutiny it is not at all clear what is meant by market and state. 
Ostrom, for example, uses the concepts throughout her work, but nowhere does she 
specify what she means by them beyond the most general characterizations (e.g., 
privatization, centralization). The same is true of commons research as a whole and of the 
other literatures consulted for the purpose of the present project. Of course, such an 
approach may make sense in the context of commons research in general and Ostrom’s 
work in particular, as it fits with the criticism that market and state frequently are used 
as mere slogan words. Even so, this is never made explicit. Moreover, the institutions of 
market and state are referenced regularly in ways that seem to presuppose some content 
beyond them being metaphors. Given the centrality of the dichotomy, I want to provide 
the concepts of market and state with some content. The table on the following page 
highlights some of the characteristics associated with market and state institutions (see 
Table 0.1: Features of market, state, and commons institutions). Much like the dichotomy 
itself, the features listed are informative simplifications, but they nonetheless capture key 
aspects of market and state institutions identified in the NIE literature broadly 
conceived.55 I also include a column listing the analogous features in commons 
institutions, which serves as a first introduction to the commons. While the aim is not to 
                                                          
55 Most of Albert Hirschman’s work, for example, predates the rise of NIE but exerts a 
profound influence on the literature. Unsurprisingly, Hirschman is sometimes identified 
as an institutional economist. 
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provide a full description of either of these institutions, I do want to distill the listed 
characteristics into a few defining features for market, state, and commons institutions 
respectively that capture the key contrasts between them and can serve as a conceptual 
guideline throughout the coming chapters. For this purpose, several characteristics are 
highlighted in boldface, because they inform the discussion of the defining features of 
market and state immediately following the table and of the commons in the next section 
(see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons).    
 
 Table 0.1: Features of market, state, and commons institutions. 
 


















                                                          
56 At times, the human model used by proponents, as well as critics, of the state is 
described as “homo dependens.” However, the homo dependens model seems to apply 
to humans who have been shaped by life in a state organization, and thus have become 
“dependent” on the state, but who in their “state of nature” correspond to the model of 
the rational, self-interested maximizer (homo economicus).  
57 The term “homo reciprocans” is also used. (Herbert Gintis, “Beyond Homo Economicus: 
Evidence from Experimental Economics,” Ecological Economics 35, no. 3 (December 
2000): 313.)  
58 Graham Thompson, Between Hierarchies and Markets. The Logic and Limits of Network 




































LEVEL OF ANALYSIS micro macro meso 
                                                          
59 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 181. 
60 Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, “Community, Market, State – and 
Associations?” European Sociological Review 1, no. 2 (September 1985): 119. 
61 Thompson, Between Hierarchies and Markets, 48. 
62 Thompson lists a second set of guiding principles: “price mechanism, competition, self-
interest, self-regulation” (market), “hierarchically organized/bureaucratic administration 
/monitoring, scrutiny, interventions” (state), and “loyalty, reciprocity, and trust” 
(networks). (Thompson, Between Hierarchies and Markets, 48.) In Thompson’s 
classification, commons institutions fall under networks. 
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Proponents of both market and state institutions depart from the assumption that 
humans are rational, self-interested maximizers.64 A characterization of human beings 
that has become known as “homo economicus.”65 While the origins of the model are 
diverse, the concept is usually attributed to Mill, who described humans as the subject of 
political economy in On the Definition of Political Economy (1836), characterizing them as 
desiring solely to possess wealth and having the ability to decide upon the best means for 
attaining that end.66,67 However, Mill does not use the term homo economicus, or the 
alternative “economic man,” both of which emerge in response to his work.68 Market and 
state can be conceived then as alternative institutional solutions to the same problem: 
the need to regulate relationships between “pesky” egotistical utility maximizers in order 
to pursue or avoid certain (un)desirable outcomes, for example, enabling collective action 
or averting the tragedy of the commons.69 While the market relies on homo economicus’ 
                                                          
64 Of course, markets and states existed long before the rise of the dichotomy. The 
present discussion must be situated within modern reflections on the institutions of 
market and state, which is the context in which the dichotomy arose.  
65 Ostrom also uses the term “rational egoist.” (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional 
Diversity, 101.) 
66 Joseph Persky, “The Ethology of Homo Economicus,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
9, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 223. 
67 Mill qualifies his abstraction of human nature for the purpose of political economy in a 
passage immediately following the characterization of humans as self-interested and 
rational. (Persky, “The Ethology of Homo Economicus,” 223.) 
68 Persky, “The Ethology of Homo Economicus,” 222. 
69 The influence of the model of the homo economicus may be the underlying explanation 
for the enduring force of the dichotomy. 
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egoistic impulses, using incentives and competition to regulate human behavior at the 
micro-level, the state subdues homo economicus, relying on macro-level authority to 
obtain the desired outcome.70 In other words, market institutions rely on dispersed 
competition between actors, while state institutions are sets of rules aimed at exercising 
hierarchical control from the top down.   
Significantly, both institutional models assume that the only way to get humans 
to cooperate is to lure or to force them to do so, for they are not capable to resolve 
collective action problems and commons dilemmas by their own doing. The strength and 
influence of this line of argument is considerable, as is evident in Daniels and Sabin’s 
discussion of the accountability for reasonableness approach (see 4. A4R in Practice). 
While their solution firmly points towards the collaborative governance of health care 
resources, a possibility they explore in the development of their approach, they 
nonetheless click into the logic of the dichotomy, ultimately pointing toward the state to 
institute accountability for reasonableness, since cooperation between stakeholders 
must be forced from the top down (see 4.4.3.4.4 The Regulative Condition). In the next 
section, I show the commons as departing from an alternative human model, giving room 
to the possibility of spontaneous cooperation at the meso-level (see 0.3 A Third Way: The 
Commons).  
                                                          
70 The sentence fits firmly within logic of the market-state bifurcation, for real-world 
organizations are hybrids displaying features of both market and state, but the goal here 
is to formulate a workable definition of market and state institutions in order to provide 
a contrast with commons institutions.  
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The influence of the dichotomy also is apparent in debates about health care 
reform, where the perceived choice between market and state is central to ongoing 
discussions surrounding the ACA in the United States.71 In these discussions, the 
institutions of market and state are often presented as adequate solutions to concrete 
policy issues, which is precisely what Ostrom warns against doing. Opponents of 
Obamacare seek to get rid of the reform, which to them implies excessive government 
interference, in favor of more private initiative, i.e., “more market.” While at least some 
proponents of the ACA find the reform effort is a good start, but believe it does not go far 
enough, instead they propose an expansion of Medicaid (“Medicaid for All”) to provide 
health care to all Americans, i.e., “more state.” Even though the choice between market 
and state is a false dichotomy, discussions about health care reform are all too often spun 
in terms of market versus state, especially in politics and in the media. 
 Such arguments fit within broader discussions between advocates of market and 
state institutions. A common debate is the presumed push toward market organizations, 
both in health care and in other institutional arenas (e.g., higher education,72 public 
                                                          
71 Obamacare’s key policy decisions to increase health care coverage among Americans 
also firmly fit within the dichotomy. The expansion of Medicaid and the creation of a 
health insurance marketplace (under government auspices) represent the institutions of 
state and market respectively. It is worth noting the ACA also explicitly made room for 
health care cooperatives, but none of these initiatives were particularly successful. 
72 In higher education, concepts like the “corporate university” and the “entrepreneurial 
university” have become commonplace, among others, translating in a corporate 
management approach and a focus on the university brand. (Herman De Dijn, Irina 
Veretennicoff, and Dominique Willems, Het Professoraat Anno 2016. Reflectie over een 
beroep in volle verandering (Brussel: Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor 
Wetenchappen en Kunsten, 2016), 4-6.) The push toward the market is also noticeable in 
scholarly publishing, which has gone through an “enclosing of the scholarly commons” 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century. (Nancy Kranich, “Countering Enclosure: 
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transportation). A trend that is typically traced back to the Reagan and Thatcher era. The 
National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom, for example, saw the introduction 
of New Public Management (NPM) in the 1980s, which within the logic of the dichotomy 
implies a move toward the market (e.g., the introduction of internal markets). Rudolf 
Klein argues that this push toward market organizations is undergirded by the belief that 
market institutions function better than state institutions,73 especially in rapidly changing 
environments.74 In response, there has been a surge in criticisms of the market, with some 
arguing for a return to the state. To reference an earlier example, calls to expand 
Medicaid to cover all Americans must be situated in this movement.75 If the discussion of 
the dichotomy has taught us one thing, however, it is that arguments like these all too 
often result in ideological battles between proponents of institutional ideal types that do 
                                                          
Reclaiming the Knowledge Commons,” in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From 
Theory to Practice, eds. Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
2011), 86-93.) 
73 Rudolf Klein, “Self-inventing Institutions: Institutional Design and the U.K. Welfare 
State,” in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 246. 
74 The argument goes that markets are better at processing information and hence better 
able to cope with change.  
75 To give another example, calls to renationalize railway service in Great Britain fit with 
the revaluation of the state ideal, this in response to failures perceived to be the result of 
the privatization of much of the British railway service after the passing of the Railways 
Act (1993). Without wanting to delve too deep into the details of railway service in Britain, 
it is worth noting the following: (1) The privatization is in fact a reprivatization, as service 
was nationalized with the creation of British Railways after WW II. Thus, the history of 
railway service in Britain nicely illustrates the swing of the institutional pendulum from 
market to state and back. (2) According to some, the British railways’ current woes are 
the result of an incomplete privatization, i.e., too little market. (3) The privatization of 
British railway service is incomplete, as the state continues to play an important role in 
organizing railway services (e.g., Strategic Rail Authority), illustrating once again that all 
real-world organizations are hybrids.  
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not readily correspond or translate to a reality of mixed institutions. The ongoing polemic 
between advocates of market and state institutions does illustrate the profound and 
enduring influence of the dichotomy, which in turn highlights the need to move beyond 
the market-state bifurcation, beyond talking about markets and states as seemingly 
mutually exclusive and fully described institutional solutions to complex health care 
issues. The aim of both Ostrom’s work and the current project is to take such an approach 
that steps outside of the bounds of the dichotomy.  
 So what to make then of the dichotomy? To summarize, the market-state 
dichotomy is an oversimplification, but useful nonetheless. As ideal types, the institutions 
of market and state continue to play a prominent role in policy debates. Moreover, the 
dichotomy does capture a feature of modern society, i.e., the de facto dominance of 
market and state, which explains why they are sometimes called the “status quo 
institutions.” In addition, the concepts of market and state do have some content, even 
if they often remain underdetermined, and thus malleable in function of policy debates. 
In short, the dichotomy has merits making it a valuable notion. However, in light of the 
current project the dichotomy plays an altogether more modest double role: First, the 
dichotomy serves as a warning against proposing overly simple solutions to complex 
policy issues. Heedless policy recommendations based on insubstantial metaphors are to 
be avoided, what matters are the organizational details and they do not neatly fit the 
dichotomy. Second, the idealized institutions of market and state serve as signposts that 
provide a language to compare and contrast organizations, this in the knowledge real-
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world organizations are situated somewhere along the market-state continuum.76 Adding 
commons institutions to the mix, I visualize the institutions as an imaginary triangular 
plane with the three ideal types (i.e., market, state, and commons) as the limits (see 
Figure 0.1: The institutional plane).77 In reality, organizations are hybrids that must be 
situated somewhere on the plane between the ideal types.78 Given the influence of the 
dichotomy, most hybrids must plausibly be situated closer to the market-state axis, but 
many institutions will possess some features of commons institutions.79 The terms 
market, state, and commons make it possible to talk about real-world organizations and 
their features while acknowledging these organizations are never either/or, but always a 
mix.  
 
                                                          
76 To complicate matters further, when considered individually the concepts of market 
and state are not uniform and neatly defined either. For example, there are several 
different categorizations of the (welfare) state, the most influential of which identifies 
three regimes: “liberal,” “conservative” or “state-corporatist,” and “social democratic” 
(Gøsta Esping-Andersen). While a tradeoff between market and state explains part of the 
distinction between the three regimes, the categories are altogether more intricate and 
suggest the concept of state also exists on a continuum. (Nick Spencer, The Evolution of 
the West. How Christianity Has Shaped Our Values. (London: SPCK Publishing, 2016), 170-
173.) 
77 Much like mathematical limits, organizations may approach the ideal, but the 
institutional ideal is never fully realized, even in the most archetypical examples (e.g., 
stock market, Soviet Union). As ideal types, the institutions of market and state also have 
a normative value.  
78 Of course, it is possible to conceive of hybrids at the institutional level as well, i.e., ideal 
types that combine feature of the institutions of market, state, and commons. To give an 
example, polycentric governance systems can be construed as hybrid institutions 
combining features of the ideal types of state and commons (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The 
Best of Many Worlds?). 
79 In contrast, the institutions that are the subject of Ostrom’s research find themselves 
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Figure 0.1: The institutional plane. 
 
0.3 A THIRD WAY: THE COMMONS 
Ostrom’s work breaks open the dichotomy by discussing commons institutions as a viable 
institutional alternative to the status quo institutions, i.e., an institutional third way. Even 
though Ostrom herself at times presents the commons as an alternative governance 
solution,80 especially in her early work, characterizing commons institutions as an 
alternative governance model or an institutional third way risks turning the dichotomy in 
a trichotomy. Therefore, it is better to think of the commons as a complementary 
governance model that can be integrated with existing institutions, both in theory and in 
practice. Ostrom argues for such an integration in her later work, when she discusses the 
need to develop polycentric governance regimes (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many 
                                                          
80 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 2, 15. 
INSTITUTIONS 
(regardless of  scale) 
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Worlds?).81 This intellectual evolution fits with Ostrom’s repeated warnings against 
thinking in terms of simple models when trying to solve policy issues; whether the model 
is market, state, or commons. 
 While market and state institutions depart from the assumption that humans are 
rational and self-interested maximizers, Ostrom argues this is only half the story. She does 
not offhand dismiss the homo economicus model, acknowledging that oftentimes humans 
are primarily interested in pursuing their own profit or welfare.82 Ostrom shows through 
experiments and field studies that humans also behave as “conditional cooperators,” 
meaning they are willing to collaborate with others “so long as other participants also 
cooperate.”83,84 The model of human beings as conditional cooperators is also called 
“homo sociologicus” or “homo reciprocans.” As such, the commons departs from a human 
                                                          
81 Polycentric governance regimes combine features of state and commons, but they can 
conceivably include features of market institutions. 
82 Ostrom is more critical of the characterization of humans as rational maximizers. While 
she acknowledges humans may pursue the most possible benefit, they commonly 
satisfice rather than maximize when pursuing their self-interest. At least one reason for 
doing so is that oftentimes the optimal (i.e., maximal) solution is either not knowable or 
not known to self-interested actors, the former due to the complexity of pursuing optimal 
outcomes in real-world scenarios and the latter due to the limitations of human 
rationality. Ostrom argues the correct model for human rationality is that of “bounded 
rationality” (Hebert Simon) rather than perfect rationality. The work of Kahneman on 
human decision-making, among others, the role of heuristics and biases, can be situated 
in the same context (see footnote 9). (Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, 
Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 
34-35, 215-218.) 
83 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 54. 
84 A more detailed characterization is the following, “Conditional cooperators are 
individuals who are willing to initiate cooperative action when they estimate others will 
reciprocate and to repeat these actions as long as a sufficient proportion of the others 
involved reciprocate.” (Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social 
Norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 142.)  
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model that allows for spontaneous or emergent cooperation between actors, rather than 
“coerced cooperation” between rational egoists, whether through the use of incentives 
(market) or through the exercise of authority (state). While market and state institutions 
must be situated at the micro- and macro-level respectively, I situate commons 
institutions at the meso-level, where they open up a space for conditional cooperators to 
collaborate with one another, among others, on resource allocation issues like the 
governance of scarce health care resources. This is precisely the way in which the 
commons presents a distinct alternative, or third way, vis-à-vis the status quo institutions. 
However, much like concrete market and state organizations are hybrids, adopting 
elements from the ideal types of both market and state, commons organizations are 
hybrids as well, as they incorporate features of market and state.85 In other words, the 
meso-level at which emergent cooperation can take place does not operate in isolation, 
but depends on and incorporates the micro- and macro-level (i.e., market and state 
features respectively). Formulating the ideal types and their loci in this manner allows for 
another visualization of the ideal types as existing on a continuum (see Figure 0.2: The 
market-commons-state continuum). While state and market institutions depart form the 
assumption that homo economicus must somehow be “forced” to cooperate, the 
                                                          
85 Staunch advocates of the commons paradigm may argue that there is such a thing as a 
“pure” commons organization, i.e., one that does not incorporate features of market and 
state. I believe, however, that is a difficult position to maintain. Commons organization 
seem to incorporate certain state-like features by design (e.g., use of monitors, layered 
system of rules) and, depending on how one defines the market ideal type, they also 
appear to adopt certain market features (e.g., use of incentives). 
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commons opens up a crucial space in between for emergent collaboration among 
conditional cooperators. 
 
MACRO-LEVEL STATE AUTHORITY 
   
MESO-LEVEL COMMONS COOPERATION 
   
MICRO-LEVEL MARKET COMPETITION 
 
Figure 0.2: The market-commons-state continuum. 
 
The three institutional ideal types have distinct features, but can interact with one 
another in complex ways within concrete organizations. Within this constellation, the 
adoption of the commons ideal allows organizations to build in explicitly the opportunity 
for emergent cooperation. Thus, commons institutions are also called “self-governance 
regimes” or “self-governed systems,” because they emerge at the middle-level as a result 
of bottom-up cooperation by the organizations’ members, who play a key role in their 
management.86 As such, the commons model empowers private individuals to solve their 
own collective action problems, particularly the governance of scarce resources, by self-
                                                          
86 This goes back to questions about the origins of social order: does there need to be an 
“orderer” or can social order also arise spontaneously? (Jacob Levy, Rationalism, 
Pluralism, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University 2015), 36-37.) Commons research 
shows order can indeed arise without a Leviathan.  
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organizing into commons organizations.87 A more detailed discussion of commons 
institutions is to follow (see 2.3 Commons Institutions).  
For now, it is important to note the commons are a resource management system 
rather than an ownership system,88 as the latter is akin to communism, i.e., the public or 
common ownership of all property.89 As such, the commons model can be adopted by 
market and state organizations. Adding commons to the institutional mix provides 
policymakers with a broader range of institutional solutions to tackle resource 
governance issues. Using Ostrom’s criteria for the evaluation of institutional 
performance,90 the aim is to design organizations that allow for the most equitable, 
                                                          
87 For example, Ostrom citing Sugden: “Most modern economic theory describes a world 
presided over by a government (not, significantly, by governments), and sees this world 
through the government’s eyes. The government is supposed to have the responsibility, 
the will and the power to restructure society in whatever way maximizes social welfare; 
like the US Cavalry in a good Western, the government stands ready to rush to the rescue 
whenever the market ‘fails’, and the economist’s job is to advise it on when and how to 
do so. Private individuals, in contrast, are credited with little or no ability to solve 
collective problems among themselves. This makes for a distorted view of some 
important economic and political issues.” (Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 417.) 
88 Most commons research focuses on the management of natural resources that are not 
owned by anyone or nominally owned by the state, or a private actor, but the ownership 
rights are not exercised and/or the resource is not actively managed by the owner (e.g., 
a forest that is owned by the state but used by a local community who have set up a 
governance regime to manage the resource). 
89 Cooperatives, in which users share ownership of the organization and its resources, are 
a particular type of commons where management and ownership overlap. 
90 Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge 
Commons,” in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice, ed. 
Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 61-68. 
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efficient, sustainable,91 and effective92 management of resources.93 A few remarks are in 
place: First, the criteria are external to the meso-level analysis, meaning they are 
applicable to all real-world organizations, regardless which of the ideal types they most 
closely resemble. Second, Ostrom also uses “robustness” as a criterion,94 which at times 
seems to be used as an overarching concept to evaluate institutional performance,95 but 
in other places appears to be used as a synonym for sustainability. Third, sustainability 
and robustness are central notions in commons research, probably because of the field’s 
historical emphasis on the governance of natural resources. The concepts can refer to the 
sustainability of the resources themselves as well as to the robustness of the organization 
managing the resources.96 The former is close to the everyday usage of the term 
sustainable, referring to the long-term availability and viability of the resources (e.g., fish, 
water, money). The latter refers to the ability of organizations to adapt over time in 
response to changing circumstances (e.g., environmental changes, new technology, 
                                                          
91 Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul Stern, “The Drama of the 
Commons,” in The Drama of the Commons. Committee on the Human Dimensions of 
Global Change, ed. Elinor Ostrom et al. (Washington: National Academy Press, 2002), 25-
26. 
92 Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 436. 
93 Ostrom often highlights equity, efficiency, and sustainability as key evaluative criteria 
for assessing institutional performance. (See, among others, Dietz, Dolšak, Ostrom, Stern, 
“The Drama of the Commons,” 25-26.) She mentions effectiveness as an evaluative 
criterion in her Nobel Prize Lecture. (Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 436.) 
94 Elinor Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What Have We 
Learned?” in Property Rights and Land Policies, ed. Gregory Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong 
(Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2009), 31. 
95 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 258. 
96 The terms are not quite used as synonyms in the literature. Both sustainability and 
robustness are utilized in reference to institutions, while in reference to resources 
preference is given to the term sustainable.   
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ageing populations).97 Robust organizations are a precondition to ensure the 
sustainability of scarce resources over time.98 Fourth, with the exception of sustainability 
and robustness, Ostrom does not develop or explain the evaluative criteria in much detail. 
Which begs the question, what does it mean for an organization to be just, efficient, and 
effective? Ostrom may not develop the criteria in more detail because within the scope 
of commons research it plausibly is up to the members of a commons institution to fill in 
the evaluative criteria. Alternatively, she may simply find a comprehensive discussion of 
the criteria outside of the scope of her research. Of course, Ostrom’s silence on the topic 
does not imply there are no general standards for these criteria, i.e., external to a 
concrete commons organization, particularly in the case of justice. Philosophers can 
develop and elucidate the criterion of equitableness (see 4.4.2.1 A Theory of Justice for 
the Commons), while concepts from NIE can help philosophers reflect on justice (see 4. 
A4R in Practice), making the topic of justice one of the most promising interfaces between 
philosophy and NIE. Finally, striving for the most equitable, efficient, sustainable,99 and 
effective100 institutional solution is easier said than done. While the criteria can 
conceivably be maximized in experimental settings, given that one can agree on a 
definition of each criterion, in real-world scenarios it is impossible to determine whether 
                                                          
97 A good example of the ability of organizations to adapt to changing circumstances is 
the (in)ability to reform health care systems in response to changes like the introduction 
of expensive new health care technologies.  
98 Robust organizations are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the sustainability 
of scarce resources, as certain changes can conceivably destroy the available resources 
regardless how robust the institution managing them (e.g., natural disaster, war).  
99 Dietz, Dolšak, Ostrom, Stern, “The Drama of the Commons,” 25-26. 
100 Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 436. 
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institutions perform optimally. Moreover, tradeoffs plausibly exist between the different 
criteria (e.g., the most efficient organization is not the most just,101 increasing equitability 
lowers efficiency). Therefore, in practice institutional design is a matter of satisficing 
rather than maximizing, i.e., finding a satisfactory solution rather than the optimal 
solution. Of course, this does not preclude institutional designers from experimenting in 
order to find better institutional solutions. On the contrary, Ostrom encourages ongoing 
institutional experiments (see 4.3 Institutional Experiments).  
Again, the goal is to move past the trichotomy and toward organizational hybrids 
that combine features of market, state, and commons institutions (see 4.5 Polycentricity: 
The Best of Many Worlds?). The reasoning is such organizations will perform better with 
regards to the criteria to evaluate institutional performance. While I will not show directly 
that adding commons to the institutional mix indeed results in better performing 
institutions, the arguments developed over the course of the coming chapters can be 
connected to the criteria for the evaluation of institutional performance. To give an 
example, organizations that are able to avoid a tragedy of the health care commons (see 
                                                          
101 For example, depending on how efficiency and justice are defined, the “principle of 
efficiency” (welfare economics) and the “difference principle” (Rawls) are at odds with 
one another. The principle of efficiency states an efficient arrangement is one where 
nobody’s welfare can be improved without reducing someone else’s welfare (Pareto 
optimal), while the difference principle requires socioeconomic inequalities must be 
arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. (Norman 
Daniels, Just Health (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 54.) Despite its name, 
the principle of efficiency can also be conceived as a principle of justice.  
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1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons) ensure the sustainability of the available 
resources.102  
0.4 THE DOUBLE AIM OF THE PROJECT 
The reach of the current project is ambitious, attempting to bridge several burgeoning 
fields of inquiry and developed bodies of literature. In order to provide focus to the work’s 
arguments, I formulate two aims or theses. After each thesis statement, I briefly discuss 
the aim, and relate it to the contributions in the following chapters. Where the first thesis 
emphasizes the relevance of NIE/commons research to biomedical ethics, the second 
thesis centers on the value of bioethics to commons research.   
 
Thesis 1: I argue that NIE in general and commons research in particular are 
valuable to bioethics for at least two reasons: (1) NIE and commons research 
provide a language and concepts to talk and think about health care institutions. 
(2) Commons research can further key debates in biomedical ethics by showing 
he potential of emergent cooperation among resource users as a way to manage 
scarce health care resources.  
 
The first thesis breaks down into two major contributions. (1) NIE and commons 
research provide a theoretical language to think and talk about health care institutions in 
                                                          
102 Similarly, the ability of the commons to generate parallel institutional experiments (see 
3. The Polycentric Experiment) and to promote institutional change plausibly lead to more 
efficient, effective, and robust institutions. To give another example, Daniels’s account of 




bioethics.103 The language of NIE provides a high-level, abstract conceptual framework to 
think about health care at all levels of organization, e.g., interpersonal interactions, small 
group practices, hospitals, concrete health care systems, and abstract health care 
institutions. Currently, biomedical ethics and philosophy of health care lack such a 
language. Organizational ethics usually considers concrete examples of organizations, for 
example, a hospital, insurer, and so on.104,105 Bioethics can benefit from the abstract 
account of institutions NIE provides. NIE supplies a language to discuss and conceptualize 
health care organizations in more general and precise terms.106 I present some of the 
basic concepts of NIE in the introduction (see 0.5 A Glossary of Commons Terms). Later, I 
provide a detailed, critical discussion of Ostrom’s main conceptual tools in the context of 
health care, i.e., the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the 
design principles of successful commons (see 2. Ostrom’s Black Bag). My analysis of 
Ostrom’s conceptual tools is an important contribution this dissertation makes to both 
commons research and bioethics. My discussion of the design principles is the most 
                                                          
103 In the context of knowledge commons, David Bollier talks about “the commons as a 
new language.” (David Bollier, “The Growth of the Commons Paradigm,” in Understanding 
Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice, ed. Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2011), 31-34.) 
104 See, for example: Rosamond Rhodes and James J. Strain, “Trust and Transforming 
Medical Institutions,” Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 9, no. 2 (April 2000): 205.  
105 To give another example, “The design of organizations is examined by taking the 
example of how professional associations might be structured. The structure of systems 
is examined by looking at how an office of organizational integrity works in a corporation. 
The structure of the medical institution in general receives the greatest focus and is 
examined by looking at the webs of interaction among healthcare entities.” (Linda 
Emanuel, “Ethics and the Structures of Healthcare,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics 9, no. 2 (April 2000): 151.) 
106 NIE and the language of rules can be seen as a socioeconomic metaphysics, as they 
describe much of our social reality.  
36 
 
comprehensive available in the literature. By applying Ostrom’s principles to health care, 
I develop a series of concrete suggestions for the design of successful cooperative health 
care institutions. The concepts of parallel experimentation and polycentricity to health 
care. My criticism and refinement of these concepts goes beyond what is currently 
available and it makes a contribution to the commons literature. Moreover, I develop and 
criticize these concepts beyond what is currently available in the commons literature (see 
3. The Polycentric Experiment).  
(2) In addition to the value of the language and apparatus of NIE for theorizing 
health care institutions, commons research has the potential to further longstanding 
debates in biomedical ethics, particularly when it comes to the challenges surrounding 
the governance of scarce health care resources. The idea that health care may be at risk 
of suffering a tragedy of the commons has been around since the publication of Garrett 
Hardin’s The Tragedy of the Commons (1968), but most discussions have been limited to 
straightforward arguments from analogy. A systematic discussion of the possibility of a 
tragedy of the health care commons, providing arguments in favor of such a tragedy and 
considering objections against it, has been notably absent from the literature until now 
(see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons). I fill that gap. I then apply Ostrom’s 
work to Daniels’ theory of justice for health care and the accompanying accountability for 
reasonableness (A4R) approach, which is arguably the single most influential account for 
the just allocation of health care resources in the bioethics literature (see 4. A4R in 
Practice). Relying on NIE, I explore and develop the institutionalist ideas that are the 
implicit starting point of Daniels’ project. Furthermore, I show that the four conditions of 
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the A4R approach can be interpreted as institutional design principles. My overarching 
argument is that Daniels recognizes the need to cooperate when governing health care 
resources, but does not fully appreciate the role the institutional meso-level can play in 
realizing his approach, instead reverting to the state (macro-level) for implementation. I 
argue that the commons provides Daniels with an institutional arrangement that is 
particularly suitable to put his approach to resource allocation into practice.  
 
Thesis 2: I provide a philosophical and normative analysis that advances NIE and 
commons research. I do this by: (1) Providing a philosophical analysis of crucial 
terms integral to commons research. (2) Commons researchers have a 
normative perspective they do not explicitly theorize and justify. They also have 
“equity” as an explicit criterion for evaluating commons solutions, yet fail to 
clarify this criterion. I draw on the bioethics literature on justice to fill this gap.        
 
The second thesis can be broken down in the following contributions: (1) As a 
relatively young field of inquiry, commons research stands to benefit from philosophical 
reflection on its key concepts and arguments. In the introduction, I conceptually analyze 
some of commons research’s key terms; particularly when looking at the concepts of 
institution, organization, and resources (see 0.5 A Glossary of Commons Terms). The 
detailed discussion of the design principles of successful commons institutions critically 
assesses the principles and the relationships between them. Such an analytical treatment 
of the design principles has been notably absent from the commons literature (see 2.6 
38 
 
The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions). In the third chapter, I rely on 
Jacob Levy’s work on the pluralist tradition in liberalism to illustrate the importance of 
meso-level institutions in safeguarding the diversity needed for health care systems that 
are fully responsive to local needs and values (see 3.4 Pluralism and Freedom in Health 
Care). Levy’s arguments can provide the basis for a normative argument in favor of health 
care commons in particular and commons in general. I evaluate Ostrom’s proposal to 
develop polycentric governance regimes (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many 
Worlds?).  
(2) Commons researchers make normative claims and have a normative 
perspective they do not explicitly thematize, and critically evaluate or defend. Bioethics 
can aide in the development of undertheorized areas of commons research. In particular, 
biomedical ethics can supply the commons with an account of justice.  While Ostrom lists 
equity as one of the key criteria for the evaluation of institutional performance, she does 
not develop the criterion of justice in her work. Given that questions of fairness are linked 
to the success of commons institutions, Ostrom must provide more in terms of a 
clarification or specification of the criterion of justice than she currently does. Daniels’ 
theory of justice for health care, based on the seminal work of John Rawls, can provide 
Ostrom with an account of justice that is a good fit for her project, thus remedying a key 
weakness of commons research (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for the Commons?). 
Moreover, the conditions of the A4R approach can be interpreted as four additional 
institutional design principles for the development of just (commons) institutions (see 
4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles). 
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 While I present Thesis 1 and Thesis 2 as separate, they are complementary. The 
underlying idea, and overarching aim, is to show that commons research and biomedical 
ethics can both benefit from an intellectual cross-fertilization. As such, the project is 
pervaded by an additional general aim: I want to extend an invitation to apply the 
language of NIE to health care in order to “learn to see the commons” in health care.107 
Ostrom did not invent the commons, but identified and described organizations that in 
some cases have existed for hundreds of years.108 Similarly, commons organizations must 
be present throughout health care. I simply take Ostrom’s tools into a new realm with the 
aim of identifying and describing these existing health care commons. To give an example, 
Atul Gawande discusses how physicians in Grand Junction, Colorado, “agreed among 
themselves to a system that paid them a similar fee whether they saw Medicare, 
Medicaid, or private-insurance patients, so that there would be little incentive to cherry-
pick patients.”109 They also agreed, together with the town’s main health plan, an HMO, 
to meet regularly to discuss their patients’ charts together in small peer-review 
committees.110 The result of this commitment to jointly manage the community’s health 
                                                          
107 Sandy Smith-Nonini, “Conceiving The Health Commons. Operationalizing a ‘Right’ to 
Health,” in The Global Idea of ‘the Commons’, ed. Donald Nonini (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2007), 115. 
108 Indeed, Ostrom is not the first to recognize these distributed governance systems. To 
give an example, the anthropologist Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard discusses the dispersed 
political system of the Nuer in his famous study of the Nuer people, who lack central 
organs of government. (Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes 
of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940).) 
109 Atul Gawande, “The Cost Conundrum. What a Texas town can teach us about health 
care,” The New Yorker, May 25, 2009. 
110 The doctors and the HMO also set up regional information network to share office 




care resources were fewer problems, higher quality, and lower costs.111 Even though 
these initiatives at a minimum have certain features of the commons, Gawande does not 
recognize them as such,112 making the case of Grand Junction a good example of the role 
NIE can play in identifying and describing commons in health care.113 Right now, many 
commons initiatives likely go unrecognized for what they are, or are overlooked 
altogether.114 As Sandy Smith-Nonini notes, this may simply be “a fluke of 
nomenclature,”115 which can be resolved by introducing the language of NIE to talk and 
think about commons in health care. But this “fluke of nomenclature” has significant 
implications. The language of the commons enables us to escape long-standing impasses 
in how we approach health care institutions. By extending commons language, we can 
discern possibilities of cooperation that can be used to explain why the Grand Junction 
                                                          
111 Gawande, “The Cost Conundrum.” 
112 Gawande may come closest to recognizing the commons in the following statement, 
“Grand Junction’s medical community was not following anyone else’s recipe. […] The 
leading doctors and the hospital system adopted measures to blunt harmful financial 
incentives, and they took collective responsibility for improving the sum total of patient 
care.” (Gawande, “The Cost Conundrum.”) 
113 The following are just a few other examples of commons in health care: (1) Daniels and 
Sabin’s description of the Oregon health insurance experiment. (Daniels and Sabin, 
Setting Limits Fairly, 9-10.) (2) Marc Rodwin’s discussion of local health planning boards 
and employer cooperatives. (Marc Rodwin, “Exit and Voice in American Health Care,” 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 32, no. 4 (1999).) (3) The aforementioned 
Obamacare cooperatives. (Reed Abelson, “Tough Going for Health Co-ops,” The New York 
Times, September 15, 2015, B1.) (4) The We Can Do Better (www.wecandobetter.org) and 
Health Transformation Alliance (www.htahealth.com) initiatives, which may fit better 
with the market ideal type, but nonetheless rely on ideas described in NIE and commons 
research.  
114 The latter is, among others, a worry in case of informal health care commons. Ostrom, 
for example, talks about the danger of self-organized community groups going unnoticed. 
(Elinor Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 2 (June 1999): 496.) 
115 Smith-Nonini, “Conceiving The Health Commons,” 115. 
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system has been so successful, and how others can adopt for their context a similar 
commons solution. I want to show the potential of NIE and commons research in efforts 
to improve the performance of health care institutions. To reiterate Ostrom’s criteria, the 
aim is to design the most equitable, efficient, sustainable, and effective institutions for 
the management of scarce resources. Biomedical ethicists and health care professionals 
are likely more familiar with the so-called “triple aim,” lowering the cost of care while 
improving outcomes at both the individual and the population level.116 Health care 
organizations play a key role in realizing the triple aim.117 While the project focuses on 
the way commons can contribute to the fair and sustainable governance of scarce health 
care resources, commons institutions plausibly can improve quality of care and outcomes 
as well (see 5.3 Future Research). 
0.5. A GLOSSARY OF COMMONS TERMS 
NIE and commons research rely on a jargon that must be introduced in order to make 
sense of what is to follow, as certain everyday terms are used in a technical sense. The 
foremost example, of course, is the notion of institution. Other key terms requiring 
explanation are organization, rules, resource user, and resources. The glossary goes 
beyond a mere overview of the terms as they are discussed in the commons literature by 
critically reflecting on these key concepts. In particular, the discussions of the institution-
organization distinction and of the notion of resources contribute to commons research.  
                                                          
116 Donald Berwick, Thomas Nolan, and John Whittington, “The Triple Aim: Care, Health, 
and Cost,” Health Affairs 27, no. 3 (May- June 2008): 759. 
117 The triple aim plausibly aligns with Ostrom’s criteria (e.g., improving outcomes at the 
population level can be related to efficiency and equitability), but a detailed exploration 




In the margin of institutional research, there have been several philosophical attempts to 
define the notion institution, which can elucidate the concept’s use in commons 
research.118 Goodin notes there is a wide diversity in the way institutions are defined 
across disciplines.119 According to him, this definitional diversity can be explained by the 
tendency of different fields to “[…] opt for a discipline-based, theory-impregnated 
internalist-style definition of the term.”120,121 Instead, Goodin, citing Samuel Huntington, 
proposes what he calls an “externalist” definition of institutions as “[…] stable, valued, 
recurring pattern[s] of behavior.”122 Such an account of institutions explains “what 
institutions are and what they do,”123 but refrains from explaining why they do what they 
do, which would require a much more narrowly circumscribed and discipline-dependent 
definition.124 Leaving behind Goodin’s language of internalist and externalist definitions, 
this first attempt at defining institutions is very general, but such a general definition is 
precisely what is needed to capture the diverse range of social activities that we would 
                                                          
118 This section’s discussion of possible definitions of the notion of institution once again 
highlights the difficulty of maintaining a strict distinction between the concepts of 
institution and organization (see also 0.5.2 Organization and footnote 23). 
119 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 19. 
120 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 21. 
121 Ostrom provides a similar analysis in the opening pages of her book chapter titled 
Doing Institutional Analysis. (Ostrom, E., “Doing Institutional Analysis. Digging Deeper 
than Markets and Hierarchies,” in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, ed. Claude 
Ménard and Mary M. Shirley (Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 2008), 819-822.) 
122 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 21. 
123 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 21. 
124 One might also say that explaining why institutions do what they do would require an 
“institution dependent” and/or “discipline dependent” definition. 
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want to deem to be institutions.125 Seen the diversity that exists in (commons) 
institutions, this is a valuable feature of the definition. Apart from aforementioned 
barebones definition, Goodin also provides a richer definition of institutions, stating they 
are “[…] organized patterns of socially constructed norms and roles, and socially 
prescribed behaviors expected of occupants of those roles, which are created and re-
created over time.”126 He adds that institutions provide constraints that are advantageous 
to individuals and groups in pursuit of particular projects.127 John Searle settles on a 
similar definition of institutions: “What is an institution? An institution is any collectively 
accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enables us to create institutional 
facts.”128 Anthropologist Mary Douglas, reiterating David Lewis’ definition of convention, 
who in turn relies on the work of David Hume,129 provides the following definition of 
institution: 
 
Minimally, an institution is only a convention. […] [A] convention arises when all 
parties have a common interest in there being a rule to insure coordination, none 
has a conflicting interest, and none will deviate lest the desired coordination is 
lost.130 
 
Douglas’ definition retains the stable, valued, and recurring patterns of behavior from 
Goodin’s initial definition, albeit implicitly, and she adds the need for “a rule to insure 
                                                          
125 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 21-22. 
126 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 19. 
127 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 20. 
128 Searle, “What is an Institution?” 21. 
129 David Lewis, Convention. A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1969), 3-4. 
130 Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 46. 
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coordination” of behavior toward a common interest, goal, or outcome. The inclusion of 
the term “rule” in the definitions of Searle and Douglas is important, as it is central to 
Ostrom’s definition, or rather her definitions, of institutions. 
 Moving the discussion to Ostrom, one might expect she provides a more detailed, 
discipline-specific definition of institutions. After all, she is one of the most prominent 
representatives of the school of NIE. However, Ostrom’s emphasis on the complexity of 
resource governance issues, and the diversity of institutions to solve those problems, 
already hints at her attitude toward defining institutions. Therefore, before looking at 
some of Ostrom’s definitions, consider the following: First, more often than not Ostrom 
does not define the term institution in her writings. Of course, it could be the case the 
reader is simply expected to be familiar with Ostrom’s work and her definition of 
institutions, but that seems unlikely. In her Nobel Prize acceptance lecture, for example, 
which is intended for a broad audience that is unfamiliar with her work, Ostrom does not 
bother defining institutions.131 The more probable answer is that Ostrom believes it is 
neither possible nor useful to define the concept precisely,132 which is supported by the 
fact she is not committed to a single definition. Commons institutions are not one 
narrowly described institutional solution, but rather a theoretically infinite number of 
different institutional arrangements that can vary significantly from one another. 
                                                          
131 Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States.” 
132 Ostrom is not alone in her (refusal to) struggle to define institutions. As Turner notes, 
there “surprisingly” is no consensus on what an institution is in the social sciences. 
(Jonathan Turner, “The Formation of Social Capital,” in Social Capital. A Multifaceted 




Moreover, the status quo institutions (state, market, and state-market hybrids) are not 
the monolithic institutional arrangements they are sometimes made out to be either, but 
can vary considerably from case to case. Any attempt to capture such diversity with a 
single definition is going to be unsuccessful. Second, and a direct consequence of the 
previous point, the only type of definitions that can fully capture this institutional diversity 
are general definitions. Thus, Ostrom would not only approve of the Goodin’s, Searle’s, 
and Douglas’s definitions, but she appears to favor such general definitions of institutions 
herself. I now look at some of the ways in which Ostrom defines institutions. In Governing 
the Commons (1990), Ostrom provides the following, rather detailed definition of 
institutions: 
 
“Institutions” can be defined as the sets of working rules that are used to 
determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are 
allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures 
must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and what 
payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions.133  
 
This early definition is unusual in that it almost provides discipline-specific account of 
institutions, particular to Ostrom’s work and impregnated with theory.134 She later moves 
away from trying to define institutions in this manner and instead opts for much more 
general definitions. The only element she retains from this definition, and that is included 
in all later definitions, is that institutions are “sets of rules.” Here are some of Ostrom’s 
later and much more general definitions of institutions: 
                                                          
133 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 51. 
134 As far as I know, Ostrom does not attempt such an encompassing, internalist definition 
later in her career.  
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Institutions are the rules that people develop to specify the “do’s and don’ts” 
related to a particular situation.135 (2002) 
 
Broadly defined, institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to organize all 
forms of repetitive and structured interactions including those within families, 
neighborhoods, markts, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and 
governments at all scales.136 (2005) 
 
[…] I use the term “institution” […] to refer to the rules, norms, and strategies used 
by humans in repetitive situations.137 (2005) 
 
[I]nstitutions refers to the rules that humans use when interacting within a wide 
variety of repetitive and structured situations at multiple levels of analysis.138 
(2012) 
 
We define institutions as formal and informal rules that are understood and used 
by a community.139,140 (2007) 
 
To this last definition, Ostrom and Charlotte Hess add the rules are put in place to achieve 
a desired outcome, for example ensuring the sustainability of common resources.141 The 
concept of “rule,” central to all of these definitions, will be explained in more detail 
shortly (see 0.5.3 Rules).  
 
 
                                                          
135 Dietz, Dolšak, Ostrom, Stern, “The Drama of the Commons,” 21. 
136 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 3. 
137 Ostrom, “Doing Institutional Analysis,” 824. 
138 Elinor Ostrom, “Why do we need to protect institutional diversity?” European Political 
Science 11 (2012): 130. 
139 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 42. 
140 In the glossary of Understanding Knowledge as a Commons (2011) institutions are 
defined differently, and even more generally, as: “Rules affecting two or more persons 
that specify who decides what in relation to whom.” (Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom, 
Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2011), 350. 




Institution and organization are not treated as synonyms in commons research.142 On the 
contrary, Ostrom repeatedly emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between 
institution and organization. This begs two questions: What are organizations? And how 
do both concepts relate to each other? Much confusion exists around the relationship 
between institutions and organizations.143 I conceptualize the matter as one of social 
ontology, and while a wholly satisfactory resolution of the issue is beyond the scope of 
this project, some clarification is nonetheless in place. While I consistently try to use 
institution and organization as discrete concepts, I believe maintaining a strict distinction 
between the two is difficult. The concepts likely exist on a continuum.144 
 Ostrom repeatedly points out the importance of distinguishing between 
institutions and organizations, referencing North in support of maintaining a strict 
                                                          
142 While most commons researchers, indebted and loyal to Ostrom, agree the terms are 
not synonymous, there is no such consensus within NIE at large.  
143 An example is the following quote from Linda Emanuel, “Key terms needed for this 
paper are still used, even in highly articulate settings, in an uneven fashion, with 
conflicting and overlapping uses remaining common. In this paper, they are used as 
follows. The term organizations refers to groups that can be considered as explicitly 
organized collections of people who are cooperating toward a common set of ordered 
purposes; many organizations are also legally incorporated. […] this paper also refers to 
institutions, denoting a collection of organizations embedded in a set of nonformal yet 
traditionalized expectations in society. The term institution will not be used to mean 
organization, the alternative use that is also well established.” (Emanuel, “Ethics and the 
Structures of Healthcare,” 152.) Emanuel clears up none of the confusion surrounding the 
terms, however, as for the remainder of her paper she continues to capture both 
organizations and institutions (plus “systems”) under the term “structures,” pretty much 
equating all three for the sake of argument.  
144 Geoffrey Hodgson argues against maintaining a strict distinction in What Are 
Institutions? (2006). (Geoffrey Hodgson, “What Are Institutions?” Journal of Economic 
Issues 40, no. 1 (March 2006).) 
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distinction.145,146 In Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (1990), 
North argues institutions are “the rules of the game,” while organizations are “the players 
of the game” (see Figure 0.3: Institutions and organizations – North’s view).147 The 
players, i.e., organizations, have to abide by the rules,148 i.e., institutions, but they can 
also enact institutional change, i.e., the players can change the rules of the game, at least 
in some cases.149 Thus, North claims, the analogy captures the bidirectional interaction 
between institutions and organizations.150 North has a broad conception of what 
constitutes the rules of the game. Like Ostrom (see 0.5.3 Rules), he distinguishes between 
formal constraints (e.g., political rules, judicial rules, economic rules, contracts) and 
informal constraints (e.g., customs, taboos, standards of conduct).151 
How does North’s influential characterization of institutions, organizations, and 
the relationship between them sit with the earlier suggestion that the institutions of 
market, state, and commons are ideal types? North’s work stands outside the market-
state dichotomy.152 He scarcely even mentions market and state as abstract concepts in  
                                                          
145 Ostrom, “Doing Institutional Analysis,” 824-825. 
146 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 179-180. 
147 North, Institutions, 4-5. 
148 In practice, players do not passively submit to the rules, however, as they often behave 
strategically; meaning they ignore, circumvent, or deliberately misinterpret the rules. 
149 An interesting philosophical issue surrounding the distinction between institutions and 
organizations is the question whether rules are constitutive or prescriptive. If a rule is the 
former, then it seems like it cannot be the latter. Vice versa, if a rule is prescriptive, then 
it can seems impossible for it to be constitutive. In the case of commons institutions in 
particular, the question becomes then if rules can be both constitutive and prescriptive?  
150 North, Institutions, 5. 
151 North, Institutions, 36-60. 
152 The dichotomy is notably absent from North’s writing, but commentators have 
contrasted his work with that of Karl Polayni, whose The Great Transformation (1944) was 














Figure 0.3: Institutions and organizations – North’s view. 
 
his writings, instead he discusses the role of concrete market and state institutions and 
organizations on institutional change and economic performance (e.g., his discussion of 
the impact of institutional change in 17th century England on economic performance).153 
That being said, the ideal types of market, state, and commons can fit within the logic of 
North’s analogy by thinking of them as particular constellations of rules that display 
certain features that make the particular idealized set of rules either market, state, or 
commons (see Table 0.1: Features of market, state, and commons institutions). Market, 
                                                          
and Caroline Vincensini, “Beyond the Market-Institutions Dichotomy: The Institutionalism 
of Douglass C. North in Response to Karl Polanyi’s Challenge,” HAL Archives Ouvertes 
(2011). https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs00601544/.) 
153 North, Institutions, 112-117, 138-140. 
INSTITUTIONS = 
“THE RULES OF THE GAME” 
(e.g., political rules, contracts, social norms) 
ORGANIZATIONS = 
“THE PLAYERS OF THE GAME” 




state, and commons as abstract concepts have a similar status then as North’s categories 
for making sense of and grouping the different kinds of rules of the game (e.g., political 
rules, judicial rules, social norms). They are useful concepts to understand and talk about 
the world of institutions, but they are part of a metalanguage rather than corresponding 
to actual rules in the world, which are going to be much more concrete.154 That being 
said, the concepts are not identical either, for a notion like custom is an umbrella term 
for concrete social constraints, while the concept market as an ideal type applies to 
shared features of certain institutions. To illustrate, shaking someone’s hand when 
meeting them falls under the umbrella term custom, while constraints aimed at 
stimulating dispersed competition can be associated with the market ideal. 
 While the preceding argument fits market, state, and commons institutions into 
the logic of the rules-players analogy, it does not explain how the concepts of market, 
state, and commons organization work with North’s influential distinction. What does it 
mean to be, say, a market organization? This is where the differentiation between 
institution and organization becomes fuzzier than North makes it out to be. To maintain 
a strict distinction, the answer would have to be that a market organization is a player 
that plays according to the rules of the market game. While such an interpretation is 
possible, the issue is that the rules are not just external to the organization. North ignores 
the fact that organizations themselves can be, and de facto are, conceptualized as sets of 
rules. Business analysts, for example, formalize organizational processes into formal sets 
                                                          
154 North would probably argue, with Ostrom, that the concepts of market and state are 
much too vague to be of much use. You need to provide them with content first for them 
to make sense, and whatever content you give them will likely be context specific.  
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of rules, usually in the form of flowcharts. These are the rules organizations “play by” 
internally, but they also stipulate how the internal rules interface with the external 
institutions. In addition, organizations operate in accordance with their own sets of 
informal rules, as is illustrated by the work of organizational culture consultants.155 It is 
worth noting that this problem exists regardless of any attempts to think of institutions 
and organizations in terms of market, state, and commons. In the visualization of North’s 
view, I use a dashed line to highlight the fuzziness of the institution-organization 
distinction (see Figure 0.3: Institutions and organizations – North’s view).  
 If we can conceptualize organizations in terms of rules, then it becomes possible 
to think of them as concrete instantiations of institutional ideal types (i.e., market, state, 
and commons). 156 In other words, institutions are abstract sets of rules, that can function 
as ideals (see 0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy), and organizations are concrete 
instances of these institutions. For example, Kaiser Permanente is a market organization, 
taking on some features of markets, but also has certain state and commons 
                                                          
155 There are other reasons to be skeptical of the ability to maintain a strict distinction 
between institutions and organizations. For example, some organizations are so central 
to the rule-making process that they can all but be identified with the rules. Obvious 
examples are certain branches of the government (e.g., United States Supreme Court) 
and supranational organizations (e.g., European Union). In the context of health care, 
some examples may be the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), the American Medical 
Association (AMA), and Anthem. 
156 Hodgson, referencing Searle, produces a similar argument. (Hodgson, “What Are 
Institutions?” 2-3.) John Rawls also distinguishes between institutions as “abstract objects 
[…] expressed by a system of rules” and the concrete “realization in the thought and 
conduct of certain persons at a certain time and place of the actions specified by these 
rules” (see 4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the Special Moral Importance of Health Care). (John Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, [1971] 1999), 48.)  
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characteristics. In this sense, the instantiation relationship is rather theoretical, but 
organizations can also be concrete instances of institutions in a much more 
straightforward manner, as organizations often are required to adopt certain 
“institutional rules”157 (e.g., health insurers have to abide by rules enacted by Obamacare, 
but two insurers may put the requirements into practice differently, albeit functionally 
the same). 
The above arguments hardly settle the debate surrounding the concepts of 
institution, organization, and their relationship.158,159 The point is that maintaining a 
distinction between institutions and organizations, like North and Ostrom suggest, is not 
as straightforward as the rules-player analogy makes it seem. Given the persistent 
ambiguity, I try to reserve the term institution to refer to (1) abstract sets of rules and (2) 
the institutional ideal types (i.e., market, state, and commons).160 I consistently try to use 
the word organization to refer to (1) the players of the game, which can be conceptualized 
in terms of rules themselves, and (2) concrete instantiations of the three institutional 
ideal types (e.g., Kaiser Permanente, Medicaid, Palmetto Health Baptist). At times, 
however, I inevitably use the concepts interchangeably, as I believe a strict distinction 
                                                          
157 A bit of an odd tautology within the language of commons research, hence the 
quotation marks.  
158 Hodgson arguably provides the most thorough analysis of the concepts institution, 
organization, and their relationship in the NIE literature. For a detailed discussion, see: 
Hodgson, “What Are Institutions?” 
159 The issues surrounding the conceptualization of institutions as ideal types and 
organizations as concrete instantiations thereof can be thought of as another incarnation 
of the philosophical problem of universals.  
160 While I focus on the institutions of market, state, and commons; the idea of institutions 
as abstract ideal types can be applied to other concepts, say, the distinction between 
“liberal,” “conservative,” and “social democratic” welfare regimes. 
53 
 
cannot be maintained and is, in some ways, counterproductive. This sets me apart from 
Ostrom and North, who favor the distinction, at least in theory. But other prominent 
institutionalists argue for a similar approach, among others, Geoffrey Hodgson.161 The 
gain of such an approach is that it becomes possible to think of both institutions and 
organizations in terms of rules, making the language and arguments of NIE and commons 
research applicable to both abstract institutions and concrete organizations. To give an 
example, the problem of health care reform occurs at the abstract institutional level, at 
the concrete level of health care systems, but also at the level of concrete organizations, 
like hospitals or group practices. The same is true of issues of justice (see 4. A4R in 
Practice), which can be identified and resolved at different scales or levels of analysis, to 
use the language of commons research.  
0.5.3 RULES 
Rules and rule making are at the heart of NIE and commons research,162 which can be 
conceived as the study of rules. Rules are the building blocks of institutions and 
organizations alike.163 The fundamental importance of rules means Ostrom discusses 
                                                          
161 “Institutions are the kinds of structures that matter most in the social realm: they make 
up the stuff of social life. The increasing acknowledgement of the role of institutions in 
social life involves the recognition that much of human interaction and activity is 
structured in terms of overt or implicit rules. Without doing much violence to the relevant 
literature, we may define institutions as systems of established and prevalent social rules 
that structure social interactions. Language, money, law, systems of weights and 
measures, table manners, and firms (and other organizations) are thus all institutions.” 
(Hodgson, “What Are Institutions?” 2.) 
162 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 57. 
163 As such, rules are analogous to atoms and genes. Ostrom writes, “In some ways, rules 
have an analogous role to that of genes. Genes combine to build a phenotype. Rules 
combine to build the structure of an action situation. The property rights that participants 
hold in diverse settings are a result of the underlying set of rules-in-use (Libecap 1989).” 
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them in considerable detail throughout her oeuvre.164 As a result, a study of rules in 
Ostrom’s work can be a dissertation topic in its own right. I perforce limit myself to a 
cursory treatment of rules, highlighting some of the key features necessary to understand 
the arguments that are to follow.    
 In the context of NIE and commons research, rules are to be understood primarily 
as regulations, 165 meaning something persons are required, prohibited, or permitted to 
do.166,167 Rules can be formal and explicit, but they can also be informal and implicit.168 
The latter can be made formal and explicit,169 but this can be difficult to do, even for the 
persons using these rules on a daily basis,170 while to outsiders informal and implicit rules 
may go unnoticed altogether. I adopt Ostrom’s  term “norm” to refer to informal and 
implicit rules. While that term is a bit unfortunate given its use and meaning in (moral) 
                                                          
(Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 17.) Ostrom relies on analogies to biology 
elsewhere, among others, when thinking about institution in terms of biological 
evolution. 
164 See, among others: Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 16-22, 135-215. 
165 Ostrom references philosopher Max Black’s discussion of rules. Black distinguishes 
between four different usages of the term in everyday language: regulations, instructions, 
precepts, and principles. (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 16.)   
166 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 16, 18.   
167 Ostrom defines rules as “shared understandings by participants about enforced 
prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited, or 
permitted (Ganz 1971; V. Ostrom 1980; Commons 1968). All rules are the result of implicit 
or explicit efforts to achieve order and predictability among humans by creating classes 
of persons (positions) who are then required, permitted, or forbidden to take classes of 
actions in relation to required, permitted, or forbidden outcomes or face the likelihood 
of being monitored and sanctioned in a predictable fashion (V. Ostrom 1991).” (Ostrom, 
Understanding Institutional Diversity, 18.) 
168 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 16, 18.   
169 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 58. 
170 Elinor Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” Journal of Bioeconomics 
16 (2014): 11; Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 143-144; 
Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 430. 
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philosophy, the alternatives do not quite capture the breadth of informal and implicit 
rules. North’s notion of “social norm,” for example, cannot adequately account for 
implicit and informal rules outside of the social realm. Norms include, but are not limited 
to the “generally accepted moral fabric of a community.”171,172 In Understanding 
Institutional Diversity (2005), Ostrom seems to limit the use of the term norm to such 
general moral rules,173 but overall she appears to interpret the concept more 
broadly.174,175 Rules can instill and reinforce norms. Similarly, norms can be turned into 
rules, but also play a key role in ensuring and facilitating compliance with the rules. As 
Derek Wall notes, distinguishing between rules and norms may be difficult in practice.176 
Rules and norms do not necessarily have moral content, as they can be purely technical 
in nature (e.g., in case of W the norm is to use diagnostic tool X, when using resource Y 
the rule is to register it as Z). The boundary between moral and technical rules is not clear-
cut, as behaviors regulated by technical rules and norms often have moral ramifications, 
particularly in the case of the management of scarce health care resources.177 
                                                          
171 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 17. 
172 Another way Ostrom distinguishes between rules and norms is by characterizing the 
former as external and the latter as internal. (Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 430-
431.) 
173 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 17. 
174 Ostrom’s narrow interpretation of norms in Understanding Institutional Diversity 
(2005) appears to result from an effort to track Black’s distinction between four kinds of 
rules (see footnote 165), in which norms are to be associated with precepts. (Ostrom, 
Understanding Institutional Diversity, 17.)   
175 Ostrom has the habit of carefully and precisely defining her terms in theory, but using 
them quite loosely in practice. A good example is the distinction between institutions and 
organizations.  
176 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 57. 
177 The ambiguity surrounding the distinction between moral and technical rules seems 
universal. To give an example, many of the technical rules that apply to automobiles seem 
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 Following the definitions of institution, rules and norms organize all forms of 
structured and repetitive interactions. Rules and norms “operate so as to rule out some 
actions and to rule in others”178 with the goal of achieving “better outcomes.”179 For 
example, if the goal is the sustainable management of scarce resources, then one of the 
tasks of crafting rules is to change the incentives so that free riding behavior is 
discouraged.180 A few things must be noted: (1) The rules that matter in structuring 
interactions to achieve better outcomes are the so-called “rules-in-use,” these are the 
rules individuals effectively use, which may differ from the formal and explicit rules, the 
so-called “rules-in-form.”181 (2) When structuring interactions, context is important. 
Institutional designers may want to rule out a particular behavior in some situations, 
while they aim to rule in the same behavior in others (e.g., rules for queueing in health 
care rule out skipping the line most of the time, but allow it in certain situations, say, in 
the emergency room).182,183 (3) Rules change over time, among others, in response to 
changes in behavior and technology (see 2.6.3 The Challenge of Technological Change). 
(4) Rules need not be imposed from the top down, but can also arise from the bottom up, 
                                                          
without moral content, but have moral implications (e.g., pollution, safety). Alternatively, 
these rules may seem merely technical, but are in fact inspired by moral considerations. 
178 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 18. 
179 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 132. 
180 William Blomquist, “Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater 
Systems in Southern California,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, eds. Elinor 
Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 
294. 
181 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 138. 
182 The example can be construed in terms of allocating a scarce resource, i.e., time. 
183 Ostrom gives the example of ruling out speeds exceeding a certain limit in everyday 




as individuals facing a repetitive situation attempt to craft their own rules in an effort to 
improve the outcomes they achieve.184 This is the focus and essence of Ostrom’s work 
(see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons). (5) Experiments and field studies show that rules 
imposed from the top down by a Leviathan tend to crowd out bottom-up cooperative 
behavior and the rules resulting from such behavior.185 To give an example, health care 
professionals in a given health care setting may have settled on rules that help them 
achieve a balance between outcomes and resource usage, but a new set of rules imposed 
from the top down can void their rules-in-use and undermine future collaborative efforts, 
as there is little use in crafting rules when they can be overruled at any time. Moreover, 
when rules are devised from the bottom-up, users tend to be more familiar with the rules 
and thus more likely to comply with them (see 2.4.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements).186 
(6) Last but not least, the foregoing discussion may give the impression that all rules and 
norms are intentional with respect to a goal, putting in place constraints with the aim of 
improving outcomes. However, many rules and norms develop without intent, for 
example, as an unintended byproduct of other institutional changes.187 The fact that rules 
are unintentional does not mean they are not important. On the contrary, they can be 
crucial to an organization’s success, arguably more so in cases of emergent cooperation 
                                                          
184 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 18. 
185 Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 147. 
186 Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” in The Commons 
in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptation, eds. Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 22. 
187 Norms, implicit and informal, are plausibly more often unintentional than rules, which 
are more visible, and the focus of much of institutional design.  
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(i.e., commons).188 In a famous example, researchers looked at the actions of surgeons 
and nurses in the operating room in an attempt to identify deliberate and accidental 
activities with the aim of improving procedures. As it turned out, many actions that 
neither surgeons nor nurses thought were important were in fact crucial to interactions 
in the operating room running smoothly. 
 Rules can be classified and analyzed in a number of ways. The paramount 
taxonomy is arguably the differentiation between “operational rules,” “collective-choice 
rules,” and “constitutional-choice rules.”189 The latter are also straightforwardly called 
“constitutional rules.” (1) Operational rules directly influence the everyday decisions 
made by actors, 190 whether they are persons or organizations, as they regulate actors 
“interacting with each other and the relevant physical/material world, making day-to-day 
decisions.”191 Among others, operational rules regulate resource usage (i.e., who is 
allowed to resources when and how), monitoring efforts (i.e., who monitors the actions 
of others and how), information streams (i.e., what information should be captured, 
stored and/or communicated),192 and sanctioning mechanisms (i.e., what happens if 
actors do not follow the rules). The number of operational rules in health care is vast.193 
                                                          
188 That being said, market and state institutions and organizations likely give rise to 
unintentional rules and norms of their own, possible examples are the way negotiations 
proceed in the souk or bypassing bureaucratic processes in a Soviet-style state 
respectively.   
189 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 52. 
190 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 46. 
191 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 50. 
192 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 52. 
193 Classifications of operational rules capture some of the breadth of operational rules in 
use, see: Elinor Ostrom, “A Method of Institutional Analysis,” in Guidance, Control, and 
Evaluation in the Public Sector, eds. Franz X. Kaufmann, Majone Giandomenico, and 
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Changes in specific rules may come about accidentally, say, because a rule is forgotten or 
a new one is introduced on the spot, but more often than not operational rules are 
changed through so-called “collective-choice processes,” in which considerable time and 
effort are devoted to consider changes to the rules in order to improve outcomes.194 (2) 
Collective-choice rules are used to determine who is eligible to change the operational 
rules and the specific rules to be used when doing so,195 whether the aim is to alter 
existing rules or to introduce new ones. In other words, “collective-choice rules affect 
who is involved in deciding about future rules and how preferences will be aggregated.”196 
In some cases, several collective-choice organizations may compete to change the 
operational rules.197 Through their influence on the operational rules, collective-choice 
rules affect operational activities and outcomes.198 (3) Constitutional-choice rules 
determine “who must, may, or must not participate in making collective choices.”199 The 
constitutional rules define and legitimize the rules used in making policy choices,200 i.e., 
collective-choice rules, which in turn define and legitimize the operational rules.201 To 
summarize: 
                                                          
Vincent Ostrom (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 468-471; Ostrom, “Do Institutions for 
Collective Action Evolve?” 16. 
194 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 525. 
195 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 46. 
196 Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David 
Policansky. “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science 284, no. 
5412 (April 1999): 281. 
197 Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” 15. 
198 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 46. 
199 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 50. 
200 Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” 10. 
201 Seye Abimbola, Joel Negin, Stephen Jan, and Alexandra Martiniuk, “Towards People-




The participants in operational situations are directly affected by the operational 
rules structuring what they must, must not, or may do. These rules were crafted 
in a collective-choice situation structured by collective-choice rules (which 
participants, in what positions, chosen how, given information, and an assessment 
of benefits and costs can make operational rules). The collective-choice rules were 
themselves crafted in a constitutional situation.202 
 
The rules are “nested,” meaning each set of rules is embedded in another set of rules that 
defines how the first set can be changed.203 Higher-level rules, i.e., collective-choice rules 
and constitutional-choice rules, are more difficult and more costly to change,204 thus 
providing stability and reliability to institutions and actors (see 0.5.4 Resource User).205,206 
The locus of the of rules, i.e., the institutional or organizational location where the three 
types of rules must be situated, depends on the level of analysis. Operational, collective-
choice, and constitutional-choice rules may neatly correspond to the micro-, meso-, and 
macro-level. To give an example, Obamacare instituted a set of operational rules (micro-
level), the result of a policy-making process in accordance with collective-choice rules 
(meso-level), itself governed by a set of constitutional- rules (macro-level). However, the 
micro-, meso-, and macro-level and the corresponding sets of rules can also be situated 
within an organization. To illustrate, a health insurer implementing the ACA has to change 
                                                          
Governance in Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” Health Policy and Planning 29 
(September 2014): ii32.  
202 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 214-215. 
203 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 51. 
204 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 46. 
205 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 23. 
206 Rule changes increase the uncertainty that individuals face, as rules “provide stability 




its operational rules to comply with the new law, but makes these changes following its 
own collective-choice rules, which are governed by a set of constitutional rules. The 
operational, collective-choice, and constitutional rules can also be conflated, especially in 
smaller organizations and commons, where the three kinds of rules and the level at which 
they operate can be difficult to distinguish. To give an example, in a small group practice 
the operational rules are being used by the very same people who can change these rules 
through collective-choice processes, which they themselves govern through control over 
the constitutional rules. In smaller and more informal settings in particular, individuals 
can move between the levels of rulemaking without even realizing it.207  
Much more can be said about rules, but the present discussion suffices as an 
introduction and in order to understand the project’s main arguments.208 
0.5.4 RESOURCE USERS 
In commons research, the primary actors are called “resource users,” which is not 
surprising given the field’s focus on resource management. Resource users are “decision-
making entities […] capable of selecting actions from a set of alternatives made available 
at nodes in a decision process.”209 They are also named “members” and “participants,” 
which are used interchangeably in the literature.210 I use these terms regardless of the 
                                                          
207 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 51. 
208 For an accessible overview, see: Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 420. 
209 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 38. 
210 Even though the terms are used interchangeably, they strictly speaking are not 
synonymous, as the terms participant and member can be used more broadly to refer to 
providers of resources and policymakers.  
62 
 
governance regime. In other words, resource users can (simultaneously) be participants 
in markets, states, or commons.  
 Participants can be persons, but they can also be corporate actors – nations, 
private corporations, NGOs, and so on. Depending on the level of analysis, organizations 
are often treated as individuals, albeit individuals that are internally made up out of other 
actors who stand in relationship to each other.211 Historically, resource users in commons 
research have been relatively homogeneous groups, as small natural resource settings 
have been the focus of commons research (see 0.5.5 Resources). In recent years, as the 
field has expanded, among others, to knowledge commons, the notion participant has 
come to refer to a much larger and more heterogeneous groups of actors.212 In health 
care, resource users can be patients, health care professionals, hospitals, insurers, 
professional organizations, pharmaceutical corporations, and so forth. A key group of 
participants in the context of health care is that of potential patients or future patients, 
who are not currently using health care resources, but will with high likelihood be 
resource users in the future, and thus have a claim to the available resources.213 David 
Eddy makes the same conceptual distinction when he differentiates between patients 
with a small “p,” which are people who currently have health problems, and Patients with 
a capital “P,” which encompasses both people who are currently ill and who are presently 
                                                          
211 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 38. 
212 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 48. 
213 While health care resources are often used for/on patients, making them the end-
users of the resources, the decision about resource usage for a large part lies with their 
health care provider, who is the decision-making entity capable of selecting the course of 
action. The relevant unit of analysis (i.e., patient, health care professional, or both) 
depends on the level of analysis.  
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well.214 Who the relevant participants are depends on the issue under consideration and 
the appropriate level of analysis.     
 Resource users can also be providers of resources and policymakers. In commons 
institutions in particular, participants often fulfill the three roles simultaneously, as the 
members of the institution play a key role in the management of such self-governance 
regimes. Within the context of the status quo institutions members regularly act as 
resource providers, but not as policymakers, except indirectly through voting 
mechanisms. To give a concrete example, patients use resources when they are 
diagnosed and treated, but they provide resources through paying insurance premiums 
and taxes. Here too, the locus of analysis is key, as a participant can be a user of resources 
on one level of analysis, but a provider and policymaker on another.   
0.5.5 RESOURCES 
Commons research focuses on the governance of so-called “common-pool resources,” 
which are natural or artificial resources that are sufficiently large to make it costly, but 
not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from enjoying their use.215,216 I discuss 
common-pool resources, and what sets them apart from other types of resources, in 
detail in the next chapter (see 1.6 Argument III: Type of Good). For now, I briefly want to 
discuss the difference between natural and artificial resources, as it raises questions 
about the applicability of commons research to health care, inviting the charge that I am 
                                                          
214 David Eddy, Clinical Decision Making. From Theory to Practice. A Collection of Essays 
from The Journal of the American Medical Association (Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett 
Publishers, 1996), 78, 84. 
215 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 30. 
216 I use the neutral “artificial resources” rather than Ostrom’s “man-made resources.” 
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quite literally comparing fishing grounds and hospitals, fishers and physicians. Given the 
central importance of the issue, I revisit the question of whether or not commons 
research applies to artificial resources on several occasions throughout the project with 
the aim of resolving this key challenge for commons research (see 1. The Tragedy of the 
Health Care Commons, 2. Ostrom’s Black Bag, and 4. A4R in Practice).  
While Ostrom explicitly states her research is applicable to both natural and 
artificial resources, until recently commons research has focused almost exclusively on 
the study of natural resources (e.g., fishing grounds, irrigation systems, groundwater 
basins, forests, meadows).217  Even though the focus remains on natural resources, in the 
last decade research has expanded, among others, to knowledge commons (e.g., digital 
information, intellectual property, academic publishing) and to urban commons (e.g., 
urban zoning, public spaces, urban ecosystems). Still, while artificial, the knowledge and 
urban commons are conceptually close to natural resource commons, which is especially 
apparent in the case of urban commons, which can be conceived as the city analogues of 
natural resources.218 A possible explanation for the focus on knowledge and urban 
commons is that commons research has had an easier time appending itself to these 
relatively new areas of inquiry, while it has been more difficult to enter more established 
fields, the governance of health care resources being one example. 
                                                          
217 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 30. 
218 The claimed similarity between natural resource, knowledge, and urban commons 
requires more in terms of argument than I can provide here, but offers a possible avenue 
for future research. 
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Alternatively, and worrisomely, the reason commons research has found few 
applications beyond natural resources is that there is some fundamental difference 
between natural resources and artificial resources. The key artificial resources in health 
care, and most other areas of economic activity, being physical and financial resources.219 
As far as I know, the supposed dissimilarity between natural and artificial resources is not 
explored in the literature. At least in part, the question pertains to the “physical 
attributes” of the resources and their relationship to institutions, which Ostrom discusses 
on several occasions.220 One difference between both types of resources seems to be the 
following: In the case of natural resources, the use of the resources is “predetermined” 
by the physical attributes of the resource (e.g., water, fish, fodder, wood), which in turn 
fixates (part of) the set of rules for managing the resources. However, artificial resources 
in general and financial resources in particular are open-ended in their usage, thus they 
do not provide any guidance for the design of the institution managing them. Of course, 
the question is, does this matter? The open-endedness of artificial resources seems to 
make institutional design a more complex task, as there are more ways to use the 
available resources, but otherwise it does not seem to make a difference. As I argue in 
the next chapter, the key physical attributes of excludability and subtractability apply to 
                                                          
219 Within the context of health care, physical and financial resources may fit under the 
heading “social commons.” (Donald Nonini, “Introduction. The Global Idea of ‘the 
Commons’,” in The Global Idea of ‘the Commons’, ed. Donald Nonini (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2007), 6.)  
220 William Blomquist, Edella Schlager, Shui Yan Tang, and Elinor Ostrom, “Regularities 
from the Field and Possible Explanations,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 
eds. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 




natural and artificial resources alike (see 1.6 Argument III: Type of Good). When resources 
with these attributes are crucial to the livelihood and/or survival of actors, they can lead 
to the sort of emergent cooperation that results in commons institutions, also in the 
context of health care. I return to the question of whether commons research is 
applicable beyond natural resources in the context of Daniels’ theory of justice.   
0.6 A WORD TO THE WISE 
Throughout her career, Ostrom never ceased to stress the need to treat convoluted 
problems in their full complexity, emphasizing there are no panaceas. I believe her advice 
applies to commons research in general and the current application of that research to 
health care in particular. “Getting the institutions right,”221 which in practice means 
changing the rules to achieve better health care outcomes, is not the silver bullet that will 
solve all of health care’s problems and save the health care commons from destruction. 
Institutional reform, however, seems indispensable in any solution to the health care’s 
problems, particularly the management of scarce health care resources.  
Bringing together commons research and biomedical ethics is challenging, as it is 
difficult to do full justice to both fields and the complex relationships between them in an 
initial exploration. So how to proceed? To use an analogy, exploring the relationship 
between commons research, philosophy of health care, and bioethics is like charting the 
newfound lands between several more (e.g., bioethics) and less (e.g., commons research) 
established areas of study. How to chart the new area? Much like the explorers of old, 
one walks the landscape while noting its most important features and how to they relate 
                                                          
221 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 14. 
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to one another,222 but it is impossible to chart the entire landscape, especially on a first 
expedition. “Inevitably in places the argument is speculative; equally inevitably it will 
involve both the caricaturing of distinguished thinkers’ arguments and the over-





                                                          
222 French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard discusses the relationship between different 
discourses by comparing them to a ship navigating an archipelago, sailing from one island 
to the next, and presenting to one island what it finds on the other. (Jean-François 
Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Translated by Georges Van Den Abbeele. 
Theory and History of Literature 46 (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1988), 130-
131.)   
223 Julian Le Grand, “Knights, Knaves, or Pawns? Human Behaviour and Social Policy,” 





THE TRAGEDY OF THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS 
 
“Let me here remind you that the essence 
of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. It 
resides in the solemnity of the 
remorseless working of things.”1,2 
- Alfred North Whitehead - 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
Drawing an analogy between a fictional group of herders trying to keep as many cattle as 
possible on a common pasture and the use of scarce healthcare resources by health care 
actors, like health care professionals and (future) patients, may seem farfetched and even 
ill-conceived.3 Nevertheless, I will argue the analogy does not only hold, but suggests a 
new approach to the issue of managing scarce health care resources.4
                                                          
1 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
[1925] 1997), 10.  
2 Garrett Hardin cites Whitehead in The Tragedy of the Commons. (Garrett Hardin, “The 
Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162, no. 3859 (December 1968): 1244.) 
3 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244. 
4 While I focus on resource usage, and thus on the lowering of health care expenditures, 
the challenge of governing scarce resources is inextricably linked to the challenge of 
improving health outcomes. If resources are finite, and there is an opportunity cost to any 
particular allocation, then the choice to allocate resources in one way rather than another 
translates to differences in outcomes. Similarly, inefficiencies in the management of 
health care resources affect health outcomes. Improvements in the governance of health 




Using Hardin’s seminal paper The Tragedy of the Commons (1968) as a starting 
point, I present three arguments for treating health care as a commons and health care 
resources as common-pool resources: First, I discuss the plausibility of applying Hardin’s 
overgrazing scenario to health care, refuting four objections against doing so. Second, I 
show game theory provides further support for the analogy. Finally, health care resources 
possess the key characteristics of common-pool resources, making health care a 
commons. I conclude health care is plausibly heading toward a tragedy of the health care 
commons and point toward commons research, pioneered by Ostrom, the first woman 
to win the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, as offering a novel set of tools to 
avert this tragedy (see 2. Ostrom’s Black Bag).5  
The argument presented here is the most detailed discussion of the possibility of 
a tragedy of the health care commons available in the literature. As such, the chapter 
provides important contributions to both health care research broadly conceived (e.g., 
bioethics, health care economics) and commons research. While the application of the 
tragedy of the commons to health care has appealed to researchers ever since the 
publication of Hardin’s influential paper, most discussions do not go beyond a loose 
analogy between Hardin’s herders and health care. In this chapter, a more systematic 
consideration of the tragedy in health care is provided with explicit responses to 
objections that may be posed to interpreting health care as a commons. Until now, 
                                                          
5 Ostrom was the only woman to win the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences until 




commons researchers have done little in terms of expanding their arguments into the 
realm of health care. I fill that gap. 
1.2 A TRAGEDY OF THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS? 
In health care, the challenge of governing scarce resources becomes most apparent in the 
continuous increase in health care expenditures across the developed world.6 The United 
States, by far the biggest spender, spent over three-and-a-half trillion dollars on health 
care in 2018, which amounts to 17.7 percent of the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP). More importantly, and more worryingly, the growth of health spending has been 
outrunning the growth of the GDP over the past decades, the period from 2010 to 2013 
being a notable exception.7 However, the growth in health care expenditures is projected 
to once again outpace the growth in GDP over the next decade at an estimated 0.8 
percent per year, causing health care’s share of the GDP to rise to 19.4 percent by 2027.8 
While other developed countries’ health care expenditures are lower, almost all of them 
are faced with the same discrepancy between the growth of GDP and the rise of health 
care costs, the years since the most recent economic crisis again being an exception.9 As 
                                                          
6 The emphasis on the increase in health care expenditures may seem odd, but 
economists are in the habit of placing monetary values on all resources, from hospital 
buildings over labor hours performed by health care professionals to even donor organs.  
7 “National Health Expenditures 2018 Highlights,” Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, accessed April 15, 2020, https://www.cms.gov/files/document/highlights.pdf. 
8 “National health Expenditures Projections 2018-2027,” Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, accessed April 15, 2020, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-
Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Download 
s/ForecastSummary.pdf. 
9 “FOCUS on Health Spending. OECD Health Statistics 2015,” Organisation for Economic 





in the case of the United States, the slowdown in the growth of health care costs is 
expected to be short-lived, primarily due to ageing populations in many developed 
countries over the next decades.10,11 The growth in health care expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP poses a threat to developed countries’ health care sectors in particular 
and economies in general.12,13    
One cannot have their cake and eat it too is a proverb often heard among 
economists. In economics, the figure of speech is usually understood to mean that you 
can spend a scarce resource only once. The proverb applies to the use of resources within 
the health care system, as resources used to diagnose and treat one patient cannot be 
                                                          
10 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Fiscal Sustainability of 
Health Systems. Bridging Health and Finance Perspectives (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), 
29-31. 
11 A common misconception among non-economists is that the growth in health care 
expenditures over the last decades has been due to a combination of technological 
advances and ageing populations. Until now, health care expenditures have risen almost 
exclusively due to technological progress and its influence on health care practices, at 
least when controlling for time. Over the next decades this is projected to change due to 
the ageing of the Baby Boom generation. (Livio Di Matteo, “The Macro Determinants of 
Health Expenditure in the United States and Canada: Assessing the Impact of Income, Age 
Distribution, and Time,” Health Policy 71, no. 1 (January 2005): 39-40.)   
12 Of course, there is no set ceiling on how much a nation can and should spend on health 
care. For the United States, economists Robert Hall and Charles Jones have suggested 
optimal health spending should be more than thirty percent of GDP by the year 2050, 
almost double the current level. (Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones, “The Value of Life 
and the Rise in Health Spending,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, no. 1 (February 
2007): 68.) 
13 There are important differences between the member states of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). I think it is worth pointing out that the 
most notable drop in health care expenditures has occurred in the countries that were 
most severely hit by the economic crisis: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Hence, the so-
called “PIGS” are responsible for much of the decrease in health care costs, even though 
other OECD member states have seen the increase in expenditures fall below the growth 
of GDP as well, largely in the wake of the crisis. (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 




used for another. More generally, money spent in one place, say to build a hospital or 
hire a new physician, cannot be spent elsewhere. Hence, the competition for scarce 
resources in health care intensifies as economic growth is unable to meet the growing 
health care needs. A few concrete implications of this evolution are increased health 
insurance premiums, the erosion of coverage, and strain on the fiscal solvency of public 
insurance programs.14 In addition, money spent on health care cannot be spent on other 
goods and services and “every dollar spent represents other human wants that go 
unfulfilled.”15 The continuing increase in health care expenditures risks crowding out 
other forms of private spending (e.g., iPhones, automobiles) and public spending (e.g., 
education, infrastructure) straining private and public finances alike. In the very long run, 
the continuous growth of health care expenditures in excess of the growth in GDP poses 
an existential threat to health care sectors and economies across the developed world, as 
current growth rates are unsustainable.16,17 A collapse of the health care sector in 
                                                          
14 Peter S. Hussey et al., “A Systematic Review of Health Care Efficiency Measures,” Health 
Services Research 44, no. 3 (2009): 784.   
15 Loren Lomasky, “Medical Progress and National Health Care,” in Medicine and Moral 
Philosophy, eds. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1982), 117.   
16 I do not use “very long run” in the technical sense here, meaning that all inputs are 
variable, including government rules and social customs. However, it is worthwhile to 
keep the economic usage of the term in mind, as I will suggest a redesign of health care 
institutions to “save” health care from collapsing, such a redesign falls under the very long 
run. 
17 Of course, the assumption is that no action is taken in the meanwhile to remedy health 
care’s expenditure crisis. The demise of the health care sector in the United States, and 
other developed countries, due to rising costs has been predicted before, but so far has 
not materialized. The situation is reminiscent of the Malthusian catastrophe and the 
Simon-Ehrlich wager. In both cases disastrous consequences were predicted, but neither 
prediction proved to be correct. As in these two cases, there seems to be a negativity bias 




particular and the economy in general as a consequence of rising health care expenditures 
may seem unlikely, but the main drivers of expenditure growth, technological progress 
and ageing populations, are here to stay.18 Some economists, like Tyler Cowen, suggest 
developed economies have picked all the low-hanging fruit and people need to get used 
to the GDP growing at rates around 2 percent, at least for now.19 Seeing the two enduring 
trends of increasing health care expenditures and slow economic growth, the collapse of 
health care sectors and developed economies does not only seem plausible, but may be 
inevitable, and thus tragic in the  sense that Whitehead uses the term in the quotation at 
the beginning of this paper.20 Such a collapse need not be catastrophic, in the sense that 
                                                          
its effects on the health care sector. This merely to point out health care across the 
developed world has thus far proven to be remarkably resilient to economic pressures, 
the likely reason is that gradually small, and not-so-small, measures have been taken to 
keep them from collapsing.   
18 Technological advances can also lower costs, specifically in the case of a particular 
technology that makes a procedure cheaper and leads to better outcomes. Moreover, 
new technologies can often find other applications over time. Looking at technological 
progress in general, however, it seems that technology’s primary impact on expenditures 
is increasing them. Much is expected from health information technology (HIT) as a 
technology that can lower the cost of health care as a whole, for example through the use 
of electronic health records, especially in the United States, but the use of HIT requires a 
large initial investment and considerable operating costs, while savings are uncertain and 
realized in the future. (Gerard F. Anderson, Bianca K. Frogner, Roger A. Johns, and Uwe E. 
Reinhardt, “Health Care Spending and Use of Information Technology in OECD Countries,” 
Health Affairs 25, no. 3 (May-June 2006).) In addition, there is the risk that HIT becomes 
an end in itself rather than a means to an end, namely reducing costs and improving 
outcomes. 
19 Tyler Cowen, The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All the Low-Hanging Fruit of 
Modern History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better (New York: Dutton, 2011). 
20 In developed nations, a collapse of the health care sector is only imaginable if the 
economy as a whole founders, as the bankruptcy of one is the only thing that would 
plausibly lead to the demise of the other and vice versa. Similarly, when discussing health 
care reform Victor Fuchs and Ezekiel Emanuel conclude: “Over the long term, reform is 
likely to come in response to a major war, depression, or large-scale civil unrest.” (Victor 




whole health care systems and economies suddenly come crashing down, but more likely 
is a slow and creeping process, a drawn-out sequence of resource governance issues (e.g., 
drug shortages, inability to pay for new technologies) and quick fixes (e.g., increased 
premiums, minor institutional changes).21 The tragedy remains, however, as the overuse 
of resources remorselessly threatens the long-term economic viability of health care 
systems and economies across the developed world,22 thus necessitating a transition to 
new institutional arrangements to manage health care resources. To make the scenario 
of an inevitable collapse of health care due to the overuse of resources more tangible and 
plausible, I turn to Hardin’s The Tragedy of the Commons (1968).23 
1.3 THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS 
The collapse of a resource due to overexploitation is the focus of Hardin’s paper, albeit in 
the context of overpopulation. I discuss his main example, the overgrazing and 
destruction of a common pasture by the cattle of rational herders, at some length 
because I will use it to argue for the plausibility of a tragedy of the health care commons. 
                                                          
Take to Effect Comprehensive Change,” Health Affairs 24, no. 6 (November-December 
2005): 1412.) 
21 See also footnote 17. 
22 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1. 
23 Hardin’s tragedy of the commons has been hugely influential, but also received its share 
of criticism. For the purpose of the current argument, it is worth highlighting the risk of 
using Hardin’s straightforward scenario as a realistic model for complex and dynamic 
resource governance issues, which is analogous to using contentless models of market 
and state as solutions to such issues (see 0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy). (Elinor 
Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, “Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons,” in 
Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice, eds. Elinor Ostrom 
and Charlotte Hess (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2011), 12.) Hardin’s tragedy can 





 Imagine a pasture that is open to all. One can expect each herder to try to keep as 
many cattle as possible on the commons. After all, as a rational being, each herder wants 
to maximize his own gain. “Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, ‘What 
is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?’”24 According to Hardin the 
utility has a negative and a positive component: 
 
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since 
the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, 
the positive utility is nearly +1. 
2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by 
one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all 
herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is 
only a fraction of -1.25  
 
The rational herdsman has to conclude the only sensible course of action is to keep adding 
animals to his herd. However, all the herdsmen sharing the commons reach the same 
conclusion and herein lies the tragedy. Each herder is compelled to increase his herd 
without limit, extracting evermore resources from a limited commons. With a sense for 
drama, Hardin concludes, “Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons.”26 The herders in Hardin’s story are trapped in a tragedy of the commons that 
they themselves cannot overcome.27 Thus, according to Hardin there are only two options 
to avoid the tragedy, either privatize the commons or have a state-like entity regulate 
                                                          
24 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244. 
25 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244. 
26 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244. 
27 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University 




access to the pasture, providing a nice illustration of the market-state dichotomy at work 
(see  0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy).28,29 
 Hardin is quick to point out some may consider his scenario a platitude, much in 
the same way some might find the scenario of rising health care expenditures and the 
collapse of health care outlined above unlikely, but rebuts by arguing natural selection 
favors psychological denial. “The individual benefits as an individual from his ability to 
deny the truth even though society as a whole, of which he is part, suffers.”30 Hardin’s 
concern is certainly not new.  In Governing the Commons (1990) Ostrom cites Aristotle:31 
“For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. 
Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when 
he is himself concerned as an individual.”32 She adds that Thomas Hobbes’s description 
of man in a state of nature can be seen as a tragedy of the commons as well.33 Moreover, 
the standard analysis in modern resource economics is that whenever a number of 
resource users have access to a common-pool resource, they will withdraw a larger 
                                                          
28 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1245. 
29 In his paper, Hardin discusses several ways in which the second option can be 
implemented, but all of them require the presence of a Leviathan to regulate the right to 
use the commons. 
30 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244. 
31 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 2. (Ostrom’s quotation of Aristotle is slightly shorter 
than the one I use here: “what is common to the greatest number has the least care 
bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at the all of the common 
interest.”)  
32 Aristotle, Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2000) 
57. 




number of units from the resource pool than the “optimal economic level of 
withdrawal.”34,35  
 Another way to describe the tragedy of the commons is by characterizing it as a 
so-called “commons dilemma,” which is a specific type of social dilemma, terminology 
Hardin does not use in his article. A social dilemma is a situation in which everyone is 
tempted to take one action but everyone will be better off if all, or at least most, take 
another course of action.36 Put more precisely, each individual receives a higher payoff 
for a socially defecting choice, in this case adding more cattle to the pasture, than for a 
socially cooperative choice, in this case refraining from adding more animals, but 
everyone is better off if all individuals cooperate than if all defect.37 Individuals profit from 
selfishness, unless everyone chooses to be selfish. A commons dilemma can be 
characterized as a situation in which individuals have a strong incentive to use more and 
more resource units when acting independently, leading to overuse and eventually 
destruction of the common resource, unless they find a way to coordinate their actions.38  
 Now the question is the following: Does Hardin’s tragedy of the commons apply 
to the use of resources in health care? Put differently, does health care find itself in a 
                                                          
34 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 3. 
35 Ostrom’s use of the term “optimal” is a bit puzzling, because she does not explain its 
meaning. Does she refer to Pareto-optimality, meaning that it is impossible to make any 
one individual better off without making at least one individual worse off? She refers to 
a “Pareto-optimal outcome” two pages further. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 5.) Or 
does she mean the highest possible level of withdrawal without jeopardizing the 
resource?  
36 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 79. 
37 Robyn Dawes, “Social Dilemmas,” Annual Review of Psychology 31 (1980): 169. 




commons dilemma? I believe the answer to these two questions is affirmative and I 
present three arguments to back up my view. 
1.4 ARGUMENT I: ANALOGY 
Several scholars have suggested there exists an analogy between Hardin’s tragedy of the 
commons and the use of resources in health care. The first to do so was Howard Hiatt, a 
physician and professor at Harvard Medical School, in an article titled Protecting the 
Medical Commons: Who is Responsible? (1975). Published less than a decade after The 
Tragedy of the Commons, Hiatt’s article received, and still receives, considerable 
attention, having been cited over three hundred times according to Google Scholar. In 
most cases, however, Hiatt’s paper is referenced only incidentally when discussing the 
problem of rising health care expenditures, without further exploring the analogy.39 Two 
notable exceptions are an article titled Managing Medical Resources: Return to the 
Commons? (2007) by Christine Cassel and Troyen Brennan and an essay titled Protecting 
the Medical Commons – Ensuring Adequate Care (2012) by Dale Block. In both, the 
analogy is explained in somewhat greater detail, primarily by summarizing Hardin’s 
original discussion of the tragedy, but without discussing its merits.40 So what would the 
tragedy of the commons look like when applied to health care?  
                                                          
39 As far as I have been able to establish, no one then makes the further connection 
between Hiatt’s analogy and Ostrom’s work on the commons. 
40 Leonard Fleck falls somewhere in between these two categories. While Fleck does not 
simply mention the risk of a tragedy of the health care commons in passing, he does not 
flesh out the analogy in detail either. That being said, Fleck nicely captures the essence of 
the tragedy when he writes, “[T]hen this is precisely what the “tragedy of the commons” 
is about. We all have “a right” to use the commons because we have helped to create it. 
We all understand that the commons can be destroyed if we overuse it, but we have failed 




 Imagine any pool of health care resources that is open to a group of users. The 
resource pool can vary in size from the shared resources in a group practice over the 
financial resources of a hospital to the assets of a health insurance company. One can 
expect each user, whether they are a health care professional or a patient, to try to 
appropriate as much of the resource as possible.41 After all, as rational beings, each user 
seeks to maximize her own gain, asking herself: “What is the utility to me of extracting an 
additional resource unit from the pool?”42 In making this decision, the resource user 
makes a tradeoff between the positive utility of appropriating one additional resource 
unit and the much smaller negative utility of putting additional strain on the available 
health care resources. The rational health care professional or patient has to conclude the 
only sensible course of action is to extract an additional resource unit. Since all the users 
of the scarce health care resources reach the same conclusion, however, more and more 
resources are extracted leading to a tragedy of the health care commons.43 Thus, 
                                                          
excessive use of the commons. The consequence is that the commons is overused and 
the cost of the commons is persistently pushed upward, despite the fact that virtually no 
one wants to bear those increased costs.” (Leonard Fleck, Just Caring: Health Care 
Rationing and Democratic Deliberation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 157.) 
41 Users need not be persons, but can also be impersonal actors, for example a hospital 
department, that behave in a self-interested, rational manner.  
42 The user’s gain in a health care context is varied. Of course, improving one’s health is a 
central gain for both the patient and the attending health care provider, but especially for 
the latter there may be other gains at stake, for example financial returns or increased 
influence.  
43 As Charles Han notes, the process is reinforced by resource users’ perception of the 
availability of health care resources. When resource users come to believe there is a risk 
the resource system may collapse, a so-called “It won’t be me”-effect comes into play, 
meaning that resource users may want to grab as much of the available resources as 
possible before the system collapses. (Charles Han, “Overgrazing Behavior and 
Rationality: A Dynamic Perspective,” paper presented at the 26th International 




following Hardin’s recipe to avert the tragedy, scarce health care resources must either 
be privatized or access to them must be restricted from the top down. After all, the 
resource users themselves cannot overcome the tragedy, at least according to Hardin.   
 The analogy has a certain commonsensical appeal to it, not in the least because it 
takes minimal effort to adapt Hardin’s example in order to apply it to health care, but 
does it hold? I briefly consider four objections against the analogy: First, Hardin illustrates 
the tragedy of the commons by using a pasture, which is a natural resource, as his key 
example. Moreover, commons research has thus far focused largely, almost exclusively in 
fact, on the management of natural resources. This might lead one to object that the 
tragedy of the commons does not apply to health care resources, which are artificial 
resources, primarily financial resources. Even though the difference between natural and 
artificial resources is important, principally because the possible uses of financial 
resources in particular are more open-ended, which complicates their management (see 
0.5.5 Resources), the logic of Hardin’s tragedy seems to apply to both types of resources: 
Hardin briefly mentions the example of public parking spaces,44 Ostrom provides several 
examples of commons research applied to artificial resources,45 and Derek Wall discusses 
several artificial resource commons, among others, health commons.46,47  
                                                          
https://proceedings.systemdynamics.org/2008/proceed/papers/HAN 105.pdf.) The logic 
is similar to that of a bank run. 
44 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1245. 
45 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 3. 
46 Derek Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom. Commons, Contestation and 
Craft (New York: Routledge, 2014), 137-153. 
47 Wall mentions the Ostrom workshop was given a research grant to investigate health 




Second, and closely related to the previous objection, artificial resources in 
general and health care resources in particular can be replenished more easily than 
natural resources, because one does not depend on capricious and slow natural processes 
to restore the resource. Put differently, while natural resource commons (e.g., fishing 
grounds, irrigation systems) are depleted over time, the available health care resources 
can be replaced as they are used, and even increased. While this may be true, the 
characteristic of being more easily replenishable does not solve the tragedy, but merely 
allows for the proverbial can to be kicked down the road by gradually replenishing the 
resources to avoid collapse. As the economic figures indicate, the “day of reckoning” must 
come, to use Hardin’s words.48 The continuous growth of health care expenditures over 
the growth of the GDP requires societies across the developed world to pour more and 
more financial resources into health care in order to replenish the resources being 
extracted, which is unsustainable in the long run (see 1.2 A Tragedy of the Health Care 
Commons?).  
Third, while the resource in Hardin’s example, a pasture, is clearly defined, health 
care resources are not. As physician James Gaulte puts it in an insightful blog post, health 
care resources are amorphous, defying enumeration and always changing.49 The 
amorphous character of health care resources makes it more complicated to apply 
                                                          
Apart from a paper by Michael McGinnis, which has not been published and is not meant 
for citation, the outcomes of the grant are unclear. 
48 Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1244. 
49 James Gaulte, “Is the Term “Medical Commons” a Useful Analogy to US Health Care or 





commons research to health care, but does not change the logic of the tragedy. The fact 
resources are difficult to divvy up or to define does not mean they are not subject to 
overuse by rational resource users, even though it likely makes it more difficult to devise 
successful policies to protect the resources from overexploitation and collapse. 
Moreover, there is a straightforward solution to the problem of dealing with nondescript 
health care resources, namely dividing them into so-called virtual pools of common 
resources, for example a group practice, a hospital, or a region.50 Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs) are a particularly promising virtual commons.51 Ostrom suggests a 
similar approach when she states the need to identify the “appropriate level of analysis 
relevant to addressing a particular puzzle,”52 which allows solutions to the 
overexploitation of resources to be developed and implemented at the local level, after 
which they can possibly be scaled up, rather than attempting to tackle the large and ill-
understood problem of the overexploitation of amorphous health care resources in a 
uniform matter. The pooling of resources need not be virtual only, as health care 
organizations increasingly make use of global budgets. Indeed, the pooling of resources 
is a common practice throughout health care, as I argue later (see 1.6 Type of Good).   
                                                          
50 Notice that I have tentatively suggested this course of action in the example of the 
tragedy of the health care commons by saying: “The resource pool can vary in size from 
the shared resources in a group practice over the financial resources in a hospital to the 
assets of a health insurance company.” 
51 Christine K. Cassel and Troyen E. Brennan, “Managing Medical Resources: Return to the 
Commons?” Journal of the American Medical Association 297, no. 22 (July 2007): 2519-
2520. 




Finally, the original tragedy relies heavily on the pasture being “open to all,” and 
seemingly owned by no one. One may object that arguably this is not the case with health 
care resources. To formulate the objection differently, health care resources are already 
owned by someone, rather than no one.53 There are two lines of argument to meet this 
challenge. One is to point out the difference between the resources on the one hand and 
the form of ownership on the other. “Different forms of ownership can be applied to 
common pool resources. For example, a lake can be owned by a community, an individual, 
a state or may be unowned.”54 So health care resources can be owned by a hospital or an 
insurer, but still be common-pool resources. Another, closely related line of argument is 
to highlight the difference between usage rights and ownership rights. For example, an 
insured patient might not own the insurer’s financial resources, even though she 
contributed to them by paying her premiums, but by virtue of being insured she has a 
claim to use the insurer’s resources.55 To give another example, an administrator might 
not own a hospital’s resources, but as an employee of the hospital she is entitled to use 
the available resources. In both examples the rational user, not the owner, of the resource 
is tempted to extract additional resource units from the pool of resources to maximize 
her own gain, thus contributing to the tragedy.56 The user of the resources can be seen 
                                                          
53 Gaulte, “Is the Term “Medical Commons” a Useful Analogy.”  
54 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 80. 
55 Needless to say the term “moral hazard” is sometimes used, usually for illustrative 
purposes, in the commons literature. (See, for example: Ostrom, Understanding 
Institutional Diversity, 51.) 
56 In the commons literature, the difference between ownership rights and usage rights 
is often highlighted in the context of marine fisheries. Many fishing zones, and thus the 
fishery resources in them, are owned by states, but the resources are still common 




as a member of the insurance company and the hospital respectively, a feature I will 
discuss in greater detail when explaining common-pool resources as a distinct type of 
resource (see 1.6 Argument III: Type of Good).57 Regardless the level of analysis, the usual 
recipes to prevent that the aggregate self-interested behavior of members leads to the 
overexploitation of the available resources are market and state rules, or combinations 
thereof. To anticipate the conclusion of the chapter, and one of the central 
recommendations of the project as a whole, Ostrom’s research suggests that resource 
users working together in emergent cooperative organizations is a valuable 
complementary solution to the overexploitation of resources. 
 Before continuing, a few remarks are in place about the benefits that stem from 
the resources. So far, the discussion of the analogy has centered on the features of the 
resources, among others, when considering objections against applying the analogy to 
health care. I now shift focus to the health and economic benefits generated by the use 
of health care resources. Looking at the benefits generated by the resources suggests two 
further disanalogies: First, while the benefits flowing from natural resource commons stay 
                                                          
to Common-Property Fishery Resources: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” in Dynamic 
Optimization and Mathematical Economics, ed. Pan-Tai Liu (New York: Plenum Press, 
1980), 117.) 
57 The fact that the patient and the administrator are members of the insurer and the 
hospital respectively is important, because commons research puts a strong emphasis on 
the difficulty of excluding outsiders from extracting resource units (see 1.6 Argument III: 
Type of Good). I would like to point out, however, that due to the special importance that 
is attributed to health and health care, non-members are in some circumstances allowed 
to make use of available health care resources as well. For example, an uninsured patient 
requiring urgent medical attention will still receive care, and thus make use of the 
available resources. In other words, the special importance of health care gives rise to 
moral considerations that make it more difficult to exclude outsiders, thus making the 




the same over time (e.g., the benefit of bringing in another haul of fish); the benefits 
generated by the health care commons have increased spectacularly over the years (e.g., 
improvements of health outcomes). In other words, the marginal utility of extracting 
additional units from a natural resource commons is constant, while the marginal utility 
of extracting additional units from the health care commons has increased over time. 
While this increase in aggregate marginal utility has benefited patients, it does not count 
as an objection against the application of the tragedy to health care. On the contrary, the 
fact that the marginal utility of extracting additional units has increased over time makes 
it that resource users have an additional incentive to extract more resources from the 
pool. Health care’s successes have induced in health care actors the assumption that the 
extraction of an additional resource unit will in all cases lead to (much) better outcomes. 
Of course, the assumed increase in aggregate marginal utility often does not materialize 
when applied to particular interventions, because not all treatments are (equally) 
beneficial. Still, patients and physicians all too often extract additional resource units even 
when there is only a small chance at a slightly better outcome. The result is twofold: (1) 
While the marginal utility of extracting additional units has increased over time for health 
care as a whole, this is not true when looking at individual resource usage decisions, many 
of which result in little or no additional benefit. Thus, these decisions only put additional 
strain on the available resources, but do not lead to improved outcomes. (2) The 
continuous increase in benefits at the aggregate level has only been possible because 
more and more resources have been poured into health care, as is illustrated by the 




Commons?). If the pool of resources would be kept constant, then the impact of these 
individual resource usage decisions becomes more palpable, since it then  becomes clear 
that using a resource unit for one purpose means that it cannot be used for another (e.g., 
treating one patient comes at the cost of treating another). As such, the growth of the 
resource pool (e.g., increased premiums and taxes) does not only stave off the tragedy, 
but also obscures the necessity of making such tradeoffs. Second, the use of natural 
resource commons does not directly benefit other members of the commons, while the 
use of the health care commons can benefit other members of the commons (e.g., a 
patient visiting a provider benefits that provider). In many natural resource commons, 
however, the extraction of resources has a similar effect as in the case of health care 
resources. To give an example, monitors auditing a commons (e.g., irrigation system) 
quite directly benefit from the use of resources, even in cases where they themselves are 
not resource users (see 2.6.4 Monitoring). The presence and magnitude of such ripple 
effects likely is a feature of the size and complexity of the resource system rather than of 
the type of resources managed by the commons (e.g., fish, fodder, knowledge, money). 
A further objection may be that in the case of natural resources these multiplier effects 
do not contribute to the resource. For example, a guard being paid to monitor an 
irrigation system does not increase the amount of water in that system. On the contrary, 
the use of health care resources can feed back into the pool of resources. For example, a 
health insurance payment to a physician can feed back into the pool of resources, say, 
through a contribution to the hospital the physician works at. However, these resources 




amount of resources available in the system. In the example, the money has gone from 
the insurer to the physician and then on to the hospital, but no resources have been 
created along the way. The fact that several actors have benefited from the resources 
along the way, which is a feature of both natural and artificial commons, does not mean 
the available resources have increased. 
1.5 ARGUMENT II: GAME THEORY58 
Commons researchers in general and Ostrom in particular oftentimes rely on game theory 
to better understand the tragedy of the commons.59 The well-known prisoner’s dilemma 
game is used most often to elucidate the tragedy.60,61 The classic prisoner’s dilemma is 
modeled as a non-cooperative game in which the players possess complete information, 
meaning the players are not allowed or able to communicate with each other and know 
the full structure of the game and the payoffs attached to the different outcomes.62 In 
Governing the Commons (1990), Ostrom applies the prisoner’s dilemma to Hardin’s 
herders in a straightforward game she calls the “Hardin herder game.”63  
                                                          
58 Interestingly, Hugo Tristram Engelhardt suggests that it may be possible to develop a 
“content-full secular ethics as a basis for bioethics and health care policy” on the basis of 
game theory. (H. Tristram Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, [1986] 1996), 55.) He describes the following tradeoff that is applicable 
to the three arguments presented here: “In more general terms, the more individuals 
value personal freedom and autonomy over other goods, the more they will regard as 
unacceptable the costs to freedom and liberty that come from coordination that does not 
increase the amount of freedom or liberty. On the other hand, as the value of nonliberty 
interests (e.g., prosperity) increases, the more constraints on freedom and liberty will be 
acceptable if the result is greater prosperity.” (Ibid.)  
59 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, xvii. 
60 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 3-5. 
61 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 63. 
62 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 4. 




Suppose there are two herders who have to make a decision about the number of 
animals to graze on a shared meadow. Assume there is an upper limit to the number of 
animals that can graze on the pasture and be well fed, namely L. If the herdsmen opt for 
a cooperative strategy, each will let L/2 animals graze on the pasture. If they choose to 
defect, however, each will let as many animals graze as he thinks he can sell at a profit. In 
her example, Ostrom somewhat arbitrarily sets the outcomes for the different 
combinations of strategies as follows:64 If both herdsmen cooperate, limiting their grazing 
to L/2, they obtain 10 units of profit. If they both defect, then they will obtain 0 profit. If 
one of the herders defects and the other does not, then the defector obtains 15 units of 
profit, while the so-called “sucker”65 is left behind with a negative return of -1.66 In a non-
cooperative setting under conditions of full information, the dominant strategy, meaning 
the strategy that the player is always better off choosing, is to defect, regardless of the 
other player’s choice.67 Thus, both herders defect rather than cooperate, the game’s Nash 
equilibrium. 
                                                          
64 The choice of outcomes is not arbitrary because in a traditional prisoner’s dilemma the 
temptation to cheat (T) must be larger than the reward (R) for cooperation, which has to 
be bigger than the punishment (P) for noncooperation, which in turn has to be larger than 
the sucker’s payoff (S). (T > R > P > S) 
65 In the literature, the term “sucker” is the generally accepted designation for the player 
who chooses to cooperate in game where the other players defects, thus being left 
empty-handed. The choice of words is intriguing, because it implies a negative moral 
judgment of the cooperative player, who is the one making the right (i.e., moral) choice. 
More interesting still, there is no analogous term for the defector, say egoist, even though 
he is more deserving of a negative moral judgment. Nevertheless, I use the term sucker 
moving forward because of its status as a technical term. 
66 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 4. 




Just like the tragedy of the commons, the Hardin herder game may seem a bit 
forced, but as with the tragedy the emphasis is on the logic at work in the game. Since the 
dominant strategy for each player is to defect, two rational individuals will never choose 
to cooperate, even if doing so would lead to a better outcome for both players. Ostrom 
concludes the prisoner’s dilemma fascinates scholars because, “The paradox that 
individually rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes seems to challenge 
a fundamental faith that rational human beings can achieve rational results.”68 As long as 
the structure of the game is not changed and the players only pursue their own immediate 
outcomes as the only value to take into account, rational individuals will not achieve 
outcomes that leave everyone better off.69 Fortunately, small changes in the structure of 
the prisoner’s dilemma game, for example, allowing the players to communicate with 
each other, can lead to big differences in outcomes.70 
Similar to the Hardin herder game, the prisoner’s dilemma game can be applied 
to health care. The game can relatively straightforwardly be turned into a “physician’s 
dilemma” or a “hospital’s dilemma,” to give just two examples.71 Suppose there are two 
general practitioners with a comparable patient base of 100 patients each. The physicians 
have to make a decision about the amount of resources to use to treat their patients.72 I 
                                                          
68 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 5. 
69 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 37. 
70 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 69. 
71 Other imaginable games are the “administrator’s dilemma” and the “patient’s 
dilemma,” in which the dominant strategy with regards to resource usage of two players, 
administrators and patients respectively, is to defect rather than to cooperate. 
72 The example makes abstraction of the relationship between resource usage and quality 
of care (see also footnote 4). The assumption is that overuse is the necessary result of 




assume they share a fixed yearly budget (i.e., global budget), with a size of R, which means 
there is an upper limit to the number of patients that can be treated with the available 
resources. If the two physicians decide on a cooperative strategy, each will use R/2 of the 
available resources to care for their patients. But if they defect, each will use as much of 
the resources as she thinks she can use to treat her patients. I set the outcomes for the 
different combinations of strategies as follows: If both physicians cooperate, limiting their 
resource use to R/2, they are both able to treat 90 patients. If both of them defect, 
attempting to use as many resources as possible to treat their own patients, then they 
will only be able to care for 70 patients each.73 If one of the physicians defects while the 
other does not, then the defector is able to treat all 100 of her patients, while the sucker 
is left with enough resources to care for 60 of her patients. The basic assumptions of the 
game being the same as the prisoner’s dilemma (i.e., non-cooperation and full 
information), the dominant strategy for both physicians is to defect regardless of the 
other physician’s decision. Therefore, both physicians defect rather than cooperate, 
leaving 40 patients untreated.74 A possible objection against the physician’s dilemma 
                                                          
resources a physician can expend on the treatment of any patient. That being said, there 
often are diminishing returns when using health care resources to treat patients. The real 
challenge would be for both physicians to treat all patients for whom they are responsible 
with the best possible outcomes for each patient and their respective medical condition. 
73 The outcome if both physicians defect might seem odd, or even unreasonable, but keep 
in mind the physician’s dilemma is primarily intended to highlight the irrational outcomes 
of individuals pursuing rational strategies. That being said, a possible explanation for the 
outcome could be that in case of defection by both physicians, the practitioners run out 
of resources before the end of the year, leaving them with only the most basic resources, 
the physician’s black bag, to treat patients for the remainder of the year. 
74 The temptation (T) to cheat, having the ability to treat 100 patients, must be larger than 
the reward (R) for cooperation, having enough resources to care for 90 patients, which 




game is the contrived use of a fixed yearly budget. Even though fixed global physician 
budgets are increasingly being used, they for good reasons do not put a hard limit on the 
physician’s available resources, as is the case in the physician’s dilemma, but instead use 
financial incentives to reward and punish physicians that stay under and go over their 
global budgets respectively.75 When included in the physician’s dilemma, the use of 
financial incentives alters the payoffs of the game, possibly making it more attractive for 
physicians to cooperate rather than to defect.76 Notice, however, that many other forms 
of paying for physician services, like fee-for-service, in which there is no fixed budget, 
remove all incentives for the physician to cooperate, as she can extract as many resources 
as she likes in the knowledge the resources will be replenished anyway, driving up 
resource usage and thus health care expenditures over time.77 Rather than discussing the 
                                                          
treat 70 patients, which must be larger than the sucker’s payoff (S), being left with enough 
resources to treat 60 patients. (T > R > P >S) 
75 Global physician budgets can be treated as common-pool resources. I talk more about 
this in the next section. (John Hurley and Robert Card, “Global Physician Budgets as 
Common-Property Resources: Some Implications for Physicians and Medical 
Associations,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 154, no. 8 (1996).) 
76 The use of incentives does not necessarily make it more attractive for the physicians to 
cooperate, because the incentive would have to be such that the reward (R) to cooperate 
becomes larger than the temptation to cheat (T). Therefore, altering the structure of the 
game, for example by allowing communication, might be a less costly way to stimulate 
cooperation.  
77 In laboratory experiments, resource extraction often follows a pulsing pattern, meaning 
individuals use resources until there is a strong reduction in yield, at which point they 
extract fewer resources. A pattern that is repeated over time. (Ostrom, Understanding 
Institutional Diversity, 83.) Applied to the physician’s dilemma, if the game would be 
repeated, the disastrous result of the strategy to defect in the first year might lead the 
physicians to extract resources at a lower rate in the following year. Since such feedback 
in the form of less resource availability due to overexploitation is absent in real-life health 
care settings, there is no signal for physicians to decrease their use of resources. On the 
contrary, resource use keeps increasing over time, which may eventually lead to a 




hospital’s dilemma game in detail, which would be analogous to the Hardin herder game 
and the physician’s dilemma game, I want to look at two concrete examples to make the 
logic of the “physician’s dilemma” and the “hospital’s dilemma” more plausible. 
The physician’s dilemma game may seem farfetched, but the idea of physician 
synchrony, briefly discussed by David Eddy in his book Clinical Decision Making (1996), 
closely resembles the logic of the physician’s dilemma. The idea of synchrony between 
physicians, which Eddy believes at least some physicians adhere to, is that if each 
physician focuses on the good for her patients, this will optimize health outcomes for 
everyone.78 In other words, each physician makes decisions to optimize the good for a 
particular patient and combined all these decisions by individual physicians for their 
patients, through some sort of invisible hand, lead to the greatest good for all. Two 
physicians, both adherents of the idea of synchrony, would decide to defect rather than 
to cooperate, after all they believe this will lead to the best health outcomes for their 
patients as well as for the patients of other physicians, thus driving up resource usage and 
health care expenditures. The hospital’s dilemma can be illustrated with the example of 
positron emission tomography (PET) scanners in Belgian hospitals. Ideally, hospitals 
cooperate when it comes to the use of PET scanners, which are expensive to purchase 
and operate, particularly in a small country like Belgium. According to an estimate by the 
Health Care Knowledge Centre (KCE), the Belgian equivalent of NICE, the country only 
needs 10 such scanners, because hospitals can collaborate regionally, with a minimum 
                                                          
78 David Eddy, Clinical Decision Making. From Theory to Practice. A Collection of Essays 
from The Journal of the American Medical Association (Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett 




impact on patients (e.g., wait times, driving distance). In 2013, however, there were no 
less than 30 PET scanners, spread across 22 different hospitals.79 The decision of hospitals 
to get one, or sometimes more, scanners can be seen as a defect strategy, whereas the 
decision to share scanners can be seen as a cooperative strategy. The example of the PET 
scanners can easily be expanded to fit the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma game. In 
both examples, individually rational strategies lead to a collectively irrational outcome.  
The physician’s dilemma and the hospital’s dilemma are, of course, 
oversimplifications. Ostrom admits that the mathematical tools of game theory are 
powerful and enlightening, but can only be used to elucidate the structure of relatively 
simple situations.80 Even in the case of highly structured but much more complex games, 
game theory quickly becomes unwieldy, which is not promising for its application to the 
messy realities of health care. I nonetheless believe applying game theory to health care 
can be valuable for the following reasons: First, despite the complexities of health care, 
game theory can be used to elucidate key interactions between health care actors, which 
can be represented as games.81 Similar to the virtual commons discussed in the previous 
section, it might be worthwhile to focus on specific interactions in health care through 
the lens of game theory. Second, game theory can be useful to suggest policies to improve 
cooperation in the management of resources in health care, much like Ostrom uses game 
theory to develop policies for the successful management of natural common-pool 
resources. To give a very straightforward example, according to game theory, cooperation 
                                                          
79 Peter Backx, “30 PET-scanners in Belgische Ziekenhuizen,” Artsenkrant 2294 (2013): 7. 
80 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 34. 




becomes a possibility when games are set up to last an indefinite number of rounds.82 
Since health care systems are set up to last indefinitely, here too cooperation is a 
possibility, at least in theory, but can be stimulated by building long-term relationships 
between health care actors. Game theory also shows cooperation is much more difficult 
to achieve in large group than in small groups, which suggests the best way to increase 
cooperation in health care is to first develop small-scale initiatives and then attempt to 
expand them, using the small-scale initiatives as incubators for cooperation. Lastly, and 
closely related to the previous point, showing the logic of the Hardin herder game applies 
to many situations in health care furthers my claim of a tragedy of commons. The 
physician’s dilemma and hospital’s dilemma games show that health care actors need to 
find ways to deal with self-interest broadly conceived, which includes fiduciary obligations 
physicians have to their patients.83 If left unchecked self-interest has the potential to 
destroy the health care commons. The pursuit of self-interest, as in the standard Nash-
equilibrium assumed in game theory, may lead to a reduction in individual gains in the 
long run.84 
 
                                                          
82 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 54. 
83 Many health care actors are narrowly self-interested, for example, a hospital investing 
in a PET scanner because of the financial benefits, prestige, and fear of losing patients to 
competitors. However, many health care actors behave as defectors because of their 
genuine and longstanding focus on the interests of others, for example, a physician who 
deliberately miscodes a treatment to make sure it is covered by the patient’s health 
insurance. The latter can be thought of as mediated self-interest, because the physician 
acts in the self-interest of the patient. The motivations of the actor do not matter when 
it comes to the tragedy of the commons, as laudable and despicable motivations alike can 
lead to overuse and destruction of the available resources. 




1.6 ARGUMENT III: TYPE OF GOOD 
A final argument in support of the claim that health care is heading toward a tragedy of 
the commons is to point out health care resources are common-pool resources, because 
they possess the characteristics of such goods. Traditionally, economists divide goods into 
two different types, private and public, where it is worth noting that this division is 
consistent “[…] with the dichotomy of the institutional world into private property 
exchanges in a market setting and government-owned property organized by a public 
hierarchy.”85 In 1965, James Buchanan, like Ostrom a laureate of the Nobel Memorial 
Prize in Economic Science, added a third type of good. He called this third type “club 
goods” or “toll goods.”86 Ostrom, together with her husband Vincent Ostrom, 
distinguished a fourth type of good, which they named “common-pool resources” (CPRs). 
The four different types of goods are differentiated from one another on the basis of two 
characteristics, subtractability and excludability. Subtractability refers to the extent to 
which use by one individual subtracts from the availability of the resources for 
consumption by others.87 In other words, the consumption of resource units by one 
individual to more or lesser extent removes those units from what is available to others.88 
The following straightforward examples illustrate the concept: enjoying a park does not 
subtract (much) from its ability to be enjoyed by others, meaning the subtractability of a 
park is low, but eating a hamburger implies someone else cannot enjoy it, so the 
                                                          
85 Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex 
Economic Systems,” The American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June [2009] 2010): 410. 
86 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 78. 
87 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 23. 




subtractability of a hamburger is high. Rather than being an all-or-nothing variable, 
subtractability ranges in magnitude.89 Excludability, which Ostrom sometimes calls 
“exclusion,” refers to the ease with which one can exclude or limit individuals from using 
a resource once it is provided.90,91 Two examples can clarify the concept: it is easy to 
exclude potential beneficiaries from using a car, while it is difficult to exclude possible 
users from a forest. Like subtractability, excludability can range in magnitude. The 
characteristics of subtractability and excludability can be used to make a distinction 
between the four different types of goods (see Table 1.1: The four types of goods). 
CPRs share the attribute of high subtractability of use with private goods and the 
characteristic of difficult excludability of use with public goods.92 Thus, CPRs are natural 
or artificial resources from which it is difficult to exclude or limit users once the resources 
are provided and the use of which removes the consumed resource units from the 
available resources, making them no longer available to other individuals.93,94 
                                                          
89 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 79. 
90 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 6. 
91  At times, and somewhat confusingly, Ostrom describes excludability in terms of the 
difficulty, rather than the ease, with which one can exclude individuals from using the 
resource. Two prominent examples are her discussion of the features of common-pool 
resources in Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005) and in her Nobel Prize Lecture 
(2009). (See: Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 23, 79; Ostrom, “Beyond 
Markets and States,” 412-413.) Ostrom does not provide a rationale for her choice to 
define excludability in terms of the difficulty to exclude potential beneficiaries in these 
writings, but the change fits with small variations in her depiction of the classification of 
goods throughout her work (see Table 1.1: The four types of goods). I define excludability 
in terms of the ease of excluding resource users because it is the more intuitive 
conceptualization and appears to be the common usage of the term.  
92 Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 412. 
93 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 79-80. 
94 Ostrom’s definition of CPRs differs slightly from one work to another, but always relies 




Table 1.1: The four types of goods. 
 
 
















(Source: Ostrom, E., Governing the Commons (1990), p. 7.) 
 
The pasture in Hardin’s fictional example is a CPR because it possesses the characteristics 
of high subtractability and difficult excludability. The resources consumed by the animals 
of one herdsman can no longer be consumed by those of another and denying herders 
access to the pasture is difficult. According to Ostrom and her colleagues, the 
characteristics of subtractability and excludability can create commons dilemmas “[…] in 
which people following their own short-term interests produce outcomes that are not in 
anyone’s long-term interest.”95 Therefore, individuals sharing CPRs potentially face a 
tragedy of the commons. The possibility of a commons dilemma and an ensuing tragedy 
of the commons makes sense in light of the characteristics. After all, when the users know 
                                                          
use the term common-pool resources (CRPs) to refer to resource systems regardless of 
property rights involved. CPRs include natural and human constructed resources in which 
(i) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and institutional means is especially costly, 
and (ii) exploitation by one user reduces resource availability for others.” (Elinor Ostrom, 
Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Policansky, 
“Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges,” Science 284, no. 5412 (April 
1999): 278.) This particular definition is useful because it highlights the aforementioned 
difference between the CPRs and the property rights.   




resources consumed by one individual are no longer available to others, they will likely 
try to appropriate as much of the available resources as they can for fear they will not be 
available later.96 When it is difficult to exclude users from appropriating the resources, 
they are more likely to extract resources without concern for the negative effects and/or 
without themselves contributing to the pool of resources, so-called “free-riding.”97  
 As with the two previous arguments, the question is whether this line of reasoning 
applies to health care. The key characteristics of high subtractability and difficult 
excludability do seem to apply to many resources in health care, which makes them CPRs. 
Of course, there is the aforementioned issue of health care resources being amorphous, 
so it is not difficult to find examples of health care resources that are not CPRs, like a 
physician’s personal stethoscope, which is a private good. Nonetheless, many resources 
in health care do appear to be CPRs, particularly when resources are monetized.  
The first characteristic, the high subtractability of health care resources, is the 
easiest to ascertain, keeping in mind it is impossible for one to have their cake and eat it 
too. Resources used by one actor in health care in many cases are no longer available to 
others, from a cancer drug used by a patient over the money used to pay a health care 
professional to the new intensive care unit built by a hospital, to give only a few examples. 
Even resources that at first sight may not appear highly subtractable, upon closer scrutiny 
often do possess this characteristic, consider the following example: Once purchased or 
leased, a PET scanner might not seem to be a highly subtractable resource, but 
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nonetheless is characterized by this feature. The scanner can only run a certain number 
of scans within a given period of time, say a year, and each scan costs a certain amount 
of money. This means that every time a patient “consumes” a scan, which can easily be 
monetized, the resources used to perform that scan are no longer available to someone 
else. Of course, each scanner has the capacity and budget to perform a large number of 
scans each year, but the characteristic of subtractability nonetheless applies.  
Applying the second characteristic, excludability, to health care resources is a bit 
more difficult. In the case of most natural resource commons, the difficulty of excluding 
potential beneficiaries is obvious, but it seems easy enough to exclude actors from using 
health care resources, for example, through premiums and fees. The application of the 
second characteristic is complicated by the fact that excludability can apply to the 
difficulty of excluding or limiting resource usage by members, non-members, or both. In 
a health care context, the problem of exclusion applies to both members and non-
members. The difficulty of excluding or limiting members from using resources once they 
are provided is the most important issue in health care. The following two examples make 
this clear: First, once a physician is on a hospital’s staff that physician, as a member of the 
hospital, can make use of its resources. Rules need to be in place to keep the physician 
from extracting resources, like using hospital money to redecorate her private doctor’s 
office, or to limit her ability to appropriate the hospital’s resources, say the number of 
certain test she is allowed to order per patient. Second, an insured patient is a member 
of his insurance plan and as such he has a claim to resources, after all he contributed to 




from extracting resources, say if he wants a cosmetic procedure, or to limit his use of the 
resources, like the maximum number of some test he is allowed to use.98 Putting in place 
rules to exclude or limit resource usage can be relatively straightforward, meaning 
exclusion is easy, but in many cases is difficult, among others due to the emphasis on 
physician autonomy and the special moral importance of health care (see 4.3.2.2.1 
Explaining the Special Moral Importance of Health Care). The latter is also the reason why 
it is difficult to exclude or limit resource use by non-members. The exclusion of non-
members is easy in the previous examples, since a physician who does not work for a 
hospital can readily be kept from using its resources and an uninsured patient cannot 
make use of the insurer’s pool of resources, but in some cases it is more difficult to 
exclude or limit resource usage by non-members, like in the case of an uninsured patient 
who shows up to the emergency room requiring urgent medical care. Medical staff 
withholding cooperation or denying access to medical equipment is easy in theory, but 
raises serious ethical concerns in practice, making it difficult to exclude patients from 
using health care resources. While the latter is not the most pressing case of excludability 
in health care, it is provides a clear illustration of the challenge posed by the difficulty of 
excluding resources users. In order to avert the tragedy of the health care commons, the 
issue of excludability needs to be solved when it comes to excluding or limiting resource 
                                                          
98 To provide a more common and concrete example, consider an insured patient who 
would benefit from a treatment that is not covered by their insurance, i.e., the patient 
should be excluded from the particular resource. However, it will be difficult for a 
physician to deny their patient the treatment, among others, due to the strength of the 
fiduciary relationship (see also footnote 83). The example nicely illustrates the difficulty 




usage by both members and non-members. Indeed, excludability may be the key 
challenge in managing health care resources, given the unwillingness among providers 
and the public to exclude patients from the available resources.99  
The problem of excludability is sketched poignantly by Eddy in Clinical Decision 
Making (1996). While many in society are concerned about paying for health care, 
everyone wants to shift the responsibility when it comes to bearing the costs of health 
care.100 A classic example of a social dilemma (see 1.3 The Tragedy of the Commons). The 
issue is aggravated by the widespread belief that doctors should spare no cost when it 
comes to treating their patients. Indeed, many people find it unethical to consider cost in 
the provision of health care.101 As a result, excluding patients and physicians from using 
scarce health care resources is particularly challenging. However, costs are real and 
people care about them, there is no way to simply make the problem disappear, even 
though costs are all too often hidden or disguised.102 However, obscuring the problem of 
costs can make it even more difficult to exclude resource users from extracting resources. 
I explore Eddy’s argument a bit further, because it sheds additional light on the tragedy 
of the health care commons. Eddy discusses that many health care resources are in effect 
                                                          
99 Users’ reflex to appropriate as many of the available resources now out of fear they will 
not be available later likely plays a much smaller role in health care, if it plays a role at all, 
at least as long as a catastrophic tragedy does not seem imminent. On the contrary, 
resource users likely believe the system will exist in perpetuity, or at least behave as if it 
will. This creates a new risk, however, as resource users believe their small acts do not 
affect the immortal behemoth, but the aggregate of all these small actions deplete the 
system’s resources over time. 
100 Eddy, Clinical Decision Making, 69. 
101 Eddy, Clinical Decision Making, 70. 




pooled because such pooling of resources allows to spread the financial cost of medical 
care over many resource users. He provides the following examples: private health 
insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), and 
charities.103 “Individuals pay funds into the pool according to a variety of formulas […] and 
draw funds from the pool when the need arises.”104 Thus, Eddy confirms that many health 
care resources are indeed CPRs. However, he also recognizes that the pooling of resources 
brings with it the risk of conflict between resource users, which he describes as a conflict 
between individual and society.105 This conflict arises whenever an individual receives a 
disproportionate share of resources (e.g., services), but does not replenish them (i.e., pay 
for them).106 As a result, someone else must either forego the resources that were used, 
or take responsibility for replenishing them.107 Eddy writes, “many activities in medicine 
that make great sense from the point of view of an individual patient may not make sense 
when the perspective is widened to encompass other activities for other people – what 
we call society.”108 This conflict between individual and society nicely captures the tension 
at the heart of the tragedy of the health care commons. 
To return to the characteristics of subtractability and excludability, I briefly want 
to discuss the idea of global budgets, for example the aforementioned global physician 
budgets.109 Implemented on a larger scale, the use of global budgets has been suggested 
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as a way to control costs in health care systems in general and in the United States health 
care system in particular.110,111 The characteristic of high subtractability applies to such 
budgets, as resources extracted from the global budget by one actor are no longer 
available for use by another actor. For example, if a regional health care system uses a 
global budget and one hospital uses funds from this budget to purchase a PET-scanner, 
then those funds are no longer available for use by another hospital. The characteristic of 
difficult excludability applies as well, as it is hard to exclude actors from using the 
budgeted resources. As mentioned before, it is necessary to distinguish between 
members and non-members, where the former have the right to use the budgeted 
resources, while the latter do not. For example, an insurer making use of a global budget 
must distinguish between insured (members) and uninsured (non-members) patients. A 
mechanism then needs to be put in place to regulate resource usage by members. Such a 
system is nontrivial, since self-interested and rational members want to extract as many 
resources as possible from the budget. Moreover, as members they likely feel more 
entitled to the available resources. In addition, the special nature of health care 
sometimes makes it difficult to distinguish between members and non-members, as there 
often will be a strong impetus to use resources from the global health care budget for 
non-members, say to treat uninsured patients. The straightforward applicability of 
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subtractability and excludability to global health care budgets makes these budgets one 
of the most clear-cut examples of CPRs in the context of health care.  
1.7 AVERTING THE TRAGEDY OF THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS 
The three preceding arguments help to explain the creeping tragedy of the health care 
commons that is already taking place, and indicate a more catastrophic collapse of health 
care systems is not science fiction. So how can the tragedy of the health care commons 
be averted?  
A multitude of solutions have been tried to ward off the tragedy, among others, 
the aforementioned moves to global budgets and ACOs. Indeed, governance regimes that 
are or resemble commons have been tried as well, like the initiative in Grand Junction 
(see 0.4 The Double Aim of the Project).112 Nevertheless, most attention has been given 
to solutions that rely on the institutional models of market and state. As mentioned 
above, Hardin believes these to be the only solutions, but even before him it was generally 
assumed that property should either be state owned or be privately owned, because if it 
was not then the assumption was the resource would be abused and degraded.113 Even 
today, Hardin’s conviction that states and markets, or a combination thereof, are the sole 
solutions to avert the tragedy is shared by many. In Governing the Commons (1990), 
Ostrom confirms current policy prescriptions for averting the tragedy of the commons 
tend to fall within the state-market dichotomy, either “Leviathan as the ‘only’ way” or 
                                                          
112 The few dozen health cooperatives that came into existence when Obamacare was 
introduced, but now are almost all defunct, are another example of a commons-like 
approach.  




“privatization as the ‘only’ way.”114 She emphasizes, however, that organizations are 
seldom exclusively public, “the state,” or private, “the market,” but most often are rich 
mixtures of “public-like” and “private-like” institutions, defying classification in a strict 
dichotomy (see 0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy).115 The issue is that too much 
high-level theorizing continues to build on the dichotomy, the challenge then becomes to 
move past the bifurcation and open up a conceptual space to think of institutions in more 
complex ways that, among others, do justice to the possibility of emergent cooperation 
at the middle-level as an alternative to the status quo institutions.  
 The heavy emphasis on state and market as the only possible solutions to policy 
issues in general and the management of CPRs in particular appears to be a remarkable 
case of path dependence. A good example is the influence of the aforementioned 
distinction between private and public goods, generally accepted by economists until 
1965, which neatly aligns with the dichotomy and steers solutions to resource governance 
issues in the direction of the institutions of market and state.116 The sheer amount of 
attention these solutions have received historically in academia and policymaking has 
reinforced the status of market and state as the institutional models to solve resource 
governance issues, but has simultaneously blinded many academics and policymakers 
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goods, but then went on to reinforce the status quo institutions as solutions to the 




alike to the possibility of alternative solutions to avert the tragedy of the commons.117 
The continuing influence of the abstract models of market and state on policymaking 
became clear in the political discussions surrounding the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which 
were pervaded by vague and ideological notions of market and state that were far 
removed from the complex institutional realities of the mixed American health care 
system. As if a set of complex and context-dependent resource governance issues can 
only have one of two vaguely defined institutional solutions.118 Because the models of 
market and state have an intellectual quasi-monopoly within academic research and 
policymaking, they tend to crowd out models that emphasize the possibility of emergent 
cooperation between resource users,119 both at the level of abstract institutional models 
and at the level concrete organizational solutions (see 0.5.2 Organizations).120  
                                                          
117 To give another example of the enduring impact of institutional concepts, Rudolf Klein 
argues that the distrust of local government and the emphasis on central control in the 
United Kingdom is (in part) the result of the implementation of the Benthamite principle 
of “lesser eligibility,” which has been repudiated, but the institutional emphasis on central 
control has remained. (Rudolf Klein, “Self-inventing Institutions: Institutional Design and 
the U.K. Welfare State,” in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert Goodin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 242-243.)    
118 To use an imperfect analogy, imagine the issue at hand is turning on the light, a 
context-dependent problem of varying complexity, and the only two available solutions 
are pressing a button or flipping a switch. In many cases, the available solutions will work 
fine, one will be able to turn on the light, but in a lot of cases pressing and flipping will not 
work, maybe because there is a pull cord or a dimmer switch, regardless of how hard one 
tries to apply the tried-and-true solutions. Seen the relatively simple nature of the issue, 
in practice people will quickly come up with an alternative solution, but by doing so they 
step outside of the dichotomy. The example highlights the difference and tension 
between thinking in abstract models and in concrete solutions.  
119 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 152. 
120 The idea that market and state crowd out alternatives fits within Ostrom’s suggestion 
that it is possible to apply an evolutionary logic to institutions and organizations. (Elinor 
Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” Journal of Bioeconomics 16 




 As the discussion of rising health care costs has highlighted (see 1.2 A Tragedy of 
the Health Care Commons?), the current solutions to the governance of scarce health care 
resources are unable to manage resource use successfully, and thus to avert the tragedy 
of the health care commons. The ramifications of technological progress are one of the 
main reasons for overharvesting and possibly even depletion, as the introduction of new 
technologies in a system where it is difficult to exclude users from the available resources, 
which have alternative and mutually exclusive uses, puts evermore pressure on the pool 
of resources. The move from the physician with her black bag to modern health care 
technologies has in(tro)duced commons dilemmas that market and state institutions 
cannot solve because they are “out of sync” with the capabilities of new technologies,121 
meaning the institutions have not adapted to developments in the resource system and 
in the environment at large, for the increased rate of technological change is not unique 
to health care (see 2.7.3 The Challenge of Technological Change). The challenge posed by 
technological progress will soon be aggravated by ageing populations; a problem health 
care’s existing institutions likely will not be able to cope with either. The key reason 
market- and state-based solutions have been unable to get a grip on escalating costs and 
dwindling resources seems to be their inability to find a solution to the problem of 
                                                          
themselves have come to shape over time, making it difficult for alternatives to be 
successful. To draw an analogy with biological evolution, bar a mass extinction of 
humankind, the rise of artificial intelligence, or an alien invasion it is difficult to imagine 
another species taking the place of humans as the dominant species on earth. The rise 
and fall of the Obamacare cooperatives fits within such an evolutionary argument (see 
footnote 104). 
121 Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge 
Commons,” in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice, ed. 




excludability, i.e., deciding which resource users to exclude from what resources.122 
Adding commons institutions to the institutional mix may result in organizations that are 
better able to tackle the challenge posed by excludability, because the commons opens 
up a middle-space where resource users can meet each other to decide collaboratively 
and locally on issues of excludability (see also 1.8 The Commons Solution to Health Care’s 
Tragedy).123   
 Of course, the foregoing analysis does not imply that developed countries must 
get rid of market and state institutions as models to design health care organizations 
altogether, not in the least because academics and policymakers have built up 
considerable experience with these models and their application. There is, however, a 
need to add other models to the repertoire when developing concrete resource 
                                                          
122 The issue of excludability is inextricably bound to the problem of making tradeoffs 
between using health care resources (i.e., money) for one purpose rather than another. 
The latter seems to be a particular and more concrete version of the former (e.g., a 
patient is excluded from receiving proton-beam therapy but is not excluded from getting 
a hip replacement). 
123 A key issue, undertheorized in the literature, is the relationship between commons 
dilemmas and the definition of CPRs. While the tragedy of the commons results from both 
the excludability and the subtractability of CPRs, the solution to the commons dilemma 
almost always lies in solving the issue of excludability, as more often than not it is 
impossible to change the “fact” of subtractability, at least in the case of natural resources. 
The focus on solving the problem of excludability becomes clear when one analyzes the 
design principles of successful commons institutions (see 2.6 The Design Principles of 
Successful Commons Institutions), but the relationship between the design principles and 
the characteristic of excludability is seldom emphasized. It is worth highlighting that the 
emphasis on rules to resolve the challenges posed by excludability plausibly stems from 
commons research’s historic focus on natural resources, for which resource users are 
dependent on nature to replenish the available resource. In the case of artificial 
resources, however, the resources can more easily be replenished, say, through 
contributions from resource users. Thus, rethinking the design principles to apply to 
commons governing artificial CPRs may result in additional principles that are more 




governance solution, this to break open the “[…] path dependency of existing patterns of 
practice when their accompanying ways of thinking have not yielded results,”124 as has 
been the case in health care. Such a move “beyond markets and states”125 comes with 
the realization that some institutions work in some settings and not in others.126 States 
and markets, or a combination therefore, are often presented as abstract models that can 
be applied to and will work in all contexts, but they are not always successful. I conclude 
this section with the words of Ostrom: 
 
Continuing to presume that complex policy problems are simple problems that 
can be solved through the adoption of simple designs that are given general 
names, such as private property, government ownership, or community 
organization, is a dangerous academic approach. Dichotomizing the institutional 
world into “the market” as contrasted to “the state” is so grossly inadequate and 
barren that it is surprising how the dichotomy survives as a basic way of organizing 
academic studies and policy advice. Oversimplification of our design options is 
dangerous since it hides more of the working parts needed to design effective, 
sustainable institutions than it reveals.127 
 
1.8 THE COMMONS SOLUTION TO HEALTH CARE’S TRAGEDY 
Hardin, pointing resolutely in the direction of state and market as solutions to the tragedy 
of the commons, discredited cooperation between individuals as a possible solution to 
the tragedy offhand. After all, he sees the tragedy of the commons as inevitable without 
outside interference.128 This assumption, that change must come from the outside and 
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125 Yet another reference to the title of Ostrom’s Nobel Prize lecture Beyond Markets and 
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126 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 2. 
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be imposed upon rational and self-interested resource users (see 0.2 Market and State: 
A False Dichotomy), characterizes both the state and market solution.129,130 Ostrom, 
however, is interested in “[…] the question of how to enhance the capabilities of those 
involved to change the constraining rules of the game to lead to outcomes other than 
remorseless tragedies.”131 Therefore, she argues in favor of commons institutions, in 
which resource users develop a multitude of context-dependent solutions to managing 
CPRs through emergent cooperation. Ostrom does not claim commons institutions are 
the best, let alone the only, solution to the problem of successfully managing CPRs and 
averting commons tragedies. State, market, and commons institutions are not mutually 
exclusive competing models, but can be combined into complex and context-dependent 
solutions to concrete resource governance issues (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many 
Worlds?).132 In practice, many organizations already integrate features of all three 
models, but the persistent influence of the dichotomy makes it difficult to recognize or 
emphasize the role emergent cooperation can play in managing scarce resources. Instead 
of operating under the assumption that optimal rules, whether state- or market-based, 
can be easily developed and imposed at a low cost by external authorities, she believes 
“[…] that “getting the institutions right” is a difficult, time-consuming, conflict-invoking 
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130 Hardin’s market solution (i.e., privatization of common pastures) must be enacted by 
a state actor (Leviathan) as well, once again highlighting the schizophrenia of the market-
state dichotomy, even at the level of abstract models. 
131 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 7. 
132 David Bollier, “The Growth of the Commons Paradigm,” in Understanding Knowledge 
as a Commons: From Theory to Practice, ed. Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess 




process. [A] process that requires reliable information about time and place variables as 
well as a broad repertoire of culturally acceptable rules.”133 She adds that institutional 
solutions often do not work in practice as they do in abstract models, unless those models 
are well-specified and empirically valid.  Moreover, the participants in the field must 
understand how to make these new rules work.134 
 The enduring preference for market- and state-based solutions is informed by 
“wrong” assumptions in making policy recommendations:135 First, resource appropriators 
themselves are deemed incapable of designing rules to sustain resources overtime, 
whether they are patients, administrators, or hospitals.136 After all, resource users are 
modeled as homo economicus, behaving in a rational and self-interested manner, traits 
that cause the tragedy to begin with.137 Research has shown, however, that actors’ 
motivations are mixed. Thus, the imperfect model of a homo sociologicus (or homo 
reciprocans) is more accurate than the model of a perfect homo economicus (see 0.3 A 
Third Way: The Commons).138,139 As with the abstract ideal models of state and market, 
the perfect model of the homo economicus in fact holds back the progress of successfully 
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resources are so interconnected that they must be managed centrally. (Ostrom, 
Understanding Institutional Diversity, 220.) 
136 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 220. 
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managing CPRIs, much in the same way that the progress of astronomy was held back due 
to the modeling in perfect forms.140 In the realm of social dilemmas, little empirical 
support exists for an assumption that all individuals value only the material outcomes that 
flow only to them, which points in the direction of a more realistic, but unfortunately also 
more complex, model of human behavior.141 Second, designing solutions to improve 
outcomes is assumed to be a relatively simple task best done by objective analysts or 
experts.142 However, this approach overlooks the complexities of different contexts and 
the importance of local knowledge possessed by resource users, which I discuss in more 
detail in the next chapter (see 2.2 The Ostrom Approach).143 
 Research has shown that many groups of resource users do in fact succeed in 
effectively managing and sustaining CPRs if they have suitable conditions, like appropriate 
rules, good conflict-resolutions mechanisms, and well-defined group boundaries (see 2.6 
The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions).144 While most of these 
successes have taken place in the context of the management of natural resources, health 
care actors as well have successfully adopted commons strategies (e.g., Grand Junction, 
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141 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 110. 
142 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 220. 
143 That being said, the solution to governing scarce health care resources is not as simple 
as relying on local knowledge to develop small-scale, context-dependent strategies. Local 
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Kaiser Permanente), even if they were not aware their solutions fit within a new and rich 
field of inquiry. The users of health care resources, from patients over physicians to 
hospitals, can learn from these successes and rely on them to develop their own 
commons institutions to manage scarce health care resources and to avoid the tragedy 
of the health care commons. This shows the importance of applying the tragedy of the 
commons to health care. Not only does the approach supply an entirely new language 
and body of research that can be applied to existing initiatives in the governance of health 
care resources, but commons research also paves the way for a multitude of new 
institutional solutions for the management of scarce health care resources, and for 
keeping the tragedy of the health care commons from taking place.  
1.9 CONCLUSION 
Hebert Simon, yet another Laureate of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 
repeatedly pointed out the complexity of designing humanly engineered systems, from 
computer over road networks to institutional arrangements. He especially stressed that 
no complex system can be fully planned to achieve optimal performance.145 Applied to 
highly complex health care systems, Simon would oppose attempts to apply the “two-
sizes-fit-all” approaches of state and market to manage scarce health care resources. 
Academics and policymakers alike must resist the temptation of being drawn into the so-
called “abstract model trap,” sometimes called the “ideological model trap.”146 Based on 
the figures and arguments presented in this chapter, the tragedy of the health care 
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commons appears inevitable, whether in the form of a slow crumbling or a catastrophic 
collapse. The prevailing and dominant institutional arrangements of market and state 
appear unsuccessful in their efforts to delay the growth in health care expenditures, and 
thus to avert the tragedy of the health care commons.  
 The goal of this first chapter was to show that health care is susceptible to a 
tragedy of the commons, health care resources can be seen as CPRs, and commons 
institutions are a possible “third-way” to manage health care resources. In what follows, 
I develop a framework for talking about, identifying, and developing health care commons 
institutions. The commons should not be seen as a manifesto, ideology, or buzzword; but 
rather a flexible template for talking about the rich ways in which the users of health care 
resources can manage these scarce resources.147 There already exist commons initiatives 
to manage health care resources, like regional health collaboratives, while other existing 
institutional arrangements can be analyzed and further developed using Ostrom’s tools, 
like ACOs. Eventually, the goal is sustainable health care reform, which does not only 
mean that health care resources are managed in a sustainable manner, thus averting the 
tragedy, but also that health care institutions should continuously be reformed through 
time (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons).148 One approach to achieving such sustainable 
reform, an approach that can supplement the existing state and market solutions, is to 
divvy up the health care commons into smaller, virtual health care commons that can be 
managed by health care commons organizations. Important to keep in mind is that there 
                                                          
147 Bollier, “The Growth of the Commons Paradigm,” 38.  
148 Peter Berman, “Health Sector Reform: Making Health Development Sustainable,” 




is no such thing as the commons approach, but rather an infinite number of approaches 
developed by resource users and tailored to specific commons, small and large. Ostrom 
does not offer a panacea, and anyone who does is probably a fraud. On the contrary, she 
argues against thinking in terms of abstractly modeled solutions that can be implemented 
in all contexts. According to Ostrom, the answer to resource management problems is “it 
depends.”   
Like the state and market solutions to managing scarce health care resources, 
commons institutions have their shortcomings: First, they are not immune to the 
challenge of increasing rates of change, for example technological progress, making it 
difficult to develop sustainable institutions. Commons institutions do not magically solve 
the issues of new technologies and ageing populations, but will have to find a way to deal 
with these challenges as well. Second, even though the evidence is mixed, developing 
commons organizations appears to be more difficult when the resources users are a 
heterogeneous rather than a homogenous group.149 As populations across the developed 
world become more diverse, resource users will likely find it more difficult to self-organize 
into commons organizations. Third, commons organizations tend to work best on a small 
scale.150 However, this should not be a defeating shortcoming of the commons models, 
as organizations can be developed on a small scale and then scaled up. Finally, developing 
commons organizations requires for conditional cooperators to be able to find each other 
through either institutional or spatial connections, because otherwise cooperation 
                                                          
149 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 252-253. 




cannot start, or collapses.151 And there is, of course, the possibility that most health care 
professionals and (future) patients behave, and will continue to behave, as rational 
egoists.152 Therefore, the success of the commons model requires a shift in behavior from 
health care actors, from rational self-interest to collaboration.  
 Institutions cannot only ameliorate bad outcomes, but unfortunately they can also 
exacerbate them, as may very well be the case in health care. However, institutions are 
the key tool for fallible humans to enable themselves to overcome social dilemmas and 
averting commons tragedies.153 As far as coming up with new institutional solutions to 
the existing problem of managing scarce health care resources goes, this first chapter 
tried to point out the following: “The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping 
from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of have been, into every 
corner of our minds.”154 This quote from John Maynard Keynes describes the spirit of the 
remainder of the project. 
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152 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 131.  
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OSTROM’S BLACK BAG 
 
“Our public men have, besides politics, their 
private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary 
citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of 
industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for, 
unlike any other nation, we regard the citizen who 
takes no part in these duties not as unambitious 
but as useless, and we are able to judge proposals 
even if we cannot originate them; instead of 
looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the 
way of action, we think it an indispensable 
preliminary to any wise action at all.”1 
- Thucydides II.40 - 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I presented a series of classic arguments to show health care is 
succumbing to a creeping tragedy of the commons, and is plausibly at risk of falling victim 
to a more catastrophic collapse. The chapter concluded by briefly touching upon Ostrom’s 
cooperative solution to the management of scarce health care resources. Now, I further 
explore commons institutions as an alternative approach to successfully managing scarce 
health care resources. After looking at some of the features that set apart Ostrom’s 
research (see 2.2 The Ostrom Approach), I consider the issue of defining 
                                                          
1 Jon Elster, “Introduction,” in Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998,), 1. 
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commons institutions (see 2.3 Commons Institutions). To illustrate, I briefly discuss a 
typical commons example from the literature (see 2.4 A Common Scenario). The focal 
point of the chapter is an in depth discussion of the two main tools for cooperatively 
managing CPRs: the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (see 2.5 The 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework) and the eight design principles of 
successful commons institutions (see 2.6 The Design Principles of Successful Commons 
Institutions). I conclude by discussing the main challenges to the robust governance of 
scarce health care resources by means of commons institutions (see 2.7 Challenges Face 
by the Health Care Commons). In tandem with the previous chapter (see 1. The Tragedy 
of the Health Care Commons), the aim is to provide a thorough introduction to some of 
the key discussions in commons research for those unfamiliar with the commons 
literature. 
 The IAD framework, design principles, and challenges are referenced and applied 
throughout the following chapters (see 3. A Polycentric Experiment and 4. A4R in 
Practice). Therefore, cross-references to the relevant sections in the chapters that follow 
are provided between parentheses. I strive to be comprehensive in these references, but 
inevitably I will be unable to highlight and discuss all the relationships between this 
chapter and the arguments presented in the next chapters. Whether for reasons of 
conciseness or simply because I have overlooked, or maybe not yet realized, the relevance 
of commons research for a particular debate. Thus, understanding the tools in Ostrom’s 
black bag will not only help the reader to better understand the chapters to come, but 
will also allow them to discover new relationships and develop applications of their own. 
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 The chapter provides a number of contributions to both the commons literature 
and the philosophy of health care. The three most important developments are the 
following: First, I relate the main tools of commons research (i.e., the IAD framework and 
the design principles) to health care, making them available for reflection and use in a 
new arena. Second, I critically reflect on some of the central concepts of commons 
research. Given that commons research is a young and relatively minor strand in 
economics, hitherto the field has not been subject to much philosophical reflection. 
Finally, I provide what is arguably the most detailed and critical discussion of the design 
principles of successful commons institutions currently available (see 2.6 The Design 
Principles of Successful Commons Institutions). The chapter contains several minor 
contributions, among others, critical discussions of the framework-theory-model 
distinction (see 2.2.1 Escaping the Panacea Trap), the use of local knowledge in health 
care (see 2.2.2 Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge), and the curious matter of 
defining commons institutions (see 2.3 Commons Institutions). 
2.2 THE OSTROM APPROACH 
Ostrom draws on a broad range of disciplines and theories (see 3.2.2 Plural Institutions). 
At the same time, she firmly grounds her work in practice, and has a strong desire to do 
justice to the intricacies of studying real-world commons institutions, and the 
complications of overcoming existing tragedies of the commons. The result is a 
methodological approach that in and of itself can be the subject of a research project. The 




2.2.1 ESCAPING THE PANACEA TRAP: THEORIES, MODELS, AND FRAMEWORKS 
Ostrom does not suggest one-size-fits-all institutional arrangements to solve resource 
allocation problems. In fact, she is strongly opposed against the uniform application of 
abstract institutional models to solve such problems,2 which she calls the “panacea trap,”3 
because she believes model solutions are unable to do justice to the complexities of 
resource management issues, which differ on a case-by-case basis.4 “The search for one 
best rule for solving all CPR problems is doomed for failure.”5 Lucy Gilson highlights the 
uniform application of abstract models is commonplace in health care, and agrees with 
Ostrom’s insistence on doing justice to complexity when she remarks the following: 
 
[…] many recent health reforms are apparently underpinned by an understanding 
of the health system that “… seems oddly ‘transparent’: a set of rules and formal 
organisations that can be rewritten, reorganised, and redirected, given the 
political will” (Mackintosh, 2000, p. 176). Future analysis and policy development 
must recognize that health systems are complex socio-political institutions and 
not merely delivery points for biomedical interventions.6   
 
                                                          
2 The temptation to uniformly apply models is sometimes called the “abstract model 
trap.” (Eric Schokkaert, professor of health economics at the University of Leuven, used 
this term in his keynote address at the 2015 Ethics of Economic Institutions conference at 
Utrecht University.)  
3 Mark Pennington, “Elinor Ostrom and the robust political economy of common-pool 
resources,” Journal of Institutional Economics 9, no. 4 (December 2013): 460. 
4 As Wall puts it, the danger of using models “is that a messy reality is made to conform 
to restrictive assumptions, especially in economics.” (Derek Wall, The Sustainable 
Economics of Elinor Ostrom. Commons, Contestation and Craft (New York: Routledge, 
2014), 54.) 
5 Shui Yan Tang, “Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems,” in Rules, Games, & 
Common-Pool Resources, eds. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2006), 237. 
6 Lucy Gilson, “Trust and the Development of Health Care as a Social Institution,” Social 
Science and Medicine 56, no. 7 (April 2003): 1463. (Even though Gilson cites Ostrom’s 
work several times, she does not explicitly reference Ostrom in this instance.) 
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An example of the misguided idea that abstract models can be copied and applied 
elsewhere is the recent bout of interest in health care reform in The Netherlands. Several 
newspaper articles and academic papers have suggested the Dutch model could be the 
solution to “fixing” health care in the United States. As Kieke Okma notes, it might indeed 
be possible to learn lessons from The Netherlands, but “[…] it all depends on what it is we 
think we see, how we interpret that experience, how we frame lessons from that 
experience and how we think those lessons apply in different circumstances.”7 Okma’s “it 
all depends,” a clause Ostrom likes to use as well,8 can be read as a call to do justice to 
complexities.9 There also is a moral reason against the use of abstract models to allocate 
scarce health care resources. Norman Daniels and James Sabin point out there is no 
consensus on principles of distributive justice in health care.10 Since there is no set of rules 
or an algorithm that can provide specific answers about what limitations are fair, they 
argue in favor of “[…] fair deliberative procedures that yield a range of acceptable 
                                                          
7 Kieke Okma, “Learning and Mislearning across Borders: What Can We (Not) Learn from 
the 2006 Health Care Reform in the Netherlands? Commentary on Rosenau and Lako,” 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 33, no. 6 (December 2008): 1058. 
8 To give an example, in the introduction to her discussion of the design principles in 
Understanding Institutional Diversity, Ostrom writes: “As social scientists, we have to use 
one of our favorite slogans once again – it depends!” (Elinor Ostrom, Understanding 
Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 258.) 
9 In a 1993 report on health sector reform, the World Health Organization warns against 
the uniform application of abstract models: “The complexity of the reform process is 
formidable. There is a need to go beyond prescriptive blue print approaches, to develop 
more flexible ways which allow learning from experience and adaptation.” (WHO National 
Health Systems and Policies Unit, Health Sector Reform (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 1993), 3.) 
10 Norman Daniels and James Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
[2002] 2008), 2. 
122 
 
answers.”11 As I will discuss in chapter four, commons institutions can serve as the vehicle 
for such deliberative procedures (see 4. A4R in Practice). To adopt Ostrom’s terminology, 
one can argue commons institutions are better able to deal with the moral complexities 
of allocating scarce health care resources. Athena McClean makes a similar point when 
she argues that models often tend to mechanically direct action, thus eliminating the 
need for conscious human actors. As a consequence, human praxis is reduced to a 
mechanical process, disengaging resource users politically.12,13  
Mclean’s remark raises an important issue, since models do not necessarily direct 
action in a mechanical way.14 While the application of models can indeed be rigid, models 
can also be flexible, requiring significant input from conscious human actors when 
applied. This is not just a qualitative difference between models, as one and the same 
model can be used in a rigid or a flexible manner. The matter relates to a noteworthy 
distinction in Ostrom’s work. She repeatedly differentiates between theories, models, 
and frameworks.15 As Ostrom notes, the terms are used almost interchangeably by social 
                                                          
11 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 11. 
12 Athena McLean, “Empowerment and the Psychiatric Consumer/Ex-Patient Movement 
in the United States: Contradictions, Crisis and Change,” Social Science and Medicine 40, 
no. 8 (April 1995): 1058. 
13 Athena McLean discusses models in the context of consumer models, but I believe the 
risk she identifies also applies to institutional models. 
14 McLean’s suggestion that models direct human action in a mechanical way is likely the 
result of her focus on consumer models. But again, the risk she identifies is present in any 
context where models are used.  
15 Ostrom discusses the distinction between the concepts in most detail in Rules, Games, 
and Common-Pool Resources (2006). (Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, 
Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 
23-25.) She revisits the discussion in Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005). (Elinor 
Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005), 27-29.)  
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scientists, leading “to considerable confusion as to what they mean.”16 Therefore, she 
uses the three concepts in a very specific manner, namely as “a nested set of theoretical 
concepts – which range from the most general to the most detailed assumptions made 
by the analyst.”17 Analyses conducted at each of these levels provide different degrees of 
specificity with regards to a particular problem,18 but all three levels are “important in the 
long-term development of empirically grounded theory.”19 I now summarize Ostrom’s 
discussion of the concepts, before briefly criticizing her distinction. (1)  At the framework 
level, theorists identify the elements and the relationships between these elements that 
one needs to consider for institutional analysis.20 As such, “frameworks help to organize 
diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry.”21 Frameworks provide a metalanguage that is 
necessary to discuss and compare theories.22 The framework at the center of Ostrom’s 
research is the IAD framework (see 2.5 The Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework for a detailed discussion). (2) At the conceptual level of a theory, analysts 
specify which components of a framework are relevant for certain kinds of questions and 
make broad working assumptions about these elements.23  As such, 
 
[T]heories focus on parts of a framework and make specific assumptions that are 
necessary for an analyst to diagnose a phenomenon, explain its processes, and 
predict outcomes. To conduct empirical research, a scholar needs to select one or 
                                                          
16 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 27. 
17 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 27. 
18 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity 27-28. 
19 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 23. 
20 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28. 
21 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 25. 
22 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28. 
23 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28. 
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more theories to use in generating predictions about expected patterns of 
relationships. Several theories are usually compatible with any framework.24 
 
The IAD framework is compatible with, among others, game theory, microeconomic 
theory, and social choice theory.25 Theories provide a metatheoretical language to 
formulate, postulate, predict, evaluate, and change various models of that theory (e.g., 
the game-theoretical models used by game theorists).26 (3) Formal models make precise 
assumptions about a limited set of parameters and variables to derive predictions about 
the likely outcomes of a particular set of parameters.27 Ostrom writes, 
  
Logic, mathematics, game theory models, experimentation and simulation, and 
other means are used to explore the consequences of these assumptions 
systematically on a limited set of outcomes. Multiple models are compatible with 
most theories.28 
 
Particular models can help analysts produce specific predictions about plausible 
outcomes of highly simplified structures. Models are useful in policy analysis when they 
are tailored to the problem at hand, but they are used inappropriately when applied to 
the issues that do not closely fit the assumptions of the model.29 The question is whether 
Ostrom is able to maintain her neat distinction? I think the contrast between model and 
framework in particular seems to be difficult to maintain. Ostrom’s characterization of 
frameworks makes them sound like flexible, high-level models. After all, and staying 
                                                          
24 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28. 
25 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28. 
26 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 24. 
27 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 23. 
28 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 28. 
29 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 29. 
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within the logic of Ostrom’s distinction, frameworks too can be used to predict outcomes, 
except they include a larger number of parameters and variables. Vice versa, models 
simply seem to be more detailed frameworks. Since they also identify elements and the 
relationships between them with the aim to organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry. 
Ultimately, the difference seems to boil down to a difference in the level of detail, which 
impacts the number of variables involved and the precision of the analysis. Broadening 
the discussion beyond Ostrom’s framework-theory-model distinction opens up a whole 
other can of worms, given the (philosophical) theorizing that has happened on the 
(relationship between the) concepts of model and theory in particular. To further 
Ostrom’s conceptual analysis, a confrontation with this literature is needed, but such an 
endeavor lies outside of the scope of the present project on resource allocation in health 
care. However, I have identified an issue in Ostrom’s work that can benefit from further 
philosophical reflection.  
 I briefly want to return to Ostrom’s notion of framework, given how central it is to 
her work. Ostrom’s frameworks in general, and the IAD framework in particular, are fluid 
and dynamic, making them well suited to develop context-dependent institutional 
solutions.30 Frameworks, as conceived by Ostrom, do not only provide a checklist of the 
independent variables that explain individual and group behavior, but they also offer a 
causal schema with great flexibility in determining what factors should be included.31 
                                                          
30 Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge 
Commons,” in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice, ed. 
Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 42. 
31 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 42. 
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Thus, frameworks allow “[…] for detailed analysis of specific resources and situations, 
while being general enough to apply to multiple types of inquiries.”32 This high level of 
generality is the framework approach’s greatest strength, allowing resource users to 
develop custom solutions to manage health care resources and avert the tragedy of the 
commons, but also its most important weakness, since frameworks offer little in terms of 
concrete recommendations. Robert Goodin’s characterization of the aim of institutional 
design provides a helpful clarification of Ostrom’s framework approach:  
 
[W]ithin the realm of our intentional interventions what we should be aiming at is 
not the design of institutions directly. Rather, we should be aiming at designing 
schemes for designing institutions – schemes which will pay due regard to the 
multiplicity of designers and to the inevitably cross-cutting nature of their 
intentional interventions in the design process.33  
 
Even though Goodin’s plea can also apply to the use of models, it nicely captures the high 
level of generality and the broad applicability of Ostrom’s frameworks, which are in effect 
“schemes for designing institutions.”34 
2.2.2 RESOURCE USERS RELYING ON LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 
Closely related to Ostrom’s opposition against the use of abstract models is her skepticism 
of the expert culture, which operates on the assumption that it is possible to successfully 
                                                          
32 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 42. 
33 Robert Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” in The Theory of Institutional Design, 
ed. Robert Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 28. 
34 Even though Goodin uses the terms “model,” “theory,” and “framework” in Institutions 
and Their Design (1996), he does not make an explicit distinction between the three 
concepts. However, based on the chapter, it seems likely Goodin would be supportive of 
Ostrom’s use of frameworks.  
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implement changes from the outside.35 She does not dismiss expert knowledge 
altogether, she is convinced such knowledge can be useful, but she strongly emphasizes 
the role of resource users, who possess a unique body of local knowledge and 
experience,36,37 to successfully manage CPRs.38 Rules developed by commons institutions 
can be tailored to the specific characteristics of the CPR, while rules designed by outside 
experts often fail to do justice to the characteristics of a specific CPR, making such rules 
less effective, or even counterproductive, compared to locally designed rules (see also 4.3 
Parallel Experiments).39 Moreover, resource users are the ones who are directly affected 
by the resource allocation decisions.40 Therefore, the tools Ostrom proposes take the 
                                                          
35 She talks about “the hubris of experts relying on simple models of the best engineering 
plans and idealized sets of rules.” (Elinor Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action 
Evolve?” Journal of Bioeconomics 16 (2014): 26.) 
36 For example, resource users often “know others living in the area well and know what 
norms of behavior are considered appropriate by this community.” (Elinor Ostrom, 
“Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (June 
1999): 526.) 
37 Montesquieu and Mill already recognized the importance of “local knowledge.” (Jacob 
Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University 2015), 153, 158, 
226.) 
38 See also: Friedrich Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” The American Economic 
Review 35, no. 4 (September 1945): 521-524. 
39 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 304. 
40 To give a concrete example, Kaiser Permanente Colorado initially relied on external 
consultants (i.e., experts) to steer a major reorganization of their operations, but their 
decisions did not sit well with frontline physicians affected by the proposed changes, even 
though the overhaul enjoyed broad support with the organization’s leadership. As a 
result, the reorganization did not have the desired effect. “Over time, many of us came 
to believe that the core issue was the exclusion of doctors from the decision-making 
process.” (Jack Cochran and Charles Kenney, The Doctor Crisis: How Physicians Can, and 
Must, Lead the Way to Better Health Care (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014), 50.) Only after 
an “all-hands meeting” that attracted and involved over two hundred physicians, policy 
changes became more successful in addressing the organization’s problems. (Ibid., p. 51.) 
The example illustrates the importance of involving the users most affected by the 
decision-making process as well as the value of local knowledge.   
128 
 
form of frameworks that provide suggestions for resource users to then develop their 
own institutional arrangements, the ones most suitable to their specific situation and 
resource allocation problem.41,42   
Ostrom’s framework approach is at odds with much of current practice in health 
care. Experts, relying on abstract models, play a key role in advising health care 
organizations along the state-market continuum, from private insurers over non-profit 
hospital groups to governments, on the management of health care resources.43 Christine 
Hogg goes so far as to talk about a reverence for experts and expert knowledge in health 
care.44,45 During the 1990s, for example, non-executive directors in the National Health 
Service (NHS) were appointed not so much “for their knowledge of the local area or their 
                                                          
41 Unlike the IAD framework, which has the term “framework” in its name, the eight 
design principles are not usually labeled a “framework” in the commons literature. I 
nonetheless believe the term to be applicable to the design principles as they too are fluid 
and dynamic, suited to develop context-dependent institutional solutions. Moreover, the 
design principles rely on many of the same variables as the IAD framework and assume 
an underlying causal scheme leading to robust commons institutions. 
42 Andrew Cassels stresses the need for framework approaches in an annex to the 
aforementioned World Health Organization report on health sector reform. (Andrew 
Cassels, Perspectives on Health Sector Reform (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1993), 
6.) 
43 The epitome of expert knowledge on the allocation of health care resources are 
supranational organizations, like the World Health Organization, and consultancies, like 
The Advisory Board Company and McKinsey & Company. 
44 Christine Hogg, Patients, Power & Politics. From Patients to Citizens (London: Sage 
Publications, 1999), 137. 
45 The reverence for experts in health care management and the knowledge they possess 
is probably not surprising in a field in which experts and expert knowledge are so central. 
Physicians, with their specialized body of medical knowledge, can plausibly be seen as the 
archetype of the expert after which other professions are modeled, from health care 
professionals to management consultants. 
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links with the community, but for their professional and managerial expertise.”46,47 In fact, 
most attempts to control health care costs over the past decades have relied heavily on 
an ever larger army of experts,48 ready to apply their knowledge to the issue of managing 
limited resources.49 Highlighting the role of experts is important because, despite their 
best efforts, the figures discussed in the previous chapter (see 1.2 A Tragedy of the Health 
                                                          
46 Hogg, Patients, Power & Politics, 86. 
47 The preference for non-executive directors with professional and managerial expertise 
appears to be a direct consequence of Alain Enthoven’s recommendations in the highly 
influential report Reflections on the Management of the National Health Service (1985): 
“Regional and District Medical Officers are drawn from community medicine. They are 
not trained for management and their background is not the best for persons expected 
to give leadership to consultants. Medical leadership might be strengthened by giving 
post-graduate management training to selected consultants and by finding ways to make 
careers in top-level management attractive to them.” (Alain Enthoven, Reflections on the 
Management of the National Health Service (London: The Nuffield Provincial Hospitals 
Trust, 1985), 2-3.) Two important remarks: First, Enthoven’s recommendations, and the 
subsequent reorganization of the NHS, are an excellent example of Ostrom’s skepticism 
of abstract models and expert knowledge. Keep in mind that Ostrom does not dismiss the 
importance of models and experts outright, but she would likely object that Enthoven’s 
recommendations do not do justice to the complexities of health care and the important 
role of resource users. Second, Enthoven’s report provides additional support for the 
assumption that many health care institutions can be situated along the state-market 
continuum. After all, Enthoven advocates to redesign the NHS along the continuum, from 
a state institution to a hybrid institution through the introduction of so-called “internal 
markets.” (Rudolf Klein, “Self-inventing Institutions: Institutional Design and the U.K. 
Welfare State,” in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert Goodin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 241-249.) The health care system in the United States 
underwent a similar transition toward “more market.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits 
Fairly, 8.) The move to more market has not stopped the rise in health care expenditures, 
both in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
48 Hogg, Patients, Power & Politics, 165. 
49 To illustrate just how recent of a phenomenon the expert culture is, consider the 
following: The Advisory Board Company, which nowadays focuses exclusively on 
consultancy services for health care and higher education, was founded in 1979 with the 
aim to provide research for the financial services industry and only launched its health 
care focused strategic research division in 1986. The Boston Consultancy Group (1963) 
and McKinsey & Company (1926), arguably the two most influential management 
consultancies, also only started focusing heavily on health care relatively recently.  
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Care Commons?) seem to indicate the experts have thus far been unable to subdue the 
rise in health care expenditures. The apparent failure of experts to durably manage health 
care resources does not only seem to support Ostrom’s skepticism of the expert culture, 
at least in health care, but also seems to suggest a need for alternative solutions to the 
durable management of resources, for example commons institutions. Of course, 
reconsidering the role of the expert in the management of health care resources will not 
be an easy task, as the expert’s position and influence has ossified over time. Moreover, 
the interests of the experts are significant, both in terms of power and finances, which 
are closely intertwined.50 I once again want to stress, however, that the commons 
paradigm is not meant to replace the existing institutional arrangements and the expert 
culture, but rather to supplement them, which should make commons institutions more 
palatable.51 The knowledge and experience of resource users, harnessed through 
commons institutions, can be integrated in the existing institutional arrangements (see 3. 
                                                          
50 A cynic, or maybe a realist, would argue self-interested experts are likely to oppose the 
inclusion of commons institutions in health care. After all, these institutions threaten the 
experts’ power and income. In fact, the tragedy of the commons, as described by Hardin, 
and the prisoner’s dilemma, both discussed in the previous chapter, can be applied to the 
experts’ predicament. After all, self-interested experts are inclined to defect rather than 
to cooperate when it comes to implementing commons institutions in health care. The 
situation is not helped by an apparent conflict of interest inherent to the position of the 
expert in managing health care resources between the experts’ expected role in reducing 
health care expenditures on the one hand and their interest in the revenue from future 
efforts to reduce health care spending on the other hand. This conflict of interest is 
somewhat reminiscent of the conflict of interest that is inherent to the role of the 
physician in fee-for-service settings, where the physician is both the provider and the 
purchaser of resources. (Haavi Morreim, Balancing Act: The New Medical Ethics of 
Medicine’s New Economics (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1995), 22.) 
51 Of course, more radical proponents of the commons may disagree, and instead argue 
that the commons should replace the status quo institutions. 
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The Polycentric Experiment), keeping in mind many commons initiatives already exist in 
health care, for example in Grand Junction, whether they are recognized as such or not 
(see 0.4 The Double Aim of the Project). An important first step to integrating new 
commons institutions in health care, and to identifying and developing existing ones, is to 
have a closer look at these institutions. 
2.3 COMMONS INSTITUTIONS 
I still have not answered a rather crucial, and seemingly obvious, question: what exactly 
are commons institutions? While I highlighted some key features of commons institutions 
in the introduction (see 0.2 State and Market: A False Dichotomy), and discussed the 
concept “institution” in detail (see 0.5.1 Institutions), I still have not provided a definition 
of the notion “commons institution” proper. This must seem like a gross oversight in a 
work that centers upon these institutions, but the lack of a definition reflects a quirk of 
the commons literature in general and of Ostrom’s work in particular: definitions of the 
concept “commons institution” are somewhat of a rarity! In fact, as far as I have been 
able to establish, Ostrom herself provides just one clear-cut definition of the concept.52 
Odd enough in itself, this becomes even stranger knowing she regularly and precisely 
defines her key terms. A good example are Ostrom’s plural definitions of the notion 
“institution” (see 0.5.1 Institutions), but she also provides definitions of a host of other 
concepts (e.g., rules, design principle). So why is a definition of commons institutions 
notably absent from her oeuvre?      
                                                          
52 Elinor Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions: Toward a Revised Theory,” 
in Handbook of Agricultural Economics. Volume 2. Part A, eds. Bruce Gardner and Gordon 
Rausser (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2002), 1317. 
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 The answer likely lies in Ostrom’s belief there are no one-size-fits all solutions to 
commons dilemmas (see 2.2.1 Escaping the Panacea Trap: Theories, Models, and 
Frameworks) and her emphasis on the role of resource users in managing CPRs (see 2.2.2 
Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge). Thus, commons institutions are not a single 
narrowly described institutional arrangement, but rather a theoretically infinite number 
of different institutional arrangements that can vary significantly from one another.53 
After all, the “contents” of a particular commons institution, meaning the set of rules that 
makes up the institution, are provided by a group of resource users trying to solve a 
specific resource allocation issue in a specific context. Ostrom plausibly does not find it 
fruitful to try to provide a precise definition of commons institutions precisely because 
they are so varied.  
The one defining feature shared by all institutions for collective action is that their 
members play a central role in governing the institution. Hence, the use of the terms “self-
organized” or “self-governed” resource governance systems. Unsurprisingly, this 
characteristic sits at the center of the available definitions of commons institutions. 
Ostrom defines a “self-governed common-pool resource” as follows: 
 
A self-governed common-pool resource is one where actors, who are major 
appropriators of the resource, are involved over time in making and adapting rules 
within collective-choice arenas regarding the inclusion or exclusion of 
participants, appropriation strategies, obligations of participants, monitoring and 
sanctioning, and conflict resolution.54 
                                                          
53 The wide variety of commons institutions, coupled with a poor understanding of them, 
makes that they often are not recognized as such. (Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the 
Commons,” 520.) Hence, one of the aims of my research is to make health care commons 
visible through understanding them better (see 0.4 The Double Aim of the Project).  
54 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1317. 
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The same emphasis on the role of resource users is found with Massimo De Angelis and 
David Harvie’s definition of commons institutions: “In general terms, the commons are 
social systems in which resources are shared by a community of users/producers, who 
also define the modes of use and production, distribution and circulation of these 
resources through democratic and horizontal forms of governance.”55 And again with 
Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval: In short, commons are institutions that allow for the 
joint management of resources through rules at different levels put in place by the 
appropriators themselves.56,57  
 To avoid confusion, it is worth making explicit two differentiations that I made in 
passing in the previous chapter (see 1.4 Argument I: Analogy). First, a distinction must be 
made between commons institutions, which are resource management regimes, and the 
resources that are being managed by these regimes, the CPRs (see 1.6 Argument III: Type 
of Good). In practice, the term “commons” is used to refer to both institutions and 
resources. Second, commons institutions as a resource management regime must be 
distinguished from commons as a property ownership system. CPRs can be in common 
ownership, but they do not need to be commonly owned in order to be managed by a 
commons institution. For example, health care resources can be in private or state 
ownership, but nonetheless be managed by commons institutions (see 1.4 Argument I: 
                                                          
55 Massimo De Angelis and David Harvie, “The Commons,” in The Routledge Companion 
to Alternative Organization, eds. Martin Parker et al. (Abington: Routledge, 2014), 280. 
56 Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, Commun. Essai sur la Révolution au XXIe Siècle (Paris: 
Éditions la Découverte, 2014), 149. 
57 “En un mot, les communs sont des institutions qui permettent une gestion commune 




Analogy).58,59 To make matters more confusing, both the management and ownership 
regime are labelled commons. Commons research focuses on commons institutions as 
resource management regimes rather than as property ownership systems. 
 Even though strictly speaking not (part of) a definition, one further 
characterization of commons institutions is useful in light of the following chapters. 
Ostrom typifies commons as “complex adaptive systems,”60 which she defines as 
consisting of “a large number of active elements whose rich patterns of interactions 
produce emergent properties that are not easy to predict by analyzing the separate parts 
of a system.”61 John Holland, on whose work Ostrom relies, further describes complex 
adaptive systems as “composed of interacting agents described in terms of rules. These 
agents adapt by changing their rules as experience accumulates.”62 A key property of such 
systems is their diversity, which is one of the main arguments for using commons 
institutions to manage health care resources, even though some level of centralization 
                                                          
58 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 80. 
59 As such, the commons concept cuts across the market-state dichotomy viewed as two 
opposing modes of ownership. That being said, both market and state can be 
conceptualized in a way that does not imply private and public ownership respectively, 
but thinks of them as management regimes. To give an example, a resource can strictly 
speaking not be owned by the state, but nonetheless be managed by it. The market seems 
to be more closely tied to private ownership, but also can be thought of as a management 
regime. To give an example, a resource can be owned by the state, but be governed by 
market rules. The distinction between ownership and management regime once again 
highlights the shortcomings of thinking of market and state as a dichotomy and the 
difficulty of defining such rich, diffuse institutions (see 0.2 Market and State: A False 
Dichotomy).  
60 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 520. 
61 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 520-521. 




and coordination might be needed to fully reap the benefits of the diversity offered by 
the commons (see 4.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).63  
2.4 A COMMON SCENARIO 
The above discussion of commons institutions is rather abstract, and can benefit from a 
concrete example, especially for readers who are less familiar with Ostrom’s work. There 
are many classic examples of commons, among others, the communal tenure of high 
mountain meadows and forests in Switzerland and Japan,64 the governance of 
groundwater basis in the Los Angeles Metropolitan area,65 and the management of 
coastal fisheries around the world.66 I choose to discuss the case of huerta irrigation 
institutions in Spain, primarily because Ostrom makes reference to them in her discussion 
of the design principles (see 2.6 The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions), 
which are the focus of much of the remainder of this chapter. I cite the respective design 
principles in this discussion of the huertas.67 Moreover, the huertas are a good example 
of robust institutions that continue to operate to date in a Western country. 
 Huertas are common fertile areas surrounding or near towns that are served by 
irrigation works bringing water to farmers’ fields in the semiarid region of the present-
                                                          
63 Conceptualizing institutions as complex adaptive systems fits with taking an 
evolutionary approach to think about institutions (see footnote 120 in the previous 
chapter). 
64 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 61-69. 
65 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 103-142. 
66 Edella Schlager, “Fishers’ Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource 
Dilemmas,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, eds. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, 
and James Walker (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006). 
67 The zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines are another famous example. 
(Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 82-88.) 
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day Valencian Community (i.e., Valencia, Murcia, Orihuela, and Alicante).68,69 Ostrom uses 
the term huerta specifically in reference to the common irrigation systems serving these 
areas. The Spanish huertas have existed for almost 600 years, since they were formally 
instituted on May 29, 1435 at the monastery of St. Francis in Valencia, but they have likely 
existed for much longer, close to 1,000 years according to some estimates.70 The limited 
quantities of rainfall in combination with extreme variations in precipitation make that 
“conflict over water has always been just beneath the surface of everyday life”71 in these 
areas, at times resulting in fights between individual irrigators, between irrigators and 
officials, and between groups of irrigators living downstream and their upstream 
neighbors.72 The rules of the huertas, among others, specify who has rights to water from 
the irrigation system (see 2.6.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries), how the water is to be shared 
in good years as well as bad, how to share maintenance responsibilities, what officials to 
elect and how to fine rule breakers (see 2.6.4 Monitoring and 2.6.5 Graduated 
Sanctions).73 The precise rules differ from one huerta to the next. I now discuss the 
example of the huertas in more detail with reference to the design principles (see 2.6 The 
Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions).  
 In Valencia, Murcia, and Orihuela, the right to water inheres in the land itself. Land 
that was watered before the time of the Reconquista is designated as irrigated land 
                                                          
68 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 69-71. 
69 Huertas can be found elsewhere in Spain and Portugal, but also in their former colonies 
in the Americas. They are sometimes called acequias. 
70 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 69. 
71 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 69. 
72 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 69. 
73 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 69. 
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(regadiu) and the remaining lands are dry lands (seca). Some areas are entitled to water 
only in times of abundance (extremales).74 “The basic allocation principle […] is that each 
piece of regadiu land is entitled to a quantity of canal water proportionate to its size.”75 
Around Alicante, water rights have historically been tied to land ownership, but after the 
reconquest the right to withdraw water for a fixed amount of time was separated from 
land ownership, and a market for these rights was created independent from the market 
for land (see 2.6.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries).76,77  
 In Valencia, irrigators from seven of the major canals organize into “autonomous 
irrigation communities.”78 Every two to three years, each community elects their own 
leader (sindico) and several other officials for their canal. “The syndic must own and farm 
land served by the canal.”79 The syndic, together with his executive committee composed 
of delegates from all of the canal’s main service areas (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice 
Arrangements), is the executive officer of the irrigation unit. The syndic’s responsibilities 
include the following: (1) The basic enforcement of regulations for his own unit. (2) The 
power to make allocation decisions in the case of day-to-day disputes. (3) The authority 
to levy fines (see 2.6.5 Graduated Sanctions). (4) The responsibility to determine the order 
and timing of deliveries during times of severe water shortages. (5) The duty to sit on two 
                                                          
74 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 71, 76. 
75 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 71. 
76 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 78. 
77 Alicante is able to take a different approach to assigning the water because the farmers 
took the initiative to build a dam. The Tibi Dam (1594) does not only double the amount 
of usable irrigation water, but also allows substantial amounts of water to be stored long 
enough to be traded. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 78, 92.)  
78 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 71. 
79 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 72. 
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different weekly tribunals with syndics from the other six irrigation communities.80 The 
so-called “Tribunal de los Aguas,” which has met for centuries, is the main water court for 
resolving disputes between irrigators (see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms). The 
court operates without lawyers, but many onlookers follow the proceedings.81 The 
members of the court, excluding the syndic whose canal is involved in the dispute, make 
an immediate decision based on the facts of the case and in light of the rules of the 
particular canal. After court, the syndics may convene a second tribunal to discuss 
intercanal problems and operational procedures relating to season low waters. As such, 
it serves as a coordinating committee encompassing all seven canals (see 2.6.3 Collective-
Choice Arrangements and 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises). The court mechanism is so 
longstanding and well developed because the potential for conflict over a very scarce 
resource like water is high.82 The huertas in Murcia and Orihuela are organized in a similar 
fashion to the Valencian huerta, including irrigation communities and water courts. The 
organization of the Alicante huerta differs from the others. Most importantly, there is 
only one irrigation community for the entire huerta.83 Famers form a general assembly 
and elect a dozen sindicos to serve on an executive commission, which stays on for a 
period of four years. National authorities exercise considerably more control over 
irrigation matters in Alicante than in the other huertas, not in the least due to the 
                                                          
80 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 72. 
81 The court meets the publicity condition advocated by Daniels and Sabin for the just 
allocation of health care resources (see 4.4.4.1 The Publicity Condition).  
82 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 101. 
83 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 80. 
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presence of a dam.84 Overall, all the huertas discussed here have been able to enjoy a 
large degree of autonomy to devise and change their own institutions because their self-
governance was well-established by the time the centralized monarchy in Madrid came 
to dominate Spain and its colonies (see 2.6.7 Recognition of Rights to Organize).85 The 
irrigation systems are “organized on the basis of three or four nested levels,” which in 
turn are “nested in local, regional, and national governmental jurisdictions”86 (see 2.6.8 
Nested Enterprises).  
 In Valencia, the basic rules for water allocation are based on decisions made by 
the officials of the irrigation community concerning environmental conditions (see also 
0.5.3 Rules): (1) abundance, (2), seasonal low water, and (3) extraordinary drought.87 The 
most frequent condition is that of seasonal low water: 
 
When the low-water condition is in effect, water is distributed to specific farmers 
through a complex, rule-driven hydraulic system. Each distributory canal is 
positioned in a rotation scheme in relation to the other distributory canals. Each 
farm on a distributory canal receives water in a set rotation order, starting from 
the head of the canal and culminating in the tail end of the canal.88 
 
The allocation system is known as turno and its basic elements are that the order in which 
irrigators receive water is fixed, and when it is a farmer’s turn they can decide themselves 
                                                          
84 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 81. 
85 The huertas in eastern Spain were more successful in maintaining their autonomy 
because of the historic presence and influence of the kingdom of Aragon, roughly 
compromising Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 81.) 
86 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 102. 
87 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 72. 
88 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 73. 
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how much water to take as long as it is not wasted. On the one hand, this means no 
irrigator knows exactly when their turn will come. On the other hand, each irrigator knows 
that they can take as much water as they need when their turn eventually comes.89 In 
Murcia and Orihuela, farmers use an alternative system called tanda, which means each 
irrigator is assigned a fixed time period during which they may withdraw water. As a 
result, “each farmer knows exactly when and for how long he [they] may obtain water, 
but [they do] not know exactly how much water may be available at the time.”90 As 
mentioned above, members of the Alicante huerta use a complex system of trading water 
rights.91 The rules for allocating water vary substantially between the huertas, as the sets 
of rules are specific to the particular problems in governing each of these broadly similar, 
but distinctly different irrigation systems (see 2.2.2 Resource Users Relying on Local 
Knowledge). As a result, all the huertas generate positive benefits for the farmers that 
participate in them, meaning congruity exists between the benefits members receive and 
the costs they incur from collective action (see 2.6.2 Congruence between Appropriation 
and Provision Rules and Local Conditions).92 The temptation to break the rules is 
considerable, given the environment of water scarcity and the risks associated with not 
having enough water. Thus, the level of monitoring that is used in the huertas is high.93 
Much of the monitoring happens in the fields, as it is easy for farmers to monitor what 
                                                          
89 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 73. 
90 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 76. 
91 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 78-80. 
92 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 81. 
93 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 73. 
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others are doing,94 but there exists a complex system of “reciprocal monitoring 
relationships”95 between irrigators, executive committees, syndics, and water courts to 
ensure the rules are followed (see 2.6.4 Monitoring). Historically, the fines imposed when 
somebody does break the rules are low, but the rule-breaker is held publicly accountable 
for the infraction.96 The person reporting the infraction gets to keep part of the fine (see 
2.6.5 Graduated Sanctions).97 
 The huertas in eastern Spain are remarkable examples of robust commons 
institutions that have successfully managed scarce resources for nearly a millennium. 
While the design principles of the huertas, and other successful commons, do not readily 
translate to health care, these institutions can nonetheless be an inspiration for the 
governance of scarce health care resources.  
2.5 THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK  
The first tool in Ostrom’s black bag is the IAD framework. The framework was first 
discussed by Larry Kiser and Ostrom in The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical 
                                                          
94 “Irrigation systems […] usually place the two actors most concerned with cheating in 
direct contact with one another. The irrigator who nears the end of rotation turn would 
like to extend the time of his turn (and thus the amount of water obtained). The next 
irrigator in the rotation system waits nearby for him to finish, and would even like to start 
early. The presence of the first irrigator deters the second from an early start, the 
presence of the second irrigator deters the first from a late ending. Neither has to invest 
additional resources in monitoring activities. Monitoring is a by-product of their own 
strong motivations to use their water rotation turns to the fullest extent.” (Ostrom, 
Governing the Commons, 95.) On the contrary, in health care many actors who are in 
direct contact do not have any incentive to monitor one another’s resource usage.  
95 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 74. 
96 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 74-75. 
97 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 96. 
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Analysis of Institutional Approaches (1982), even though discussions among commons 
researchers leading to the development of the framework must have started at least a 
decade earlier. The term “IAD framework” itself is used for the first time in Ostrom’s A 
Framework for Institutional Analysis (1991). Since its inception,98 the framework has 
gradually been refined by Ostrom and her colleagues, resulting in an elaborate theoretical 
apparatus that sits at the center of commons research and ties together almost all aspects 
of said research. This makes the IAD framework difficult to understand to outsiders and 
somewhat unwieldy. The more detailed discussions of the framework run more than 
twenty to thirty pages in length,99 while the most comprehensive discussion takes up 
entire books.100 I present a brief overview of the IAD framework, discuss the relevance of 
the framework to the following chapters, and briefly consider the use of the framework 
in health care. 
 The IAD framework has a theoretical and a practical purpose. Within commons 
research, the framework operates as “a general organizing tool”101 that helps with the 
development of a long-term research program on commons institutions, but also with 
                                                          
98 It is worth mentioning Ostrom traces the roots of the IAD framework to “classic political 
economy,” particularly the work of Hobbes, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Hamilton, 
Madison, and Tocqueville. (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool 
Resources, 25.) 
99 The discussions of the IAD framework in Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources 
(1994) and in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons (2011) are two good examples. 
(Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 23-50; Ostrom 
and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 41-81.)   
100 “The “map” that I will elucidate in this volume is a conceptual framework called […] 
the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework.” (Ostrom, Understanding 
Institutional Diversity, 8.) 
101 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 25. 
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analyzing “other problems where individuals find themselves in repetitive situations 
affected by a combination of factors derived from a physical world, a cultural world, and 
a set of rules.”102 In practice, the IAD framework helps “individuals to understand 
institutional puzzles”103 and manipulate them. Ostrom and Charlotte Hess describe the 
framework’s practical aim as follows: 
  
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is a diagnostic tool 
that can be used to investigate any broad subject where humans repeatedly 
interact within rules and norms that guide their choice of strategies and behaviors. 
Most importantly, it can lead one out of the path dependency of existing patterns 
of practice when their accompanying ways of thinking have not yielded 
solutions.104 
 
Apart from the framework’s dual purpose, it is important to note its applicability beyond 
natural resource commons, as the framework can be applied to any institutional 
arrangement (e.g., markets, states, mixed institutions) and in any context (e.g., health 
care).105 Figure 2.1 depicts a simplified version of the IAD framework. The framework 
centers upon an “action situation,”106 also called “action arena,”107 even though the two 
                                                          
102 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 25. 
103 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 54. 
104 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 41. 
105 “The IAD framework is intended to contain the most general set of variables that an 
institutional analyst may want to use to examine a diversity of institutional settings 
including human interactions within markets, private firms, families, community 
organizations, legislatures, and government agencies.” (Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets 
and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems,” The American 
Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June [2009] 2010): 414.) 
106 Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 414. 
107 Blake Ratner, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Candace May, and Eric Haglund, “Resource Conflict, 
Collective Action, and Resilience: An Analytical Framework,” International Journal of the 
Commons 7, no. 1 (2013): 187. 
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strictly speaking are not synonymous. The action arena is influenced by external 
variables:108 the attributes of the biophysical world (e.g., location, available 
technology),109 the characteristics of the community (e.g., size, heterogeneity, culture),110 
and the rules used by members to order their relationships (see 0.5.3 Rules).111 Within 
the action arena “patterns of interaction” are established, which lead to certain 
“outcomes.”112 These outcomes can be evaluated and inform institutional change (i.e., 
changes to the rules-in-use).113 Some of the attributes of the physical world and the 
community can also be modified after evaluation, while others are fixed.114 Ostrom 
describes the IAD framework as a “multilayer conceptual map,”115 meaning each variable 
of the schema can be “unpacked – and then further unpacked and unpacked,”116 which 
explains why the most detailed discussions of the IAD are so lengthy.117 To give an 
example, “actors” can be unpacked in actors’ “individual preferences,” “information 
                                                          
108 Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 414. 
109 Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 46. 
110 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 26-27. 
111 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 15. 
112 Ratner, Meinzen-Dick, May, and Haglund, “Resource Conflict, Collective Action, and 
Resilience,” 187. 
113 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 54. 
114 For the purpose of analyzing an institution, the analyst assumes all the exogenous 
variables are fixed. (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 14.) The variables can 
be altered for the purpose of institutional development. 
115 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 14. 
116 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 14. 
117 The gradual refinement of the external variables and the action arena through 
continuous iterations is reminiscent of the notion of reflective equilibrium from the work 
of John Rawls, which formed the basis for Daniels’s work on justice in health care (see 4. 
A4R in Practice). The IAD framework has the potential to be used as a way to 
operationalize the notion of reflective equilibrium in the design of just institutions. 
145 
 
processing capabilities,” “selection criteria” and “individual resources.” In turn, actors’ 
preferences are explained in terms of utility theory and other preference theories.118  
 
 
Figure 2.1: The IAD framework. (Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the 
Knowledge Commons,” 44.) 
 
Depending on the issue, the institutional analyst or designer may have to delve several 
layers deep into the framework to identify the problem and to find a solution. The layering 
of the framework is a first introduction to the concept of “nestedness,”119 which recurs 
through Ostrom’s work (see 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises and 3. The Polycentric Experiment). 
The idea of nesting pertains to the IAD framework in a second way, as the framework can 
be applied at different scales or levels of analysis: local, regional, and global.120 
                                                          
118 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 33-35. 
119 In her Nobel Prize Lecture, Ostrom describes the framework as “a nested set of building 
blocks.” (Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States,” 413.) 

















Alternatively, the levels of analysis can be characterized more generally as the micro-, 
meso-, and macro-level.121 As Ostrom puts it, “What is a whole system at one level is a 
part of a system at another level.”122 Many complex issues are situated at several levels 
of analysis simultaneously. Thus, part of the challenge for the institutional analyst or 
designer is to identify “the appropriate level of analysis relevant to addressing a particular 
puzzle.”123 To complicate matters further, the two types of nestedness interact with each 
other. The variables of the framework that apply at one level of analysis may not apply at 
another. Similarly, the theoretical contents of the variables changes with scale (e.g. 
depending on whether the actor is an individual, hospital, or health care system will 
impact the actor’s preferences, information processing capabilities, selection criteria, and 
resources).124 As no analyst or designer masters the theoretical contents of all variables 
at all levels of analysis, institutional analysis and design is a multi- and interdisciplinary 
endeavor.      
 Discussing the relevance of the IAD framework for the following chapters is 
difficult, because as long as one keeps unpacking the framework and/or changing the 
                                                          
121 More concrete instantiations are “equally valid,” for example “department-school-
university.” (Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 
44.) Applied to the context of health care, the following is a possible example: 
patient/practitioner-hospital-health care system.  
122 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 11. 
123 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 12. 
124 To give another example, the criteria for evaluating outcomes will vary depending on 
the level of analysis. Applied to the allocation of health care resources, a satisfactory 
outcome at the micro-level may be evaluated negatively at the meso- and macro-level 
(and vice versa), say a physician that was able to “game the system” to get treatment or 




scale, most if not all the discussions in the subsequent chapters fit in the framework. 
Moreover, debates are never limited to a single variable, but sit at the intersection of 
different variables. To give an example, health care reform consists in a change of the 
rules-in-use. High-level actors meet each other in action arenas to discuss, propose, 
decide on, and enact rule changes (outcomes), thus changing the rules-in-use. The 
interactions between the actors pursuing reform and the decisions they can take are 
themselves subject to the rules-in-use (e.g., rules stipulating whether reform requires a 
majority, qualified majority, or unanimity) and limited by the biophysical world (e.g., level 
of economic growth). 
 The IAD framework can be a useful tool to approach institutional challenges in 
health care in general. As Andrew Cassels remarks, “Institutional issues tend to be ignored 
because they are regarded as messy and difficult. There is a need for usable frameworks 
for thinking about and describing institutional change.”125 The IAD framework is precisely 
such a tool. Indeed, several attempts have been made to apply Ostrom’s framework to 
health care. To give an example, the World Health Organization (WHO) built a framework 
for use in health care relying on NIE, among others, incorporating elements from the IAD 
framework.126,127 In another example, Seye Abimbola and colleagues draw on Ostrom’s 
                                                          
125 Cassels, Perspectives on Health Sector Reform, 6. 
126 Inke Mathauer and Guy Carrin, The Role of Institutional Design and Organizational 
Practice for Health Financing performance and Universal Coverage (Geneva: World health 
Organization, 2010). 
127 Inke Mathauer and Guy Carrin draw on a number of sources apart from Ostrom, thus 
a more detailed discussion is outside the scope of the current project. 
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work in their development of a “multi-level governance framework” for analyzing the 
management of primary health care in low- and middle-income countries.128,129 
2.6 THE DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF SUCCESSFUL COMMONS INSTITUTIONS 
In comparison to the clunky and abstract IAD framework, the second tool in Ostrom’s 
black bag appears refreshingly straightforward: a series of eight concrete 
recommendations, so-called “design principles,” for the development of successful (i.e., 
efficient, effective equitable, and robust) commons institutions. In Governing the 
Commons (1990), the first work in which Ostrom advances the design principles, she 
defines “design principle” as “an essential element or condition that helps to account for 
the success of [enduring, self-governing] institutions in sustaining the CPRs and gaining 
the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators to the rules in use.”130 
One of the few other characterization of the concept I found in the literature is the 
following: “generic advice about properties that should be designed into institutions to 
increase their chances of long-term success.”131 Other definitions of the notion design 
                                                          
128 Seye Abimbola, Joel Negin, Stephen Jan, and Alexandra Martiniuk, “Towards People-
Centred Health Systems: A Multi-Level Framework for Analysing Primary Health Care 
Governance in Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” Health Policy and Planning 29 
(September 2014): ii29-ii39. 
129 Health care systems in low- and middle-income countries are particularly promising 
when it comes to the potential application of Ostrom’s work to health care, because 
governments and markets often are unable to organize a consistent and qualitative 
supply of complex and resource-intensive health care services. Commons institutions may 
be able to fill the institutional vacuum and overcome some of the challenges typical to 
providing health care in a developing world context. Given the particular challenges of 
organizing health care in low- and middle-income countries, I do not discuss this 
application of Ostrom’s work in the current project (see 5.3 Future Research). 
130 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 90. 
131 Paul Stern, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Elinor Ostrom, and Susan Stonich, “Knowledge 
and Questions after 15 Years of Research,” in The Drama of the Commons. Committee on 
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principle, let alone a detailed conceptual analysis, are noticeably absent from the 
literature. In contrast to the IAD framework, little theorizing regarding the concept has 
happened. More often than not, the idea is simply assumed, and commons researchers 
focus on the principles themselves and their application instead. 
 This pragmatic approach taken by many researchers may explain some of the 
confusion that exists regarding the design principles. They are not in the first place 
principles for the development of successful commons institutions, even though they can 
be used as such. When Ostrom conceived the design principles, she did not formulate 
them as a series of recommendations for developing new or existing institutions, but 
rather as a list of characteristics, Ostrom uses the term “conditions,” displayed by robust 
commons institutions (see also 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles). Robust, long-surviving 
institutions are characterized by most of the design principles, while fragile institutions 
are marked by some principles, and failed institutions are distinguished by very few of 
them.132 Moreover, she based the design principles on an initial sample of fourteen case 
studies,133 even though later studies have provided additional support for the design 
principles.134 In Governing the Commons (1990), Ostrom is explicit about both the origins 
                                                          
the Human Dimensions of Global Change, eds. Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, 
Paul Stern, Susan Stonich, and Elke Weber (Washington: National Academy Press, 2002), 
459. 
132 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1330. 
133 Arun Agrawal, “Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability,” in The Drama of 
the Commons. Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change, eds. Elinor 
Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Paul Stern, Susan Stonich, and Elke Weber 
(Washington: National Academy Press, 2002), 49. 
134 A much cited review of over ninety studies summarizes “the principles are well 
supported empirically.” However, the authors measure support for the design principles 
by calculating the ratio of supportive to unsupportive studies, an approach that can easily 
150 
 
and use of the design principles. She is careful to point out the list of principles is 
speculative.135 Despite these caveats, the design principles have sparked considerable 
research interest,136 looking at the principles as a way to develop new and existing 
commons institutions. This has caused some researchers, for example Nives Dolšak and 
notably Ostrom herself, to describe the design principles as “a set of general principles 
that increase the performance of an institutional design.”137 Beyond theory, international 
agencies like the United Nations, World Bank, and many NGOs have adopted the design 
principles as a tool to “craft” commons institutions.138 None of this precludes the design 
principles from being used to develop robust commons institutions, on the contrary, but 
knowledge of their genesis might temper the hope for easy success when using the 
principles as an institutional design tool. Ostrom, of course, is keenly aware of all of this. 
Reminiscing about the inception of the design principles, she writes:  
 
                                                          
be criticized. The review finds that each principles has “at least twice as many supportive 
as unsupportive cases” and refers “to principles with ratios > 10 as very strongly 
supported, ratios of 5-10 as strongly supported, and ratios of 2-5 as moderately well 
supported,” which already betrays a favorable bias toward the design principles. In 
addition, three of the design principles have a ratio of supportive to unsupportive studies 
right at or just above two. (Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold, Sergio Villamayor Tomás, “A 
Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural Resource Management,” 
Ecology and Society 15, no. 4 (2010). http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/ 
art38/.) 
135 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 89-91. 
136 Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul Stern, “The Drama of the 
Commons,” in The Drama of the Commons. Committee on the Human Dimensions of 
Global Change, ed. Elinor Ostrom et al. (Washington: National Academy Press, 2002), 16. 
137 Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” in The Commons 
in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptation, eds. Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 22. 
138 Fred Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory and the Reality of 
Commons Practice,” International Journal of the Commons 8, no. 2 (2014): 639-640. 
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At times, I think that I should have called them something else because people 
confused that term with the idea that we are trying to design something from the 
beginning. However, I was really undertaking a study of robustness of systems that 
already existed.139 
 
This passage may be the closest Ostrom has come to rejecting the use of the principles to 
design commons institutions. On the contrary, she has embraced the “misuse” of her 
brainchild, as is evidenced by the above definition and apparent throughout her later 
work.140 She does, however, repeatedly warn the design principles are not to be used as 
blueprints:141,142 “There is a danger […] that project planners searching for the “right” 
design will try to build a one-size-fits-all project supposedly based on the design 
principles.”143 A warning that chimes with her emphasis on context, local knowledge, and 
frameworks. That being said, Ostrom has also argued the design principles are universal 
and predictive in that they can distinguish successful from unsuccessful commons 
institutions, regardless of contextual differences.144 Thus, there is hope for applying the 
design principles to health care commons institutions, but their application should be 
carefully adapted to the general context of health care (e.g., considerations of justice, 
                                                          
139 Elinor Ostrom, “The Future of the Commons: Beyond Market Failure and Government 
Regulation,” in The Future of the Commons. Beyond Market Failure and Government 
Regulation, ed. Elinor Ostrom (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2012), 77. 
140 In Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005), for example, she discusses how the 
design principles can be used in practice by translating them into a series of questions 
resource users can ask when thinking about improving the sustainability of their CPR 
system. (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 270-271.) 
141 Agrawal, “Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability,” 49. 
142 Unsurprisingly, some commentators note the design principles are regularly being 
used as blueprints for commons projects. (Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool 
Resource Theory,” 641.) 
143 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 270. 
144 Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory,” 641. 
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special importance of health care to the individual and society)145 and to the particular 
health care circumstances (e.g., a group practice in the Belgium would require a different 
institutional solution from a group practice in Canada). 
 The present overview is one of the most comprehensive discussions of the design 
principles in the literature, and an important contribution to commons research, as the 
available discussions of the principles are often brief and do not critically asses the design 
principles.146 I highlight the relevance of the principles to the discussions in the following 
chapters and briefly mention possible health care applications. The current theoretical 
and practical interest in the design principles makes a more detailed study of them in the 
context of health care a promising avenue for future research. 
2.6.1 CLEARLY DEFINED BOUNDARIES 
The first design principle, “clearly defined boundaries,”147 is easy to understand, but 
difficult to implement, especially in a health care context where its implementation is 
complicated by, among others: size of the CPR, the special importance of health care, 
information issues (e.g., asymmetries, uncertainty), and moral hazard. The principle is 
                                                          
145 Leonard Fleck, Just Caring: Health Care Rationing and Democratic Deliberation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 103.  
146 I use Ostrom’s original list of eight as the basis for the survey of the design principles. 
(Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 88-102.) The design principles have later been 
amended, subdividing three of the design principles (i.e., clearly defined boundaries, 
congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, and 
monitoring) into subcomponents, this to respond to criticisms and resolve some 
ambiguities. (Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.”) Ostrom later 
endorsed this new framing of the design principles. (Ostrom, “The Future of the 
Commons,” 78.) 
147 The design principle is directly related to the characteristics of CPRs, i.e., excludability 
and subtractability (see 1.6 Argument III: Type of Good).   
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subdivided into two components:148 First, the members who have rights to withdraw 
resources from the commons must be clearly defined, thus expressing the need for “rules 
that clearly define who has rights to use a resource”149 (see 2.5.3 The Challenge of 
Technological Change for some concrete examples of boundary rules).150 This first 
component of the principle addresses the issue of free-riding behavior by limiting access 
to the CPR.151,152 The principle asks: who is authorized to use the available resources?153 
This question is recognizable to researchers and practitioners familiar with the issue of 
allocating scarce health care resources as it permeates health care at all levels of analysis. 
To give just a handful of examples: Do all (potential) patients have a claim to the health 
care commons, even those who are uninsured? Do patients have the authority to consult 
specialists, or must they be referred by a primary care provider? Are patients free to seek 
out multiple opinions? (A question that stirred emotions when the Dutch reformed their 
health care system.) What authority do physicians have over the use of resources, say, 
expensive diagnostic or therapeutic technologies? Rehashing the PET scanner example 
from the first chapter, how much leeway do hospitals have to appropriate expensive new 
imaging technologies? Who has the authority to make technology appraisal decisions in 
                                                          
148 Ostrom already distinguishes between these two subcomponents in Governing the 
Commons (1990). (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 91.) Michael Cox and his colleagues 
make the distinction more explicit. (Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design 
Principles.”)  
149 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1330. 
150 For a detailed discussion of boundary rules, see: Ostrom, Understanding Institutional 
Diversity, 194-196, 223-226. For more summary discussion, see: Ostrom, Gardner, and 
Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 302. 
151 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 260-261. 
152 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 91. 
153 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 271. 
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a given health care system? (For a more detailed discussion regarding the challenges 
posed by new health care technology, see section 2.6.3 The Challenge of Technological 
Change.) The principle is sometimes given an alternate, or maybe complementary, 
reading that fits the “spirit” of the commons paradigm: enabling members “to know who 
is in and who is out of a defined set of relationships and, thus, with whom to 
cooperate.”154 Framing the principle in terms of relationships between participants and 
cooperation is less clear, but meets a common criticism that the principle is too rigid, not 
allowing for fuzzier social relationships and ad hoc arrangements between members.155 
Emphasizing cooperation may translate into more flexible, yet sufficiently well-defined, 
boundaries through ongoing processes of deliberation at different levels of analysis.156   
Second, the boundaries of the CPR themselves must be well defined,157 meaning 
participants need to have a clear understanding of the resource system and its boundaries 
which, in the commons literature with its focus on natural resources, usually refers to 
geographic or physical boundaries (e.g., forestland, fishing ground). In other words, this 
second component of the principle aims to clarify what is meant by a particular resource 
system.158 The principle is more difficult to apply to health care for a reason highlighted 
in the previous chapter: the amorphous character of health care resources (see 1.3 
                                                          
154 Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 149. 
155 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.” 
156 I also discuss the issue of membership in the following chapter (see 3.4.3 The Dangers 
of the Middle-Level). 
157 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.” 
158 Elinor Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What Have 
We Learned?” in Property Rights and Land Policies, ed. Gregory Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong 
(Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2009), 32. 
155 
 
Argument I: Analogy). The solutions proposed in chapter one also pertain here: relying on 
virtual commons, adjusting the level of analysis, and the de facto use of global budgets in 
health care allow the boundaries of the health care commons to be defined. So at least in 
theory, it is possible to apply the second component of the design principle to health care. 
In practice, however, the principle will be difficult to use beyond small-scale health 
commons (e.g., group practice, small hospital), as the features of many health care 
systems (e.g., size, complexity, uncertainty, limited knowledge of members) make it much 
more challenging to design boundary rules clearly demarcating the health care 
commons.159 A key challenge in health care is to increase resource users’ (e.g., patients, 
providers, hospitals) awareness of the boundaries of the resource system, meaning they 
must understand “their” pool of resources and its constraints. Breaking down health care 
systems into small, well-defined virtual commons may be a good way to communicate 
the boundaries of the CPR to users and to raise awareness about its limitations, which in 
turn can be the impetus for health care reform.  
 Both components of the first design principle go hand-in-hand. Even if you are 
able to clearly define who has the right to use a resource, the CPR can still be mismanaged 
if you do not have a clear understanding of it. In other words, the resources can be used 
only by those participants who have the right to do so, and in the way prescribed by the 
boundary rules, but because the boundaries of the resources are not well defined or 
                                                          
159 Paul Stern has argued the first design principle as a whole cannot be applied in any 
meaningful way to truly global commons, like oceans or the climate. (Paul Stern, “Design 
Principles for Global Commons: Natural Resources and Emerging Technologies,” 
International Journal of the Commons 5, no. 2 (2011): 219.) 
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understood, a tragedy of the commons may still take place. Analogously, the CPR can be 
marked off precisely, but if it is unclear who is authorized to make use of the available 
resources, the resource system might nonetheless collapse.   
2.6.2 CONGRUENCE BETWEEN APPROPRIATION AND PROVISION RULES AND LOCAL 
CONDITIONS 
The second design principle, with the rather lengthy name “congruence between 
appropriation and provision rules and local conditions,” is broken down into two 
components as well: First, the principle expresses the need for congruence between the 
set of rules and local conditions,160 a recommendation that articulates Ostrom’s emphasis 
on local context and knowledge, and her wariness of one-size-fits-all institutions designed 
by model-wielding experts. Ostrom’s initial discussion of the design principle in Governing 
the Commons (1990) is limited to this first interpretation.161 Applying the design principle 
to health care is straightforward, as the principle calls for health care institutions that are 
attuned to relevant variations in local conditions, for example: differences in population 
(e.g., socioeconomic, age), therapeutic preferences of physicians and patients (e.g., 
vaginal delivery, Caesarean section), or economic circumstances (e.g., economic growth). 
Even though the second design principle, like several of the others, can also be applied to 
the status quo institutions, they are unlikely to fully do justice to differences in local 
conditions, thus strengthening the case for versatile health care commons institutions. 
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 Second, the design principle asks for correspondence between appropriation and 
provision rules, a difficult way of saying there needs to be congruity between the benefits 
members receive and the costs they incur from collective action.162 If some participants 
enjoy most of the benefits but pay few of the costs, then other members become 
unwilling to follow the rules over time,163 as the inequity frustrates participants causing 
more and more of them to consider the rules unfair.164,165 The relevance of this second 
component of the design principle to health care quickly becomes apparent when applied 
to a health care system that is perceived as inequitable. When some participants (e.g., 
patients, practitioners) believe the rules are rigged in favor of certain members (e.g., 
insurers, immigrants) this leads to an unwillingness to play by the rules and induces self-
interested behavior (e.g., moral hazard, overconsumption). Perception is everything. The 
disproportion between benefits and costs among participants need not be real.166 As long 
as the belief exists that certain members enjoy disproportionate benefits vis-à-vis the 
costs they bear, say Medicaid abusers, the damage is done. If even a small number of 
members believes there is no congruity between benefits and costs, causing them to stop 
following the rules and pursue their self-interest, this in turn affirms the belief of others 
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163 Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 150. 
164 Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions,” 34. 
165 The congruity between benefits and costs can be interpreted in a number of 
complementary ways, all of which lead to diminished compliance with the rules. For 
example, certain members may feel they bear considerable costs, but receive few 
benefits (see also 4.4.4.2 Relevance Condition). 
166 To give a concrete example, many Americans wrongfully believe illegal immigrants put 




the rules are not fair, leading to a potentially disastrous domino effect. On the contrary, 
if the institution ensures the distribution of benefits and the distribution of costs are 
broadly consistent, then participants display a greater willingness to follow the rules and 
maintain the resource system.167 As Ostrom puts it, “fairness is a crucial attribute to the 
rules of robust systems.”168 Institutions that ensure a fair distribution between benefits 
and costs can build trust.  Moreover, if the rules meet shared concepts of fairness, then 
more individuals are willing to abide by them.169 In the case of health care, so central to 
many societies, one might even argue that fair health care institutions can shape people’s 
perception of fairness.  
The second component of the design principle is particularly relevant for the 
following chapters. First, individuals’ willingness to follow the rules touches upon issues 
of legitimacy,170 which are central to Daniels and Sabin’s work on setting limits fairly. 
Commons research can shed new light on the so-called “legitimacy problem” (see 4.4.1 
Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R)), which is applicable to social institutions.171 Of 
course, questions of fairness stemming from the congruity of benefits and costs more 
generally relate to their work on just health care (see 4.4.4.2 Relevance Condition). 
Second, the (perceived) tradeoff between benefits and costs among members plays a role 
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in health care reform, as inequities can both spur reform efforts or be a hindrance to 
them.172  
2.6.3 COLLECTIVE-CHOICE ARRANGEMENTS  
The third design principle, “collective-choice arrangements,” is closely related to the 
second principle, as “resource regimes that use this [third] principle are both better able 
to tailor rules to local circumstances and to devise rules that are considered fair by 
participants.”173 But what does the principle entail? Ostrom defines the principle as 
follows: “Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying 
the operational rules.”174 Unlike the first two principles, this design principle has not later 
been refined.175,176 More importantly, this rule operates at the collective-choice level 
(meso-level) rather than at the operational level (micro-level), stipulating a particular way 
operational rules should come into existence, namely through deliberation among 
members of the commons.177 So while most other design principles function at the 
operational level (i.e., clearly-defined boundaries, congruence, monitoring, sanctioning, 
                                                          
172 The congruity between the benefits members receive and the costs they incur can also 
be a way to conceptualize equitability as a criterion of institutional performance. 
173 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 263. 
174 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 93. 
175 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.” 
176 A noticeable exception is Stern. When considering the applicability of the design 
principles to global commons, he suggests rephrasing the third design principle as follows: 
“Ensure meaningful participation of the range of interested and affected parties in 
developing rules.” (Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 221.)  
177 Of course, the question is how one should interpret that “most individuals affected by 
the rules” should participate in their modification? The answer is “it depends,” among 
others, on the boundaries of the commons (see 2.6.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries) and on 
the level of analysis.  
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and conflict-resolution mechanisms),178 this principle stipulates the manner in which 
those other rules are filled in. The fact this principle operates at the collective-choice level 
rather than the operational level sets it apart from the other design principles. In a way, 
collective-choice arrangements captures the essence of the commons paradigm: relying 
on deliberation among users to manage shared, scarce resources. One can attribute a 
certain primacy to this third design principle, for without it most of the other design 
principles must remain without content.179 The presence of collective-choice 
arrangements seems to be a precondition for the other design principles that operate at 
the operational level. Remarkably, the central importance of the third design principle 
has not been recognized in the commons literature, where the principle is consistently 
discussed in relation to the second design principle,180 much along the lines of the opening 
sentence of this section. The principle is treated simply as unum inter pares rather than 
as primum inter pares.   
                                                          
178 The last two design principles, minimum recognition of rights and nested enterprises, 
are exceptions in that they do not as obviously operate at the operational level or at the 
collective-choice level as the other principles do, but pertain to a commons institution’s 
relationship to other, often larger institutional arrangements. 
179 Nothing prevents other institutional arrangements from using the other design 
principles. To give just one example, a state can recognize the importance of clearly 
defining the boundaries of a shared resource and implement the design principle without 
relying on input from the individuals affected by the operational rules, thus filling in the 
design principle without relying on deliberation. The third design principle stands out, 
however, in that it cannot be adopted by the status quo institutions without at the same 
time embracing the key idea of deliberation among resource users, thus adopting the 
commons paradigm itself. 
180 See: Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 93; Ostrom, “Collective Action and the 
Evolution of Social Norms,” 150; Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 
1332; Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions,” 34; Cox, Arnold, 
and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.” 
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 Nonetheless, discussions of the third design principle highlight several features 
that are of interest to its application in health care: First, experiments and field studies 
have shown that participants are more willing to abide by the rules if they participated in 
their design.181 Conversely, rule compliance is lower when the rules are implemented 
form the top down.182 Second, collective-choice arrangements allow for information 
about benefits, costs, and local conditions as perceived by the members of the commons 
to be taken into account when drafting rules.183 Thus, commons institutions likely are able 
to process information more efficiently than state institutions, and possibly even more 
effectively than market institutions, because commons’ deliberative processes allow for 
more meaningful information to be processed.184,185 Third, the fact members are at the 
center of these collective-choice arrangements does not mean they must be the ones to 
initiate them. In other words, collective-choice arrangements do not have to come about 
                                                          
181 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 264. 
182 Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 150. 
183 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1332. 
184 According to Albert Hirschman, market institutions primarily rely on “exit” strategies 
to process information, and thus to effect change. For example, when a patient is 
dissatisfied with a provider or insurer, they will go to a competitor. On the contrary, state 
institutions with their political processes allow for “voice” strategies, meaning dissatisfied 
members can communicate their qualms and try to bring about change. The commons 
model, with which Hirschman was not familiar at the time he wrote Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty (1970), is arguably even better suited for “voice” strategies. Not only are 
commons institutions designed with processes for deliberation in place, but members of 
a successful commons plausibly feel a loyalty to the organization, making them more 
likely to use their voice to improve their institution. (Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).) Of course, much like the models of 
market, state, and commons themselves, the idealized ways in which these institutions 
process information are not mutually exclusive in real-world settings.  
185 Diego Gambetta argues deliberation leads to a better distribution of information. 
(Diego Gambetta, “‘Claro!’: An Essay on Discursive Machismo,” in Deliberative 
Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22.)   
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from the bottom up (see 3. The Polycentric Experiment). To give an example, a national 
health care system that wants to devise new operational rules for hospitals can set up 
collective-choice arrangements from the top down for hospitals to engage in deliberation. 
Fourth, collective-choice arrangements build trust through the development of social 
networks and reciprocal relationships between resource users.186 Rules devised by 
governments or far-away headquarters do not have the same positive impact. Finally, the 
main criticism of this design principle is especially relevant to health care, as many 
scholars worry that collective-choice arrangements may exist in form, but in practice they 
are coopted or undermined by powerful, self-interested actors (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of 
the Middle-Level for a detailed discussion of so-called “elite capture”).187  
 The most promising application of the third design principle, in combination with 
the other principles, is to offer new insights on operationalizing a series of longstanding 
proposals in the bioethics literature for deliberative resource management and policy 
development. Emanuel, for example, has proposed the development of community 
health programs based on principles of deliberative democracy.188 Fleck is another 
prominent advocate of relying on deliberation to allocate scarce resources (“rational 
democratic deliberation”),189 even though his account is heavily indebted to Daniels (and 
Sabin).190 Eddy would ideally rely on the market to make resource allocation decisions, 
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187 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.” 
188 Ezekiel Emanuel, The Ends of Human Life: Medical Ethics in a Liberal Polity (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), 154-244. 
189 Fleck, Just Caring, 140-201. 
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but because the health care marketplace is flawed,191 he believes decisions about the 
management of scarce health care resources should be based on the preferences of 
patients (“rationing by patient choice”), bottom-up rather than top-down.192 Of course, 
aggregating patient preferences does not necessarily imply deliberation.193 Moreover, 
states and/or markets can be the institutions responsible for aggregating patient 
preferences. Still, Eddy does not rule out a deliberative approach altogether, and he 
promotes deliberative approaches at Kaiser Permanente.194 In fact, Fleck names Eddy and 
Daniels in the same breath when discussing rational democratic deliberation.195,196 That 
brings us to Daniels and Sabin’s approach to the deliberative management of scarce 
health care resources, probably the most well-known and influential account. Their 
proposal, named “Accountability for Reasonableness,” is the subject of chapter four (see 
4. A4R in Practice). 
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265, no. 1 (January 1991):  105. 
192 Eddy, “Rationing by Patient Choice,” 106-107. 
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2.6.4 MONITORING  
Ostrom defines “monitoring,” the fourth design principle, as follows: “Monitors, who 
actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are accountable to the 
appropriators or are the appropriators.”197 More recently, commons researchers have 
divided the fourth design principle into two subcomponents:198 First, monitors are 
present and actively audit CPR conditions and the behavior of resource users.199 On this 
first reading, the principle simply “stipulates the presence of monitors.”200 In the absence 
of monitoring, rules become meaningless.201 The rules need following and rule breakers 
must be discovered in order to keep the commons from deteriorating.202 Moreover, by 
ensuring adherence to the rules the presence of monitoring strengthens trust.203 
Second, the principle qualifies the attributes of the monitors required by the first 
subcomponent: monitors are accountable to or are themselves resource users.204 This 
sets the design principle apart from other monitoring schemes, which often rely on 
external authorities. Reliance on external authorities for monitoring can be harmful in at 
least two ways. On the one hand, strong external monitoring does enforce cooperation, 
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203 Emily Largent, “Health Care Organizations and the Power of Procedure,” The American 
Journal of Bioethics 16, no. 1 (2016): 52. 
204 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.” 
165 
 
but without the development of any internal norms.205 On the other hand, and even 
worse, low levels of external monitoring not only discourage the formation of social 
norms, but also make it attractive for some members to abuse the commons, as the risk 
of being caught is low.206 In response, Ostrom argues members can develop their own 
rules to support cooperation, which are more easily internalized vis-à-vis externally 
imposed rules. Commons research suggests the following monitoring arrangements for 
self-governed resource regimes: In some small-scale commons, “monitoring is a 
byproduct of particular ways of managing the commons,”207 allowing for fully 
decentralized monitoring and low monitoring costs.208 Such an approach is virtually 
impossible in case of a global commons, because of the size and complexity of the 
commons. This does not only make monitoring technically difficult and costly, but the 
large number of users and high stakes lead to conflicts of interest between the major 
participants, who are best placed to monitor resource usage but have an incentive to 
underreport, and the bulk of the members to whom the monitors should be accountable 
(e.g., physicians reporting abuses by other physicians).209 This objection also plagues the 
next monitoring arrangement: reliance on official monitors selected by the members of 
the commons. By appointing monitors, participants do not have to rely solely on the 
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commons’ design and on the norms of the other members.210 Resource users can either 
rotate into the role of monitor or the position can take a more permanent form.211 In the 
former case, monitors sometimes are often not remunerated beyond the benefits that 
flow from maintaining the commons. (Of course, for this to happen monitors must benefit 
directly and sufficiently from improved resource conditions!212) In the latter case, 
monitors are usually paid from funds collected from the members.213 Still, the member-
monitor may be mired in conflict of interest or simply unable to perform the difficult task 
of monitoring. However, the monitor need not necessarily be a member of the commons, 
which offers a possible way around the objection. Rather than elect monitors amongst 
themselves, members can instead appoint independent, third-party monitoring of the 
CPR.214 In the instance of a large and rich commons (e.g., health care), the members can 
sufficiently fund the independent monitor (or monitors) to perform its difficult task and 
assure its autonomy. Nevertheless, major participants have a strong incentive to 
influence the monitor, which raises the question: quis custodiet ipsos custodes?215 A 
question that is equally pertinent when the monitor is a member of the commons. To 
resolve this second-order dilemma,216 Ostrom suggests closing the loop between 
                                                          
210 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 265. 
211 Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions,” 34-35. 
212 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.” 
213 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 265. 
214 Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 221. 
215 Freely translated, “Who will monitor the monitors themselves?” (Literally translated, 
“Who will guard the guards themselves?”) 
216 Arun Agrawal, “Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule 
Systems and Resource Use,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, eds. Elinor 




monitors and users,217 in effect turning users into the auditors of the monitors. In theory, 
users are motivated to perform this role because they have an active interest in the 
survival of the commons,218 while professional monitors receive financial incentives. To 
illustrate Ostrom’s idea, consider the following example: patients/physicians are 
monitored by administrators who in turn are audited by an independent watchdog that 
is accountable to all patients/physicians. This builds some redundancy into the monitoring 
system, as failure to detect one infraction does not trigger a cascading process of rules 
infractions.219 Polycentric governance regimes can more easily accommodate redundant 
monitoring systems that rely on feedback loops (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many 
Worlds?). 
Ostrom’s ideas about monitoring relate to health care in a number of interesting 
ways: First, her approach depart from many existing monitoring practices in health care, 
which rely heavily on top-down monitoring. Second, historically commons-like monitoring 
has played an important role in health care, for example the role professional 
organizations have played, and continue to play, in monitoring and sanctioning their 
members. However, these arrangements have important drawbacks, among others, the 
danger of creating homogenous silos of actors responsible for monitoring each other and 
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the related risk of a lack of transparency.220 A good example of such a lack of transparency 
are the controversies surrounding information about hospital performance being made 
available to the public in the United States, Belgium, and elsewhere. Ostrom’s analysis 
can inform discussions about how to institute more transparency. Finally, health care 
seems to be characterized by either very strong external monitoring, leading to health 
care actors not developing internal norms, or what are de facto low levels of internal 
monitoring, also leading actors not to develop norms and making it attractive for some 
actors to deceive and defect.221 Ostrom’s work provides concrete guidelines for 
developing more intricate, hybrid monitoring systems that can overcome the 
shortcomings of the current monitoring systems.  
2.6.5 GRADUATED SANCTIONS222  
The name of the fifth design principle conveys its main recommendation: progressive 
sanctions work best to maintain compliance with the rules. There will always be instances 
in which members break the rules; even members who are basically committed to 
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following the rules may succumb to the temptation to break them.223 The real threat to 
rule compliance, and to the commons, comes from users who repeatedly break the 
rules.224 Not only does their frequent rule breaking put a strain on the CPR, but it can 
instill the belief in other resource users that the rules are not followed, in turn making 
them less likely to comply with the rules. Commons research suggests a small, even 
negligible penalty is the most effective way to deal with occasional rule breakers, while 
more severe penalties should be reserved for repeat violators. The suggestion may seem 
common sense, but goes against the standard recommendation in the economics 
literature: harsh sanctions work best because the expected value of breaking the rules is 
negative, even when the probability of being caught is relatively low.225 
 There are several reasons imposing a small sanction on the odd rule breaker is 
most effective: First, a small penalty “may be sufficient to remind the infractor of the 
importance of compliance.”226 Of course, the first-time rule breaker might have acted 
strategically, knowingly and willingly breaking the rule out of self-interest, but users are 
likely to break the rules in error,227 especially in large and complex commons with many 
rules (e.g., health care). A small penalty reminds the rule breaker, as well as the other 
participants, of the rules. Second, minor sanctions convey information in another way, 
they let the infractor and the other users know that monitoring is ongoing and penalties 
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are being handed out, avoiding a potentially catastrophic cascade of noncompliance.228 
Third, a small initial sanction avoids the risk of crowding out endogenous cooperative 
behavior,229 for example a conditional willingness to follow the rules. If the sanction is 
disproportionate to the infraction,230 the rule breaker is likely to find the sanction unfair, 
because needlessly punitive, leaving them disenchanted with the institution.231 As a 
result, such members may be more inclined to act self-interestedly rather than 
cooperatively. Finally, field studies and experiments show that even small verbal 
sanctions directed against unknown defectors can be enough to change the behavior of 
rule breakers (i.e., simply pointing out that “someone” is breaking the rules).232 In some 
field settings, outsiders might even find it difficult to recognize minor sanctions used to 
punish first-time offenders as penalties because they center on peer disapproval,233 which 
can result in an unwillingness to extend trust to the rule breaker in future dealings, 
representing a significant cost to the offender despite the penalty itself being relatively 
minor.234 As such, small sanctions provide information in yet another way: they let users 
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know who follows the rules and who breaks them, who behaves cooperatively and who 
acts self-interestedly.235 
 Stricter penalties are reserved for repeat offenders, who pose the main threat to 
the commons. Members who repeatedly break the rules should eventually face a penalty 
that makes rule-breaking an unattractive option.236 While the initial sanctions have little 
to no impact on the expected benefit to cost ratio of breaking the rules, penalties for 
repeat offenders do alter the anticipated return of an infraction. If ever higher sanctions 
do not have the desired effect, offenders are sometimes forced to leave the commons 
altogether.237 
 Regardless of the severity of the penalties, commons research suggests sanctions 
work best in combination with arenas for communication (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice 
Arrangements).238 Based on experiments, the result of sanctioning without 
communication is often that sanctioning costs (i.e., fines) offset the gains in efficiency 
brought about by the penalties, so the net result is usually not improved by the 
sanctions.239 Sanctioning in combination with communication, however, tends to lead to 
significantly better outcomes, especially when the members are allowed to develop their 
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own sanctions.240,241 This leads Ostrom to conclude: “[S]ubjects who use the opportunity 
to communicate to agree to a joint strategy and choose their own sanctioning mechanism 
achieve close to optimal results based entirely on the promises they make, their own 
efforts to monitor, and their own investments in sanctioning.”242  
 
As monitoring and sanctioning are often discussed in tandem, several considerations 
apply to both design principles: First, monitoring and sanctioning must be carried out 
consistently in order for them to be effective. Monitors must be proactive in their efforts 
and willing to impose sanctions whenever they find rule violations.243 Of course, this does 
not mean each and every infraction needs to be detected, but members have to believe 
monitoring and sanctioning are ongoing to assure their continued compliance with the 
rules. Thus, monitoring and sanctioning activities must be public. At least to the extent 
they are transparent, even if the offenders themselves must sometimes remain 
anonymous (e.g., privacy concerns). As such, monitoring and sanctioning are subject to 
Daniels and Sabin’s publicity condition (see 4.4.4.1 Publicity Condition). In turn, commons 
research provides an additional argument to support the use of the publicity condition in 
the context of allocating health care resources. Second, according to economic orthodoxy 
resource users should not engage in monitoring and sanctioning, because these are costly 
                                                          
240 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 183-192. 
241 When participants develop their own sanctioning mechanisms, they have moved past 
mere communication into a collective-choice situation. 
242 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 193. 
243 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 240. 
173 
 
activities no homo economicus in the right mind would take up, lest he be the “sucker”244 
whose hard work other self-interested maximizers take advantage of. In other words, self-
organized systems themselves should not exist, hence the need for top-down monitoring 
by a Leviathan. Commons research challenges this “[…] Hobbesian conclusion that 
constitution of order is only possible by creating sovereigns who then must govern by 
being above subjects, by monitoring them, and by imposing sanctions on all who would 
otherwise not comply.”245 Bottom-up monitoring and sanctioning are not only possible, 
but commons research shows self-organized systems may be able to perform these tasks 
better than hierarchies can. That being said, hierarchies can help to stimulate self-
governance at lower-levels (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). 
2.6.6 CONFLICT-RESOLUTION MECHANISMS 
Conflicts are inevitable when access to scarce resource is concerned, let alone health care 
resources. While rules are assumed to be clear and unambiguous in theoretical work,246 
this is not the case in practice.247 Rules are open to interpretation, even when resource 
users have jointly drafted them, and the rules have to be understood to be effective.248 
Moreover, disagreements about the interpretation of the rules are only one potential 
source of conflicts, which can have a host of other causes, say, changing circumstances 
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(e.g., technological change) or new insights into the CPR (e.g., rate of resource usage is 
higher than initially thought). Thus arises the need for the sixth design principle: “conflict-
resolution mechanisms,” which bolsters the operation of the aforementioned design 
principles.249 The design principle stipulates the importance of “rapid access to low-cost 
local arenas in which to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials.”250 
As with the other design principles, Ostrom does little in terms of specifying what these 
conflict-resolution mechanisms should look like, that is up to the members of a particular 
commons to decide upon collectively, but she stresses arenas to resolve conflicts need to 
be present.251 Commons institutions with conflict resolution mechanisms are more likely 
to survive vis-à-vis commons where such mechanisms are difficult to access, or not 
available altogether.252  
 Still, the design principle itself and Ostrom’s writings offer some guidance as to 
what these conflict-resolution mechanisms should look like: First, the mechanisms should 
be “rapid,” arguably both when it comes to gaining access to them and resolving the 
conflict. As conflicts linger, they undermine trust, cooperation, and compliance with the 
rules. Second, the conflict-resolution mechanisms must be “low-cost.”253 When it is too 
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costly to resolve a conflict, resource users will not bother making use of the available 
mechanisms, again posing a threat to continued cooperation and compliance. This is only 
in part an issue of access. The cost to enter into the conflict-resolution process can 
deliberately be kept low, but if members (know they) subsequently get bogged down in 
a long and costly procedure, they can nonetheless be dissuaded from making use of the 
mechanism. Third, the conflict-resolution mechanism needs to be “local,” which can be 
interpreted as being situated at the appropriate level of analysis. To illustrate, a conflict 
between physicians in a group practice should ideally be resolved in that practice, while 
a conflict between regional hospitals must be resolved by that region’s health 
authority.254 Similarly, a patient seeking to access resources but being denied should be 
able to challenge the decision and resolve the conflict locally, without escalation to a far-
off, anonymous decision maker. On a complementary reading of the requirement, the 
tendency to resolve conflicts at a higher level of authority should be resisted in favor of a 
local resolution of the conflict (see 2.4.7 Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize).255 By 
doing so, members are involved in the conflict-resolution process rather than feeling the 
issue is decided over their heads. Member involvement in conflict-resolution mechanisms 
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can stimulate cooperation, increase compliance with the rules, build trust, and provide 
members with valuable insights into the nature of the resource constraints. At the same 
time, however, members need to have the option to escalate disagreements to higher-
level arenas for conflict resolution in order to avoid the conflict-resolution mechanism is 
hijacked by a few powerful local members (see 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises and 3.5 
Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).256 The result is a tiered conflict-resolution 
mechanism.257 Fourth, and closely related to the previous requirement, the solution to 
the conflict should be “generally known in the community.”258 Much like the publicity of 
monitoring and sanctioning, publicity of the conflict resolution process assures members 
that the institution works, again stimulating cooperation, rule compliance, and trust. 
Moreover, by being public, the conflict-resolution mechanism provides the users with 
information about the interpretation of the rules, resolving the ambiguity that (often) lies 
at the basis of the conflict in the first place (see also 4.4.4.1 Publicity Condition). Finally, 
the conflict-resolution mechanisms should be “orderly,”259 meaning the mechanisms 
themselves need to operate following certain rules determined by collective-choice 
arrangements (see 3.4.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements). This does not mean, however 
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resolution mechanisms implicitly seems to suggest that local mechanisms will be faster 
and less expensive than upstream conflict-resolution mechanisms, but that is not 
necessarily the case. A tiered system will almost certainly complicate the conflict-
resolution process and thus drive up its cost. 
258 Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions,” 35. 
259 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1332. 
177 
 
that the conflict-resolution process must be highly formalized. On the contrary, an agreed 
judicial body can mediate conflicts even if the process they use is highly informal.260 
 The commons literature does not explicitly acknowledge the role that conflict-
resolution mechanisms can play in bringing about institutional change. First, resolving 
ambiguities surrounding the rules can itself constitute a form of institutional change, as 
interpreting a rule in a certain way can imply a change from the way that rule was applied 
up until that point. To give a mundane example, even though a health system has certain 
vague rules about printing documents (e.g., employees should not waste paper), a 
majority of its employees may nonetheless always print their documents one-sided. If 
somebody complains about this practice, then the rule may be clarified to mean that 
employees should print double-sided whenever possible.261 While changes resulting from 
the interpretation of existing rules will often be minor, they nonetheless imply an 
institutional (micro) change. Second, conflict-resolution mechanisms are the locus to 
identify rules that must be changed to ensure the sustainability of the institution. While 
many conflicts will be one-offs, or simply the result of everyday rule infractions during the 
regular use of the resources, some conflicts may be the indication of a development which 
requires a change in the rules to cope with the evolution (e.g., shift in behavior of resource 
users, gradual depletion of the available resources, environmental changes). To give a 
concrete example, the introduction of costly health care technologies leads to new 
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conflicts about resource usage that require changes to the rules (see 2.7.3 The Challenge 
of Technological Change). Conflict-resolution mechanisms can identify developments that 
require rule changes and escalate them to the collective-choice level (see 0.5.3 Rules). 
Finally, and related to the previous point, conflict-resolution mechanisms are often 
closely aligned with, or sometimes can even be identified with, the collective-choice 
mechanisms responsible for changing the rules. To give a concrete example, the water 
court in the Valencian huerta can make certain operational decisions that directly impact 
the rules-in-use (see 2.4 A Common Scenario). As such, mechanisms responsible for 
resolving conflicts often play a key role in changing the rules.262 In conclusion, I believe 
the role conflict-resolution mechanisms can play in institutional change is an 
indispensable and valuable addition to the design principle in order to ensure institutional 
robustness.    
2.6.7 RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS TO ORGANIZE263 
Until now, the design principles have primarily been recommendations concerning the 
“inner workings” of commons institutions. However, principles seven and eight (see 2.4.8 
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Nested Enterprises) pertain to commons institutions’ relationship to other, often larger 
institutional arrangements. Both principles are related to autonomy (see also 3.4 
Pluralism and Freedom in Health Care).264 According to the seventh design principle, 
dubbed “minimal recognition of rights to organize,” external authorities do not challenge 
the rights of members to devise their own institutions.265 In other words, larger 
institutions should enable resource users in social dilemma situations to have sufficient 
autonomy so they can draft and change the rules that affect their particular situation.266 
On the contrary, if external authorities presume only they have the authority to draft, 
monitor, and sanction rules; then it becomes very difficult for resource users to sustain 
their commons institution in the long run.267 Even though in the commons literature 
external authorities are usually associated with the state, they can also appear in the guise 
of powerful market institutions. 
 Acknowledging the rights of resource users to organize is important for several 
reasons: First, local users, relying on local knowledge, are able to design rules that are 
better suited to local conditions (see 2.2.2 Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge),268 
while externally imposed rules might be ill-adapted to local circumstances, something Cox 
and his colleagues catalogue as a government failure.269 Second, the rules of commons 
that enjoy (a certain level of) autonomy are less likely to be challenged by upstream 
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entities (e.g., courts, administrative, and legislative institutions).270 When higher-level 
institutions do not recognize a commons institution’s right to organize, disgruntled 
members can appeal to these institutions when they disagree with the rules. As a result, 
the drafting or changing of rules requires unanimity in order to avoid a challenge,271 
imposing high transaction costs on the commons and preventing members from 
searching for better-matched, lower-cost rules.272 Nonetheless, some commons 
institutions that use unanimity as the rules to change rules have been able to operate for 
a relatively long time.273 Third, stressing the right of institutions to organize is necessary 
because once the process of drafting and altering rules has been taken over by higher-
level institutions, it is difficult to then turn it back over to resource users,274 itself a form 
of elite capture (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle-Level). Arguably, the monopolization 
of the rule-making process by upstream institutions has already taken place in health 
care, making it difficult to grant rights to users to draft their own rules, thus posing an 
important challenge to the development of commons solutions in health care.275 Finally, 
emphasizing the autonomy of commons institutions can help resist the push to privatize 
                                                          
270 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1332. 
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272 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 268. 
273 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 268. 
274 Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” 23. 
275 The argument can be developed further within the context of an evolutionary 
approach to institutions (see footnote 120 in the previous chapter). 
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commons or to bring them under state control (see 4.4 Pluralism and Freedom in Health 
Care).276,277 
 The design principle calls for the right to organize to be “recognized,” by no means 
does it demand for absolute autonomy. On the contrary, commons institutions do not 
operate in a vacuum but are embedded in other, often higher-level, institutional 
arrangements. Commons must relate to and rely on these other institutions in order to 
avoid several pitfalls that stem from self-organization at the local level: First, lower-level 
institutions have both “incentives and opportunities to externalize the costs of the 
resource degradation they cause,”278 effectively passing the degradation of the CPR on to 
others. Solving this issue likely requires local autonomy to be restricted in some ways 
while allowed in others or “to devise institutional forms that give local users incentives to 
self-govern in the wider interest.”279 Second, local resource users may not possess the 
necessary knowledge, or other resources, to sustain the commons without outside 
help.280 Local knowledge is important, but may fall short. Hence, commons often need to 
rely on specialized knowledge or reliable information from upstream organizations.281 
These considerations connect the principle to the final design principle (see 2.4.8 Nested 
Enterprises) and to the idea of polycentricity (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many 
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277 The enclosure of the knowledge commons is the most well-known contemporary 
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278 Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 222. 
279 Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 222. 
280 Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 222. 
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Worlds?). Finally, the design principle can also apply internally to larger organizations that 
are not themselves commons. The current formulation of the principle likely is the 
consequence of the features of the natural resource commons that much of commons 
research is based on. 
 In natural resource settings, commons often are overlooked and allowed to 
operate simply because they are “invisible” to authorities.282 It is difficult to imagine 
commons can fly under the radar in health care, however, given the costs and interests 
at stake, making it necessary to explicitly grant autonomy from the top down in order for 
health care commons to develop and for institutional experiments to take place (see 3. 
The Polycentric Experiment). To give an example, in Singapore authorities gave more 
authority to public hospitals during the restructuring of the health care system during the 
1980s, allowing them to reorganize internally.283 It is worth noting that modern 
technology (e.g., HIS, big data) allows for considerably more control to be exerted from 
the top down. On the one hand, this poses a threat to autonomy, as upstream actors may 
be tempted to use technology to micromanage downstream entities. On the other hand, 
technological developments present an opportunity, as authorities can allow 
downstream entities considerable freedom to organize themselves, while relying on 
technology to monitor their actions from a distance and interfere only when necessary. 
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2.6.8 NESTED ENTERPRISES 
The final design principle, “nested enterprises,” applies to large and complex CPRs.284 
Thus, the principle is particularly relevant to health care. In Governing the Commons 
(1990), Ostrom provides the following lengthy definition of the design principle: 
“Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance 
activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.”285 In later publications, 
she summarizes the principle as follows, “the presence of governance activities organized 
in multiple layers of nested enterprises.”286 This shorter definition is the one that stuck. 
The design principle is based on Ostrom’s observation that among robust commons, 
smaller scale organizations tend to be nested in ever-larger organizations.287 
 The need for nested enterprises arises because Ostrom believes purely 
decentralized systems are just as likely to fail as completely centralized ones.288 Relying 
on a variety of nested institutions is indispensable for the successful management of large 
and complex CPRs (see 3. The Polycentric Experiment). There are several reasons for this: 
First, commons are not insular. Resources are shared between interlocking and 
interdependent commons institutions.289 In a health care system that uses a global 
budget, for example, two seemingly discrete hospitals in fact draw on the same CPR. This 
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is the case regardless of the particular institutional form of the hospitals. Nesting allows 
larger institutions (e.g., regional health authority) “to govern the interdependencies 
among smaller units.”290 Second, and closely related to the preceding reason, the design 
principle is motivated by the first design principle (see 2.4.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries). 
The boundaries of the commons must be defined in relation to other institutions that 
make use of the same CPR. Nesting is a way to achieve this “match” between 
boundaries.291 Third, institutional monocropping is dangerous because overreliance on a 
single institutional arrangement can have catastrophic consequences for the CPRs if that 
arrangement fails (see 3. The Polycentric Experiment). This applies both to institutional 
form (e.g., state, market, commons) and to institutional size (e.g., small-scale, large-
scale). Nesting allows for the mixing and matching of institutions of different types and 
sizes to avert this threat and design more robust institutions. In practice, small-scale 
commons can function as “base institutions,” relying on face-to-face communication to 
solve “many of the day-to-day problems in smaller groups,”292 at the same time gaining 
experience with collective-choice arrangements (see 4. A4R in Practice). Building on this 
experience, larger institutions can then coordinate the activities of these commons, while 
also providing resources to tackle bigger issues (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many 
Worlds?). Finally, Ostrom notes that “[e]stablishing rules at one level, without rules at the 
other levels, will produce an incomplete system that may not endure over the long 
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run.”293 As often, she does not explain the idea of “completeness” in detail, but instead 
uses an example to illustrate its meaning.294 Applied to health care, the example looks 
something like this: the problems facing administrators at a local hospital are different 
from, but related to the issues experienced by the regional health authority, which in turn 
are distinct from, but again related to, the challenges faced by the national health care 
system. Establishing rules at one level, without accompanying rules at the other levels, 
leads to an incomplete system of rules that likely will not prove to be robust. Nesting can 
be used to produce a complete and integrated set of rules to manage CPRs. 
An important clarification of the design principle is that nesting may occur both 
vertically, between institutions at different levels (e.g., hospital and regional health 
authority), and horizontally, between institutions situated at the same level (e.g., two 
hospitals). The former is closest to the classic idea of nesting, where a governance system 
at a lower level of analysis falls under a governance system at a higher level of analysis. 
In other words, governance levels are layered one on top of the other. At least initially, 
Ostrom seems to be primarily interested in vertical relationships.295 However, governance 
levels can also be layered next to one another, in a way that there is considerable 
                                                          
293 Ostrom, Governing the Commons,  102. 
294 In the Spanish huertas (see 2.4 A Common Scenario), irrigation systems are “organized 
on the basis of three or four nested levels,” which in turn are “nested in local, regional, 
and national governmental jurisdictions.” (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 102.) The 
problems facing irrigators at the lowest level of the irrigation system are different from 
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interaction between the horizontal entities and rules must be in place to govern the 
relationship between them. Cox and his colleagues talk about connections between 
resource governance communities that must be situated at the same level.296 While 
horizontal nesting departs from the traditional interpretation of the concept of nesting, 
it does meet the definition of the eighth design principle. Moreover, horizontal nesting 
can make sense within polycentric governance systems. While many interactions 
between lower-level organizations in a polycentric governance system will run via a 
higher-level entity, resource systems at the same level may nonetheless have important 
interactions between themselves that are not mediated by a higher-level institution. The 
rationale behind the principle of nesting discussed in the previous paragraph applies to 
horizontal as well as vertical linkages. 
I think an important criticism of the argument for nested enterprises is that it 
disregards the difficulty of integrating heterogeneous institutions (see 2.7.2 The 
Challenge of Heterogeneity),297 both horizontally and vertically. Trying to coordinate 
between a series of small-scale commons, each different from the next (e.g., members, 
collective-choice arrangements, culture, conflict-resolution mechanisms), and/or having 
them work together under the auspices of a larger institution with an altogether different 
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integrating commons institutions into the existing set of rules than health care systems 
that are characterized by mixed institutions, like that of the United States. I base the 
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makeup (e.g., state, market) is a daunting task. As such, the challenge posed by 
institutional heterogeneity is not only an issue for the principle of nesting, but poses a 
serious threat to the idea of polycentricity (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many 
Worlds?).  
Nevertheless, many of the ideas discussed here will be relevant to the discussion 
of polycentricity in the following chapter (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many 
Worlds?), as polycentricity can be conceived as a complex form of nesting combining both 
vertical and horizontal integration.298  
   
The design principles as a whole raise several important questions and criticisms: First, 
there is the question of external validity. I have already highlighted the issue of applying 
research that is largely based on natural resources to artificial resources in general and 
health care resources in particular (see 0.5.5 Resources). The problem of external validity 
becomes even more salient when considering the design principles, with their promise of 
offering concrete recommendations for the development of robust commons institutions, 
despite having been conceived as a series of conditions observed in robust commons 
institutions (see 2.6 The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions). This in and 
of itself already seems to temper any strong claims to external validity! The issue of 
external validity breaks down into two questions: (1) “Can the design principles be applied 
to complex, large-scale commons, sometimes called ‘global commons?’” (2) “Are the 
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principles applicable to artificial resources in general and health care resources in 
particular?” (1) Unsurprisingly, several authors are skeptical about applying the design 
principles to cases other than the small-scale commons that were used to develop 
them,299 while Stern believes the principles can be applied to global commons given some 
adaptations and additions (see also 2.7.1 The Challenge of Size).300 The current project is 
an attempt to apply commons research in general and the design principles in particular 
to a large and complex commons, i.e., the governance of health care resources. (2) The 
commons literature offers even less in terms of an answer to the second question. 
Commons research’s focus on natural resources makes the question of whether or not 
the design principles can be applied to artificial resources often is not even considered. A 
notable exception are the knowledge commons. Ostrom speculates the design principles 
may apply to the knowledge commons,301 or maybe over time it will be possible to come 
up with a set of principles specifically for the knowledge commons,302 but she designates 
both as questions for future research.303 In the secondary literature, Wall briefly argues 
for the application of Ostrom’s ideas to the coproduction of physical goods, the 
governance of financial resources, and the management of health care resources;304 but 
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he does not discuss the possible applicability of the design principles to these other 
arenas. A possible rebuttal of the criticism that the design principles may not apply to 
artificial resources is that their rationale is independent of the kind of resource, instead 
focusing on institutional design features. Regardless, to determine whether the design 
principles apply to health care commons, small and large, real-world health care 
commons institutions must be analyzed in order to determine if they are characterized 
by the current set of design principles or maybe they display conditions specific to health 
care commons. In the meanwhile, and based on the limited success with applying the 
design principles in the context within which they were developed (i.e., natural 
resources),305 any use of the design principles as tools to develop health care commons 
should be undertaken with extreme caution. Each attempt at applying the principles is 
effectively a policy experiment with uncertain outcomes and possibly grave consequences 
(see 3.3.3 The Ethics of Parallel Institutional Experiments). Of course, this caveat also 
applies to using the design principles to operationalize Daniels and Sabin’s A4R approach 
(see 4. A4R in Practice). 
 Second, several scholars have pointed out the design principles are incomplete, 
suggesting additional criteria for the sustainable management of CPRs.306 Given Ostrom’s 
insistence on the importance of context and complexity, she would certainly agree with 
this criticism.307 To give a concrete example, some scholars have argued for the inclusion 
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of a design principle that further regulates the relation to “external socioeconomic 
factors,”308 particularly the presence of markets. Several authors find the presence of 
markets has a negative impact on cooperation and destabilizes commons 
arrangements,309 which points toward a design principle specifically regulating the 
relationship between commons and markets.  
 Finally, Ostrom’s principles raise a much more philosophical question. The design 
principles characterize well-designed commons institution. Considering the general issue 
of institutional design, Goodin asks to what extent such “good design” implies “good” in 
a moral sense? In other words, in what sense do the design principles track morality?310 
Goodin distinguishes between “internal” and “external” criteria of good design. He 
characterizes the former as an institution’s fit with its environment,311 but at the same 
time he suggests another interpretation of the notion “fit:” to what extent does the 
institution do what it is designed to do. He describes the latter as judging an institution in 
light of larger external evaluative criteria (i.e., moral criteria).312,313 To give an example, 
the Tuskegee syphilis experiments may have been well designed (i.e., good) by the 
internal criterion, in the sense that the experiment was methodologically sound and 
                                                          
308 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.” 
309 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.” 
310 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 37. 
311 “A well-designed object is one that fits its environment well.” (Goodin, “Institutions 
and Their Design,” 37.) 
312 Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” 37-38. 
313 A bit confusingly, Goodin describes the external criterion of good design in terms of 
“fit” as well, but “fit with external standards of moral worth.” (Goodin, “Institutions and 
Their Design,” 37.) 
191 
 
yielded significant scientific results,314 but were far from good when held up to judgment 
against the external criterion of morality.315 Goodin summarizes his position as follows: 
  
The appeal is, ultimately, to some larger moral code. There is a sense in which an 
institution might be said to be well designed if it is internally consistent and 
externally harmonious with its larger social environment. But that is still an 
essentially internalist definition of optimal design which must eventually give way 
to larger external critiques, rooted in normative principles that are at the end of 
the day themselves independently defensible.316  
 
What does this mean for Ostrom’s design principles? I think an initial consideration may 
be the following: as a whole the design principles for successful commons institutions are 
good by both criteria because ultimately they allow for the sustainable governance of 
CPRs, which is morally good in itself. Of course, it is just a moral good, and not the morally 
good as a whole. Still, in the case of health care resources and the resources discussed in 
the commons literature (e.g., water, fish, knowledge, and climate), the sustainability of 
the resources is a good thing. In the case of other resources, however, it may be better if 
                                                          
314 The example is imperfect for two reasons: (1) One may argue the Tuskegee 
experiments were not “harmonious with their external social environment” and thus their 
design was poor by the internal criterion from the get-go. (Goodin, “Institutions and Their 
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the tragedy of the commons takes place (e.g., drugs). Not all commons are good commons 
when judged against “some larger moral code,” it all depends on the CPR and its uses.317 
Thus, as a whole the design principles are not categorically good, which means the 
principles have to be evaluated individually, a daunting task as the principles have to be 
judged against an ethical touchstone. Luckily, Goodin provides an illustrative shortlist of 
desirable design principles that he believes have “deeper moral resonance.”318 
Referencing the work of Robert K. Merton, he describes them as “principles that trade on 
“theories of the middle range” in both empirical and normative realms.”319 Without 
explaining each of Goodin’s principles (and the rationale behind them) in detail,320 there 
is considerable overlap between his shortlist and Ostrom’s design principles: First, the 
principle of “revisability,” accounting for human fallibility and societal change,321 
resembles Ostrom’s call for conflict-resolution mechanisms, which can serve as engines 
for revising rules (see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms).322 Second, Goodin identifies 
“robustness” as a desirable principle, the capability of adapting to new situations rather 
than being destroyed by them.323 Even though none of Ostrom’s individual design 
principles calls for robustness, the eight principles together are meant to ensure the 
robustness of commons institutions. Third, Goodin suggests the need for a “publicity 
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principle,” meaning institutions and their actions must be publicly defensible.324 Publicity 
is an integral part of several of Ostrom’s design principles (e.g. clearly defined boundaries, 
collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict-resolution 
mechanisms). Fourth, the principle of “variability” is needed to ensure learning-by-doing 
in order to perfect institutional arrangements.325 Ostrom’s design principles, particularly 
the last two (2.6.7 Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize and 2.6.8 Nested 
Enterprises), explicitly aim for such variability (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many 
Worlds?). Finally, even though Goodin does not include deliberative processes on his 
tentative list of desirable design principles, he would likely agree democratic deliberation 
is a principle that has “deeper moral resonance” (see 4. A4R in Practice).  
2.7 CHALLENGES FACED BY THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS  
In addition to the design principles, Ostrom identifies a number of challenges facing 
commons institutions. These challenges complicate the use of commons institutions in 
health care and may even preclude the use of the commons paradigm in health care 
altogether. Ostrom distinguishes between what she calls “theoretical puzzles,” namely 
the problems of size and heterogeneity, and threats. The rationale behind this distinction 
is not entirely clear.326,327 I discuss both theoretical puzzles and threats under the 
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umbrella of challenges. Rather than discuss all of the challenges identified by Ostrom, I 
focus on the ones that are particularly relevant to the use of commons institutions in 
health care: size, heterogeneity, and technological change. Even then, I perforce limit 
myself to a summary discussion of these challenges, as a more detailed discussion lies 
outside the scope of this dissertation, but offers an avenue for future research, both 
theoretical and empirical.  
2.7.1 THE CHALLENGE OF SIZE328  
Almost all of the successful commons institutions described in commons research are 
small, which potentially is a big problem for the implementation of these institutions in 
health care. The laboratory experiments that commons research draws on have been 
conducted on appropriation situations ranging from two to a couple of dozen 
participants, while most field studies examine commons institutions with a maximum of 
no more than a couple of hundred resource users. The limited number of resource users, 
particularly in field studies of successful commons institutions, is no coincidence. After 
all, commons researchers agree large-scale commons institutions, sometimes called 
                                                          
does not take account of local knowledge and institutions, (6) growth of opportunistic 
behavior (e.g. corruption), (7) lack of large-scale institutional arrangements providing fair 
and low-cost resolution mechanisms for conflicts, and (8) rapid shifts in population. 
(Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 153.)  However, she only 
lists five of them in Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005): (1) rapid exogenous 
changes (e.g., technology, heterogeneity), (2) transmission failures, (3) relying on 
blueprint thinking, 4) corruption and rent-seeking, and (5) lack of large-scale supportive 
institutions. Some of the threats from the former list are seemingly and plausibly 
collapsed into one another in the latter list. (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional 
Diversity, 271-279.) 
328 “Size” primarily refers to the number of resource users involved in the appropriation 




“global commons,”329 are much less likely to be successful than small ones.330 Some of 
the reasons for the failure of global commons are the following: First, since monitoring 
and sanctioning becomes more difficult and costly as the commons increases in size, it 
becomes more likely resource users will get away with free-riding behavior. Thus, users 
are more inclined to behave strategically rather than cooperatively in large commons. 
Second, laboratory experiments have shown that face-to-face communication is crucial 
in establishing trust between resource users, which in turn provides the basis for 
successful cooperation.331,332 However, opportunities for face-to-face communication are 
limited or altogether impossible in large-scale commons. Third, as commons increase in 
size, it becomes more difficult for resource users to process all the relevant information 
due to the limits of human rationality, this in turn complicates communication with other 
resource users and impedes decision-making.333 While this issue is a challenge for all 
institutional arrangements, it is especially problematic for commons, which often are 
small-scale and lack the resources to process large and complex information. Fourth, as 
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commons grow larger, the private gain of resource users ceases to be connected to the 
degradation of the resource in a readily visible manner. In other words, the effects of 
degradation are distant, which makes it more difficult for appropriators to notice the 
connection between their behavior and the degradation of the resource.334 The increased 
distance between resource users’ actions and the degradation of the resource does not 
only obscure the fact of subtractability, but also makes it much more difficult to exclude 
users from extracting resources, or even to convince them that it is necessary to put limits 
to resource usage. This issue and the previous one are particularly important in the 
context of health care. Finally, increased size tends to lead to more heterogeneity, which 
in turn hinders collective action,335 as I will discuss in the next section (see 2.7.2 The 
Challenge of Heterogeneity).336  
 As a result, commons researchers talk about the “scaling-up problem,”337 the 
difficulty of successfully implementing self-governed solutions to large-scale commons 
dilemmas.338 This problem is particularly worrisome when considering the application of 
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commons research to health care, since even a small hospital easily has hundreds of 
members, while a health care system counts tens of thousands or even millions of 
users.339 Thus, the practical use of commons institutions in health care seems to be 
limited to small commons, like group practices or local health services. An answer that is 
hardly satisfactory, because even if small-scale commons institutions can robustly 
manage medical resources, the global health care commons remains jeopardized, which 
in turn threatens the continued existence of the local commons. After all, a minimum of 
participants is needed to achieve the collective benefit,340 meaning enough resource 
users must participate in the collective effort to durably manage health care resources 
for the effort to be successful, otherwise the attempts of those users working toward the 
durable management of the resources will be in vain.341 Applied to the aforementioned 
scenario of a local health care commons: Why would the physicians in one group practice 
or the administrators in a local health center cooperate amongst each other to conserve 
health care resources in a health care system that is otherwise characterized by self-
                                                          
behavior (i.e., cooperation). Moreover, a growing number of members might create the 
momentum necessary to sustain a commons institution in the end, because only then can 
it be a viable alternative to other institutional arrangements. (Wall, The Sustainable 
Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 142-143.) 
339 Depending, of course, on the level of analysis and who are identified as the primary 
resource users. 
340 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 188. 
341 This seems to be a special case of a general principle identified by Robert Axelrod in 
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984): A minimum number of cooperators is needed for 
cooperation to take off, because otherwise their willingness to cooperate will be 
exploited by self-interested agents. Luckily, even if there are only a few cooperators, their 
efforts can be successful as long as they are able to identify one another and work 




interested behavior? If the global health care commons are destroyed due to overuse, 
the local health care commons will more than likely collapse as well. 
 The classic solution for solving the problem of size in commons research is to turn 
to the final design principle: the nesting of commons institutions. In theory, successful 
cooperation in small-scale commons institutions can be built on to expand the 
collaborative effort to ever-larger self-governed systems nested inside one another. 
Ostrom suggests this nesting should happen according to the principle of subsidiarity, 
meaning tasks should be decentralized to the lowest level of governance with the capacity 
to perform the tasks in a satisfactory manner (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many 
Worlds?).342 Unfortunately, there is very limited empirical evidence that nesting works in 
practice, especially in large-scale commons,343 but a lack of evidence does not imply 
commons institutions should be dismissed altogether as a possible solution to managing 
global commons like health care systems. 
 Several other solutions have been proposed to mitigate the problem of size: First, 
Stern proposes a series of additional design principles that are particularly relevant for 
large-scale commons: “investing in science to understand the resource and its 
interactions with users and those affected by its use,” “integrate scientific analysis with 
broadly based deliberation” (see 4. A4R in Practice), “plan for institutional adaptation and 
change,” and “engage in a variety of institutional forms” (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best 
                                                          
342 Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions,” 43. 
343 Moreover, Ostrom speculates it might be better to start from smaller units and then 
building upward rather than creating smaller units within larger units. (Pennington, 
“Elinor Ostrom and the Robust Political Economy,” 461.) The former approach would pose 
an additional complication for the use of commons institutions in health care. 
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of Many Worlds?).344 Apart from the first design principle, which seems to be more 
applicable to complex natural resources, the principles suggested by Stern may indeed be 
helpful to manage large-scale health care commons. Second, health care information 
systems (HIS)345 might allow for the successful management of large-scale health care 
commons, as they enable resource users to process large amounts of information and can 
help them monitor resource usage more effectively and at a lower cost,346 overcoming 
two of the most important issues resource users face when managing global commons. 
Moreover, HIS can help resource users to communicate with each other more easily. 
There is, however, an important caveat. Experiments have shown that face-to-face 
communication is crucial to establish trust and spur cooperation. In experimental 
settings, resource users do not achieve the same results when they communicate through 
electronic means.347 The newest developments in communication technology, for 
example fast and easy video conferences using smartphones and tablets, might be able 
to obtain results similar to face-to-face communication,348 but additional research is 
needed to ascertain this indeed is the case.349 Even then, however, communication would 
                                                          
344 Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 223-224.  
345 The same acronym seems to refer to both “health care information systems” and 
“hospital information systems.” The terms “health information technology” (HIT) and 
“health information management” (HIM) are also used. 
346 Dolšak and Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” 27.  
347 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 149.  
348 Then again, when the complexity of the commons increases, and it increases with size, 
then the success of face-to-face communication is reduced regardless. (Ostrom, Gardner, 
and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 168.) New technologies are 
unlikely to be able to overcome this reduction as they are still limited by the nature of 
face-to-face communication. 
349 A possible counterexample are the global digital commons, such as the open-source 
movement, which a large number of members, many of whom never have face-to-fact 
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quickly become unwieldy as the number of resource users increases, which seems to limit 
the use of this technology to certain settings. Third, Ostrom suggests that the relationship 
between the size and the performance of commons institutions may be curvilinear rather 
than inverse,350 meaning increases in size may only have a negative impact on the 
performance of the institution up to a certain point, a hypothesis that is confirmed by at 
least one systematic study.351 Finally, and maybe most importantly, the problem of size is 
not only an issue for commons institutions, but for other institutional arrangements as 
well. In fact, the status quo institutions of market and state may be failing to sustainably 
manage health care resources precisely because of the complexities inherent to managing 
large-scale resources. Over half a century ago, Leopold Kohr suggested in The Breakdown 
of Nations (1957) that society’s problems are not so much caused by the particular 
institutional arrangements, but by the size of its institutions.352 In order to solve these 
problems they need to be broken down to “the human scale,” a scale at which people 
could play a part in the systems that govern their lives. Taking Kohr’s analysis seriously 
would require health care systems to be broken up into smaller units, avoiding the 
problem of size altogether. A suggestion Ostrom would no doubt be sympathetic to. 
Alternatively, and more realistically, Kohr’s work simply suggests that to tackle health 
care’s major challenges (e.g., resource governance, health care reform) these issues must 
                                                          
contact, successfully rely on technology to collaborate. (Ostrom and Hess, “A Framework 
for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” 49.)  
350 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1333-1334. 
351 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 251-252. 
352 Leopold Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1957). 
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be broken down into smaller and more manageable problems that can be solved within 
the existing organizational structures.  
2.7.2 THE CHALLENGE OF HETEROGENEITY 
The “puzzle” of heterogeneity poses a challenge to the management of health care 
resources at the individual/group level, the organizational/institutional level. The 
individual/group level is the focus of most discussions of heterogeneity in the commons 
literature, while the organizational/institutional level has received little attention from 
commons researchers, but both kinds of heterogeneity pose serious difficulties to the 
communal management of health care resources. I will discuss them in turn. 
  In the commons literature, the problem of heterogeneity arises because (groups 
of) members differ from each other along a range of dimensions, including their norms,353 
cultural background, and interests.354,355 When (groups of) members hold different sets 
of beliefs, the cooperative management of the resource becomes more difficult.356 The 
problem of heterogeneity is particularly pressing in health care and familiar to authors 
discussing the allocation of scarce health care resources. Daniels and Sabin, for example, 
write: 
                                                          
353 Hence, Ostrom sometimes talks about “heterogeneity of norms.” (Ostrom, 
Understanding Institutional Diversity, 123-125.)  
354 Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions,” 1334. 
355 Ostrom talks about the “cultural diversity challenge.” (Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, 
and Policansky, “Revisiting the Commons,” 281.) 
356 As Ostrom writes in Governing the Commons (1999): “None of these [enduring, self-
governing CPR institutions] involves participants who vary greatly I regard to ownership 
of assets, skills, knowledge, ethnicity, race, or other variables that could strongly divided 
a group of individuals.”(Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 89.) She also notes successful 
commons institutions are characterized by “extensive norms […] that narrowly define 




Even people who want to cooperate in steering a society’s health system will hold 
diverse moral and religious views. Their individual value systems will lead them to 
disagree morally about what constitutes a fair allocation of resources to meet 
competing health care needs.357   
 
The issue of collaborating on the allocation of health care resources sketched by Daniels 
and Sabin is precisely the general problem of heterogeneity from the commons literature. 
Heterogeneity arises from immigration, which brings new (groups of) participants with 
different belief systems,358 but also from the diversity inherent to liberal, individualistic 
societies. Within such societies, concurrence on the management of scarce health care 
resources is difficult to come by. 
 In contrast, consider the following two examples in which the members are more 
homogeneous: First, in societies where most people share the same value system it is 
more straightforward to agree on the management of health care resources. To give a 
concrete example, in some religious traditions there is a belief that biological life should 
be preserved at all cost, a so-called “vitalist stance.”359 In a society where mostly everyone 
adheres to this conviction, it is much easier to come to an agreement about the allocation 
of resources in case of, say, end-of-life care or abortion.360 Second, within heterogeneous 
societies, certain particular groups that are internally more homogeneous may readily 
                                                          
357 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 2. 
358 Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” 153. 
359 Jeffrey Kirby, “Balancing Legitimate Critical-Care Interests: Setting Defensible Care 
Limits through Policy Developments,” The American Journal of Bioethics 16, no. 1 (2016): 
39. 
360 Of course, adhering to a vitalist stance may place serious demands on the health care 
commons, but the example is meant to show agreement about the allocation of resources 
is easier when resource users share the same values. 
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reach agreement, because they share one or more characteristics, with accompanying 
beliefs, which bind them together. To give two concrete examples, both the woman’s 
health and disability rights movements, which relied heavily on what are in effect 
institutions for collective action (e.g. Boston Women’s Health Collective),361 were able to 
influence health care policy, and thus the allocation of resources, because they were 
united by their gender and long-term health concerns respectively.362 The example shows 
homogeneity can play a powerful role in stimulating cooperation and agreement on 
health care policy, but it also reveals a dark side of homogeneity, as homogeneous groups 
can successfully “hijack” health care policy (see 3.4.2 The Dangers of the Middle-Level). 
 How to solve the issue of individual/group heterogeneity? As with the problem of 
size, nesting commons institutions may help to overcome heterogeneity. However, the 
nested institutions would have to be designed with the challenges posed by diversity in 
mind, otherwise the lower-level institutions risk becoming competing homogeneous silos, 
making cooperation at the higher-levels more difficult. Alternatively, defenders of the 
commons paradigm argue the problem can be overcome by taking more time to draft 
better rules,363 but this seems hardly a satisfactory answer, as heterogeneity impedes the 
process of drafting rules to begin with, yet another second-order dilemma. Hence, the 
process to draft rules itself must be designed in such a way that it can help to overcome 
heterogeneity. In theory, carefully designed deliberative procedures can aid resource 
                                                          
361 Marc Rodwin, “Exit and Voice in American Health Care,” University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform 32, no. 4 (1999), 1047. 
362 Rodwin, “Exit and Voice in American Health Care,” 1051-1052. 
363 Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory,” 643. 
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users work “through” their heterogeneity, serving as the basis for cooperation and over 
time a shared understanding of the issues at hand (see also 4. A4R in Practice). Over time, 
repeated experiences with deliberative processes might lead to the creation of a shared 
or collective identity among the participants in the deliberative procedure,364 so the 
members think of themselves first and foremost as deliberators rather than as Catholics, 
physicians, paraplegics, or Americans.365 In practice, however, the emergence of an 
overriding collective identity as deliberative members of the commons is a tall order.366 
As Fred Saunders notes, it is more likely the members’ other identities will emerge and 
disrupt the deliberative process.367 That being said, some evidence exists that 
communication can help to overcome heterogeneity, at least in small-scale 
experiments.368  
 The problem of heterogeneity also arises at the organizational/institutional level. 
Daniels, whose work served as the inspiration for this second kind of heterogeneity, 
                                                          
364 Fred Saunders uses both the term “shared identity” and “collective identity.” 
(Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory,” 647.) 
365 In Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005), Ostrom describes a similar process, 
suggesting individuals can “develop a shared mental model” through repeated 
interactions, particularly face-to-face communication. (Ostrom, Understanding 
Institutional Diversity, 107.) 
366 Moreover, resource users can converge on identities that are altogether not desirable. 
A good example is the shift from “caring” to “curing” discussed by Daniel Callahan. Under 
the influence of biomedical advances, many people now share “the belief that the long-
standing, seemingly inherent finitude of the body […] can be overcome.” (R. Larry 
Reynolds, “The Delivery of Medical Care and Institutional Change,” Journal of Economic 
Issues 23, no. 1 (March 1989): 223-224.) It is worth pointing out his is an easy belief to 
converge on, as it is in the self-interest of virtually all members of the health care 
commons, from (potential) patients over providers to insurers. 
367 Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory,” 647. 
368 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 87-91. 
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describes health care systems as involving “a diverse set of institutions which have a 
major impact on the level and distribution of our welfare.”369 Both integrating 
heterogeneous organizations (e.g., hospitals, health systems) and abstract institutions 
(e.g., combine market, state, and commons into a polycentric governance system) are 
nontrivial. As far as I know, the problem receives no attention in the commons literature. 
On the one hand, this is not all that surprising seen commons research’s virtually exclusive 
focus on commons institutions. On the other hand, the issue of institutional diversity also 
plagues commons institutions themselves, since they are not narrowly defined and can 
vary significantly from one another. Thus, relying on the final design principle (see 2.6.8 
Nested Enterprises) to manage a global commons, like health care, could be complicated 
if the commons organizations involved are diverse.370 To give just one example, the 
deliberative procedures of one health care commons can differ significantly from those 
of another, making it difficult to wed their deliberative processes. The issue is 
compounded when commons organizations are integrated with market and state 
organizations. Even without this additional complication, however, the issue of 
institutional heterogeneity seems to be of interest to commons researchers.  
 As with individual/group heterogeneity, the question arises how to address the 
issue of organizational/institutional heterogeneity? The reflex to get rid of 
organizational/institutional heterogeneity altogether must be resisted. As discussed in 
                                                          
369 Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), ix. 
370 Of course, the nesting of enterprises could result in more minimal procedures as one 
moves to higher levels within the nested system, but these higher-level rules would 




the introduction (see 0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy), there is a drive toward 
organizational/institutional mono- and dual-cropping, relying on (a combination of) 
market and state. A movement that is also apparent in health care, just think about the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in the United States, which introduced health insurance 
marketplaces (market) while at the same time expanding Medicaid (state), or the 
privatization of health care in The Netherlands, which pushed the Dutch health care 
system toward an increased reliance on market forces. Having diverse 
organizations/institutions is not just a problem but also a strength, as heterogeneous 
organizations/institutions can serve as incubators for new ideas and are more resilient in 
the face of systemic shocks (see 3.5 Polycentrism: The Best of Many Worlds?). Thus, 
institutional heterogeneity is a challenge that must be managed rather than a problem 
that needs to be gotten rid of. Of course, this leaves the question: how to manage 
institutional diversity? Even though the problem is not explicitly discussed in the 
commons literature,371 commons research offers a suggestion as to how to tackle the 
issue. Organizations/institutions can be integrated into complex governance systems in 
which the actions of lower-level entities are coordinated by higher-level rules, i.e., 
polycentric governance systems (see 3.5 Polycentrism: The Best of Many Worlds?). 
Ostrom would point toward the importance of developing higher-level deliberative 
procedures to manage organizational/institutional diversity at lower levels of analysis. 
However, as with the issue of individual/group heterogeneity, this is not an entirely 
                                                          
371 Ostrom’s Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005) does not offer many answers, 
despite what the title may suggest. 
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satisfactory answer. On the contrary, successfully scaling up deliberative processes from 
the intra- to the inter-organizational/institutional level is a nontrivial task.  
2.7.3 THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Of all the challenges identified by Ostrom, academics and practitioners acquainted with 
the issue of allocating scarce health care resources are likely to be most familiar with the 
threat posed by technological change.372 As discussed in the previous chapter (see 1.2 A 
Tragedy of the Health Care Commons?), new medical technologies are the primary cause 
of the rise in health care expenditures, and thus of the ever increasing strain on health 
care resources. The commons literature pays ample attention to the issue of technological 
externalities as well, as commons are often threatened by the introduction of new 
technologies. The classic example are fisheries, where the introduction of new fishing 
methods and technologies can disturb existing resource usage patterns and lead to a 
tragedy of the commons.373,374 Of course, changes in technology may also decrease 
pressure on the commons by providing more efficient ways of using them. I will discuss 
the threats and opportunities posed by technological development in turn. I would like to 
point out that the following arguments for most part make abstraction of issues of quality 
(i.e., improving health outcomes).375 
                                                          
372 Ostrom sometimes discusses the threat of technological change under the header 
“rapid exogenous changes.” (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 272.) Even 
though in the case of health care, but also in the example of fisheries, many technological 
developments seem to be endogenous to the institution. Then again, Ostrom’s use of the 
word “exogenous” is not entirely clear, because it raises the question: exogenous to 
what? 
373 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 12, 252-253.  
374 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 273. 
375 See footnote 4 in the previous chapter. 
208 
 
 Up until the middle of the twentieth century, “health care was largely delivered in 
homes by family members.”376 The available technology was limited. Physicians, for 
example, had little to offer apart from their “conscientious care and attention.”377 As one 
author reminisces in 1978, when medicine’s technological revolution was already well 
underway, “[on a house call] there is only you, your black bag, and the patient – whose 
trust springs from past generations of physicians who brought comfort to the home even 
when they had little else to offer.”378 The use of the same, necessarily restricted 
technology across the board meant that health care expenditures were low and 
predictable.379 To use the language of the commons, the use of limited and homogeneous 
technology throughout health care makes the pace at which members extract resources 
slow, steady, and thus easy to foretell.380 But technological innovations cause the rate at 
which resources are extracted to intensify, sometimes unpredictably so, increasing 
                                                          
376 Morreim, Balancing Act, 8. 
377 Morreim, Balancing Act, 8. 
378 Robert Taylor, “Home Care,” in Family Medicine. Principles and Practice, eds. Paul 
Paulman and Robert Taylor (New York: Springer, 1978), 114. 
379 As Morreim notes, in 1929 health care represented only 3.5% of the Gross National 
Product (GNP) of the United States and by 1950, over twenty years later, that figure had 
risen to just 4.4%. (Morreim, Balancing Act, 8.) 
380 Of course, describing the relationship between technology and resource usage as one-
directional is an over-simplification made for the sake of discussing the threat of 
technological change. In reality, economic growth and the accompanying increase in 
health care’s key resource, money, spurred medicine’s technological revolution. 
Moreover, and more relevant to the commons, the relationship between technological 
change and the pooling of health care resources is complex. The increased reliance on 
expensive health care technology necessitated the creation of large, common-pools of 
resources in order to pay for these expensive technologies. In turn, over time pooling 
became an answer to rising health care expenditures driven by technological advances 
(e.g., the use of global budgets, HMOs, ACOs). Disentangling these relationships is an 
promising avenue for future research. 
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pressure on the available health care resources and thus expenditures for all members, 
even those that do not directly make use, or even want to make use, of the new 
technology. A good example is the overuse of PET scanners in Belgian hospitals discussed 
in the first chapter (see 1.5 Argument II: Game Theory), the proliferation of the expensive 
scanners leads to increased costs and pressures on the health care system’s global 
budget.381  
 The standard solution to the challenge of technological change found in the 
commons literature is the use of “technology rules,” limiting the types of technology that 
can be used and/or the frequency with which these technologies may be used. As such, 
technology rules are a specific type of a boundary rule, in line with Ostrom’s first design 
principle (see 2.4.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries).382 Technology rules can reduce the load 
on the available resources and help sustain the long-term use of the commons.383 As with 
other rules, careful monitoring and graduated sanctions need to be in place for the rule 
to be successful, as self-interested members have an interest in circumventing the rules.  
Technology rules are commonplace in health care, abound with clinical practice 
guidelines (e.g., the National Guideline Clearinghouse developed by the Agency for Health 
Care Research and Quality in the United States), which often contain a technology 
component, and technology appraisal decisions (e.g., NICE technology appraisals in the 
                                                          
381 Of course, the scanners also improve diagnostic certainty, thus improving health 
outcomes and possibly saving money. (Charles Phelps, Eight Questions You Should Ask 
About Our Health Care System (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2010), 50.) Remember, 
the issue in Belgium is there are too many PET scanners. 
382 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 258-259. 
383 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 511. 
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United Kingdom), which are clear-cut examples of technology rules.384 Systems are in into 
place to monitor the use of technology (e.g., reimbursement based on diagnosis-related 
groups)385 and sanction the illegitimate use of technology (e.g., budgetary sanctions). Of 
course, the problem of self-interested members trying to circumvent the rules is also 
present in health care, resulting in attempts to “game the system” at all levels of 
analysis.386 Belgian hospitals without a PET scanner, for example, may fear to be at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis their peers with the imaging technology. To give 
another example, patients and physicians who believe a technology may be beneficial to 
treat a particular condition, even though the guideline recommends the technology not 
be used, may be tempted to game the system. The most striking are cases of patients who 
are terminally ill and want to make use of costly unproven technologies in a final attempt 
to save their lives. Often such cases are highly publicized, as patients and their physicians 
attempt to capture the discourse (see 4. A4R in Practice). In short, the large amount of 
resources (i.e., money) revolving in health care and the special importance of health care, 
both at the individual and the societal level, provide resource users with considerable 
incentives to strategically pursue their own interests and bypass technology rules.  
                                                          
384 Daniels and Sabin’s example of coverage decisions regarding growth hormone therapy 
for children are another illustration of technology rules (see 5.4.3.4.1 Publicity Condition). 
385 Morreim, “Gaming the System,” 444. 
386 Morreim’s comprehensive discussion of gaming, particularly her discussion of 
“resource rules,” is strikingly similar to discussions of technology rules in the commons 
literature. (Morreim, “Gaming the System,” 443-444.) 
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Of course, technological advances can also have a positive impact on the 
commons.387 First, technology can directly lead to the more durable use of resources. 
Dolšak and Ostrom point out advanced industrial economies may be able to decrease 
pressures on the commons by coming up with more efficient ways of using the available 
resources because of technological development.388 A good example from the health care 
arena is laparoscopic surgery, which does not only lead to better outcomes, but can also 
lead to lower costs, as keyhole surgery is less invasive (e.g., patient does not have to stay 
in the hospital as long, reduced risk of infection), say in the case of anti-reflux surgery.389 
As already noted, however, most technologies will cost more money rather than less. 
Second, technological developments can help to solve commons dilemmas, by enabling 
members to identify and monitor the available resources more effectively and at lower 
costs,390 but this is “not a substitute for decision-making.”391 Take the example of HIS in 
general and electronic patient records in particular, which are technologies that can be 
used to more closely monitor the use of health care resources. These technologies are 
regularly presented as a silver bullet to more efficiently manage resources and lower 
costs,392 not in the least by outside experts, often representatives of “the market” (e.g., 
                                                          
387 First and foremost, new health care technologies can lead to improvements in 
outcomes, but the present discussion focuses on the issue of resource governance. 
388 Dolšak and Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” 27. 
389 Francisco Schlottmann, Paula Strassle, and Marco G. Patti, “Comparative Analysis of 
Perioperative Outcomes and Cost between Laparoscopic and Open Antireflux Surgery,” 
Journal of the American College of Surgeons 224, no. 3 (March 2016) 
390 Dolšak and Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” 27. 
391 Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, and Policansky, “Revisiting the Commons,” 279. 
392 See, for example, William Haseltine’s discussion of the Singapore health care system 
and its reliance on electronic patient records to control costs. (Haseltine, Affordable 
Excellence, 75-76.) For another example, see Jack Cochran’s discussion of the 
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consultants). In and of themselves, these technologies cannot decide on the allocation of 
scarce health care resources, which requires some sort of decision-making process. On 
the contrary, focusing exclusively on HIS and presenting them as a panacea for health 
care’s cost crisis can hide or obscure the need for hard choices.393 Finally, technological 
advances may indirectly play a role in averting the tragedy of the commons by facilitating 
deliberation between members of the commons, leading to the more efficient use of 
resources. To give a concrete example, Singapore’s experiments with Telemedicine, allow 
for micro-level deliberations between patients, nurses, general practitioners, and 
specialists.394 In theory, such initiatives could be scaled-up relying on the design principle 
of nesting. As I have already highlighted the drawbacks of technology-based 
communication when discussing possible solutions to the challenge of size (see 2.7.1 The 
Challenge of Size), I will not discuss them again here. 
 Like other global commons, the health care commons grapple with accelerating 
rates of technological change. Imaging technologies and HIS are still relatively recent 
additions to health care’s black bag, but continue to develop at a rapid pace. In 
comparison, biotechnology is in its infancy, and so far health care applications are limited, 
but “biotech” holds great promise (e.g., personalized and regenerative medicine), albeit 
at a hefty price tag. The breakneck speed of technological change causes learning by doing 
                                                          
“Information Age model of care.” (Cochran and Kenney, The Doctor Crisis, 31.) A former 
professor at Harvard University, Haseltine is the founder of ACCESS Health International, 
a non-profit health care consultancy, while Cochran is a physician-executive with Kaiser 
Permanente. 
393 Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), 115, 136. 
394 Haseltine, Affordable Excellence, 75-76.  
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to become increasingly difficult, “as past lessons are less and less applicable to current 
problems.”395 As such, technological change might lead to a feeling of resignation: ever 
more and evermore expensive technology will lead to a tragedy of the health care 
commons, as resource users fruitlessly apply solutions that have not worked in the past 
to the technological revolution of the present. Even if some technological advances (i.e., 
HIS) can lead to better monitoring, coordination, and deliberation; health care’s 
technological rat race does not revolve around these institutional goals.396 The focus is on 
curative technologies that “will cost more money, often much more.”397 As such, and 
herein lies a glimmer of hope, technology may over time be the impetus for institutional 
change. Enduring technological progress combined with the inability of the current 
institutions to deal with the demands these new technologies place on the health care 
commons may result in a shock due to resource overuse. Strong institutions often emerge 
in the wake of such shocks and subsequently persist over time.398 A “technological shock” 
can thus bring about new institutional solutions to the challenge posed by technological 
change.  
The challenges of size, heterogeneity, and technological change are not stand-
alone issues. They are relevant to the discussions on institutional experiments (see 3. The 
Polycentric Experiment) and deliberative processes (4. A4R in Practice) in the subsequent 
                                                          
395 Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, and Policansky, “Revisiting the Commons,” 281-282. 
396 HIS holds the risk of becoming a goal in and of itself, much in the same way bureaucracy 
existed for the sake of bureaucracy in the USSR.  
397 Phelps, Eight Questions You Should Ask, 59. 
398 Giangiacomo Bravo, “Agents’ Beliefs and the Evolution of Institutions for Common-
Pool Resource Management,” Rationality and Society 23, no. 1 (2010): 119, 145. 
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chapters. As with the IAD framework and the design principles, to do full justice to the 
complex relationships between the challenges and these debates is difficult, but 





THE POLYCENTRIC EXPERIMENT 
 
“In an advancing society […] any restriction on liberty 
reduces the number of things tried and so reduces 
the rate of progress.”1 
- Henry Bayard Phillips - 
  
“It’s always the patient who has to take the 
chance when an experiment is necessary. And 
we can find out nothing without 
experiment.”2 
- George Bernard Shaw - 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, I summarized, discussed, and criticized key ideas from commons 
research. I consistently related and applied these concepts to health care, highlighting the 
potential value of the commons paradigm to the governance of scarce health care 
resources. The current chapter takes a different approach in that it presents one 
overarching argument in favor of the use of commons institutions in health care relying 
on a fundamental idea: pluralism. Starting from the indetermination of commons 
institutions, I argue that the introduction of the commons paradigm in health care has the 
                                                          
1 Henry Bayard Phillips, “On the Nature of Progress,” American Scientist 33, no. 4 (October 
1945): 255. 
2 George Bernard Shaw, The Doctor’s Dilemma (London: Penguin Books, [1911] 1954), 98.  
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following advantages: First, pluralist commons institutions allow for running diverse 
parallel experiments to solve health care’s challenges. Second, Jacob Levy’s work on 
pluralism and freedoms suggests diverse institutions can function as a safeguard against 
overbearing power concentrations within health care. I conclude by discussing how these 
advantages can be integrated with the strengths of the institutions of market and state 
by taking a polycentric approach to health care systems. 
 The chapter provides contributions to both commons research and health care 
ethics. First, the discussion of parallel experiments is the most comprehensive available 
in the commons literature. Moreover, the commons approach to parallel experiments has 
not been applied to health care.3 Second, Levy’s work on pluralism and freedom provides 
an entirely new perspective on Ostrom’s work, which is sometimes criticized for being 
apolitical, while at the same time deepening existing discussions in the commons 
literature and suggesting another role for the commons in health care, namely as 
bulwarks against overbearing power concentrations. Finally, the concluding discussion of 
polycentricity is distinct because of its breadth and critical assessment of the concept. 
3.2 PLURALISM OUT OF INDETERMINATION 
Probably the most puzzling, and arguably the most frustrating, aspect of commons 
institutions has been their elusiveness, for they are theoretically infinite in number and 
the sets of rules they adopt can differ greatly. As discussed in chapter two, the only 
                                                          
3 Discussions of parallel experiments in the commons literature are virtually all limited to 
brief, theoretical musings over the possibility and the advantages of running parallel 
institutional experiments with self-organized governance regimes. Thus, the application 
of the idea of parallel experimentation is somewhat of a novelty in the field regardless of 
the area of application (i.e., health care).  
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feature shared by all institutions for collective action is that their members play a central 
role in governing the institution (see 2.3 Commons Institutions). However, the 
indeterminism of the commons is also their strength, as it allows for the emergence of a 
wide diversity of rules to solve resource governance issues. This will the argument of the 
current section: commons institutions are characterized by indetermination out of which 
pluralism arises. 
3.2.1 INDETERMINATE INSTITUTIONS   
The indeterminateness of commons institutions can easily be construed as problematic. 
Human beings dislike indetermination because it is akin to uncertainty. Self-governed 
institutions put the onus of governance on resource users to draft their own rules, which 
is difficult enough when someone already is a member of an existing commons 
institutions, and almost inconceivable in the case of new commons. Policymakers, 
entrenched in health care’s status quo institutions,4 do not care for open-endedness 
because it makes for poor policy proposals, ostensibly akin to: “You, health care users, 
must self-organize in order to govern your scarce resources!” In addition, the one feature 
shared by all commons institutions, the emphasis on the responsibility of the members, 
diminishes the power of traditional decision-makers, distributing decision-making among 
a large number of actors instead.  
                                                          
4 In this case, the term “status quo institutions” does not primarily refer to the institutions 
of market and state, but to existing health care organizations regardless of their precise 
institutional makeup. Of course, most health care institutions are a mix of market and 




The problem of (in)determination is easy to exaggerate, however, as health care’s 
status quo institutions are seldom precisely defined either, but function as unquestioned 
(or even unnoticed) background assumptions.5 This definitional deficit is not experienced 
as an insurmountable problem in the implementation of institutions in health care and 
elsewhere. As Ostrom argues, “both the centralizers and the privatizers frequently 
advocate oversimplified institutions – paradoxically, almost “institution-free” 
institutions,” leaving the precise rules, what Ostrom calls the “institutional details,” up in 
the air.6 The institutions operate as tacit assumptions both in the literature and in 
practice.7  
Furthermore, the open-ended definition of commons institutions does not mean 
concrete commons arrangements are underdefined. On the contrary, Ostrom stresses the 
set of rules used in a given commons institution should be defined as precisely as 
possible,8 ruling out ambiguities and possible freeriding. From a philosophical 
perspective, one may argue the commons paradigm implies a shift in focus from the 
universal to the particular. This move is interesting because it makes explicit a process 
that willy-nilly also takes place in case of the status quo institutions, namely the 
                                                          
5 Health care institutions have developed over a long period of time through a 
combination of conscious decisions, many now forgotten or settled into documents (e.g., 
laws, policies, guidelines), and organic evolutions. Institutions only cease to be invisible 
background assumptions if policymakers learn to see them (see 0.4 The Double Aim of the 
Project). 
6 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 22. 
7 Institutionsvergessenheit is not confined to the realm of economics (see 0.1.1 A Brief 
History of Institutional Economics). 
8 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 22-23. 
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development of concrete policy measures (e.g., for the governance of health care 
resources) enacted through sets of rules broadly construed.9 Commons institutions draw 
these policy decisions out into the open, engaging the members of the institution in the 
decision-making process (see also 4. A4R in Practice).  
As such, relying on commons does not sideline policymakers, but requires a 
redefinition of their role. Rather than making decisions themselves, policymakers must 
facilitate decision-making. The empowerment of downstream actors to design their own 
institutions inevitably implies that upstream actors lose (some) immediate power over 
the rule-making process, which is part of the reason commons are difficult to implement 
in the presence of longstanding institutions, as is the case in health care. The downward 
distribution of the decision-making process necessitates that traditional decision-makers 
act as facilitators, enabling downstream actors to design their own rules. What that 
facilitator role looks like in practice depends on both the current institution and the 
commons-like institution that follows it, but likely is as context dependent as commons 
institutions themselves (e.g., an existing organization in which downstream actors already 
enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy requires a different approach than an 
organization in which they do not).10 In addition, traditional policymakers can take on 
second-order institutional responsibilities, among others, contributing to the resolution 
of conflicts (see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms) and the design of constitutional 
                                                          
9 At the limit, any process, decision, or resolution can be construed as a rule (see also 
0.5.3 Rules). 
10 The suggestion is not that older institutional arrangements should be replaced by 
commons, but that commons institutions are integrated in the existing set of rules (see 
3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). 
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rules (see 0.5.3 Rules). Regardless, from the perspective of the status quo institutions, 
such a recasting of their role may be a difficult pill to swallow for actors that currently 
hold considerable sway over the rule-making process. 
3.2.2 PLURAL INSTITUTIONS 
Out of the indetermination of commons institutions arises institutional diversity. The 
result of relying on small-scale, bottom-up decision making is that rules are locally 
specified as solutions to particular problems. Indeed, groups of resource users facing 
similar, or even identical, resource governance issues can design radically different 
institutions to approach the same challenge. Not only can the rules themselves be specific 
to particular commons, but also the process through which the solution was reached. The 
multiplicity of commons institutions is evidenced by the rule diversity observed in field 
studies and by the theoretical number of possible rules.11 The commons paradigm implies 
institutional pluralism at the meso-level. Interestingly, the term pluralism is largely absent 
from the commons literature, despite being a central theme of commons research. As far 
as I have been able to establish, Ostrom herself does not use the term at all.12 A possible 
explanation for the absence of the concept from her oeuvre can be found in Paul Dragos 
                                                          
11 Ostrom gives the example of allowing five rules changes to each of the seven 
components of an action situation (see 2.5 The Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework) resulting in 75,525 (57) combinations. “This is a gross simplification, however, 
since the important rules used in field settings include more than five rules –at least 25 in 
the case of boundary rules, and over 100 variants in the case of authority rules.” (Elinor 
Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 
(June 1999): 519.) In theory, the number of different combinations of rules is infinite. 
12 The term “pluralism” does not appear in any of the (40+) papers and books by Ostrom 
I consulted. A search on Google Scholar for “Ostrom pluralism” did not produce any 
writings by her hand either. 
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Aligicia’s Institutional Diversity and Political Economy: The Ostroms and Beyond (2014). 
According to Aligicia, “the themes of institutional diversity, pluralism, and 
heterogeneity”13 in the work of the Ostroms have two major sources:14 First, Ostrom’s 
pluralism is foundational. Ostrom regards pluralism as a “social fact.” As a result of this 
“inexorable and irreducible feature of the world,”15 institutions are and need to be 
pluralist as well.16 Aligicia summarizes: 
 
In other words, when it comes to organizing human coordination and 
interdependence in diverse circumstances, with diverse preferences, 
endowments, and beliefs, institutional pluralism is a fact, a challenge, and a prima 
facie normative answer.17,18 
 
He then situates the Ostroms within social philosophy, placing them among radical 
pluralists, genre Isaiah Berlin, rather than moderate pluralist, like John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas.19 Aligicia characterizes moderate pluralists as acknowledging the challenge of 
pluralism, but still trying to find “a common grounding principle, a counterweight to 
heterogeneity.”20 Radicals, on the contrary, do not believe in universal theoretical or 
                                                          
13 Paul Dragos Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy: The Ostroms and 
Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1. 
14 The Ostroms are Elinor and her husband Vincent (see also 1.5 Argument III: Type of 
Good). 
15 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 1. 
16 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 1. 
17 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 1. 
18 A bit oddly, Aligicia concludes the paragraph by writing: “All in all, Ostromian 
institutionalism seems to have a strong pluralist bend.” (Aligicia, Institutional Diversity 
and Political Economy, 1.) 
19 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 2-3. 
20 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 2. 
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institutional strategies to reduce pluralism to some sort of homogeneity.21 To them, 
“diversity, divergence, and disagreement are unavoidable characteristics of our social 
condition.”22 Pluralism is a fact and has a foundational role to play. 
 
Consequently, we should be prepared to think in contextual and situational terms, 
about a variety of solutions to the variety of problems, identified by a variety of 
people in a variety of circumstances, sometimes involving profound trade-offs and 
irreconcilable tensions and sacrifices.23 
 
Second, Aligicia points toward the evolution of the research program of the Ostroms as 
an origin of their pluralism. He questions to what extent the Ostroms were fully aware of 
the “profound pluralism embedded in their approach”24 from the start. Instead, he 
suggests their pluralism grew over time as their research agenda progressed.25 An 
important consequence of this second source is that Ostrom is not a doctrinaire pluralist. 
Rather, her pluralism is the result of “an ongoing dialogue between theory and empirical 
reality.”26 Regardless the precise origins of Ostromian pluralism, likely an interplay of both 
                                                          
21 I do not wholly agree with Aligicia’s argument. At least at the level of the individual 
commons institutions, Ostrom seems to believe pluralism can be overcome through rule-
making and collective-choice arrangements. A view that is also evidenced by her 
discussions of heterogeneity as a theoretical puzzle that can be solved (see 2.7.2 The 
Challenge of Heterogeneity). 
22 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 2. 
23 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 2. 
24 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 3. 
25 I argue that the two sources of Ostrom’s pluralism as identified by Aligicia appear at 
odds with one another. For if her pluralism is foundational, then it seems like her research 
program must have been pluralist from the outset. Vice versa, if her pluralism only arose 
over time, then it appears it cannot have been foundational. Aligicia neither 
acknowledges nor resolves this apparent tension, even though resolutions are possible 
(e.g., the Ostroms were committed to pluralism from the outset, but did not fully 
recognize their commitment until much later in their intellectual development).  
26 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 3. 
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sources, Aligicia’s discussion may explain the absence of the term pluralism from 
Ostrom’s oeuvre. If Ostrom’s pluralism is foundational, it can be presumed to underlie 
her entire work, without her perceiving the need to make it explicit. Or rather, without 
her feeling the urge to spell it out, as ideas of pluralism and diversity permeate her work. 
If her pluralism is the result of the evolution of her research, then it may only have 
become clear in retrospect. Indeed, most sources explicitly relating Ostrom’s work to 
pluralism are recent, for example Aligicia’s book.27 
 Ostrom’s institutional pluralism is the focus of this chapter, but she is also labeled 
a value pluralist, epistemological pluralist, and methodological pluralist.28 Aligicia typifies 
her work as “all-the-way-down pluralism.”29 These different types of pluralism appear to 
be undergirded by a foundational belief in pluralism, as discussed in the previous 
paragraph, but are also related to one another, albeit without her ever making these 
relationships explicit. For example, Ostrom’s institutional pluralism is supported by her 
value pluralism, which in turn is the result of plural meso-level institutions. Wall does 
some work unpacking these relationships, in particular the link between Ostrom’s 
                                                          
27 Wall’s The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom (2014) is another example. (Derek 
Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom. Commons, Contestation and Craft (New 
York: Routledge, 2014), 30, 38, 49, 179.) 
28 Aligicia adds “sociological pluralism” to this list. (Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and 
Political Economy, 3.) Wall includes Ostrom’s “causal” and “ontological” pluralism. (Wall, 
The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 53.) I do not attempt to justify this multitude 
of characterizations of Ostrom’s pluralism, for the remainder of the chapter builds solely 
on her institutional pluralism.  
29 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 3. 
224 
 
epistemological and methodological pluralism,30 but much remains to be done to further 
map Ostrom’s pluralism, a promising avenue for future research. 
 Pluralism is often conceived as a good in itself and thus something that ought to 
be pursued.31 Even though Ostrom regards pluralism as a matter of fact, her institutional 
pluralism too has an undeniable normative component,32 “there is in it an implicit 
embrace of pluralism and diversity, a predilection toward negotiation and commonly 
agreed solutions.”33,34 Even though I support Ostrom’s position,35 the pluralist argument 
presented in the remainder of the chapter is altogether more pragmatic and does not 
require an endorsement of pluralism as a normative good in itself: institutional pluralism 
is a way to stimulate parallel experiments in health care (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments), 
and to ensure the freedom of health care (see 3.4 Pluralism and Freedom in Health Care).   
3.3 PARALLEL EXPERIMENTS 
Friedrich Hayek, the famous economist and political philosopher,36 argues that free 
societies are successful because they allow their members to find solutions to problems 
                                                          
30 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 53. 
31 Ted Honderich ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Second Edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 727. 
32 Saying Ostrom’s pluralism is normative offers support to the claim that her pluralism is 
foundational. 
33 Aligicia, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy, 22. 
34 Of course, it is possible to “embrace” pluralism and diversity, while being indifferent 
about whether they should be promoted.  
35 Given that pluralism permeates Ostrom’s work, following her in (most of) her 
arguments as I do inevitably implies endorsing her strand of pluralism with its normative 
implications. 
36 Hayek was also an accomplished philosopher of science. One of the first classes he 
taught at the University of Chicago was a seminar on the philosophy of science attended, 
among others, by Enrico Fermi. (Bruce Caldwell, Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual 
Biography of F.A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 298-299.) 
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through trial-and-error.37 “Liberty is essential in order to leave room for the 
unforeseeable and unpredictable; we want it because we have learned to expect from it 
the opportunity of realizing many of ours aims.”38 North summarizes Hayek’s argument 
as follows: “The society that permits the maximum generation of trials will be most likely 
to solve problems through time.”39 The use of commons institutions in health care allows 
for precisely this: the running of parallel institutional experiments to identify the best 
practices to manage health care resources, while providing a diverse range of institutional 
arenas to test and evaluate solutions to other contested health care issues, like different 
approaches to health care reform.40 Daniels and Sabin, among others,41 recognize the 
need to identify best practices to manage health care resources. They “believe societies 
should experiment with a family of best practices,”42 and argue it would be wise for 
society “to experiment with several promising strategies in order to learn more over time 
about how well they work and how morally acceptable they seem in light of actual 
                                                          
37 Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
[1960] 2011), 73-90.  
38  Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 81. 
39 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 81. 
40 In a WHO report on health sector reform, Cassels argues health care reform is “not a 
sequential process” and there is a need to analyze “the outcome to different approaches 
to institutional change.” (Andrew Cassels, Perspectives on Health Sector Reform (Geneva: 
World Health Organization, 1993), 6-7.) 
41 Cochran, a physician-executive at Kaiser Permanente, argues: “We have a responsibility 
to identify the very best practices for quality, efficiency, and cost control; package them 
so they are easily spread; and share them with organizations throughout the country.” 
(Jack Cochran and Charles Kenney, The Doctor Crisis: How Physicians Can, and Must, Lead 
the Way to Better Health Care (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014), 19.) 
42 Norman Daniels and James Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
[2002] 2008), 79.  
226 
 
practice.”43 Parallel trials are especially important in health care, among others, because 
of disagreements about the moral acceptability of certain approaches and the high 
degree of uncertainty involved in health care practice.44 I return to Daniels and Sabin’s 
particular approach, and discuss some of its shortcomings, in the next section (see 3.3.1 
State and Market Experiments).  
 Much like Hayek and North, Ostrom is convinced that “allowing parallel self-
organized governance regimes to engage in extensive trial-and-error learning”45 is the 
best approach to finding close-to-optimal solutions in highly complex systems.46 Her 
emphasis on experimentation stems from her conviction “that “getting the institutions 
right” is a difficult, time-consuming, and conflict-invoking process.”47 In Coping with 
Tragedies of the Commons (1999) and again in Understanding Institutional Diversity 
(2005), she argues designing rules that approach optimality or improve institutional 
performance is not a straightforward analytical task that can be undertaken by experts 
(see 2.2.2 Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge). Instead, the policy design process 
should be understood as tinkering with rules in an attempt to find combinations that work 
                                                          
43 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 68. 
44 There are additional reasons running parallel trials is especially important in health 
care. For example, if health care indeed is of special moral importance, then the collapse 
of health care systems and the resources they manage is particularly troublesome. Relying 
on parallel institutional experiments rather than a single system decreases the risk of 
catastrophic collapse.  
45 Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David 
Policansky. “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science 284, no. 
5412 (April 1999): 280-281. 
46 “In any design process that involves substantial probability of error, having redundant 
teams of designers has been shown to be advantageous.” (Ostrom, “Coping with 
Tragedies of the Commons,” 520.) 
47 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 14. 
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together better than others.48 Thus, policy changes must be thought of as experiments 
based on informed expectations about possible outcomes, and the impact of these 
outcomes on participants. Whenever a rule is changed, a policy experiment is 
conducted.49,50 ln other words, all efforts to solve resource management problems must 
be viewed as experiments based on partial analyses of specific problems.51 Ostrom’s 
institutional experiments sound much more abstract than the trials proposed by Hayek 
or the best practices of Daniels and Sabin, but in practice these rule changes refer to 
concrete practices, like implementing a guideline or using a particular piece of technology 
(see also 2.7.3 The Challenge of Technological Change).  
Of course, running policy experiments is not a feature exclusive to commons 
institutions. Parallel experiments can take place within the status quo institutions as well. 
However, both state-run experiments and market-run experiments have important 
drawbacks vis-à-vis policy experiments relying on commons institutions. In turn, 
“commons experiments” have their own disadvantages, suggesting the best approach to 
conducting successful policy experiments is to ensure they take place within a diverse set 
of institutions (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). Once again, Ostrom 
does not think commons institutions are an institutional magic bullet meant to replace 
the status quo institutions, but can be a valuable and underappreciated addition to the 
                                                          
48 Elinor Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” Journal of Bioeconomics 
16 (2014): 4. 
49 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 519-520. 
50 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 243. 
51 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 220. 
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institutional repertoire when trying to resolve resource governance issues. Before 
discussing the advantages and disadvantages of conducting policy experiments using 
commons institutions (see 3.3.2 Commons Experiments), I discuss some shortcomings and 
advantages of state- and market-run experiments.  
3.3.1 STATE AND MARKET EXPERIMENTS 
Within states, policymakers tend to experiment simultaneously with all of the resources 
within their jurisdiction. Of course, central governments can undertake pilot programs to 
experiment with various options, but they usually intend to find the set of rules that works 
best for an entire jurisdiction.52 Once a successful approach is identified, the risk exists 
other experiments are shut down and the rules identified in the successful experiment 
are adopted universally. The urge to do so must be resisted for at least two reasons: First, 
the solution identified in one experiment might not work across the board. Ostrom 
believes the rules should be context-specific and based on local knowledge (see 2.2.2 
Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge). Second, a set of rules that seems to work 
initially might not be successful in the future. Path dependence, a familiar issue in the 
evolution of technology, equally applies to institutions.53 As North explains, a productive 
path can turn into an unproductive one over time but because of path dependence, the 
initially chosen set of rules is nonetheless preserved and even reinforced.54 Thus, the 
                                                          
52 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 520. 
53 The classic example of path dependence is the QWERTY keyboard layout. The layout is 
not the most efficient (e.g., the layout overemphasizes the left hand), but other layouts 
were prone to cause the arms of mechanical typewriters to clash and jam. As a result, 
QWERTY became the standard. The dominance of VHS (Video Home System) over 
Betamax is another common example of path dependence.  
54 North, Institutions, 8, 92-104. 
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universal adoption of a single experiment may prove disastrous, yet inescapable in the 
long run (e.g., the widespread use of fee-for-service promotes resource use due to the 
incentives it creates, but for the same reason the rule has proven difficult to change once 
it is entrenched in health care systems). One can speculate certain features of the 
American health care system (e.g., systemic errors in the financing and organization of 
health care55) are the result of such path dependence gone awry. The concept of path 
dependence highlights another issue, as a path that is viable in the long term in one 
context, may not be in another context. Apart from their misguided emphasis on finding 
a single successful approach, state-run experiments are usually slow,56 in part a 
consequence of the limited number of experiments being run. Finally, experimentation is 
counter to hierarchical institutions themselves, as the liberty Hayek identified as being 
the key to generating the maximum number of trials is at odds with the centralized, 
command-and-control structures of state institutions. 
 The shortcomings of state-run experiments do not preclude them from playing a 
role in trial-and-error learning. First, states have the ability to coordinate experiments in 
a way that markets and commons cannot (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many 
Worlds?). Second, even if states experiment with all or most of the resources within their 
jurisdiction, parallel experiments can still take place. However, one is required to take an 
                                                          
55 Victor R. Fuchs and Emanuel J. Ezekiel, “Health Care Reform: Why? What? When? What 
it Might Take to Effect Comprehensive Change,” Health Affairs 24, no. 6 (November-
December 2005): 1400.  
56 Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” 14. 
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international perspective, looking at policy experiments across borders.57 This is precisely 
the approach taken by Daniels and Sabin in Setting Limits Fairly, especially in the chapters: 
An International Learning Curve,58 Learning to Share Medical Resources,59 and Revisiting 
the International Learning Curve.60 The authors use the term “social learning process”61 
to describe the implementation of their ideas on the fair management of health care 
resources in different countries. They write: 
 
It is necessary to examine efforts to implement fair rationing procedures across 
national boundaries. The many factors that would discourage such efforts, such 
as the conviction that political and health system differences between countries 
vitiate efforts at transferring experiences, must be set aside. Too much is at stake 
not to engage in a serious effort at examining best practices across variations in 
systems design.62 
 
Daniels and Sabin analysis of “fair rationing procedures across national boundaries” is 
akin to a series of parallel experiments. Such an international approach, comparing state 
experiments, can be valuable to identify best practices, but there are several caveats to 
consider: First, even if a large number of countries experiment with different policies for 
governing health care resources, the total number of experiments remains relatively 
limited. Second, countries might copy and then build on each other’s rule sets early on. 
                                                          
57 As Hogg writes, “International cooperation provides opportunities for users to learn 
from the experiences of other countries.” (Christine Hogg, Patients, Power & Politics. 
From Patients to Citizens (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 156.) In the United States, 
parallel experiments could be organized at the state-level. 
58 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 149-168. 
59 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 169-174. 
60 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 175-191. 
61 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 175. 
62 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 167. 
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Not only does this aggravate rather than mediate the risks of path dependence, but it also 
limits the number of independent experiments and thus the probability of identifying best 
practices. A good example is the influential Norwegian report (1987) on setting limits, 
which served as a model for reports in Sweden (1994), Finland (1995), and Denmark 
(1996).63 Such modeling is not wrong. After all, it reflects the basic idea of parallel 
experiments: to identify, disseminate, and build on best practices. However, copying early 
on reduces the number of unique policy experiments. 64 As a result, better rules (and 
outcomes) “may exist in a subspace that was cut off early in the process of crafting 
rules.”65 Finally, if Ostrom’s is right about the importance of local context and knowledge 
(see 2.2.2 Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge), then Daniels and Sabin likely 
underplay the impact “political and health system differences between countries” have 
on the possibility to transfer experiences.66 Sets of rules are likely more easily transferable 
within more homogeneous local contexts (e.g., countries, regions, and states) than 
between countries, with some exceptions (e.g., the Scandinavian countries). Of course, 
none of these arguments renders parallel experiments at the international level in general 
and Daniels and Sabin’s discussion in particular futile. They simply highlight concerns 
                                                          
63 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 153, 155. 
64 Ostrom warns against simply imitating the rules that operate in more successful 
systems as local circumstances differ, the rules being copied are misunderstood, or there 
may be existing rules in the imitating system that are incompatible. In addition, imitation 
holds the risk of “biased transmission” because “some rules are particularly easy to 
understand, remember, and seem to work well.” (Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective 
Action Evolve?” 21-22.) 
65 Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool 
Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 325. 
66 They do not entirely ignore them either. See, for example, their discussion of the 
differences between the United States and other developed countries. 
232 
 
about running parallel experiments at an international scale. Once policy experimenters 
are aware of these concerns, they can incorporate them into the social learning process 
promoted by Daniels and Sabin. Even though their discussion focuses heavily on learning 
processes between countries, Daniels and Sabin mention several parallel experiments at 
smaller scales. For example, they describe the decentralized Canadian health care system 
as “an excellent laboratory,”67 but also speak highly of the regional organization of Kaiser 
Permanente and the Veterans Health Administration in the United States as facilitating 
the search for best practices.68 These examples are much closer to the idea of parallel 
experimenting proposed by Ostrom and discussed in the next section. 
While state experiments are often plagued by an excess of coordination, market-
run experiments are at risk of suffering from a lack of coordination. Markets allow for a 
large number of parallel experiments to be run, but the lack of oversight makes it more 
difficult to identify successful experiments, among others, because the solution that 
“wins” in the marketplace is not necessarily the best.69 Moreover, the outcomes of the 
experiments risk becoming proprietary, making it difficult (i.e., costly) or altogether 
impossible to copy them.70 These characteristics make it more difficult to recognize and 
implement best practices. Lastly, even though the market is likely to give rise to numerous 
experiments, the fact all these experiments take place within organizations that all share 
                                                          
67 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 181. 
68 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 188-191. 
69 To draw an analogy, in the realm of technology startups there often are several 
ventures offering a similar product or service. The startup that comes out on top is usually 
the one that can attract the most capital, even if other startups offer a superior product 
or service. 
70 Such enclosures are a well-known phenomenon in the study of knowledge commons. 
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the same basic design plausibly decreases the variety of the trials being run. For example, 
market institutions all have certain obligations to their shareholders and share similar 
management structures, some of which are legal requirements. As a result, the decisions 
made by market organizations are likely to converge. To give a concrete example, 
consider the impact of exclusively relying on the market to develop new drugs, which is 
another resource allocation issue (i.e., the decision to allocate resources to the 
development of certain drugs but not to the development of others).71 Drug 
manufacturers have neglected and in many cases altogether stopped the development of 
antibiotics, primarily because they have a poor return on investment compared to drugs 
that treat chronic illness.72 Thus, some promising experiments will not be run or even 
conceived in the marketplace simply due to the lack of institutional diversity.    
 Of course, this brief overview does not do justice to state and market experiments, 
not in the least because I have focused almost exclusively on their shortcomings. Rather 
than wanting to criticize these approaches, the reason for highlighting their weaknesses 




                                                          
71 This resource allocation decision can be described in terms of rules, namely drug 
manufacturers adopting a rule not to develop antibiotics. 
72 Antibiotics are taken for a short time and cure the target disease, while drugs that treat 
chronic illness (e.g., high blood pressure) are taken daily for the rest of the patient’s life. 
(WHO, “Race Against Time to Develop New Antibiotics,” Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization 89, no. 2 (2011): 88.) Moreover, the high cost of developing new antibiotics 
is unattractive in light of increasing resistance of bacteria. 
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3.3.2 COMMONS EXPERIMENTS 
Relying on commons institutions to experiment with different institutional arrangements 
and to explore different solutions to health care problems has several advantages: First, 
the use of commons institutions can break down complex and unwieldy institutional 
challenges, like the management of health care resources, into smaller and more 
manageable issues. Evidence suggests that individuals in relatively simple systems are 
likely to develop rules that are more nearly optimal than individuals in more complex 
systems.73 After all, small-scale commons institutions allow resource users to rely on local 
knowledge, include trustworthy participants, and make use of disaggregated 
knowledge.74 This often appears to lead to better rules than can be provided by any 
general system of rules.75 Faced with complex problems, individuals grouped in small-
scale, cooperative, and overlapping organizational arrangements “have a better chance 
at testing, modifying, and improving rules.”76 
 Second, commons institutions tend to have lower monitoring and enforcement 
costs than state institutions. Since local participants have to bear the costs of monitoring 
and enforcement, they are likely to devise rules that make infractions highly obvious. 
                                                          
73 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 326. 
74 To give a concrete example, the administrative costs of small health insurers in 
Switzerland are remarkably low when compared to those of large insurers, even though 
the latter benefit from economies of scale. Insurers with fewer than 1,000 members 
averaged $80 per enrollee, while costs for insurers with more than 1,000,000 members 
averaged $78. (Diana Shaw, “Mergers and Health Care Organizations.” Journal of Health 
Care Finance 29, no. 3 (Spring 2003).) A possible explanation is that small insurers “benefit 
from their superior knowledge of the health care status of the enrollees in their small 
territories.” (Ibid.)  
75 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 526. 
76 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 326. 
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Moreover, locally created rules are more easily seen as legitimate, leading to higher 
conformance rates among participants in commons institutions.77 The lower monitoring 
and enforcement costs, combined with high conformance, increase the likelihood of 
success of local experiments.  
Third, as discussed in the previous section, introducing commons institutions into 
the health care system is akin to running parallel experiments, building redundancy into 
the system, and thus greatly reducing the probability of systemic failure. Relying on 
parallel, redundant design teams each trying to find the best combination of rules also 
reduces the risk of local breakdowns, as the designers are attuned to the local context. 
Unlike policies imposed on entire regions from the top down without taking into account 
the differences, thus increasing the chances of a mismatch between the rules and the 
local circumstances, resulting in a local tragedy.78     
Commons institutions for most part share these first three advantages with 
market-run experiments. However, commons experiments have several features that set 
them apart from market institutions: First, using commons institutions in health care can 
combine “the advantages of market competition while yet maintaining the principle of 
assigning merit goods like health care on nonmarket criteria, and avoiding the possibility 
that the production of such goods may be corrupted by the profit motive.”79 David Miller 
                                                          
77 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 526. 
78 Elinor Ostrom, “Why do we need to protect institutional diversity?” European Political 
Science 11 (2012): 129-130. 
79 Rudolf Klein, “Self-inventing Institutions: Institutional Design and the U.K. Welfare 
State,” in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 246. 
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calls such “a market approach which deliberately seeks to eliminate the profit motive: a 
market of co-operatives.”80 Within such a market of co-operatives it is presumably easier 
to identify, share, and adopt successful experiments (see also 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best 
of Many Worlds?).81  
 Second, the chapter began with highlighting the elusiveness of commons 
institutions, which are theoretically infinite in number and produce a huge diversity of 
rules. In field studies of irrigation systems, for example, farmer-owned systems generate 
a far greater diversity of rule configurations than government-owned systems.82 
Arguably, and depending on the definition of market institutions (see 0.2 Market and 
State: A False Dichotomy), commons are more diverse than market institutions as well, 
since the latter all arise within the market ideology with its reliance on the profit motive.83 
Ostrom does not provide any empirical data to back up this conjecture, but the example 
of drug manufacturers neglecting the development of new antibiotics is a possible 
illustration. The takeaway is relying on inherently diverse commons institutions in 
addition to the more uniform status quo institutions will generate a much larger number 
of trials and is thus considerably more likely to solve health care’s problems.  
                                                          
80 Klein, “Self-inventing Institutions,” 246. 
81 Of course, the profit motive is just one possible incentive that can corrupt the 
production of merit goods. Indeed, even laudable motivations (e.g., altruism) can lead to 
the corruption of the production of merit goods. Moreover, the profit motive plays a 
crucial role in providing information as to what health care goods and services are in 
demand and must be produced. In other words, the profit motive does not merely 
corrupt.  
82 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 235. 
83 North, Institutions, 81. 
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 Finally, and closely related to the previous point, running a large diversity of 
experiments is important because it can help plan for institutional adaptation and change, 
so-called iterative risk management. As internal and external variables change, like new 
medical technologies and ageing populations, health care institutions need to be able to 
adapt to these changes.84 In the context of institutional change, North talks about the 
importance of institutions that are “adaptively efficient.”85 Running a large and diverse 
number of institutional experiments increases the odds of finding solutions to problems 
in a changing world. However, North points out the process is not merely a probabilistic 
one. Institutions that are (not) adaptively efficient can also arise systematically, because 
a particular set of rules is easy to understand or seems to work well,86 but also because 
of ideologies that give people a preference for similar solutions.87 So even though markets 
can give rise to a large number of experiments, they may all resemble one another, and 
thus not be adaptively efficient. Introducing commons institutions into health care can 
mitigate this risk. Moreover, commons institutions might be better suited to adapt to 
changes than market institutions. Because the latter may be terminated when they do 
not meet some performance measure (e.g., not profitable, unable to attract capital), 
some promising experiments might be abandoned early on, even though they would 
                                                          
84 Paul Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons: Natural Resources and Emerging 
Technologies,” International Journal of the Commons 5, no. 2 (2011): 224. 
85 Adaptive efficiency is a feature of both the institutions themselves and the “trials, 
experiments, and innovations” those institutions generate. (North, Institutions, 80-81.) 
86 The systematic appearance of adaptively inefficient institutions can be the result of 
“transmission bias,” a preference for certain rules because they “are particularly easy to 
understand, remember, and seem to work well.” (Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective 
Action Evolve?” 21.) 
87 North, Institutions, 81. 
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prove to be adaptively efficient further down the road. As Ostrom points out, “the best 
outcome may exist in a subspace that was cut off early in the process of crafting rules.”88 
Running a large number of diverse experiments and allowing members to learn from each 
experiment before launching another one greatly increases the chances complex systems, 
like health care, will be able to adapt to changes.89   
 Of course, commons institutions also have their limitations when conducting 
parallel experiments: A first important disadvantage of relying on commons experiments 
is that some members will not organize themselves. A particular worry in the context of 
health care, as members often have neither the time nor knowledge to set up cooperative 
experiments. Some of the main reasons are a lack of leadership and a fear of seeing their 
experiments overturned by outside authorities,90 hence the importance of a minimal 
recognition of the right to organize (see 2.6.7 Recognition of Rights to Organize).91 If 
central governments recognize the importance of running parallel experiments, they can 
mediate the issue by incentivizing self-organization (see also 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best 
of Many Worlds?).  
Second, incentives need not necessarily be financial,92 as the hurdle to organize 
and conduct successful policy experiments will often be a lack of specialized knowledge. 
                                                          
88 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 324. 
89 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 525. 
90 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 526. 
91 Elinor Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What Have We 
Learned?” in Property Rights and Land Policies, ed. Gregory Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong 
(Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2009), 36. 
92 In fact, material incentives can be counterproductive when trying to stimulate 
cooperation, because they signal that self-interest is normal. (Brent Simpson and Robb 
Willer, “Beyond Altruism: Sociological Foundations of Cooperation and Prosocial 
239 
 
Local groups may possess extensive local knowledge and be specialists in their respective 
fields of health care, but that does not mean they have the necessary expertise to set up, 
conduct, and communicate the results of experiments. Central governments can provide 
local groups with project managers or train health care professionals, like physicians and 
administrators, in order to conduct successful experiments (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The 
Best of Many Worlds?). Such an approach could fit within a more general move to 
incorporate more economics into medical education,93 which could emphasize the value 
of NIE to health care in general and the importance of parallel policy experiments in 
particular. 
Third, experiments must be followed up to prevent stagnation from occurring. 
Once a local group has found a set of rules that works relatively well for them, they might 
be tempted to cling to this solution “and stop innovating long before they have developed 
rules likely to lead to better outcomes.”94 Incentives and knowledge provided by a 
centralized government can help to ensure experiments continue moving forward, which 
can be part of the reenvisioned role of policymakers as facilitators of rule-making 
processes (see 3.2.1 Indeterminate Institutions). Setting up experiments according to the 
aforementioned principle of a market of co-operatives can also help to prevent 
stagnation.  
                                                          
Behavior,” Annual Review of Sociology 41 (August 2015): 48.) Relying on the power of 
reputation and the prospect of forming new, enduring relationship may be more effective 
to promote cooperation and prosocial behavior. (Ibid., 49, 53.)  
93 Samuel Sessions and Allan Detsky, “Incorporating Economic Reality into Medical 
Education,” Journal of the American Medical Association 304, no. 11 (September 2010): 
1229-1230.  
94 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 527. 
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Finally, the issue of size, one of the theoretical puzzles haunting the commons (see 
2.7.1 The Challenge of Size), also plagues commons experiments. Some experiments 
simply are beyond small-scale institutions, which lack the resources to conduct them. 
Closely related, commons institutions may be well suited to conduct a large variety of 
policy experiments, but to identify and scale-up those experiments some larger-scale 
jurisdiction likely is necessary, whether a centralized government or a higher-level 
commons institution,95 as is suggested by the design principle of nesting (see 2.6.8 Nested 
Enterprises). Still, the cooperative ethos of the commons may facilitate the scaling up of 
experiments. After all, the more prevalent commons institutions are in society, the more 
trust is built up through the collaborative interactions within and between these 
institutions, presumably making the scaling up of experiments easier. The question 
remains whether experiments can or should be scaled up altogether, given variations in 
local circumstances solutions identified in one experiment might not work across the 
board, but instead must be adapted to operate within other meso-level institutions.  
Even though the foregoing discussion focused on the advantages and 
disadvantages of relying on commons institutions to conduct policy experiments, the 
status quo institutions of market and state were never far away, not only as points of 
comparison, but also as necessary complements to the commons. The importance of 
broader institutional diversity when conducting parallel experiments points in the 
direction of polycentric institutions that combine the advantages and mitigate the 
                                                          
95 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 527. 
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weaknesses of any single institutional arrangement (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of 
Many Worlds?).  
3.4 PLURALISM AND FREEDOM IN HEALTH CARE 
We saw that Hayek believes freedom is essential to find solutions to society’s problems 
through the process of trial-and-error. As discussed in the previous section, indeterminate 
and plural institutions allow for the parallel experiments that can help realize this goal. In 
turn, as I argue in this section, pluralistic institutions operating at the meso-level can 
secure the freedom of society and the autonomy of its members by providing a 
counterbalance against concentrations of power in one or a few institutions. In other 
words, freedom permits societies to run parallel institutional experimentation, while 
parallel institutional experiments safeguard the freedom of society. 
 What is true for society in general applies to health care in particular. Parallel 
institutional experiments can be used to identify best practices in health care, but diverse 
institutions can also serve as “institutional bulwarks”96 against overbearing states or 
powerful market institutions.  Domineering status quo institutions can seize control over 
the allocation of health care resources,97 thwarting ideals of jointly managing resources 
                                                          
96 As Levy points out, “bulwark” falls short as a metaphor because it refers to a physical 
structure that passively protects, like a wall, while institutional bulwarks have a capacity 
to act politically. (Jacob Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford 
University 2015), 254.) 
97 The tendency to seize control over health care resources is directly related to 
discussions about the nature and ownership of health care resources (see 1.6 Argument 
III: Type of Good). Health care resources are often pooled, the result of contributions by 
members (e.g., potential patients paying insurance premiums, physicians paying dues to 
hospitals), but once pooled ownership and control over the resource often de facto ends 
up with the institutions managing the resource pool, an encroachment that can be 
conceived as an enclosure (see also 3.4.1 Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom). 
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through deliberative democracy (see 4. A4R in Practice), but they can also hijack other 
aspects of health care, like the process of health care reform.    
3.4.1 RATIONALISM, PLURALISM, AND FREEDOM 
Levy’s Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom (2015) provides a comprehensive discussion 
of the pluralist tradition in liberalism in contrast with the better known, and more 
influential, rationalist tradition. “[S]ince rationalist liberalism is most easily and most 
often mistaken for the whole of liberal political philosophy, the history and the arguments 
in favor of pluralism are generally underdeveloped and unfamiliar in contemporary 
theory,”98 hence Levy focuses on the pluralist tradition.99 Levy’s approach is primarily 
historical, providing a chronological overview of pluralism from ancient constitutionalism 
to John Stuart Mill, a notable critic of pluralist liberalism.100 He does draw some normative 
conclusions in the last two chapters of the book, but these unfortunately are not the 
work’s strongest.101 While Levy proves himself to be an excellent historian, he falls short 
in the application of his rich historic material.102   
                                                          
98 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 28. 
99 According to Levy there is a “tendency in the twentieth century to treat rationalist 
liberalism as the sum total of the liberal tradition.” (Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and 
Freedom, 235.) As Charles Frankel puts it in The Case for Modern Man (1955): “There has 
been a tendency, on one side of liberalism, to neglect the importance for the freedom 
and power of individuals of secondary associations in between the individual and the 
State, and to overlook the possibility of any kind of collective action for the achievement 
of broad social purposes that is not State action.” (Charles Frankel, The Case for Modern 
Man (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, [1955] 1972), 205.) 
100 The bulk of Levy’s book is devoted to a detailed historic discussion of the pluralist 
tradition. (Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 85-249.) 
101 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 251-282. 
102 The normative conclusions he draws in chapter ten (The Constitution of Group Life) 
echo the sources he draws upon rather than transcends them, while the application of his 
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 The importance of Levy’s work for the health care commons lies in its focus on so-
called “intermediate groups,”103 which stand between the individual and the state as 
“sites where free people live their diverse lives.”104 The label “intermediate group” 
pertains to a wide diversity of organizations and institutions, classic examples being 
guilds, churches, and universities. The term is also applicable to commons institutions, for 
example the huertas discussed in the previous chapter (see 2.4 A Common Scenario). 
Given the project’s focus on the commons, I treat the terms “intermediate group” and 
“commons (institution)” as interchangeable, but it is worth keeping in mind that Levy’s 
concept applies to a broader range of organizations (see also 3.4.2 Securing the Freedom 
of Health Care).105 
Levy characterizes pluralist liberalism as “skeptical of the central state and friendly 
toward local, customary, voluntary, or intermediate bodies, communities, and 
associations.”106 In contrast, rationalist liberalism focuses on the freedom of the 
individual and the role of the state in guaranteeing that freedom in face of “local 
tyrannies.”107 While the rationalist tradition is plausibly skeptical of commons institutions, 
                                                          
normative conclusions to universities in chapter eleven (Associations are Not States) adds 
little to his overall argument. 
103 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 2. 
104 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 2. 
105 Indeed, certain market organizations may be construed as intermediate groups. To 
give an example, Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) can plausibly be conceived as 
intermediate groups (see also footnote 199). The fact both commons and market 
organizations can be construed as intermediate groups once again highlights the fluidity 
of both concepts, and the difficulty of clear demarcation (see 0.2 Market and State: A 
False Dichotomy). 
106 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 2. 
107 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 2. 
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the pluralist tradition is sympathetic to the idea of institutions for collective action. 
Indeed, Levy references Ostrom’s work on the commons when discussing the sources of 
social order.108 His summary of the pluralist view of the origins of social order would feel 
right at home in the commons literature, and is a first testimony to the relevance of Levy’s 
work for the commons:  
 
The rival set of answers to the question of where social order comes from involves 
the emergence and evolution of norms that govern group life in any particular 
setting. The emphasis is typically on the development of rules suited to a particular 
group's social needs, on the stable benefits of cooperation and reciprocity under 
conditions of long-term coexistence, and on local knowledge of everything from 
the natural environment to the character of one's neighbors.109 
 
To further tie in Levy’s work with that of Ostrom, several remarks and reflections are in 
place: First, within the pluralist tradition, and thus also in Levy’s book, the focus is on 
safeguarding the liberty of intermediate groups and their members vis-à-vis states. This 
exclusive focus on states is understandable seen liberalism’s development in concert with 
the rise and subsequent dominance of the nation state,110 but since the beginning of the 
twentieth century different market organizations at different times have rivaled the 
nation state’s power (e.g., railroad companies, banks, and now internet giants like Google, 
Amazon, and Facebook).111 Even though many market organizations can be situated at 
                                                          
108 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 37. 
109 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 37. 
110 (Rationalist) liberalism itself is in part responsible for the rise of the nation state. 
Moreover, intermediate organizations were, and still are, associated with the Middle Ages 
(e.g., guilds, cities) immediately making them suspect in the eyes of many Early Modern 
political philosophers. 
111 Levy’s history of the pluralism ends before these developments take place. Moreover, 
Levy has reasons to exclude economic institutions from his study. (Levy, Rationalism, 
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the middle-level, a select few are quasi states.112 Within market-based health care 
systems, such market powerhouses exist as well113 (e.g., Anthem Inc., Hospital 
Corporation of America, and Community Health Systems in the United States).114 Apart 
from an ability to control the health care marketplace, these organizations also wield 
power by influencing states through lobbying efforts.115 Second, the authoritative and 
dominant rationalist tradition of liberalism emphasizes the individual (micro-level) and 
the state (macro-level), while ignoring and even dismissing intermediate groups (meso-
level). This arguably goes a long way in explaining why the middle-level has been 
overlooked, for example in economics with its classic division into microeconomics and 
macroeconomics. The subject of the former are the decisions of individuals and firms, 
while states typically are the subject of latter.116 In other words, the state-market 
                                                          
Pluralism, and Freedom, 12-16.) However, both the institutions he considers as economic 
institutions and his reasoning for excluding them are unclear: (1) Levy explicitly excludes 
labor unions and commercial corporations, but seems to leave room for commons 
institutions as he cites Ostrom’s work. (Ibid., 37.) He also repeatedly discusses guilds, 
which are economic organizations. (2) Levy appears to exclude economic institutions on 
the basis that their locus of control is external rather than internal, but then goes on to 
discuss at least some ways in which non-economic institutions project power externally. 
112 Even though their power falls short in comparison to that of states in some ways (e.g., 
monopoly of violence), in other ways their influence surpasses that of states (e.g., not 
territorially bound, available resources).   
113 Linda Emanuel talks about the American health care system at the turn of the century 
as an “era of mushrooming power for health care organizations.” (Linda Emanuel, “Ethics 
and the Structures of Healthcare,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9, no. 2 (April 
2000): 153.) 
114 Anthem Inc. is the country’s largest for-profit managed care company, while Hospital 
Corporation of America and Community Health Systems are two of the largest hospital 
systems in America. 
115 Interestingly, they lobby through intermediate organizations more narrowly defined 
(see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle-Level). 
116 G. Chris Rodrigo, “Micro and Macro: The Economic Divide,” Finance and Development, 
June 1, 2018, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/bigsmall.htm. 
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dichotomy itself can plausibly (and in part) be traced back to the dominance of rationalist 
liberalism (see 0.2 State and Market: A False Dichotomy), but a more detailed discussion 
of its influence lies outside the scope of this chapter.117,118 Third, and closely related to 
the previous point, the rationalist tradition’s emphasis on the individual and the state 
likely shaped the distinction between private goods (micro-level) and public goods 
(macro-level), while club goods and common-pool resources, both situated at the meso-
level, were not recognized until relatively recently (see 2.5 Argument III: Type of Good). 
Fourth, each of the traditions provides part of the puzzle to ensure a free society based 
“on different sociological and psychological generalizations,”119 for example the model of 
the homo economicus in contrast with the homo sociologicus (see 0.2 Market and State: 
A False Dichotomy). As Levy repeatedly points out, each strand of liberalism has its merits 
and faults (e.g., both intermediate groups and states can protect individual freedom or 
pose a threat to it). Levy’s focus on the pluralist tradition must be understood as the 
revaluation of an unappreciated strand of liberalism rather than as a dismissal of the 
rationalist tradition.120 Lastly, Levy believes the tension between the two traditions is 
irresolvable.121 On the one hand, this may imply it will be difficult to carve out a space for 
pluralist liberalism given the existing dominance of rationalist liberalism, even though 
                                                          
117 Economic liberalism and ordoliberalism, which emphasizes the role of the state in 
regulating the market, align with rationalist liberalism. 
118 The division in microeconomics and macroeconomics does not arise until the 
twentieth century but, of course, that does not rule out the influence of rationalist 
liberalism. (Rodrigo, “Micro and Macro: The Economic Divide.”) 
119 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 253. 
120 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 3, 253. 
121 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 3, 253. 
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Levy’s and Ostrom’s work are a testament to a tentative revaluation of pluralism. On the 
other hand, it suggests the potential value of a polycentric approach to protect freedom 
(see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds), as a mix of micro-, meso-, and macro-
level institutions can potentially ensure a balance of power without any particular level 
becoming overbearing. The importance of safeguarding freedom in health care and the 
role of intermediate groups in doing so will be discussed in more detail in the next section 
(see 3.4.2 Securing the Freedom of Health Care). 
 Before continuing, it is worth to touch upon two philosophers who figure 
prominently in Levy’s book as well as in the work of Ostrom.122 Levy notes there is a 
“recurring tendency to treat Hobbes as a or even the founder of liberalism,”123 adding 
that pluralists have no place in any liberalism of which Hobbes is the source.124 Contrary 
to pluralists, whose views on the origins of social order have been summarized above, 
Hobbes believes social order must be “coercively imposed from above”125 by an 
orderer,126 Hobbes’s famous Leviathan. Collective action problems can only be 
successfully resolved through coercion.127 This is Hardin’s preferred solution to the 
                                                          
122 A third figure to add to this list is Hayek, who influenced Ostrom deeply, but is 
dismissed by Levy because he conflates “the rationalist tradition within liberalism as more 
or less equivalent to an attraction to economic planning, and the pluralist tradition largely 
equivalent to the market liberalism that values the spontaneous economic order of 
commercial society.” (Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 14.) According to Levy, 
such conflations between the two liberal traditions on the one hand and normative 
theories of political economy on the other should be avoided because it interferes with a 
clear understanding of either. (Ibid.)  
123 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 235. 
124 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 235. 
125 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 36. 
126 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 36. 
127 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 37. 
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tragedy of the commons (see 1.3 The Tragedy of the Commons) and thus the impetus to 
Ostrom’s research.128 Insofar as Hobbes is the father of rationalist liberalism, he is one of 
the main intellectual opponents of Levy and Ostrom as representatives of pluralism. The 
second philosopher is Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the most influential thinkers in the 
pluralist tradition and arguably Ostrom’s single most important intellectual inspiration.129 
Levy writes, “Tocqueville consistently sees the world of intermediate local groups as a 
check on or alternative to centralized state power.”130 Even though Ostrom presents 
commons institutions as an alternative to states (and markets), she does not emphasize 
their role as checks on power concentrations. Indeed, this section has highlighted several 
parallels between Levy’s work on pluralism and Ostrom’s research on the commons, but 
the concepts of “freedom” and “liberty” as sources of political power so central to 
pluralist liberalism are notably absent from her work. Throughout, she treats autonomy 
as if it is merely passive, something that is given rather than demanded, and not a basis 
to actively engage with other autonomous units.131 Both her discussion of parallel 
experiments (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments) and the seventh design principle (see 2.6.7 
Recognition of Rights to Organize) are good examples of her treatment of freedom and 
liberty. In other words, the argument that intermediate groups, like commons 
                                                          
128 Ostrom mentions Hobbes on the second page of Governing the Commons (1990) and 
the section titled “Leviathan as the “only” way” discusses the Hobbesian solution to the 
tragedy of the commons. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 8-12.) (See also 1.6 Averting 
the Tragedy of the Health Care Commons.) 
129 Wall, The Sustainable Economics of Elinor Ostrom, 24-26. 
130 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 213. 
131 The absence of the notion of autonomy can also be explained by the fact Ostrom 
undertheorizes the role of power.  
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institutions, function as a bulwark against powerful state and market institutions is not 
Ostrom’s, but is nonetheless inspired by her work and complements the role she envisions 
for commons institutions. 
3.4.2 SECURING THE FREEDOM OF HEALTH CARE 
Plural institutions can protect the freedom of health care, both the independence of 
health care institutions and the autonomy of individuals participating in health care,132 by 
providing a counterbalance against overbearing concentrations of power, whether in the 
hands of the state or in those of powerful market organizations. This section begins by 
discussing how plural institutions can protect individual autonomy, then shows why and 
how pluralism can protect the freedom of health care institutions themselves, and ends 
by arguing commons institutions are better suited than market organizations to fulfill the 
role of bulwark against overbearing state and market institutions.   
Individual autonomy is considered an important value in contemporary 
biomedical ethics, arguably the most important value.133 To give two prominent 
                                                          
132 Freedom and autonomy are not necessarily the same, even though the concepts can 
certainly be defined as being equivalent. Usually, freedom is considered the ability to act 
without internal or external constraints, while autonomy concerns the independence and 
authenticity of the desires that move ones actions in the first place. (John Christman, 
“Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2020 Edition), accessed June 1, 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-
moral/.) For the sake of the present argument, I use the concept of autonomy when 
talking about individuals, because of its usage in the bioethics literature, while I use both 
concepts interchangeably when talking about institutions, as Levy does in Rationalism, 
Pluralism, and Freedom (2015). Treating the concepts separately would result in a more 
intricate argument but the basic claim, and the arguments supporting it, would remain 
the same: plural institutions operating at the meso-level secure freedom and autonomy. 
133 The importance of autonomy is also stressed in the influential The Belmont Report, 
which discusses  the importance of autonomy in the context of human subjects research. 
The report defines autonomy as follows: “An autonomous person is an individual capable 
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examples: (1) In Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’s influential Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics (1984), the principle of autonomy is one of four principles undergirding 
moral reasoning in bioethics, but according to some critics enjoys a primacy vis-à-vis the 
other three principles.134 (2) Onora O’Neill, influenced by Kantian ethics, highlights the 
centrality of autonomy in biomedical ethics in Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics 
(2002).135,136 Autonomy is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable. In the Western 
                                                          
of deliberation about personal goals and of acting under the direction of such 
deliberation. To respect autonomy is to give weight to autonomous persons' considered 
opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their actions unless they are 
clearly detrimental to others. To show lack of respect for an autonomous agent is to 
repudiate that person's considered judgments, to deny an individual the freedom to act 
on those considered judgments, or to withhold information necessary to make a 
considered judgment, when there are no compelling reasons to do so.” (The National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
“The Belmont Report. Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Research,” accessed November 20, 2019, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ 
regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/read-the-belmont-report/index.) 
134 Beauchamp and Childress discuss how their approach has often been criticized for 
placing too much emphasis on respect for autonomy, but they themselves emphatically 
deny the principle of autonomy has moral priority over the other principles. (Tom L. 
Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Seventh Edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1977] 2013), 101, 141.) 
135 “[N]o themes have become more central in large parts of bioethics, and especially in 
medical ethics, than the importance of respecting individual rights and individual 
autonomy. These are now the dominant ethical ideas in many discussions of topics 
ranging from genetic testing to geriatric medicine, from psychiatry to in vitro fertilization, 
from beginning to end of life problems, from medical innovation to medical futility, from 
heroic medicine to hospices.” (Onora O’Neill, O., Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. The 
Gifford Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2.) O’Neill also points 
toward Beauchamp and Childress as being responsible for the prominence of autonomy 
in bioethics. (Ibid., 34.) 
136 O’Neill’s treatment of autonomy in relationship to trust is interesting, because it sits 
at the intersection of the current discussion, and the role trust plays in ensuring the 
success of institutions for collective action. Her argument that gains in autonomy may 
lead to decreases in trust can be framed in terms of institutions (e.g., sets of rules that 
enhance autonomy lead to more self-interested behavior and thus to a decrease in trust). 
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philosophical tradition, autonomy has become a basic moral and political value with the 
turn to the individual in modernity.137 According to Mill, to give an example that fits within 
the prior discussion of rationalist liberalism, autonomy is “one of the elements of well-
being.”138 Unsurprisingly, as bioethics stems from this philosophical tradition, autonomy 
is sometimes considered of intrinsic value in biomedical ethics, for example in the work 
of Beauchamp and Childress,139 even though some contest this status of autonomy as an 
intrinsic good.140 Individual autonomy is of instrumental value because it furthers such 
goods as patient well-being and the ability of physicians to act in the best interest of their 
patients,141 to give just two examples.142 In response to the rationalistic and individualistic 
                                                          
A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but offers a promising 
avenue for future research.  
137 Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.” 
138 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, [1859] 2015), 55-72. 
139 “Personal autonomy is, at minimum, self-rule that is free from both controlling 
interference by others and from limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that 
prevent meaningful choice. The autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with a 
self-chosen plan, analogous to the way an independent government manages its 
territories and sets its policies.” (Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics, 101.) 
140 Jukka Varelius claims many bioethicists ostensibly present autonomy as being of 
intrinsic value without argument altogether or without good arguments. (Jukka Varelius, 
“The Value of Autonomy in Medical Ethics,” Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy 9, no. 
3 (2006): 377-388.) The lack of argument may (in part) be explained by the emphasis on 
individual autonomy as an intrinsic good in the Western philosophical tradition.  
141 The instrumental value of autonomy in bioethics is uncontested. James Stacey Taylor, 
for example, believes “the value of autonomy in bioethics is primarily instrumental.” 
(James Stacey Taylor, Practical Autonomy and Bioethics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), xv.) 
Christopher Tollefsen has also argued autonomy has instrumental rather than intrinsic 
value. (Chris Tollefsen, “Sic et Non: Some Disputed Questions in Reproductive Ethics,” in 
Handbook of Bioethics: Taking Stock of the Field from a Philosophical Perspective, ed. 
George Khushf (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004).) 
142 More generally, autonomy is of instrumental value because it allows individuals to act 
in a way that allows them to pursue their desires and goals. 
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account of autonomy that still dominates medical ethics,143 some bioethicists have 
proposed relational accounts of autonomy. Both the concept of autonomy and its value 
can be discussed at length, but the takeaway point for the purpose of the present 
discussion is one all bioethicists agree on: autonomy matters in health care, even if it the 
principle’s precise role and value are contested.   
While the emphasis on autonomy in general and individual autonomy in particular 
must primarily be situated within the dominant rationalist tradition of liberalism from 
which it originated, I argue that plural institutions operating at the meso-level play a key 
role in securing that (individual) autonomy. As I discussed in the previous section (see 
3.4.1 Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom), rationalist liberals tend to emphasize the role 
of the state in ensuring the autonomy of the individual, while pluralist liberals stress the 
role of middle-level institutions as bulwarks against oppressive power concentrations and 
as loci where autonomy is realized. The concerns of rationalists and pluralists translate to 
health care. I briefly discuss three examples that illustrate the dynamic between powerful 
hierarchies and meso-level institutions in the context of autonomy. In each case, I 
highlight the concerns of both rationalists and pluralists, but beyond that the examples 
lack detail. (1) A terminally ill patient has been admitted to a Catholic hospital and due to 
his condition cannot be moved. The atheist patient has requested euthanasia, but his 
physician and the hospital refuse to grant his request, because it conflicts with their moral 
convictions. Under the assumption that euthanasia is legal, rationalist liberals would 
                                                          
143 O’Neill talks about the “triumph of autonomy.” (O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in 
Bioethics, 34-37.) A reference to the title of a book chapter by Paul Root Wolpe titled The 
Triumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A Sociological View (1998). (Ibid., 2.) 
253 
 
argue the state should step in to protect the patient’s right to choose euthanasia. 
However, the pluralist may argue in favor of the autonomy of the physician and the 
hospital, stating they should have the freedom to act according to their convictions. From 
this perspective, state intervention is a form of oppression that should be resisted.144 (2) 
The state regulates the health care market, among others, to protect individuals against 
potentially predatory behaviors of health care organizations (e.g., Obamacare forbids 
health insurance companies to refuse coverage or charge patients more just because of 
the presence of a preexisting condition),145 thus ensuring patient autonomy. Middle-level 
organizations may argue such state intervention in fact limits patient choice, and thus 
threatens (potential) patients’ autonomy, by determining too narrowly how health care 
organizations ought to behave in the marketplace. The case is tricky, because in practice 
rationalist liberals often argue against state intervention in favor of personal autonomy, 
but that goes to show that the allegiances of rationalists and pluralists are messy. (3) A 
Muslim woman in need of emergency care demands to be treated by a female physician. 
                                                          
144 I loosely base the example on several cases that made headlines in Belgium following 
the legalization of euthanasia in 2002. Zorgnet Vlaanderen, the representative of 
(primarily) Catholic hospitals in the north of Belgium, has repeatedly stated that their 
members follow the law on euthanasia. 
145 While the case of health insurers refusing to cover patients with preexisting conditions 
appears to be a clear-cut example, there are arguments to defend the practice, especially 
in situations where having health insurance is not compulsory. In such a scenario, 
disallowing insurers to deny coverage to patients with preexisting conditions can lead to 
a moral hazard, where potential patients remain uninsured, and thus do not contribute 
to the pool of health care resources, until they become seriously injured or ill. To frame 
the problem in the language of the commons, making it illegal for insurers to refuse 
coverage to patients with preexisting conditions makes it difficult for insurers to exclude 




The hospital wants her to see a male physician on the grounds that no female doctors are 
available.146 Based on the woman’s experience, local Muslim groups argue for the hospital 
to change its procedures to make sure a female physician is present, or at least on call. 
The example illustrates the role middle-level organizations can play in both limiting and 
enabling individual autonomy in a context that pluralists are particularly concerned about 
(i.e., safeguarding religious freedom and personal autonomy with regards to religious 
convictions). I discuss the dangers posed by local tyrannies in detail in the next section 
(see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle-Level). These examples highlight the doubleness in 
the role of both the state and middle-level organizations. On the one hand, the state and 
meso-level organizations can protect individual autonomy.147 On the other hand, both 
types of institutions can encroach upon personal autonomy in ways that are experienced 
as authoritarian. Within the context of middle-level organizations, rationalist liberals tend 
to be suspicious of local tyrannies, and focus on the role the state can play in ensuring 
personal autonomy. At the same time, however, rationalist are wary of overbearing state 
influence, but they tend to mitigate this by emphasizing the central importance of 
individual autonomy rather than pointing toward middle-level institutions. Pluralists 
stress the role of the meso-level in safeguarding autonomy, but risk local oppression. Levy 
                                                          
146 Aasim I. Padela and Pablo Rodriguez del Pozo, “Muslim Patients and Cross-Gender 
Interactions in Medicine: An Islamic Bioethical Perspective,” Journal of Medical Ethics 37, 
no. 1 (January 2011). 
147 In theory, powerful market institutions can also fulfill the role of the state when it 
comes to protecting individual autonomy, but it is difficult to construe their motivations 
for allocating resources to the protection of autonomy in terms other than self-interest. 
To give a concrete example, health insurance companies often present themselves as 
champions of patient autonomy, arguing in favor of patient choice, but their reason for 
doing so likely is not a strong commitment to ensuring personal autonomy. 
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summarizes the doubleness of the middle-level as follows: “The virtues of group life 
include groups' ability to protect their members and to counterbalance against intrusive 
state power; but that ability depends on normative and institutional features of group life 
that increase the risks of internal unfreedom.”148 Both macro- and meso-level institutions 
have a role to play in protecting individual autonomy. Like Levy, I focus on meso-level 
organizations because their significance has been underappreciated given the dominance 
of the rationalist tradition. And, of course, because of the project’s focus on commons 
institutions which must be situated at the middle-level.  For societies in general and health 
care institutions in particular to ensure the most possible personal autonomy, there 
plausibly needs to be a mix of macro- and micro-level institutions (see 3.5 Polycentricity: 
The Best of Many Worlds?). However, as the prior examples show, within such a context 
the different institutional levels likely exist in tension with each other concerning 
particular matters of personal autonomy. Indeed, different meso-level organizations may 
play opposing roles, both protecting and limiting autonomy. While this will inevitably lead 
to conflicts, this institutional dynamic is not something that ought to be resolved, but 
rather a prerequisite for preserving autonomy.  
The pluralists’ concerns about the threat (quasi) states pose to individual 
autonomy are arguably more pressing in developed societies and their health care 
systems than those of the rationalist: First, there is the de facto dominance of rationalist 
liberalism and the comparative weakness of pluralist liberalism described by Levy. These 
are not mere theoretical considerations, but have practical implications. For example, 
                                                          
148 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 9. 
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rationalists’ emphasis on the state and the individual combined with their suspicion of 
the meso level has plausibly resulted in the inflation of top-down power concentrations 
and the underdevelopment, and subsequent erosion,149 of the middle-level.150 The 
breakdown of the meso level leaves Western societies largely divided into micro-level 
human monads and macro-level institutional Leviathans, where the latter pose a threat 
to the autonomy of the former. Second, Levy confirms as much when he discusses the 
threat that “taking centralization to excess”151 poses to autonomy.152  States and market 
organizations have a tendency to turn into centralized, bureaucratic behemoths whose 
power curbs individual autonomy.153 According to Kohr, abuses of power at the cost of 
the individual are the inevitable corollary of such institutional oversize (see 2.7.1 The 
Challenge of Size).154 Finally, given the state of the institutional landscape and the existing 
                                                          
149 Putnam provides extensive empirical evidence for the disappearance of intermediate 
organizations from the meso level in Bowling Alone (2000), leaving market organizations 
as the prevalent institutions occupying the middle-level.  
150 Path dependence plays a role here, as these institutional developments are likely 
reinforced over time and difficult to change (see 3.3.1 State and Market Experiments for 
a more detailed discussion of institutional path dependence). 
151 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 200. 
152 Levy’s detailed discussion of “Tendencies toward State Excess” for most part is equally 
applicable to large and powerful market organizations. (Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and 
Freedom, 61-70.) Among others, he highlights the “organizational imperative to gather 
information,” which leads the state to increase the “legibility of society” (i.e., 
surveillance), and the centralizing temperament of the “man of system” that is opposed 
to “custom or to local reasons that do not mirror the balance of reasons considered 
appropriate by the state.” (Ibid., 64, 68.) 
153 Unsurprisingly, the fear of taking centralization to excess figure prominently in popular 
culture, from the superstates in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (Oceania) and 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (World State) to the megacorporations in Paul 
Verhoeven’s RoboCop (Omni Consumer Products) and Frank Herbert’s Dune (CHOAM). In 
the case of Nineteen Eighty-Four and Brave New World, loss of autonomy at the hands of 
powerful, centralized bureaucracies is a key theme. 
154 Leopold Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1957). 
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power distributions, there is another reason to believe individual autonomy being curbed 
by overbearing centers is a greater concern than individual autonomy being curtailed by 
middle-level institutions. In “one-on-one battles”155 against (quasi) states, the individual 
is always going to be at a disadvantage and more often than not will lose out.  Without a 
developed and active meso level, there is no source of institutional resistance against 
powerful hierarchies.156 “Many-on-one battles,”157,158 where individuals organize 
themselves in intermediate groups, and these middle-level organizations can in turn 
coordinate and mobilize against power concentrations, offer better odds at success.159  
 Meso-level organizations do not only play a role in protecting the autonomy of 
individuals, but also safeguard the freedom of organization, which is a precondition for 
the middle-level to do its part in the protection of individual autonomy.160 In other words, 
                                                          
155 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 22. 
156 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 58. 
157 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 22. 
158 As Putnam puts it in Bowling Alone (2000), “when people associate [in intermediate 
groups] their individual and otherwise quiet voices multiply and are amplified.” (Robert 
Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2000), 338.) 
159 The argument is inspired by Putnam’s discussion of intergovernmental relationships in 
Italy, where regional governments individually had a hard time prevailing against the 
central government in policy decisions, while regional governments acting as a group 
were much more successful in achieving victories. (Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 
22.)  
160 The previous paragraphs focus on the role middle-level organizations play in enhancing 
individual autonomy, promoting autonomy at the micro-level, i.e., “downward.” The 
current discussion focuses on the role meso-level organizations play in enhancing 
institutional freedom, promoting autonomy at the meso- and macro-level, i.e., “lateral” 
and “upward” respectively. To use an imperfect analogy, a faculty member can enhance 
the autonomy of her students (micro-level, downward), but she can also promote the 




meso-level organizations can ensure institutional freedom, and thus promote the 
freedom of health care systems (e.g., the freedom to start a new group practice or health 
care cooperative) and societies (e.g., the liberty for groups of individuals to draft their 
own rules).161 This role of the meso level as the guardian of institutional freedom is 
seldom discussed,162 particularly in biomedical ethics. First things first, however, why 
does institutional freedom matter? Like individual autonomy, institutional freedom may 
be of intrinsic value, as it is a prerequisite for flourishing institutions.163 Alternatively, 
organizational freedom may be construed as a direct expression of value pluralism, 
because free institutions are diverse institutions.164 Unsatisfactory as these reasons for 
attributing intrinsic value to institutional freedom may be, in practice the freedom of 
organizations is often presented as an intrinsic good.165 If the reasons for attributing 
                                                          
161 Given the central role of health care in society, a free society and a free health care 
system likely go hand in hand. 
162 Levy too pays relatively little attention to the role intermediate groups can play in 
protecting institutional autonomy, possibly because much of his argument is historical, 
and since the pluralist tradition developed in relation with the rationalist tradition, it 
primarily positions itself vis-à-vis the macro- and micro-level. Hence, when pluralist 
liberals (and Levy) are concerned about protecting institutional freedom, they primarily 
worry about defending meso-level institutions against the power of the state (macro-
level) or an internal putsch by individuals (micro-level) (see 3.4.3 Dangers of the Middle-
Level). 
163 The term “prerequisite” points toward instrumental rather than intrinsic value. Then 
again, the same can be said about the intrinsic value of individual autonomy. After all, 
stating that autonomy is “one of the elements of well-being,” to use Mill’s example, just 
seems to be the rationalist liberal’s way of saying it is a necessary prerequisite for human 
flourishing, which reeks of instrumental value.  
164 Here too, freedom seems like a necessary condition for institutional diversity, 
suggesting instrumental rather than intrinsic value. 
165 The modern ideas about the intrinsic value of individual autonomy have seemingly 
spread to institutions. One plausible reason for this “contamination” is economic: 
assuming institutional freedom is an intrinsic good provides a justification for ever 
increasing organizational freedom, particularly of market organizations. The claim to 
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intrinsic value to institutional freedom are dubitable, there are good arguments in 
support of the view that free institutions are instrumentally valuable: First, institutional 
freedom is important to safeguard individual autonomy. Without free institutions, 
personal autonomy comes under threat of overbearing power centers,166 as I argued at 
length in the previous paragraphs. Second, institutional freedom allows for running 
parallel institutional experiments, which play a key role in identifying best practices and 
protecting complex systems against catastrophic failure (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments). 
Third, institutional freedom allows for the expression of diverse values and the protection 
of those values. A typical example is the freedom to organize health care in line with 
certain religious beliefs (e.g., the freedom of Catholic hospitals in Belgium to refuse 
euthanasia).167 Finally, institutional freedom is of instrumental value because it is a 
precondition for institutions to fulfill their role of protectors of freedom, whether 
                                                          
intrinsic value is a powerful argument in discussions about corporate personhood, for 
example in the context of the high-profile Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission 
case, to provide just one illustration. (Remember the slogan “Corporations are people!” 
which, among others, featured prominently on Stephen Colbert’s The Colbert Report. The 
catchphrase implies corporations and people enjoy the same rights and freedoms.) 
166 Even though I present institutional freedom as a necessary condition for individual 
autonomy, there may be cases where the latter is present without the former, say in a 
society governed by an Enlightened despot who seeks to maximize individual autonomy 
but sees institutional freedom as a political threat. Of course, this places at least one 
important limitation on individual autonomy (i.e., a restriction of the freedom of 
organization). 
167 The example illustrates both a meso-level organization asserting itself against the 
legislative state (macro-level) and placing limitations on individual autonomy (micro-
level). At least, if the individual in the example does not subscribe to the same religious 
ideas, because the hospital’s refusal can also be construed as enhancing the religious 
individual’s autonomy in a society that “promotes” euthanasia (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of 
the Middle-Level).  
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individual autonomy or institutional freedom. In other words, organizations need 
freedom in order to protect it. 
 Meso-level institutions protect institutional liberty by providing a “germ of 
resistance” against overbearing power centers, to use the words of Benjamin Constant.168 
They play a crucial role in maintaining a balance of power in society by checking the power 
of the state and powerful market organizations. According to ancient constitutionalists, 
middle-level institutions need not have an interest in protecting the freedom of 
individuals or society at large, as long as they pursue the protection of their own freedom 
this automatically tempers any “absolutist pretensions.”169 Of course, this requires 
middle-level institutions to have some capacity to act politically,170 which in turn 
necessitates political institutions for them to exercise their political power (see 3.5 
Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). Arguably, however, even without such rules in 
place the meso level can provide a counterbalance against powerful centers. Meso-level 
institutions can fulfill their role as protectors of freedom in a variety of ways: First, they 
can function as “schools for democracy,” teaching civic and social skills to their members, 
turning them into citizens able to engage in public issues, also outside of the sphere of 
their own institution.171 Second, and closely related to the previous point, middle level 
organizations can serve as forums where participants hone their democratic skills and 
                                                          
168 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 254. 
169 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 120. 
170 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 254. 
171 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 338. 
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build trust,172 allowing them to fight “many-on-one battles” against centers of power.173 
As such, the meso level guards the freedom of individuals, organizations, and society 
alike. 
 For the purpose of the present discussion, i.e., vindicating the role of the meso 
level in protecting individual and institutional autonomy, middle-level organizations have 
so far been treated in aggregate, this in order to highlight the dynamic between the 
different levels of analysis. However, the middle level is occupied by a diversity of 
institutional arrangements: market organizations, commons, and the intermediate 
groups that are the subject matter of Levy’s study. The potential of each of these 
institutional arrangements as champions of autonomy must now be assessed. Given the 
focus of this study on commons and markets, I treat commons as a particular type of 
intermediate group (see 3.4.1 Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom), and draw a 
comparison between commons and market organizations, arguing the former are 
superior as bulwarks against overbearing centers.174 First, there is the issue of motivation: 
the motives of market organizations are much more narrowly defined by their 
institutional form than those of commons institutions, whose pluralism allows for a much 
broader range of motivations. Market organizations all share similar motivations and 
related goals: to create shareholder value, to increase market share, to innovate more, 
                                                          
172 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 339. 
173 Collective-choice arrangements provide such a forum (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice 
Arrangements). 
174 As with the market-state dichotomy (see 0.2 Sate and Market: A False Dichotomy), 
here too talking in terms of a division between commons and market organizations is an 
undue but necessary simplification for the sake of the argument. 
262 
 
and so on (see also 3.3.1 State and Market Experiments). However, safeguarding their 
own autonomy, let alone the autonomy of others (e.g., individuals, competitors, 
intermediate groups), at best seems to be a secondary motivation to help them reach 
their primary goals.175 In comparison, the pluralism of commons institutions allows for 
much more diverse motivations and goals: to preserve certain practices, to serve the local 
community, to protect the autonomy of their members, and so on. These goals can be 
primary rather than secondary. Moreover, the emphasis of the commons paradigm on 
horizontal cooperation makes it more likely commons institutions will be motivated to 
protect the autonomy of their peers (e.g., because they feel the practices of the other 
intermediate groups and their members are worth preserving as well). In other words, 
commons can be primarily and authentically motivated to protect the autonomy of 
themselves, their members, and other institutions. Even though, in practice, they often 
act in their own interest (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle-Level). Second, the 
emphasis of commons institutions on the participation of their members allows for the 
interests of the institutions and its members to align in a way that enforces the autonomy 
of both the individual and the institution. Ideally, the goals of the self-governed individual 
should line up with the goals of the self-governed intermediate group in meaningful ways 
beyond the realm of the mere economic (e.g., a religious physician who chooses to work 
in a Catholic hospital). Conflicts can take place, but there are designated arenas to resolve 
                                                          
175 There are, of course, examples where safeguarding their own autonomy becomes a 
primary motivation, say in the case of a hostile takeover by another market organization 
or impending government seizure of their assets. Still, it is unclear what would motivate 
market organizations to be staunch defenders of individual and institutional autonomy 
tout court.  
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these disagreements through dialogue (“voice”) rather than through disengagement 
(“exit”),176 thus deepening the relationship between the institution and its members, 
resulting in a strong mutual allegiance (“loyalty”).177 Arguably, members and institutions 
in such close-knit relationships will have a greater interest in and commitment to 
safeguarding their respective and joint autonomy. Of course, this tightly knit relationship 
between the institution and its members also opens the door for local tyrannies (see 3.4.3 
The Dangers of the Middle-Level). Third, intermediate groups quite literally fill up a void 
in social space between individuals and (quasi) states.178 As Charles Frankel noted about 
life in centralized, bureaucratic societies in The Case for Modern Man (1955): 
 
The individual can no longer have the sense – except vicariously – that he is taking 
an active part in the making of public decisions that affect him. His access to 
centers of social power becomes increasingly difficult; he comes to experience 
social authority as something remote and abstract; he feels isolated and 
depersonalized.179 
 
Commons institutions are better suited than market organizations to bridge this space 
that has opened up in contemporary society, because they are inherently political, 
internally as well as externally. This also becomes apparent in the relationship individuals 
have to commons institutions, which is akin to a responsible citizen rather than a self-
                                                          
176 See also 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanism. 
177 For more on Hirschman’s concepts of “exit,” “voice,” and “loyalty” see footnote 184 in 
the previous chapter (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements). 
178 I use the term “social space” in the same way as Levy (see 5.4.3 The Dangers of the 
Middle-Level). 
179 Frankel, The Case for Modern Man, 202. 
264 
 
interested consumer.180 Finally, commons institutions build so-called “social capital”181 
that enables them to mobilize against (quasi) states threatening their autonomy, but also 
empowers their members, non-member individuals, and indeed society at large.182 
Societies with a large supply of social capital will be able to better resist threats to their 
freedom at all levels of analysis. Of course, an excess of social capital can also lead to blind 
devotion, which can in turn pose a threat to autonomy (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the 
Middle-Level).183 Some have argued there is a middle ground, between too little and too 
much social capital, characterized by an informed commitment to the wider society, while 
                                                          
180 Of course, individuals can also relate to market organizations as employees, which 
does allow them to develop many of the same civic and social skills, with some limitations. 
181 While Ostrom already mentions social capital in Governing the Commons (1990), she 
becomes increasingly interested in the concept later in her career, coediting a monograph 
on the topic titled Foundations of Social Capital (2003). Ostrom recognizes the following 
“three basic forms” of social capital: trustworthiness, networks, and institutions. (T.K. Ahn 
and Elinor Ostrom, “Social Capital and Collective Action,” in The Handbook of Social 
Capital, eds. Dario Castiglione, Jan W. van Deth, and Guglielmo Wolleb (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 73.) For the purpose of the project, I have limited the use of the 
concept to this single passage, as the notion of social capital remains controversial. 
182 Milton Esman, Social Capital and Empowerment (Washington: World Bank, 2003). 
183 The attitude of Americans toward their health care system may be a good example of 
social capital gone awry. Social capital can be bonding (within the same group, horizontal), 
bridging (between groups, horizontal), or linking (between groups, vertical).  Similarly, 
one can think of social capital as operating horizontally or vertically, a distinction made 
by Putnam. Horizontal social capital creates horizontal allegiances and alignments, while 
vertical social capital imposes “hierarchy and order on latent anarchy.” (Putnam, Making 
Democracy Work, 130.) Vertical social capital can make one fiercely devoted to one’s 
country, as is the case in the United States. In case of war, for example, Americans rally 
behind their Commander in Chief. This national allegiance may also express itself in the 
belief of many Americans that their country’s health care system is the best in the world, 
despite overwhelming proof to the contrary. (Robin Herman, “Most Republicans Think 
the U.S. Health Care System is the Best in the World. Democrats Disagree,” accessed 




preserving independence and liberty, so-called “embedded autonomy.”184 Thus, in theory 
there are some reasons to believe commons institutions are better protectors of 
autonomy than market organizations, but realizing this theoretical potential in practice is 
difficult. For one, there is the dominance of market and state institutions, so even if 
commons are better at safeguarding autonomy, the fact they are underrepresented 
makes it difficult for them to fulfill this role. Taking an evolutionary perspective of 
institutions, one can speculate the status quo institutions and the power relationships 
fixated in them have shaped a social environment in which they thrive and which is aimed 
at maintaining the balance of power.185 In addition, many intermediate groups fall victims 
to the dangers of the middle-level, posing a threat to autonomy themselves rather than 
safeguarding it. This is, at least in part, the result of oversize and a lack of diversity (see 
2.7.1 The Challenge of Size). When there are too few commons institutions that are too 
large, it becomes easier for them to behave self-interestedly and align with the proverbial 
powers that be, while it becomes difficult to challenge them. As Levy notes, for group 
pluralism to be politically stable, it must be to some degree oppositional, since “bulwarks 
depend on their being a sense of independence that makes it possible to say ‘no.’”186 
Having more and more diverse institutions induces opposition and stimulates a sense of 
                                                          
184 Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock, “Health by Association? Social Capital, Social 
Theory, and the Political Economy of Public Health,” International Journal of Epidemiology 
33, no. 4 (August 2004): 656. 
185 Putting the matter as such imbues the status quo institutions with agency and reeks 
of conspiracy theories, but the dominance of market and state has come about and is 
maintained quite organically. Of course, particular (quasi) states and the individuals 
leading them understand their own power and can wield it. A rare few may even be able 
to exert some influence on the otherwise impersonal processes at work. 
186 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 254-255. 
266 
 
independence.187 This, in turn, points to a role for the institutions of market and state, as 
they also add to the pluralism needed to build free societies and health care systems (see 
3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).  
3.4.3 THE DANGERS OF THE MIDDLE-LEVEL 
Meso-level institutions have been presented as bulwarks against powerful status quo 
institutions and guarantors of the freedom of health care, but that is only half the story. 
Levy may favor the “neglected and unfamiliar”188 pluralist liberalism, but he 
acknowledges many of the worries rationalist liberals have about pluralism.189 Arguably, 
Levy’s most pertinent contributions to the commons literature are his discussions of 
rationalist criticisms of intermediate groups, because they relate to several discussions in 
commons research. Moreover, they provide important criticisms of the, at times, overly 
optimistic arguments of proponents of the commons paradigm.190 
 First, when discussing the issue of heterogeneity, we saw nesting commons 
institutions is a possible solution, but the strategy risks creating self-contained and 
homogeneous meso-level institutions (see 2.7.2 The Challenge of Heterogeneity). The 
                                                          
187 Of course, too much diversity may lead to irresolvable tensions. An issue that can, in 
theory, be resolved by nesting diverse clusters into one another (see 2.6.8 Nested 
Enterprises). 
188 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 3. 
189 Much like Ostrom, Levy is an intellectual fox rather than a hedgehog, to use Isaiah 
Berlin’s famous distinction. (Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on 
Tolstoy’s View of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1953] 2013).) 
190 There are more mundane worries about an increased role for meso-level institutions 
than the philosophical concerns that are the focus of this section, say their ability to 
perform the administrative tasks performed by macro-level institutions (i.e., states and 
large market organizations). In Italy, for example, the regionalization of the national 
health care system during the 1970s was “regarded by many as an administrative fiasco.” 
(Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 48-49.)  
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worry is that nesting creates homogeneous silos, which impede rather than promote 
cooperation. Levy recognizes the same risk in the context of intermediate groups: 
“Freedom of association in one generation could leave the next with a social world wholly 
carved up into mutually exclusive groups, with no space in between.”191,192 As such, 
freedom of association may in fact be self-undermining.193 Homogeneous institutional 
silos at the middle-level are worrisome for another reason, since their rules may not take 
into account the interests of outsiders or prospective new members, which is “especially 
acute when it comes to membership rules themselves.”194 Relying on boundary rules (see 
2.6.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries), commons institutions can decide “whom to admit and 
whom to refuse,”195 a prerogative rationalist liberals take issue with as the refusal of 
membership can be pernicious.196 In the case of health care, meso-level institutions could 
base membership on religious views, excluding those who do not adhere to a particular 
value system. Even more blatant, a successful health care commons may deny 
membership to the sick or destitute, because they are perceived as a threat to the 
available CPRs. This, of course, is the well-known issue of refusing health insurance 
coverage on the basis of preexisting conditions and the closely related problem of adverse 
selection (see 3.4.2 Securing the Freedom of Health Care). Levy notes worries about 
                                                          
191 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 47. 
192 Space can refer to physical space, but also to metaphorical social space. (Levy, 
Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 47.) Thus, Levy’s space can also mean space to 
deliberate and cooperate on commons dilemmas. 
193 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 47. 
194 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 40. 
195 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 40. 
196 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 40. 
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exclusion often raise questions about diversity, because strict boundary rules will lead to 
intermediate groups that lack diversity vis-à-vis the whole of society, enabling members 
to live their lives insulated from diversity altogether.197 The defense of the proponents of 
associational freedom and pluralism is a familiar one: 
  
[…] diversity can be, and often is best, an intergroup rather than an intragroup 
phenomenon. We will have more genuine diversity if there is a range of genuinely 
different organizations, communities, and institutions to choose among than if we 
insist that each organization must be a representative microcosm of the whole 
social order.198 
 
A large number of diverse homogeneous silos is better than a diverse society at large, 
because it provides “genuine” diversity, for example when experimenting with different 
sets of rules to find the best possible solutions to health care’s problems (see 3.3 Parallel 
Experiments). This is not, however, a satisfactory response to the rationalist’s objection. 
Instead, striving for a diverse set of institutions that can ensure both intergroup and 
intragroup diversity can satisfy pluralist and rationalist liberals alike (see 3.5 
Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).    
 Second, there is another danger of meso-level institutions hidden in the previous 
paragraph that is deserving of scrutiny. Levy writes intermediate groups “will not take the 
interests of outsiders […] into account.”199 In other words, middle-level institutions are 
likely to be self-interested. As Levy puts it, “[W]hile the state ideally puts the right ahead 
of the good, intermediate associations are strongly dedicated to their particular 
                                                          
197 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 40. 
198 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 40. 
199 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 40. 
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conceptions of the good.”200 We have already encountered this issue in chapter two (i.e., 
homogeneous groups hijacking health care policy,201 competition rather than cooperation 
between internally homogeneous commons institutions),202 and the problem arises also 
in the context of health care reform.203 Of course, states are not wholly disinterested 
either, often pursuing the self-interests of political actors,204 but state power can put the 
right ahead of the good in a reasonably just constitutional state, according to Levy. The 
leaders of intermediate groups, however, are by definition committed to not being 
disinterested,205 even when they pursue the good of their intermediate group rather than 
their own interests. Levy does not offer a solution, beyond stating the problem exists for 
both meso-level (i.e., intermediate groups) and macro-level institutions (i.e., states). 
Ostrom would likely point to the inevitable, yet unsatisfactory, drafting of better rules or 
to polycentricity as possible solutions (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). 
                                                          
200 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 79. 
201 “It is a commonplace of political science that small coherent interest groups can secure 
legal and political victories disproportionately often, on topics of greater importance to 
them than to the majority. The paradigmatic case is that of a narrowly targeted subsidy: 
the benefit to the recipients can be great enough to justify their political efforts, while the 
costs are so widely diffused that no one has enough incentive to mobilize against them.” 
(Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 258.)  
202 See 2.7.2 The Challenge of Heterogeneity. 
203 For example, self-interested intermediate groups’ lobbying efforts in the case of 
health care reform affect non-members, who do not have the incentive or resources to 
organize (e.g., patients, citizens). 
204 Buchanan, who introduced the concept of club good (see 1.6 Argument III: Type of 
Good), is one of the founders of public choice theory, among others, the analysis of self-
interested behavior in politics. (James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of 
Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
[1962] 1999).) The final section of the work, titled The Politics of the Good Society is of 
particular interest to philosophers. (Ibid., 216-219.) 
205 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 79. 
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 Finally, spread throughout Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom (2015) are 
arguments that are relevant to the issue of elite capture, which we have come across in 
our discussion of the design principles (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements and 
2.6.7 Recognition of Rights to Organize). Before having a closer look at Levy’s arguments, 
it is worth noting the issue of elite capture is closely related to the problem of self-
interested behavior of intermediate groups discussed in the previous paragraph.206 As the 
interests of the group often, albeit not necessarily,207 reflect the self-interest of a small 
elite. However, elite capture is not only an intergroup problem, between meso-level 
institutions and in their relationship with larger units (e.g., society as a whole, the state, 
the health care system), but also intragroup. In fact, one of the main worries rationalist 
liberals have about intermediate groups is the tendency “toward intragroup hierarchies 
and domination.”208 Mill, for example, in his criticisms of Tocqueville, showed deep 
concern “with local power in all its varieties.”209 Even though he was intellectually 
committed to balancing centralization and decentralization, he had much more 
confidence in the ability of the state to ensure freedom and to check intragroup 
tyranny.210 Levy summarizes Mill’s view of intermediate groups as follows:  
 
                                                          
206 Even though Levy discusses both issues, he does not always make the relationship (or 
distinction) between them clear, sometimes moving from one issue to the other without 
making it explicit. A good example is his discussion of Interested and Invasive Power at 
the end of chapter three. (Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 79-83.) 
207 Middle-level institutions can internally be just (e.g., functioning collective-choice 
arrangements are in place to ensure member participation), but nonetheless be “strongly 
dedicated to their particular conceptions of the good,” to use Levy’s words. 
208 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 3. 
209 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 217. 
210 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 217. 
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Mill's pervasive concern with the entwined problems of local despotism and local 
backwardness offered him reason to prefer distant power strong enough to 
overcome them. Local rule, small-group loyalties and membership, and adherence 
to custom were necessarily stultifying, at odds with the interests of man as a 
progressive being; and forcible inclusion into a great kingdom, nation, or empire 
at least might point the way toward intellectual uplift.211 
 
Of course, one may wonder if Mill would have the same faith in the bureaucratic states 
of the twentieth and twenty-first century, but that is a different matter altogether.212 
Regardless, Mill nicely articulates the issue of elite capture from the commons literature. 
Authority, whether at the meso- or the macro-level, generates power. This creates 
opportunities for those in power to reach decisions “for their own reasons, in their own 
interests.”213 In turn, power allows group leaders to wield authority over the group’s 
other members,214 posing a threat to the freedom of the group members.215 The issue of 
a self-interested elite arbitrarily wielding power over its subordinates is related to the 
age-old problem that those who seek power are particularly ill-suited to be trusted with 
it.216,217 Moreover, rules to promote institutional diversity at the meso-level and to 
                                                          
211 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 225. 
212 The rationalist critique of pluralism must be seen in the context of Early Modern 
Europe, where religious groups are the example intermediate groups and the specter of 
the “Dark Ages,” with their guilds and provincial liberties, looms large.  
213 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 50. 
214 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 71. 
215 As Levy notes, “A group's internal rules and decisions become a kind of law outside the 
state's control, at least for their members and often for others.” (Levy, Rationalism, 
Pluralism, and Freedom, 35.) 
216 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 80. 
217 The issue is maybe put most adroitly by Douglas Adams in The Restaurant at the End 
of the Universe (1995): “To summarize: it is a well-known fact that those people who must 
want to rule people are, ipso facto, those least suited to do it. To summarize the summary: 
anyone who is capable of getting themselves made President should on no account be 
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protect intermediate groups from state power can worsen the issue of elite capture,218 as 
these rules provide opportunities for leaders to establish intragroup hierarchies and 
domination. A problem of institutional pluralism that receives little attention in commons 
researchers. At the same time, however, rationalist liberals may perceive undue 
domination and abuses of power where there are none. After all, group members’ 
second-order preferences may be derived from and structured around group life.219 
Members may not only derive their views about right and wrong conduct from the 
intermediate group, but also have second-order preferences to be good group members 
(e.g., contribute resources, participate in collective-choice arrangements, serve as 
monitors). So whenever pressure is exerted on individuals to comply with rules or 
sanctions are imposed a breach of the rules (see 2.6.5 Graduated Sanctions), it is difficult 
(and sometimes impossible) to know if that individual wants to be brought into 
                                                          
allowed to do the job.” (Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe (New 
York: Del Rey, [1980] 1995), 197.) 
218 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 4. 
219 Childress makes the same point, albeit a bit more elaborately and eloquently: 
“Abdication of first-order autonomy appears to involve heteronomy, that is, rule by 
others. However, if a person autonomously chooses to yield first order decisionmaking to 
a professional or to a religious institution, that person has exercised what may be called 
second-order autonomy. People who are subservient to a professional or to a religious 
institution may lack first-order autonomy – self-determination regarding the content of 
their first-order decisions and choices – because they have exercised and continue to 
exercise second-order autonomy in selecting the professional or institution to which they 
choose to be subordinate. Hence, in those cases, respect for their second-order 
autonomy is central, even though their first-order choices are heteronomous. This point 
is important because of the common supposition that the principle of (respect for) 
autonomy is at odds with all forms of heteronomy, authority, tradition, etc.” (James F. 
Childress, “The Place of Autonomy in Bioethics,” The Hastings Center Report 20, no. 1 
(January-February 1990): 13.) 
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compliance or sanctioned.220 In other words, it is difficult to differentiate between “a case 
in which the rule is irksome but strongly connected to other group goods and goals that 
the person does endorse; or a case in which biased or power-hungry or intrusive elites 
and enforcers are, in good faith or bad, constraining the person unnecessarily.”221 Of 
course, this is hardly a solution to the problem of elite capture, but merely shows that in 
some cases members may willingly submit themselves to intragroup authority that strikes 
an outsider as an unjustifiable limitation of freedom. Again, a mix of diverse institutions 
may be able to check the intragroup power of elites (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of 
Many Worlds?). 
3.5 POLYCENTRICITY: THE BEST OF MANY WORLDS? 
We discussed how relying on plural commons institutions in health care allows for parallel 
institutional experiments to identify best practices and erects bulwarks against 
overbearing centers of power. Moreover, commons are an institutional “third way” to 
avoid the tragedy of the commons (see 1.8 The Commons Solution to Health Care’s 
Tragedy). We encountered the advantages of commons institutions vis-à-vis the status 
quo institutions of market and state, but we also underlined some of the challenges (see 
2.7 Challenges Faced by the Health Care Commons) and dangers (see 3.4.3 The Dangers 
of the Middle-Level) of relying on the commons paradigm in health care. Commons are 
not an institutional magic bullet to solve all of health care’s problems. Not only does such 
a single-minded approach run counter to the spirit of Ostrom’s work, as she always 
                                                          
220 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 32-33. 
221 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 33. 
274 
 
stresses the need for complex solutions to complex problems, but the status quo 
institutions of state and market have certain features commons institutions cannot adopt. 
Hierarchies offer a degree of coordination, especially at larger scales, that is foreign to 
commons. Markets rapidly process information and drive innovation through the 
mechanisms of price and competition. Unsurprisingly, some of the most successful 
examples of commons management are so-called “mixed regimes,” combining elements 
of cooperative governance, public regulation, and individual property.222 Commons, 
states, and markets are complementary institutions rather than alternatives. Each of 
these institutional arrangements has persuasive arguments in its favor. As Ernst Friedrich 
Schumacher puts it in Small is Beautiful (1973): “Maybe what we really need is not either-
or but the-one-and-the-other-at-the-same-time.”223  
Ostrom’s version of “the-one-and-the-other-at-the-same-time” is called 
polycentricity. The idea is so central to Ostrom’s work that it is sometimes used to 
characterize her thought as a whole, “polycentric governance.”224 Simply put, 
polycentricity means a “world of many social orders.”225 Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout, 
and Robert Warren introduced the notion in 1961 in an effort to better understand how 
                                                          
222 Mark Pennington, “Elinor Ostrom and the robust political economy of common-pool 
resources,” Journal of Institutional Economics 9, no. 4 (December 2013): 454. 
223 Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1973), 242. 
224 The title of Ostrom’s Nobel Prize Lecture is Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric 
Governance of Complex Economic Systems (2009). 
225 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 37. 
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a multitude of public and private agencies provides public services in metropolitan 
areas.226 They define the concept as follows:227 
 
‘Polycentric’ connotes many centers of decision making that are formally 
independent of each other. Whether they actually function independently, or 
instead constitute an interdependent system of relations, is an empirical question 
in particular cases. To the extent that they take each other into account in 
competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and cooperative 
undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the 
various political jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may function in a coherent 
manner with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behavior. To the 
extent that this is so, they may be said to function as a ‘system’.228  
 
In other words, polycentricity suggests there is a need for many decision centers: 
communal (commons), public (state), and private (market). Each decision center can act 
with a high degree of autonomy within their own jurisdiction, but they all operate under 
an overarching set of rules. These macro-level rules focus on the maintenance of order 
and the resolution of disputes (see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms) rather than on 
specifying the particular rules to be used by each subsidiary.229 The concept can also be 
                                                          
226 Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex 
Economic Systems,” The American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June [2009] 2010):411. 
227 The term “polycentrism” was coined a few years earlier by Palmiro Togliatti, leader of 
the Italian Communist Party, to describe “a new type of autonomous relationship among 
Communist parties and a new style of cooperation between Communists and other 
socialist forces.” (Joan Barth Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: From 
Togliatti to Berlinguer (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1986), 21.) Togliatti suggests 
decentralizing the Communist movement and organizing it into diverse centers of 
development. (Ibid., 231.) 
228 Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren, “The Organization of 
Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry,” American Political Science 
Review 55, no. 4 (December 1961): 831-832. 




described in terms of nestedness (see 2.5 The Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework and 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises). Polycentricity then means layering various 
institutional arrangements on top of one another, resulting in so-called “multitier 
governance systems.”230 The following definition from Ostrom combines both features:  
 
By polycentric, I mean a system where citizens are able to organize not just one 
but multiple governing authorities at differing scales (see V Ostrom et al 1961; V 
Ostrom 1987, 1991, 1997). Each unit may exercise considerable independence to 
make and enforce rules within a circumscribed scope of authority for a specified 
geographical area. In a polycentric system, some units are general-purpose 
governments, whereas others may be highly specialized (McGinnis 1999a,b,c). 
Self-organized resource governance systems, in such a system, may be special 
districts, private associations, or parts of a local government. These are nested in 
several levels of general-purpose governments that also provide civil equity as 
well as criminal courts. In a polycentric system, the users of each common-pool 
resource would have authority to make at least some of the rules related to the 
use of that particular resource.231 
 
Like commons institutions, Ostrom also describes polycentric governance systems as 
complex adaptive systems (see 2.3 Commons Institutions). The former then are so-called 
“parallel adaptive systems,” while the latter are both horizontally and vertically 
integrated adaptive systems.232 As with any other institutional arrangement, there is no 
guarantee polycentric governance systems will find those combinations of rules at diverse 
levels that are optimal for the environment. On the contrary, one should expect 
polycentric governance systems to operate at less than optimal levels, given the difficult 
of fine-tuning any complex and multitier system.233 
                                                          
230 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 221. 
231 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 528. 
232 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 286. 
233 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 528. 
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 Polycentricity is particularly relevant for the management of global commons 
(e.g., health care). While commons institutions may be able to govern local resources 
successfully, the governance of large-scale CPRs transcends them. Therefore, Stern 
suggests polycentricity as an additional design principle necessary for governing global 
commons (see 2.7.1 The Challenge of Size). He baptizes this design principle, “Engage in 
a variety of institutional forms.”234 Stern suggests polycentricity is not included in 
Governing the Commons (1990), which served as the basis for later discussions of the 
design principles, because of the work’s focus on successful local commons institutions.235 
A plausible explanation given that Ostrom places more emphasis on polycentricity later 
in her career, maybe because she gets a better grasp of the limitations of the commons 
paradigm as commons research progresses and finds applications beyond local, natural 
resource commons. If one adopts polycentricity as an additional design principle, the 
challenge then becomes finding those combinations of institutional arrangements that 
can implement the other principles best,236 as will become clear in the following 
discussion of the advantages of polycentricity. Parenthetically, the concept of 
polycentricity is not meant to replace commons theory, instead it reinforces the commons 
paradigm’s existing assumptions by emphasizing that small, self-governed institutions are 
crucial for designing effective and sustainable institutions.237  
                                                          
234 Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 224. 
235 Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 224. 
236 Stern, “Design Principles for Global Commons,” 224. 
237 Fred Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory and the Reality of 
Commons Practice,” International Journal of the Commons 8, no. 2 (2014): 645. 
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 The advantages of relying on polycentric governance regimes for managing global 
commons are many, as polycentricity combines the strengths of parallel meso-level 
institutions with those of macro-level institutions. The following is a nonexhaustive list of 
the benefits of polycentric governance systems: First, we saw that states, markets, and 
commons have their particular strengths and weaknesses when running parallel trials (see 
3.3 Parallel Experiments). Polycentricity enables one to capitalize on the advantages of 
each of these institutional arrangements, while mitigating their drawbacks when 
experimenting. To give a concrete example, one issue of meso-level institutions is 
communicating the results of their experiments, both failed and successful, to one 
another. Improving communication between middle-level institutions, which all have 
experience with multiple rules related to manage similar resources, would allow them to 
make informed decisions about the impact of rule changes.238 This is where macro-level 
institutions come in, as they can organize the sharing of information, thus increasing “the 
likelihood of improving performance over time.”239 Macro-level institutions can also set 
up systems to identify successful experiments. At the same time, the diversity of 
polycentric governance regimes results in more diverse experiments, as different 
institutional arrangements will likely come up with different rule changes, which might 
nonetheless apply to, and be copied by, other institutional forms (e.g., a market 
institution might come up with a new way to allocate resources that can be adopted by 
commons institutions). Second, mixed regimes can draw on both local knowledge and 
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expert knowledge (see 2.2 The Ostrom Approach). To illustrate, when running 
experiments institutions can draw upon expert knowledge available at the macro-level, 
say guidelines about how to best organize trials, while at the same time relying on local 
knowledge at the meso-level, say information about local conditions. To provide another 
example, Ostrom recommends blending scientific information (i.e., expert knowledge) 
with local knowledge by requiring major universities and research centers to relay their 
findings to smaller units within their respective regions.240 Third, polycentricity can 
mitigate some of the dangers of the middle-level (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle-
Level). Concerns about local tyrannies and inappropriate discrimination can be alleviated 
by relying on macro-level institutions “that are responsible for protecting the rights of all 
citizens and for the oversight of appropriate exercises of authority within smaller units of 
government.”241 Moreover, macro-level institutions can direct meso-level institutions 
toward the common good, lest the latter focus too much on the pursuit of their own 
interests. Fourth, in line with Stern’s interpretation of polycentricity as an additional 
design principle, polycentric regimes can be used to better implement the other design 
principles. To give a few examples: (1) Polycentric governance may result in less costly 
and more effective monitoring (see 2.6.4 Monitoring) and sanctioning (see 2.6.5 
Graduated Sanctions). As we discussed in chapter two, members are more likely to 
comply with rules they themselves helped to devise through collective-choice 
arrangements, especially when they are affected by these rules on a day-to-day basis (see 
                                                          
240 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 528. 
241 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 528. 
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2.6.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements). Moreover, participants at the meso-level often are 
better placed to observe infractions and to impose sanctions.242 However, macro-level 
institutions can provide mechanisms to support local monitoring and sanctioning 
efforts,243 among others, by backing up monitoring and sanctioning decisions taken at the 
middle-level (see 2.6.7 Recognition of Rights to Organize). Higher-level regimes also have 
the scale necessary to implement certain monitoring mechanisms that are beyond meso-
level institutions, say because they are too costly or require a level of expertise 
unavailable locally (e.g., HIS).244 (2) Polycentric regimes can provide upstream arenas to 
resolve persistent intrainstitutional conflicts as well as interinstitutional conflicts (see 
2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms). If meso-level institutions are unable to resolve 
internal conflicts, these can interfere with the operation of the institution and may 
eventually threaten the institution’s existence. Polycentric regimes offer the possibility to 
escalate conflicts to higher-level institutions for resolution. Similarly, conflicts between 
middle-level institutions can be resolved by upstream entities. Provisions can also be 
made to resolve issues between meso- and macro-level institutions, by closing the loop 
between different institutional levels (see 2.6.4 Monitoring). In such a scheme, lower-
level institutions would play a role in resolving conflicts between higher-level institutions 
(e.g., arbitration mechanisms in which the arbitral tribunal consists of representatives of 
                                                          
242 Pennington, “Elinor Ostrom and the Robust Political Economy of Common-Pool 
Resources,” 459. 
243 Elinor Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions: Toward a Revised Theory,” 
in Handbook of Agricultural Economics. Volume 2. Part A, eds. Bruce Gardner and Gordon 
Rausser (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2002), 1326. 
244 Monitoring and sanctioning are another good example of the ability of mixed regimes 
to combine local knowledge with expert knowledge. 
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downstream institutions). The same approach could be used to resolve tensions within 
macro-level institutions, when escalation to a higher-level is no longer possible. Finally, 
polycentricity introduces an element of redundancy, as multiple levels of institutions can 
cope with poor institutional performance at any level (see also 2.6.4 Monitoring). Under 
threat of a tragedy of the commons, mixed regimes are better suited than any single 
institutional arrangement to avert catastrophic failure, because when small systems fail 
there are larger systems to step in and vice versa (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments).245 In a 
polycentric regime, one can imagine a large-scale collapse of the commons, where macro-
level institutions and most meso-level institutions fail, but there are several independent 
holdouts at the middle-level. The advantages of polycentric governance regimes lead 
Ostrom to conclude that a combination of higher levels of government and local systems 
is better able to cope with tragedies of the commons.246 Moreover, mixed regimes are 
able to develop more effective rules over time than regimes that lack institutional 
diversity,247 again decreasing the risk of tragedy. 
 The supposed advantages of polycentricity are tentative. The concept is still 
relatively new, and its implications in commons research are still being worked out.248 
Polycentric governance is attractive in theory, but the practical implementation of mixed 
regimes raises many questions and concerns. First, there is the issue of institutional 
                                                          
245 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 528. 
246 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 526. 
247 Ostrom, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” 497. 
248 Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory,” 645. 
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heterogeneity (see 2.7.2 The Challenge of Heterogeneity).249 Mixing diverse institutions 
into interdependent polycentric regimes is a nontrivial process that is likely to lead to 
conflict, especially given that some of the features of the three model institutional 
arrangements are at odds with one another (e.g., blending collaborative commons with 
competitive market organizations and hierarchically organized states). That being said, 
conflict can potentially generate information that is useful for all participants involved in 
order to solve their collective action problems.250 Second, the balance between the 
steering center and the autonomous meso-level institutions is unclear,251 and the precise 
degree of integration between the different institutional arrangements is equally fuzzy, 
as the institutions per the definition can remain formally independent but at the same 
time “function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable patterns of 
interacting behavior.”252 The reply that this is a case-by-case, empirical issue is 
unsatisfactory. Commons research must resolve some of the ambiguities of the concept 
of polycentricity for it to be meaningful and useful.253 Third, and closely related to the 
previous concern, some meso-level institutions will plausibly resist polycentric 
governance regimes because they fear central direction and domination (see 3.4.2 
                                                          
249 The issue of size comes into play as well when integrating institutions into polycentric 
regimes (see 2.7.1 The Challenge of Size). Even though decision centers in theory remain 
independent, and thus relatively small, in practice mixed regimes may turn into large and 
unwieldy “super institutions.” After all, per the definition these polycentric regimes “may 
be said to function as a ‘system’,” which seems to imply a single system.  
250 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 286. 
251 Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory,” 645. 
252 From Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren’s definition of polycentric systems cited prior. 
253 For now, the consensus among commons researchers is that different institutions 
should be linked through systems of representation, at least when vertically integrating 
them. (Saunders, “The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory,” 645.) 
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Securing the Freedom of Health Care).254 Moreover, becoming part of a larger whole 
might not be attractive to downstream organizations, because they worry becoming an 
insignificant and meaningless cog in the mixed regime. The standard reply is that such 
apprehensions are unfounded because they are based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of polycentricity,255 which stresses the formal independence of the 
different units, and the lack of any “one central authority dominating all the others,”256 
but given the ambiguities of the concept this is hardly a satisfactory answer. Even if, for 
the sake of the argument, we do grant the reply in theory. In practice, the threat of 
overbearing centers is likely difficult to defuse. Fourth, and following from the previous 
two points, there is the question of how to bring about polycentric governance regimes: 
from the top down or rather from the bottom up? The former seems to be counter to the 
emphasis of commons research on self-organization, while the latter places too much 
responsibility on meso-level institutions to organize into large-scale mixed regimes.257 A 
possible solution is to rely on the state to facilitate the process of integration rather than 
to take full responsibility, having it play the role of a so-called “facilitator state.”258 
However, that role must be defined much more precisely to differentiate it from a 
                                                          
254 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 284. 
255 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 284. 
256 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 284. 
257 The question “Why organize?” applies to both individuals organizing themselves into 
commons institutions and meso-level institutions arranging themselves into mixed 
regimes. In theory, neither should have an incentive to organize themselves into larger 
wholes. In practice, of course, self-organization does take place, which is the observation 
that drove Ostrom’s research in the first place. 




traditional, more involved, top-down approach. Finally, there is no need for commons 
researchers to reinvent the wheel. The concept of polycentricity may be new, but the 
arguments behind it have precedents. Levy, for example, reviews the work of Otto von 
Gierke and John Dalberg-Acton, better known as Lord Acton, both proponents of 
“decentralization, competing institutions, and multiple authorities checking one 
another.”259 Their work may be of interest to commons scholars. The extensive literature 
on the principle of subsidiarity seems to be more directly applicable to polycentricity,260 
but its relevance has been insufficiently recognized and investigated.261 Graham Marshall 
is one of the few scholars who has explored the relationship between commons research 
and the principle of subsidiarity in any detail.262 Several of these questions and concerns 
                                                          
259 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom, 240. 
260 Andraes Føllesdal defines the principle as follows: “The “principle of subsidiarity” 
regulates authority within a political order, directing that powers or tasks should rest with 
the lower-level sub-units of that order unless allocating them to a higher-level central unit 
would ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness in achieving them.” (Andreas 
Føllesdal, “Survey Article: Subsidiarity,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 6, no. 2 (June 
1998): 190.) Schumacher cites Pope Pius XI’s famous formulation of the principle of 
subsidiarity: “It is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right 
order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate 
organisations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to 
the members of the body social and never destroy and absorb them.” (Schumacher, Small 
is Beautiful, 244.) 
261 Even though the principle of subsidiarity seems to be present implicitly throughout 
Ostrom’s work, only once does she briefly discuss the principle of subsidiarity in the 
context of polycentricity. (Basudeb Guha Kasnobis, Ravi Kanbur, and Elinor Ostrom, 
“Beyond Formality and Informality,” in Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: 
Concepts and Policies, eds. Basudeb Guha Kasnobis, Ravi Kanbur, and Elinor Ostrom 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 11-12.)  
262 Graham R. Marshall, “Nesting, subsidiarity, and community-based environmental 
governance beyond the local level,” International Journal of the Commons 2, no. 1 (2007); 
Graham R. Marshall, “Can community-based NRM work at the scale of large regions? 
Exploring the roles of nesting and subsidiarity,” in Contested Country: Local and Regional 
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are reflected in a final criticism of polycentric governance and in a concrete example of a 
mixed regime, discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 A critique of polycentricity that deserves some closer attention is its supposed 
emphasis on decentralization. David Harvey, approaching commons research from a 
Marxist perspective, asks:  
 
How can radical decentralization – surely a worthwhile objective – work without 
constituting some higher-order hierarchical authority? It is simply naïve to believe 
that polycentrism or any other form of decentralization can work without strong 
hierarchical constraints and active enforcement.263  
 
According to Harvey, administrative decentralization and local autonomy seem attractive, 
but ultimately benefit neoliberalism, as they facilitate the reproduction of class 
privileges.264 Harvey provides an interesting example, because it readily translates to 
health care and tags on to worries about a society divvied up into homogeneous silos. He 
worries that in the context of a metropolis divided into local jurisdictions, each with their 
own tax regime, the rich would be able to vote with their feet, paying the entry price of 
property and land costs. Thus, the rich have access to superior public education at the 
cost of increased higher property prices and taxes, while the poor are stuck “in a poor 
jurisdiction with poor public education.”265,266 The issue is reminiscent of the so-called 
                                                          
Natural Resources Management in Australia, eds. Marcus Lane, Cathy Robinson, and 
Bruce Taylor (Collingwood: CSIRO Publishing, 2009). 
263 David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (London: 
Verso, 2012), 84. 
264 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 82. 
265 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 82. 
266 Of course, the issue Harvey highlights is a common problem in the funding of public 
education across the United States, as schools often are funded by property taxes. 
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postcode lottery in the United Kingdom, where citizens receive different care depending 
on the postal code they happen to live in.267 Adapted to the context of the commons, the 
members of one commons institution may enjoy better health care than the members of 
another, using boundary rules the members of the former institution can exclude new or 
undesirable  entrants (e.g., old, sick, poor) (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle-Level).268 
Harvey’s concerns are justified, but at the same time his criticism misses its target. After 
all, the aim of polycentricity is precisely to incorporate a degree of centralization and 
hierarchy to counter the dangers of the middle-level. Moreover, Ostrom explicitly states 
she does not advocate radical decentralization.269 In Why Do We Need to Protect 
Institutional Diversity (2012), for example, she discusses radical decentralization into 
                                                          
267 “‘Postcode lottery’ revealed in NHS care,” The Guardian, September 7, 2016, https:// 
www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/08/postcode-lottery-revealed-in-nhs-care. 
268 Of course, self-selection is also possible. In Belgium, for example, ideologically inspired 
mutual health insurance funds play a key role in managing health care (i.e., Catholic, 
socialist, liberal, independent, or neutral). Each mutual health insurance fund offers the 
same legally required health insurance package, but also offers additional insurance (e.g. 
eye glasses, hospitalization insurance) and services (e.g. summer camps, vacations). 
Historically, the larger mutual funds (i.e., Catholic, socialist) have been able to offer more 
comprehensive additional insurance and services. Thus, membership of one of these 
larger mutual funds entailed, and still entails, certain benefits. However, in a society 
characterized by “pillarization” (verzuiling), citizens feel they must become members of 
the mutual health insurance fund that aligns with their (family’s) ideology. Belgium’s 
mutual funds, and the other organizations within the same ideological pillar (e.g., 
newspapers, schools, trade unions), are good examples of meso-level institutions. (In 
Dutch, these organizations are called maatschappelijk middenveld, literally “societal 
midfield,” as they form a bridge between citizens and the government. In English, these 
organizations are part of civil society.) However, as these organizations are often highly 
centralized, they do not neatly fit the commons paradigm.   
269 That being said, Harvey’s interpretation of Ostrom’s research as proposing “radical 
decentralization” is not altogether unreasonable. The emphasis on more complex, 
multilayered, and multicentric institutions only arises later in Ostrom’s work. 
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“self-organized, local bodies”270 as one form of governance, but she is quick to add that 
commons research “supports more complex, adaptive designs that do enable the users 
to have a substantial voice in the design and monitoring of rules but also involve larger 
units in a polycentric system.”271 Interestingly, Harvey’s criticism mirrors several of the 
questions surrounding the concept of polycentricity discussed in the previous paragraph, 
and his critique may in fact originate from these ambiguities: the balance between 
centralization and decentralization is unclear, so is the degree of integration, and its 
origins (i.e., top-down and/or bottom-up). 
 The following example from Daniels and Sabin raises similar questions. In Setting 
Limits Fairly (2008), Daniels and Sabin discuss how different programs (i.e., Health 
Partners, PacifiCare, Aetna, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon, Group Health Cooperative 
of Puget Sound, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, and Northern California Kaiser 
Permanente)272 decide whether to cover lung volume reduction surgery (LVRS).273 Before 
continuing, notice how the decision-making processes of these organizations can 
plausibly be conceived as a series of parallel “experiments.” As Daniels and Sabin point 
out: 
 
In the mixed U.S. health care system, the [scientific and clinical findings about a 
new technology or treatment] are processed and acted upon by a mixture of 
local/regional/ national insurance and managed care programs, public and 
private, and not-for-profit and for-profit. All programs have access to the same 
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scientific and clinical data, but they operate under a diversity of internal structures 
and external market conditions.274,275 
 
As such, the case study highlights a particular strength of the pluralistic American health 
care system. Based on, among others,276 “differences in the policy-making process”277 
(i.e., differences in the rules-in-use), two organizations decide not to cover LVRS while 
five others do.278 To return to the issues surrounding the concept of polycentricity, the 
different programs deciding to cover LVRS certainly have the appearance of a mixed 
regime. After all, these programs can be construed as meso-level institutions “formally 
independent of each other,” but operating under an overarching set of rules.279 
Broadening the scope, or changing the level of analysis, Daniels and Sabin describe the 
                                                          
274 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 89. 
275 Daniels and Sabin’s “internal structures” can be thought of in terms of sets of rules, 
while the “external market conditions” are part of the environment. As such, the example 
fits the IAD framework (see 2.5 The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework). 
276 Daniels and Sabin also mention differences in the “local environment,” which evokes 
Ostrom’s call for institutions that are adapted to the local context and rely on local 
knowledge (see 2.2.2 Resource Users Relying on Local Knowledge). (Daniels and Sabin, 
Setting Limits Fairly, 92.) 
277 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 92-93. 
278 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 89-90. 
279 Before discussing LVRS, Daniels and Sabin discuss the management of last chance 
therapies in general. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 67-83.) They discuss how 
Aetna and Kaiser Permanente’s approach to decide about the coverage of last chance 
therapies has become mandatory for all California insurers through legislation passed by 
the California legislature (Friedman-Knowles Experimental Treatment Act). Whenever a 
patient “with a condition that has no effective therapy and is likely to cause death within 
two years is denied coverage for a new treatment with some scientific promise, an 
independent expert review of the decision must be offered.” (Ibid., 75.) The bill “[…] 
mandates an organizational decision-making process designed to reduce fears about 
conflict of interest and increase deliberative reflection and clarity about the reasons for 
coverage decisions.” (Ibid., 76.) An example of a multitier governance system where 
meso-level institutions operate under an overarching set of rules, which in turn operate 
under federal health care legislation. 
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American health care system as decentralized and pluralistic.280 At the same time, 
however, the system has strong central institutions, both at the federal level (e.g., CMS, 
NIH, CDC) and at the state level (e.g., DHEC, DHHS).281 In other words, the American health 
care system seems to be a multitier, polycentric governance regime. Moreover, the 
American health care system de facto possesses the following features of such regimes: 
(1) Parallel institutional experimentation (e.g., organizations trying out different 
approaches to managing last chance therapies in general and LVRS in particular, which 
are then adopted by other organizations). (2) Institutional redundancy (e.g., health 
insurers, hospital systems, or Obamacare coops can fail without jeopardizing the health 
care system as a whole).282 (3) Individual autonomy (e.g., patients can choose between 
insurers, hospitals, and providers) and institutional freedom (e.g., the right to start a new 
health care organization, the opportunity for legal recourse against other organizations 
and the state). In short, the system achieves some of the key objectives of polycentric 
                                                          
280 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 101. 
281 The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) is 
responsible for a host of health-related programs (e.g., acute/chronic disease 
epidemiology, birth defects, health licensing) and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHSS) manages South Carolina’s Medicaid program. 
282 One can wonder about the degree of redundancy of the American health care system. 
How resilient would the system be in case one (or more) key actors are knocked out of 
this diverse, multitier governance regime (e.g., Anthem Inc., Hospital Corporation of 
America, Medicare and Medicaid)? Even in case of the catastrophic failure of 
government-run health care programs (i.e., Medicare, Medicaid, and the Health 
Exchanges), it is possible that health care would continue to be provided at an organized 
and sophisticated level by non-government actors. Of course, the failure of government-
run health care programs would likely coincide with the failure of (large parts of) the 
United States government, which would greatly complicate the provision of any goods or 
services. The key point is that highly centralized, single-payer systems (e.g., Belgium, 
France) plausibly are less redundant. 
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governance regimes. Therefore, both in form and in function the American health care 
system appears to be a polycentric governance regime.283 Yet it is doubtful whether 
Ostrom, or any other commons researcher for that matter, would consider the American 
health care system as an example of a polycentric governance regime. Why? Pointing out 
the multifold failures of the American health care system is an inadequate. Like commons 
institutions, polycentric regimes can be successful or unsuccessful, but their success or 
failure is not what determines if they are mixed regimes.284  Moreover, valuable lessons 
can be learned from imperfect governance regimes. To return to the question at hand, 
why would not Ostrom, or most other advocates of the commons, consider the American 
health care system a polycentric governance regime? The plausible answer is that they 
ultimately envision multitier, polycentric governance regimes to give more weight to 
decentralized, self-governed institutions; which are integrated into more complex, 
centralized systems from the bottom up. While Ostrom explicitly rejects radical 
decentralization later in her career, the more complex governance regimes she proposes 
nonetheless emphasize the importance of users having a substantial voice in the design 
and monitoring of their own rules, as becomes clear from the aforementioned definition 
of polycentricity.285 Thus, from the perspective of commons research, the key feature that 
is missing from the United States health care system for it to be a polycentric governance 
                                                          
283 Reading Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren’s definition of polycentricity with the American 
health care system in mind, one cannot help but to conclude it is per definition a 
polycentric governance regime. 
284 In Governing the Commons (1990), Ostrom also discusses failed and fragile commons 
institutions. (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 143-181.) 
285 Ostrom, “Why do we need to protect institutional diversity?” 140. 
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regime is the prevalence of robust self-governed institutions. The fact that self-
governance regimes are present in certain pockets of the system (e.g., Kaiser 
Permanente, Group Health Cooperative) is likely insufficient for them to characterize the 
system as a whole as polycentric.286 However, the emphasis on self-governance appears 
to be a feature of the historic focus of commons research on small, self-governed 
institution rather than an essential feature of tiered, polycentric governance regimes as 
defined by (Vincent) Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren.287 Moreover, in light of the challenges 
faced by global commons in general and health care commons in particular (see 2.7 The 
Challenges Faced by the Health Care Commons), it is questionable whether polycentric 
regimes can develop from the bottom up out of small, self-governed institutions in a 
context like health care.288 The truth is that polycentricity may willy-nilly require more 
centralization, integration, and top-down control than commons researchers are readily 
willing to admit given their allegiance to the principle of small-scale self-governance, 
which is precisely Harvey’s point when he writes that polycentricity is unimaginable 
without a strong center. 
                                                          
286 Kaiser Permanente acquired Group Health Cooperative, formerly Group Health 
Cooperative of Puget Sound, in 2017. 
287 Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, “The Organization of Government in Metropolitan 
Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry,” 831-832. 
288 Even under the counterfactual assumption that these health care commons are 
allowed to develop in an institutional vacuum, meaning there are no other organizations 
and institutions already in existence providing health care, it seems implausible that large 
and complex polycentric governance regimes would easily arise out of small, self-
governed institutions. After all, most commons are de facto small, and tackling larger 
commons dilemmas (e.g., climate, oceans) has proven to be problematic. 
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 The foregoing critique of polycentricity leads to the following conclusions: First, 
even though Ostrom’s theory of polycentric governance regimes originate from commons 
research, the concept of polycentricity seems to exist in tension with the commons 
paradigm’s emphasis on self-organized, local governance systems. While the concept is 
appropriated by commons research, it can be construed as a standalone institutional 
design that is applicable to systems that do not necessarily have a strong commons 
component (e.g., the United States health care system). Second, and following from the 
previous point, a clear distinction needs to be made between polycentricity as tiered, 
diverse, and multicentric governance regimes, and polycentric regimes as displaying all 
the prior features plus a significant commons component. While the latter is Ostrom’s 
vision of polycentricity, it is certainly possible to envision polycentric governance regimes 
that do not emphasize self-governance. Commons research must explicitly acknowledge 
the duality of the concept of polycentricity. On the one hand, doing so promotes the 
introduction and application of a meaningful concept (i.e., polycentricity) outside of the 
realm of commons research. On the other hand, the distinction highlights the possibility 
of a more fully realized kind of polycentricity that emphasizes the inclusion of small, self-
governed institutions; incorporating the advantages of such institutional arrangements 
and resulting in more diverse polycentric governance systems. Finally, questions remain 
surrounding the concept of polycentricity: What is the balance between the center and 
the periphery (centralization vs. decentralization)? How integrated are polycentric 
regimes? How does the governance system come about (top-down vs. bottom-up)? And 
what is the role of self-governance? While the answer to some of these questions may be 
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“it depends,” a more developed and detailed account of polycentricity is needed in order 
to successfully identify, define, discuss, and develop multitier, polycentric governance 
regimes.  
 
The commons paradigm is not the panacea to cure health care’s many ills. In chapter one, 
we saw they are not the only solution to tragedies of the commons. Yes, they provide an 
alternative to state and market, but the latter are de facto the preferred solutions, at least 
for now. In the second chapter, we discussed three challenges to the communal 
management of health care resources (i.e., size, heterogeneity, and technological 
change). A nonexhaustive list of issues plaguing global commons in general and health 
care commons in particular that commons research does not offer satisfactory solutions 
to. Finally, in this chapter, we considered the dangers of meso-level institutions, as they 
risk partitioning society into self-interested, homogeneous silos dominated by local elites. 
Yet, for all its shortcomings, the commons offer some things the status quo institutions 
do not: a promise of self-governance, an increase in trust, a focus on parallel experiments, 
and a safeguard against overbearing centers. The advantages discussed so far all stem 
from the commons literature. Promising as they may be, they are theoretical and distant. 
Their implications for health care are all but clear. I now turn to the accountability for 
reasonableness approach, a prominent approach to allocating scarce health care 
resources from the health care ethics literature, to show how commons research can 





A4R IN PRACTICE 
 
“The design given to political institutions such  
as health systems governs the notions of  
morality and justice prevailing in society.”1  
- Lucy Gilson - 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The challenge of the fair allocation of health care resources has permeated the discussion 
of commons research in the preceding chapters. Now the time has come to apply 
Ostrom’s work to a concrete philosophical account for the just governance of health care 
resources. Daniels’ theory of justice for health care and the accompanying accountability 
for reasonableness (A4R) approach, which he developed together with Sabin, is arguably 
the single most influential account for the just allocation of health care resources in the 
bioethics literature. Moreover, the theory of justice and A4R interface with the commons 
in ways that enhance our understanding of the work of both Daniels and Ostrom. The 
result of bridging their work is a proposal for a hybrid “Daniels-Ostrom approach” to the 
just allocation of health care resources.
                                                          
1 Lucy Gilson, “Trust and the Development of Health Care as a Social Institution,” Social 
Science and Medicine 56, no. 7 (April 2003): 1462. 
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 The chapter proceeds as follows. I first highlight two key features of the approach 
to allocating resource allocation presented here, which focuses on (1) fair procedures (see 
4.2.1 A Procedural Approach) at the (2) meso-level of health care institutions (see 4.2.2 A 
Meso-Level Approach). I then move to the discussion of Daniels (see 4.3 Enter Daniels), 
arguing his approach to allocating health care resources can be characterized as 
institutionalist (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist), and providing a detailed account of 
his theory of justice for health care (see 4.3.2 A Theory of Justice). I interweave the 
discussion of Daniels’ theory of justice with reflections on the possibility of applying his 
theory of justice to the commons (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for the Commons?). Next, 
I discuss Daniels and Sabin’s accountability for reasonableness approach (A4R), beginning 
with the suggestion that the approach’s four conditions can be interpreted as institutional 
design principles (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles). I then discuss each of the conditions 
in turn with a focus on the relationship between the conditions and commons research 
(see 4.4.4 The Four Conditions), particularly the design principles for successful commons 
institutions. I briefly highlight a few more ways in which commons research can contribute 
to a deeper understanding of A4R (see 4.5 The Further Institutionalization of A4R). Finally, 
I suggest the need to develop an ethics of health care institutions (see 4.6 Toward an 
Ethics of Health Care Institutions). 
 The encounter between the research of Daniels and Ostrom offers important 
contributions to both literatures, primarily by filling gaps in the respective analyses. 
Commons research furthers Daniels’ work in two major ways: First, while Daniels 
recognizes the need to cooperate when governing health care resources, he does not fully 
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appreciate the role the institutional meso-level can play in realizing his approach, instead 
reverting to the state (macro-level) for implementation. The commons provides Daniels 
with an institutional arrangement that is particularly suitable to put his approach to 
resource allocation into practice (see 2.1 A Meso-Level Approach). Second, NIE supplies a 
language and tools that can further develop the A4R approach as a conceptual framework 
for designing just health care institutions. Moreover, Ostrom’s work exposes weaknesses 
of A4R and suggests solutions to them. For example, when it comes to the interpretation 
and development of the regulative condition (see 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition). 
Daniels’ main contributions to commons research are twofold as well: First, while Ostrom 
lists equity as one of the key criteria for the evaluation of institutional performance, she 
does not develop the criterion of justice in her work on the commons, even though 
concerns about fairness are often at play in the background, among others, when 
discussing the need to balance the benefits members receives and the cost they incur 
from collective action (see 2.6.2 Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules 
and Local Conditions). Given that questions of fairness are linked to the success of 
commons institutions, Ostrom must provide more in terms of a clarification or 
specification of the criterion of justice than she currently provides. Daniels’ theory of 
justice for health care, based on the seminal work of John Rawls, can provide Ostrom with 
an account of justice that is a good fit for her project (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for 
the Commons?), thus remedying a key weakness of commons research. Second, Daniels’ 
development of a theory of justice for health care provides an additional argument for 
the extension of the commons paradigm beyond natural resources to artificial resources 
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in general and health care resources in particular (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the Special 
Moral Importance of Health Care and 4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the Special Moral Importance of 
Health Care). Ultimately, the encounter between the work of Ostrom and Daniels may be 
able to provide a new impetus for the development of a full-fledged ethics of health care 
institutions. I provide several novel suggestions for the advancement of research into 
such an ethics (see 4.6 Toward an Ethics of Health Care Institutions). 
 The scope of the chapter grew over time, as the full degree to which the research 
of Daniels and Ostrom interface with one another revealed itself through the 
development of the arguments presented here. Initially, the idea was that commons 
research can be used to develop A4R as an institutional design approach. The relevance 
of Daniels’ work to commons research in particular only became clear subsequently. The 
relationships between the bodies of research suggests that a continued exploration will 
plausibly lead to further insights that can move forward both literatures. 
4.2 THE DANIELS-OSTROM APPROACH 
I develop a hybrid “Daniels-Ostrom approach” to the fair allocation of health care 
resources characterized by two main features, which come from the work of Daniels and 
Ostrom respectively: (1) The approach relies on procedural justice (Daniels). (2) The 
approach must be situated primarily at the meso-level (Ostrom). I briefly discuss both 
features with an emphasis on the latter, since the approach is to be implemented at the 
meso-level of health care institutions, but is backed by a higher-level theory of justice, 




4.2.1 A PROCEDURAL APPROACH 
Daniels and Sabin decide on a procedural approach to allocating health care resources 
because there is no “consensus on principles for resolving conflicting claims on resources 
for meeting health needs,”2 a general problem that also arises in the context of other 
needs that must be met.3 In the absence of agreement on distributive principles for health 
care, societies must find some other way to arrive at social policies, and procedural justice 
provides a path to allocate scarce resources despite disagreement.4  They write, 
 
The basic idea behind this appeal to procedural justice is quite familiar. When we 
lack consensus on principles that tell us what is fair, or even when we have general 
principles but are burdened by reasonable disagreements about how they apply, 
we may nevertheless find a process or procedure that most can accept as fair to 
those who are affected by such decisions. The fair process then determines what 
counts as a fair outcome.5,6 
 
While Ostrom is for most part tacit when it comes to matters of justice, apart from 
including equity in her list of criteria for institutional performance (see 0.3 A Third Way: 
The Commons and 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for the Commons), she likely is amenable to 
a procedural approach. In her Nobel Prize lecture, Ostrom notes that there is no “single 
                                                          
2 Norman Daniels, Just Health (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 24. 
3 Daniels, Just Health, 24. 
4 Norman Daniels and James Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
[2002] 2008), 2-4. 
5 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 4. 
6 Largent provides a similar characterization of procedural justice, “When, as in health 
care, there is no broadly accepted, independent criterion for what constitutes a just 
distribution of resources, we often rely on procedure: If a process is just, the outcomes 
should be fair. In other words, the procedure itself becomes a criterion for what 
constitutes a fair outcome.” (Emily Largent, “Health Care Organizations and the Power of 
Procedure,” The American Journal of Bioethics 16, no. 1 (2016):  51.) 
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normative theory of justice that can unambiguously be applied to all settings”7 discussed 
in the commons literature. Unfortunately, she does not explain her remark.8 Even though 
Ostrom is right that the concrete distributive principles used by commons differ from one 
institution to the next, most successful commons institutions decide upon the rules to 
allocate resources through collective-choice arrangements (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice 
Arrangements). Moreover, successful commons have rules in place to appeal and revise 
the distributive rules (see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms and 4.4.4.3 Revisions and 
Appeals Condition). As such, the distributive principles are the result of institutional 
procedures, which implies a procedural approach. Of course, the fact that the principles 
are the result of procedure does not necessarily mean the procedure is, or has to be, fair. 
However, given Ostrom’s concern with justice, both explicit (e.g., equity as a criterion for 
evaluating institutional performance) and implicit (e.g., need for conflict-resolution 
mechanisms, commitment to pluralism), procedural justice is the apparent path to 
designing fair (commons) institutions. She just omits a discussion of what justice means 
in the context of the commons, and how to implement equity in commons institutions. 
As I argue later in the chapter, the four conditions of A4R can plausibly be interpreted as 
additional design principles for the development of just (commons) institutions (see 4.4 
A4R in Practice). Due to their focus on deliberation, commons are a particularly suitable 
institutional arrangement for implementing procedural approaches to justice. The 
                                                          
7 Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex 
Economic Systems,” The American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June [2009] 2010): 435. 
8 Ostrom cites Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009) as the source for her claim. 
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endorsement of A4R as design principles for just (commons) institutions automatically 
entails the adoption of a procedural approach to justice. 
4.2.2 A MESO-LEVEL APPROACH 
Historically, bioethics has focused on micro-level moral issues (individual), with questions 
of justice coming to the forefront later, and being relegated to the macro-level (policy).9 
Daniels works within the contrast between micro- and macro-level bioethics.10 Indeed, in 
the opening pages of Just Health Care (1985), Daniels explicitly states that he is “entirely” 
concerned with the macro-level of decision-making, which he associates with the design 
of health care institutions (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist).11 Inspired by Ostrom’s 
work on the commons, I suggest that Daniels’ macro-level approach would benefit from 
the introduction of the meso-level of health care institutions, effectively “splitting” his 
approach between a macro-level theory of fair resource allocation, and the meso-level 
institutional implementation thereof when solving concrete resource governance issues. 
 I argue that Daniels’ theory of justice must be situated at the macro-level, 
providing the rationale for and anchoring the practice of the fair allocation of health care 
resources (see 4.3.2 A Theory of Justice). The A4R approach, which specifies four 
conditions for the design of just health care institutions (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design 
                                                          
9 Daniels writes that early on medical ethics “has fed on new-life-and-death dramas.” 
(Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1.) 
10 The fact that Daniels works within the constraints of bioethics’ micro-macro bifurcation, 
situating his contribution at the macro-level, exerts a profound influence on his project, 
much like the market-state dichotomy does (see 4.5.1 Breaking Open the Dichotomy). 
Among others, the bifurcation can explain the Daniels’ challenge of framing his theory of 
justice and A4R as an exercise in institutional/organizational design, i.e., meso-level (see 
4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). 
11 Daniels, Just Health Care, 1-2. 
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Principles), can be situated at both the macro- and meso-level. The concrete 
implementation of the conditions in health care organizations must be located at the 
meso-level of health care organizations, i.e., instantiated institutions (see 0.5.2 
Organization). However, the four conditions of A4R as abstract principles for institutional 
design, as discussed by Daniels and Sabin, can be conceived as higher-level (i.e., macro-
level) institutional design principles that are made concrete when they are implemented 
at the meso-level by health care organizations.12 As such, A4R is fixed at the macro-level, 
grounding the approach by providing an independent set of criteria for fair health care 
institutions, but becomes context sensitive when implemented at the meso-level. The 
major gain for Daniels and Sabin is the introduction of the meso-level of health care 
institutions, which ties their approach in with the NIE literature, furthering their goal of 
designing fair health care institutions. Moreover, Ostrom provides an alternate path to 
the implementation of cooperative decision-making regarding the allocation of health 
care resources, emerging from the bottom up rather than coming from the top down, a 
possibility that Daniels and Sabin do not fully appreciate. It is worth to keep in mind that 
the design of fair health care institutions likely requires designers to move dynamically 
between the meso- and macro-level, going back and forth during the implementation 
process.13 
                                                          
12 I discuss the status of the conditions of A4R vis-à-vis the other design principles in more 
detail later (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles). The discussion of the conditions of A4R 
as design principles raises several issues that suggest the proposed distinction between 
meso- and macro-level may not be as clear-cut as presented here. 
13 The process resembles the method of reflective equilibrium as discussed by Rawls in A 
Theory of Justice (1971), a coherent set of beliefs arrived at through a process of 
deliberative adjustment between general principles and particular judgments. (John 
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 Once implemented, the meso-level becomes the locus for fair process in the 
allocation of health care resources, enabling public deliberation and democratic oversight 
when setting health care limits.14 Situated between the micro- and macro-level, the meso-
level is arguably the most suitable level to take resource allocation decisions in health 
care for reasons discussed throughout the project. To reiterate a few: (1) The issue of 
scarcity becomes more palpable to resource users at the meso-level. (2) At the meso-
level, the deliberative process becomes more manageable, among others, allowing more 
resource users to participate in deliberation and ensuring transparency of the process. (3) 
Meso-level decision-making processes are likely more efficient and effective than their 
macro-level counterparts, among others, because the set of rules is not unnecessarily 
inflated and rule compliance is higher. (4) The meso-level keeps allocation issues away 
from the bedside without having to resort to macro-level policies.  
4.3 ENTER DANIELS 
Daniels recognizes the key role of institutions and their design in setting limits on the use 
of health care resources. Before I provide a detailed discussion of Daniels’ Rawlsian theory 
of justice for health care (see 4.3.2 A Theory of Justice), I argue that his overall project of 
setting fair limits rightfully can be characterized as institutionalist (see 4.3.1 Daniels the 
Institutionalist).   
 
 
                                                          
Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, [1971] 1999), 40-46.) 
14 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 4. 
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4.3.1 DANIELS THE INSTITUTIONALIST 
I am going to go ahead and call Daniels an institutionalist. That may seem like a bold claim, 
and certainly a convenient one given my overarching argument, but the project Daniels 
embarks on in Just Health Care (1985) is fundamentally institutionalist.15 If I am able to 
show that Daniels is indeed an institutionalist, then this does not only further my own 
argument, it also allows others to see and develop Daniels’ work in new ways that do 
justice to his underlying commitment to institutions, thus providing an important 
contribution to the literature.   
Daniels is keenly aware of the role institutions play in ensuring a just health care 
system.16 The opening sentences of his work read: 
 
This book is about justice in the design of a health-care system. The term ‘health 
care’ is used broadly to include personal medical services, preventive medical and 
public health measures, including health and safety regulation, and certain social 
support services for the chronically ill or disabled. So a health-care system involves 
a diverse set of institutions which have a major impact on the level and distribution 
of our welfare. A theory of justice articulates the general principles which should 
govern this system.17 (Emphasis mine.) 
                                                          
15 Daniels’s institutionalism most likely is inspired by Rawls, who discusses the role of 
institutions in ensuring justice throughout A Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls treats 
institutions in a more sophisticated manner than Daniels (see footnote 176), who adopts 
Rawls’s language of institutions but focuses on extending Rawls’s theory of justice. While 
an in-depth assessment of Rawls as an institutionalist is outside of the scope of the 
current project, I briefly touch upon Rawls’s institutionalism later on (see 4.3.2.2.2 
Justifying the Special Moral Importance of Health Care and 4.7 Conclusion).  
16 The statement may be interpreted as mischaracterizing Daniels’s project, as his primary 
concern is to develop a theory of justice that can then inform the design of health care 
institutions (theory of justice → design of health care institutions). Nonetheless, Daniels 
recognizes the key importance of institutions in ensuring a just health care system (health 
care institutions → justice). 
17 Daniels, Just Health Care, ix.  
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Thus, Daniels conceives of a health care system in terms of “a diverse set of institutions,” 
which influence welfare through their role in the distribution of “various goods and 
services,”18 i.e., the governance of health care resources. Daniels aim is to seek “principles 
of justice to govern the design of basic health-care institutions”19 and to solve “problems 
in the design of health-care institutions.”20,21 He highlights the importance of institutions 
and institutional design to the just allocation of health care resources numerous times 
throughout Just Health Care (1985), particularly in the opening pages of the work.22 So 
labeling Daniels as an institutionalist is not as farfetched as it may seem. 
 Of course, to brand Daniels an institutionalist is one thing, but to claim he is a new 
institutionalist is a different matter altogether. Obviously, Daniels is not ignorant about 
the central role institutions play in health care. In this sense, he does not need to learn to 
“see” the institutions. However, he does not “see” them through the lens of NIE (see 0.4 
The Double Aim of the Project). As such, Daniels misses the language and theoretical 
framework to bring his vison about health care institutions to complete fruition. While he 
develops arguably the single most influential account of justice in health care,23 and 
                                                          
18 Daniels, Just Health Care, ix. 
19 Daniels, Just Health Care, 9. 
20 Daniels, Just Health Care, 10. 
21 A few pages earlier, Daniels writes that health inequalities “are the direct results of 
features in the design of our basic health-care institutions.” (Daniels, Just Health Care, 3.) 
Principles of justice can “serve as a public and final basis for resolving disagreements 
about how basic institutions, such as health-care institutions, should be designed.” (Ibid., 
4.)  
22 Daniels, Just Health Care, ix-xi, 1-4, 8-10, 41, 45, 47-48, 95, 99-100, 102. 
23 I deliberately do not use the word “successful” to characterize Daniels’s theory of 
justice in health care, as it has been the target of a host of criticisms, which I choose to 
ignore here for the sake of the argument. Again, even though I am sympathetic to 
Daniels’s account of justice, I am not strongly committed to it, but his account is 
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applies this theory to a variety of cases, his institutional project is not as successful as it 
could be. Daniels seems to realize the shortcomings of his argument. While he dwells on 
the role of institutions at length early on in Just Health Care, repeatedly emphasizing their 
importance in the preface and opening chapter, he does not develop his institutional 
arguments further. Daniels spends the first three chapters of the work developing a 
Rawlsian theory of justice for health care (see 5.4.2 A Theory of Justice for Health Care), 
and the remaining six chapters discuss more or less concrete applications of this theory 
to health care, but there is no general discussion of the role of institutions. Daniels, who 
squarely situates his project at “the social or macro level of decision-making,”24 lacks a 
meso-level theory of institutions to make his macro-level theory of justice more specific 
without having to descend all the way to concrete applications (micro-level).25 The 
hypothesis that Daniels is somewhat disillusioned with his institutional ambitions is 
further backed up by the marked cutback in talk about institutions and institutional design 
                                                          
particularly amenable to show the possible applications of NIE and commons research to 
issues of justice in health care, among others, because of Daniels’s foundational concerns 
about the role of institutions. 
24 Daniels, Just Health Care, 1. 
25 A few remarks are in place: (1) Daniels states he is “entirely” concerned with the macro-
level and thus appears to situate the concrete applications in the book’s later chapters at 
the macro-level as well. (Daniels, Just Health Care, 1.) (2) Such a characterization makes 
sense from Daniels’s perspective, as he works within the “classic” bioethical distinction 
between the micro-level (individuals) and the macro-level (policy), which defines much of 
biomedical ethics as a field of study. Interestingly, Daniels’s struggle with institutions may 
be a direct result of the bioethics’ micro-macro bifurcation. (3) From the perspective of 
NIE, however, Daniels’s concrete applications can be situated at the level of organizations, 
i.e., instantiated institutions (micro-level). On this view, Daniels does not have a meso-
level theoretical framework to discuss institutions in abstract terms. (4) The terms micro, 
meso-, and macro-level are equivocatory, as they mean different things in biomedical 
ethics and in NIE. Moreover, by now it should be clear the idea of levels of analysis is used 
liberally in commons research. 
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in Just Health (2008), the sequel to Just Health Care (1985) that reiterates, updates, and 
expands many of the earlier work’s arguments.26 The difference between the books is 
particularly noticeable in the opening pages.27  
Then there is the issue of Daniels’s use of the term “institution,” which I briefly 
touched upon in the introduction (see 0.1.2 NIE, Bioethics, and Philosophy). For most part, 
Daniels treats the words institution and organization as synonyms, both referring to 
concrete organizations rather than abstract institutions.28 In other words, from the 
perspective of NIE, when Daniels talks about institutions, he really means organizations, 
and when he discusses institutional design, he really means organizational design. In the 
opening pages of Just Health Care (1985), however, Daniels appears to mention 
institutions and their design in a way that brings his work much closer to NIE.29 Of course, 
the fact he then goes on to use the terms as synonyms seems to prove I am reading 
                                                          
26 To be sure, Daniels uses the word institution a lot in Just Health (2008), over a hundred 
times, but almost exclusively as a synonym for organization.  
27 If Daniels’s institutionalism is indeed inspired by Rawls (see footnote 15), which seems 
plausible, this may offer an additional explanation for the initial focus on and later 
departure from institutions. While Daniels adopts the language of institutions early on, 
he does not develop the institutional argument in detail, and instead chooses to focus on 
the theory of justice, thus the institutional strand loses importance over time. 
28 Daniels’s enumeration of some of health care’s “most visible and familiar” institutions 
is especially telling, as almost all the institutions he lists are organizations (e.g., hospitals, 
clinics, training institutions for medical professionals, R&D institutions, institutions 
providing social support and personal care). (Daniels, Just Health Care, 1.) He also includes 
“laws and agencies responsible for the control of infectious disease, nutrition and health 
education, drug and food protection, consumer product safety, and the regulation of 
health hazards in the environment.” (Ibid.) The latter illustrates Daniels does not 
distinguish between laws (i.e., sets of rules) and agencies (i.e., organizations), at least not 
in the relevant sense. 
29 Rawls’s institutionalism, and its influence on Daniels (see footnote 15), may explain why 
Daniel’s earlier work discusses institutions in a way that seems closer to NIE, as Rawls 
defines institutions in a way that resembles definitions from NIE (see footnote 176).  
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Daniels’s supposed new institutionalism into his work. Still, I think early on Daniels is 
grappling with the concepts of institution and institutional design on a deeper level, or at 
a higher level of abstraction, but he abandons this line of inquiry because he does not 
possess the theoretical apparatus to pursue it further.  
Then again, to say Daniels gives up on his attempt to think about institutions in 
abstract terms strictly speaking is not correct either, as he continues to pursue his goal of 
solving problems in the design of health care institutions, culminating in the 
accountability for reasonableness (A4R) approach he develops together with Sabin in 
Setting Limits Fairly (2002). A4R is in effect an exercise in institutional design, not 
organizational design, as the approach’s four conditions are essentially abstract principles 
for the design of health care institutions. I discuss the A4R approach as a set of 
institutional design principles, and how they fit with commons research, in detail later in 
the chapter (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles). Within the scope of the current 
discussion of Daniels’ merits as an institutionalist, I think it is remarkable that A4R is not 
framed in terms of institutions or institutional design, or even recognized as such. Daniels 
sets out to solve institutional design issues, and he succeeds in doing so in developing 
A4R, but the full extent of his proposed solution only becomes clear from the perspective 
of NIE. Institutionalism leads to a deeper appreciation of the problem Daniels has solved. 
He set out to develop conditions for fair health care organizations (i.e., theory of justice, 
A4R), but provides design principles for just health care institutions. The fact Daniels’ 
solution can be “scaled up” to a higher level of analysis or abstraction seems to be a 
feature of the continuity between institutions and organizations (see 0.5.2 
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Organization).30 Put differently, Daniels “sees” the institutions, but he sees them as 
organizations rather than as abstract sets of rules. He believes and knows he has proposed 
an “institutional design” (i.e., organizational design) solution, but he does not appreciate 
the full implications of his solution, and in a real way he does not know he has in fact 
developed an institutional design solution.31 Fortunately, the epistemological intricacies 
of the matter need not be of concern here, what matters is that Daniels is motivated by 
a concern about just health care institutions and in response develops an institutional 
design solution which, when interfaced with NIE, provides a powerful tool to setting fair 
limits in health care. By looking at Daniels through the lens of NIE, one can recognize the 
worth of Daniels the institutionalist and build on his vision using the tools of NIE. Bridging 
both literatures allows for a fuller exploration of “that intermediate space in which we try 
to look at real social institutions with some philosophical vision”32 and provides additional 
guidance on how to design more just health care institutions.33  
                                                          
30 The fact Daniels’ solution can be scaled up so easily provides additional support for the 
continuity between organizations and institutions (see 0.5.2 Organizations), which first 
and foremost requires a conceptual switch from the level of concrete organizations to 
that of abstract institutions.  
31 Daniels’s predicament is of epistemic interest, as he knows he has provided an 
institutional solution to designing just health care institutions, he has a justified true belief 
(JTB), but his knowledge seems to be the result of a contingent feature, i.e., the continuity 
of institutions and organizations, because he does not know he has provided an 
institutional design solution. The problem is reminiscent of the well-known Gettier 
problem but is not a textbook example, as Daniels’ justification for the belief is not false. 
Then again, maybe the problem at hand is not that complicated, but simply a case of (1) 
Daniels not understanding the full implications of his work and (2) a semantic issue 
deriving from treating institution and organization either as synonyms (Daniels) or as 
distinct concepts existing on a continuum (NIE).   
32 Daniels, Just Health Care, xi. 
33 Daniels, Just Health Care, x. 
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Before continuing, I want to highlight that, while Daniels’ approach plausibly can 
be characterized as institutionalist, meaning he recognizes the central importance of 
institutions and their design in governing health care resources, this does not necessarily 
put him in the camp of Ostrom and the commons. While Daniels is a proponent of a 
deliberative approach to allocating health care resources, he situates his intellectual 
project at “the social or macro level of decision-making,”34 and the same is true of the 
practical implementation thereof. Ultimately, he believes it is up to the state to regulate 
the mechanisms for the fair allocation of resources he envisions (see also 4.4.4.4 The 
Regulative Condition). Daniels has a good reason for this approach, as he believes and 
wants his theory to be universally applicable, but his choice for the macro-level may also 
be the result of the lack of a meso-level institutional entity (i.e., commons) to serve as the 
vehicle for the A4R approach. As we will see, Daniels advocates deliberation and 
cooperation, but he does not fully realize or appreciate how the solution he proposes can 
be associated with a distinctive institutional meso-level, instead he reverts back to the 
institutional macro-level (i.e., state). Integrating commons research in Daniels’ analysis 
implies an important gain, as it allows Daniels to have his cake and eat it too. His theory 
of justice for health care and the A4R approach can function as a macro-level theory of 
justice and institutional design principles respectively, but their implementation can take 
place at the meso-level of health care commons organizations. As a result, his approach 
maintains its universality, but at the same time can allow for differences in health care 
context. To give an example, it allows for some variation within what counts as relevant 
                                                          
34 Daniels, Just Health Care, 1. 
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reasons in making resource allocation decisions, say, in a secular as compared to a 
religious context (see 4.4.4.2 The Relevance Condition). Of course, Daniels may disagree 
with allowing such leeway in the meso-level implementation of his approach because it 
undermines the universality of his project, among others, because it may lead to a slippery 
slope with regards to relevant reasons. To sum up, while Daniels can be labeled an 
institutionalist, he may or may not be a proponent of the commons. He may want to be, 
because it makes his approach sensitive to real-world differences in health care context, 
but he may not want to be, as it requires him to give groups of resource users more 
autonomy in making resource allocation decisions than he is willing to concede.  
4.3.2 A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
While Daniels goal is to design more just health care institutions, his first concern is to 
develop a theory of justice for health care that can inform institutional design. The A4R 
approach is a later development that is justified by, and relies on, Daniels’s theory of 
justice. Hence, before I discuss A4R in connection with commons research, I provide a 
detailed summary of the theoretical rationale behind the A4R approach drawing on Just 
Health Care (1985) and Just Health (2008). Furthermore, summarizing Daniels’s theory of 
justice is of potential value to commons research. While Daniels is concerned with health 
care institutions, and his theory of justice can be applied to health care commons, as I 
argue below, his work can plausibly be applied to certain commons institutions beyond 
health care (e.g., knowledge commons, urban commons,35 natural resource commons). 
                                                          
35 Rawls’s theory of justice may straightforwardly apply to certain commons without 
having to extend the theory, as Daniels does to apply it to health care. Urban and 
knowledge commons, for example, may fall directly under the first principle of justice as 
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While I do not present a detailed argument in support of this thesis, which is beyond the 
scope of the current project, I briefly discuss the possible relevance of Daniels’s theory of 
justice to commons research, and highlight some of the reasons the theory may pertain 
to the commons as I breakdown Daniels’s argument (see 4.3.2.2 A Theory of Justice for 
Health Care).  
4.3.2.1 A THEORY OF JUSTICE FOR THE COMMONS? 
The chapter focuses on the role NIE can play in developing and expanding Daniels’s 
institutional project. In other words, the chapter’s central question is, “What can 
commons research do for Daniels?” However, Daniels’s work may provide a 
straightforward path to a theory of justice for the commons. At a minimum, his theory of 
justice for health care can inform and facilitate the development thereof. Thus, this 
section seeks to provide an initial answer to the question, “What can Daniels bring to 
commons research?” A question I return to outside of the scope of a theory of justice 
throughout the chapter. 
 I briefly discussed Ostrom’s criteria for evaluating institutional performance in the 
introduction,36 flagging justice as one of them and suggesting the criterion is one of the 
most promising interfaces between NIE and philosophy. Since Ostrom does not elucidate 
what she means by justice, the concept remains undefined in her work.37 Nor is the 
                                                          
fairness, which states each person has a claim to equal basic liberties, because they are 
important to ensure (political) liberties.  
36 As a reminder, Ostrom’s criteria for the evaluation of institutional performance are 
justice, sustainability, efficiency, effectiveness, and robustness (see 0.3 A Third Way: The 
Commons). 




criterion a topic in the commons literature. Ergo, Ostrom presents justice as a criterion to 
evaluate institutional performance, but she provides no guidance on how to determine 
whether an institution is just. Moreover, as the criterion goes undetermined, it cannot 
provide any guidance on the design of just commons institutions. This is where the work 
of Daniels comes in, as his extension of Rawls’s theory of justice can plausibly be adopted, 
and if necessary adapted, to provide content to Ostrom’s criterion of justice. As such, the 
theory can serve as the basis for assessing whether a commons institution is equitable.38 
The theory of justice can also provide guidance on the design of just commons 
institutions, much as Daniels aims to do in his work (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). 
Furthermore, Daniels’s theory of justice may be able to justify Ostrom’s emphasis on 
justice, i.e., provide a rationale for including justice as a criterion to evaluate institutional 
performance, particularly in the evaluation of commons institutions (see 4.3.2.2 A Theory 
of Justice for Health Care).    
 Daniels applies his theory of justice for health care to a range of organizations, as 
is evidenced by the diversity of examples he uses, covering all institutional types (i.e., 
market, state, and commons) and levels of analysis (e.g., local, regional, national, 
transnational). Indeed, one of the strengths of Daniels’s approach is that it operates at a 
level of generality that allows it to interface with a variety of institutions. Therefore, even 
though Daniels’s procedural account fits particularly well with the commons, as I suggest 
                                                          
38 While Daniels does not make it explicit, he already uses his theory of justice for health 
care as a criterion to evaluate organizational performance when he compares and 
contrasts concrete examples, which is yet another way in which commons research sheds 
new light on Daniels’s project. 
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throughout the chapter, it can be applied to all kinds of institutions, including hybrids and 
polycentric governance regimes (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). 
Ostrom would likely be amenable to Daniels’s approach to justice, as his theory allows for 
the institutional pluralism she holds so dearly (see 3.2.2 Plural Institutions).  
 Of course, more work needs to be done to turn Daniels’s theory of justice for 
health care into a theory of justice for the commons. An important question that must be 
answered is whether Daniels’s theory can be applied to commons outside the realm of 
health care in a straightforward manner. I briefly argue that it can indeed be applied to 
other commons later in the chapter (see 4.4.2.2 A Theory of Justice for Health Care). 
Alternatively, Rawls’s theory of justice can be adapted in some other way in order to apply 
it to the commons, much in the same way Daniels adapts Rawls’s theory to apply it health 
care.  
4.3.2.2 A THEORY OF JUSTICE FOR HEALTH CARE 
Daniels develops his theory of justice for health care in Just Health Care (1985) and 
extends the theory in Just Health (2008). As the arguments in both works are largely 
analogous, I treat them as one. In the later work, Daniels expands his theory to apply to 
health needs generally rather than health care alone,39 albeit broadly conceived,40 but the 
gist of his argument remains unchanged.41 In a few places, I interlace the discussion of 
                                                          
39 Daniels, Just Health, 29. 
40 Daniels, Just Health Care, ix. 
41 In Just Health (2008), Daniels finds additional support for his claim that justice requires 
the protection of opportunity by drawing on recent theories that compete with Rawls’s 
view of distributive justice. (Daniels, Just Health, 30, 63-77.) 
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Daniels’s theory of justice with remarks on its possible applicability to the commons (see 
4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for the Commons?).  
 To repeat, Daniels ultimate aim is “a just redesign of health-care institutions,”42 
but how does one embark on such an endeavor? A straightforward but inadequate 
answer to the question is to appeal to a “notion of individual or human rights,”43 which 
can then serve as the basis for redesigning health care’s institutions. The problem with 
such an approach is that “rights are not moral fruits that spring up from bare earth, fully 
ripened, without cultivation.”44 The notion is too vague to serve as the basis for decisions 
about the governance of scarce health care resources,45 as Daniels argues in some detail 
in Just Health Care (1985).46 Any appeal to a right to health or health care must be based 
on, and derived from, a general theory of distributive justice or a particular theory of 
justice for health care.47 The easiest way to proceed then seems to be to apply a general 
theory of justice to health care, but this approach assumes that such theories can simply 
be applied to health care.48 Daniels attempts such a strategy early in his career, 
straightforwardly extending Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness to health care, but fails.49 
The unsuccessful attempt or rather attempts, as he tries four different approaches, lead 
him to conclude,  
  
                                                          
42 Daniels, Just Health Care, 4. 
43 Daniels, Just Health, 14. 
44 Daniels, Just Health Care, 5.  
45 Daniels, Just Health Care, 9. 
46 Daniels, Just Health Care, 4-9. 
47 Daniels, Just Health, 15. 
48 Daniels, Just Health, 15. 
49 Daniels, Just Health Care, 10. 
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In order to apply such general theories to health care, we need to know what kind 
of a social good health care is. We need to know what its functions and effects are 
and why we might think these make it differ in moral importance from other 
things which improve our quality of life in various ways. An analysis of this problem 
cannot be provided by appeal to the theories of justice themselves.50 
 
Therefore, Daniels begins his search for a theory of justice for health care by asking, “Is 
health care special?”51 A question he later broadens to, “What is the special moral 
importance of health?”52 Before continuing, it is worth noting the relevance of Daniels’s 
experience to the development of a theory of justice for the commons, as the question 
about the special moral importance of health (care) also applies to commons institutions, 
which are much more diverse in the resources they manage and the goals they pursue 
than are health care institutions, even when the latter are broadly conceived. A possible 
strategy is to argue that most commons discussed in the literature are of special moral 
importance to their respective communities, who depend on them for their livelihood 
and often for their very survival (e.g., water, fish, fodder, wood).53 The same is true of the 
                                                          
50 Daniels, Just Health Care, 10. 
51 Daniels, Just Health Care, 10-11. 
52 Daniels, Just Health, 17. 
53 The suggestion raises an interesting question, can any commodity, or service for that 
matter, become of special moral importance given the circumstances? To give an 
example, smartphones are not usually considered to be of special moral importance, on 
the contrary, but to refugees they can be crucial tools to stay in touch with family and to 
access crucial information, which also explains the opposition to proposals to confiscate 
them. (Will Worley, “Syrian Woman Explains Why Refugees Need Smartphones,” The 
Independent, May 12, 2016.) Similarly, oil seems to be of special moral importance, 
especially for oil producing countries, who depend on the resource for their 
socioeconomic development, effectively protecting the range of opportunity open to 
their citizens, among others, by funding health care and education. The issue raises a 




artificial and global commons that have become a topic of interest in the commons 
literature over the course of the last decades (e.g., knowledge commons, urban 
commons, climate, oceans),54 which are not like other commodities (e.g., smartphones, 
cars),55 but resemble health care in that they seem to be of special moral significance. I 
do not pursue a detailed answer here, but return to the issue after looking at Daniels’s 
explanation of the special moral importance of health care (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the 
Special Moral Importance of Health Care). For now, it is important to note that a further 
development of this line of argument is not necessary for the health care commons, as 
they fall squarely under Daniels’s theory of justice for health care and the question, “What 
is the special moral importance of health?” 
 Before providing a systematic answer, Daniels notes that health care certainly 
looks as if it is special, as is illustrated by the observation that people and societies that 
tolerate vast inequalities in wealth and power are morally outraged when sick people 
cannot get care because they cannot afford it.56 The short answer is that health care is 
special because it keeps people functioning normally, which ensures the range of 
opportunities open to them. The protection of opportunity is, among others,57 justified 
by Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. While disease and disability reduce the range of 
                                                          
54 In all these examples the commons appear to be of special moral importance 
55 Daniels, Just Health Care, 10-11. 
56 Daniels, Just Health, 18. 
57 Daniels finds additional support for the protection of opportunity in the capabilities 
approach (Sen, Martha Nussbaum) and the appeal to “equal opportunity for welfare or 
advantage” (Richard Arneson, Gerald Cohen), even though these accounts are critical of 
key aspects of Rawls’s work. (Daniels, Just Health, 63-77.) A detailed discussion is beyond 
the scope of the current project, but NIE can plausibly adopt and/or benefit (from) these 
other approaches to distributive justice. 
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opportunities open to people compared to when they are healthy or fully functional, 
keeping them functioning normally protects their range of opportunities.58,59 Hence, “the 
socially controllable factors that promote health […] derive special importance from their 
contribution to protecting opportunities.”60 I now discuss the key moves of Daniels’s 
argument in detail.61 For the sake of clarity, I break down the argument in two parts, 
which roughly correspond to the way Daniels sets up his argument. I first explain the 
special moral importance of health (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the Special Moral Importance 
of Health Care) and then discuss the justification for health care’s special significance (see 
4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the Special Moral Importance of Health Care).  
4.3.2.2.1 EXPLAINING THE SPECIAL MORAL IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH CARE 
Daniels begins by arguing health care is better thought of in terms of needs rather than 
preferences, despite the problems surrounding the former notion and the strengths of 
the latter concept, which is used in welfare economics.62,63 A common argument to show 
any talk about health care needs can be avoided is the so-called “Argument from Fair 
                                                          
58 Daniels, Just Health, 20-21. 
59 Daniels summarizes the argument as follows: (1) “Since meeting health needs promotes 
health (or normal functioning), and since health helps to protect opportunity, then 
meeting health needs protects opportunity.” (2) “Since Rawls’s justice as fairness requires 
protecting opportunity, as do other important approaches to distributive justice, then 
several recent accounts of justice give special importance to meeting health needs.” 
(Daniels, Just Health, 29.) 
60 Daniels, Just Health, 21. 
61 I primarily draw on the somewhat shorter, and in places more organized, argument 
from Just Health (2008). (Daniels, Just Health, 29-63.) 
62 Daniels, Just Health, 31. 
63 The prevalent “preference for preferences” seems to be in part the result of the 
influence of orthodox economics.  
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Shares.”64 The argument can be summarized as follows: (1) suppose each person had a 
“fair income share” according to some agreed upon theory of distributive justice, (2) 
suppose there is a competitive medical market to buy insurance, then (3) people could 
protect themselves against the risk of needing health care resources by purchasing a 
reasonable insurance package,65 defined as a package that “meets the health-care needs 
or risks it is rational for a prudent person to insure against.”66,67 Thus, demand, in the form 
of preferences for different insurance packages, and supply, in the form of health care 
goods and services, meet each other in the health care marketplace and are efficiently 
matched,68 or so the argument goes. However, the argument does not show that we can 
do without health care needs, because even though we know little about “fair income 
shares,” it seems plausible such a share is fair only if someone can buy a reasonable 
insurance package with it.69 But what is someone’s income share is too small to afford a 
reasonable insurance package? Then the share is inadequate, i.e., it is unfair that person 
cannot buy a reasonable health insurance package.70 Daniels concludes, 
  
So, to know whether income shares are fair, we must know that they can buy 
reasonable coverage. But to know what coverage is reasonable, we need to know 
                                                          
64 Daniels, Just Health Care, 20. 
65 Daniels, Just Health Care, 20. 
66 Daniels, Just Health Care, 21. 
67 Of course, one can object there is no insurance level that is prudent for everyone. An 
objection Daniels counters by arguing the variation of prudence must not be exaggerated, 
since the notion of prudence reflects a concern for meeting certain basic needs. Some 
individuals may have a fair share of income, but nonetheless be unable to purchase a 
reasonable insurance package, i.e., one that meets these needs, which puts them in a 
position where they are unable to act prudently. (Daniels, Just Health, 31.) 
68 Daniels, Just Health Care, 20-21. 
69 Daniels, Just Health, 31. 
70 Daniels, Just Health, 31-32. 
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what health-care needs it is prudent to insure against. Thus we must talk about 
health-care needs after all!71 
 
 Since the concept of needs cannot easily be eliminated, and is necessary in order to talk 
about the special moral important of health care, the notion must be clarified.72 A key 
issue with the concept is that it seems to be both too weak and too strong to be of use,73 
i.e., “too many things become needs, and too few.”74,75 However, not all needs are on 
par.76 In some moral contexts, like health care, certain needs are given a special moral 
weight.77 In order to sort out competing claims for resources in these contexts, one must 
rely on various objective criteria to assess needs instead of on subjective assessments. 
Daniels frames the issue as a question about the structure of the scale used to assess the 
strength of different claims for assistance.78 The scale is truncated or selective rather than 
full or complete,79 meaning the scale gives weight to some kinds of needs, which are 
reasons for assistance, but not to others, which are irrelevant.80 The scale differs from 
one moral context to another (e.g., health care, education, parenting).81 For such a scale 
to function, the needs must be “objectively ascribable,”82 meaning they can be ascribed 
                                                          
71 Daniels, Just Health Care, 21. 
72 Daniels, Just Health Care, 23. 
73 Daniels, Just Health, 32. 
74 Daniels, Just Health Care, 23. 
75 Daniels calls the concept “opportunistic.” (Daniels, Just Health Care, 23.) 
76 Daniels, Just Health Care, 23. 
77 Daniels, Just Health, 33. 
78 Daniels, Just Health, 33. 
79 Daniels, Just Health Care, 24-25. 
80 Daniels, Just Health, 33. 
81 Daniels, Just Health, 34. 
82 Daniels, Just Health Care, 25. 
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to someone even if that person does not realize their need, and “objectively important,”83 
meaning there is widespread agreement on their importance and relevance.84 The needs 
that fit the bill are “those required for normal species functioning.”85,86 Such needs are 
objectively ascribable, assuming the notion of normal species functioning can be 
adequately specified. But why are they objectively important? In other words, what 
explains the broad agreement on the importance of needs that ensure normal species 
functioning?87 A tempting, but unsatisfactory answer is that these needs are a condition 
for happiness, i.e., people are unable to achieve their chosen goals and be happy without 
normal species functioning.88 However, not all of life’s important goals are undermined 
by ill health or disability. Moreover, it is possible to adapt one’s goals in accordance with 
health issues and thus achieve happiness still.89 While Daniels admits it is plausible that 
meeting key needs that contribute to normal functioning indeed has “a definite tendency 
to promote happiness,”90 he proposes an alternative account that he believes better 
explains the broad agreement on meeting those needs that are essential to normal 
species functioning, but does not depend on any empirical claims about the relationship 
between happiness and normal functioning.91 The alternative account hinges on the idea 
                                                          
83 Daniels, Just Health Care, 25. 
84 Daniels, Just Health, 34. 
85 Daniels, Just Health, 34. 
86 They are also called “course-of-life needs” (David Baybrooke) because humans have 
them throughout their lives or at certain stages of their lives everyone must go through 
(e.g., food, shelter, clothing, rest, companionship). (Daniels, Just Health Care, 26.)  
87 Daniels, Just Health, 34. 
88 Daniels, Just Health, 34-35. 
89 Daniels, Just Health Care, 27. 
90 Daniels, Just Health, 35. 
91 Daniels, Just Health, 35. 
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that any impairment of normal species functioning reduces the normal range of 
opportunities open to the person in pursuing their “plans of life” or “conceptions of the 
good” (Rawls).92  
 In order to clarify the relationship between the above account of needs and health 
needs in particular, the notion “health” needs further specification.93 Daniels starts from 
the basic, albeit somewhat misleading notion that “health is the absence of disease,” 
which fits with the controversial biomedical conception of health.94 This negative 
definition is deceptive, because the concept of disease is too narrow to provide an 
adequate contrast to health. Instead Daniels, following Christopher Boorse, characterizes 
health as the “absence of pathology,”95 where pathology must be understood as a 
departure from normal functioning.96 In other words, health is normal species functioning 
and health needs are things needed to maintain said functioning over the course of a 
human life. As such, health needs are objectively ascribable, because for most cases it is 
possible to rely on biomedical science to characterize pathology and on epidemiology to 
clarify normal functioning. Moreover, health needs are objectively important, because 
aforementioned sciences ensure considerable agreement on where to draw the line 
between normal function and pathology.97 Daniels discusses several objections against 
                                                          
92 Daniels, Just Health, 35-36. 
93 Within the development of his theory of justice for health care, Daniels’s account of 
health has undergone the greatest evolution from Just Health Care (1985) to Just Health 
(2008).  
94 Daniels, Just Health, 35. 
95 Daniels, Just Health, 37. 
96 I return to Boorse’s controversial definition of health in the next section (see 4.3.2.2.2 
Justifying the Special Moral Importance of Health Care). 
97 Daniels, Just Health, 37, 42. 
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his approach, but their discussion would not add much to the current argument, so I omit 
them.98,99 In general, the distinction between normal functioning and pathology holds, 
even allowing and accounting for the criticisms of Daniels’s argument.100 The result is a 
list of health needs, which “are those things we need in order to maintain, restore, or 
provide functional equivalents (where possible) to normal species functioning (for the 
appropriate reference class by gender and age).”101 Health needs are a diverse set: (1) 
“adequate nutrition,” (2) “sanitary, safe, unpolluted living and working conditions,” (3) 
“exercise, rest, and such important lifestyle features as avoiding substance abuse and 
practicing safe sex,” (4) “preventive, curative, rehabilitative, and compensatory personal 
medical services (and devices),” (5) “nonmedical personal and social support services,” 
and (6) “an appropriate distribution of other social determinants of health.”102,103 The list 
includes things that are not commonly thought of as health needs, but Daniels argues it 
is designed to broaden thinking about health care beyond personal medical services, by 
highlighting the relationship between health and the “many goods, services, and 
institutions that bear on health and its distribution.”104,105 As a side note, by broadening 
                                                          
98 Daniels, Just Health Care, 29-32. 
99 Daniels, Just Health, 37-42. 
100 Daniels, Just Health, 42. 
101 Daniels, Just Health, 42. 
102 Daniels, Just Health, 42-43. 
103 Daniels identifies the first five as health care needs in Just Health Care (1985) and he 
adds the sixth category of “socially controllable factors affecting health” in Just Health 
(2008) to broaden his account to all health needs. (Daniels, Just Health, 42.) 
104 Daniels, Just Health, 43. 
105 While Daniels does not here assign any primacy to institutions, they are responsible 
for allocating health (care) goods and services. Of course, based on Daniels’s remarks 
about institutional design, especially early on in Just Health Care (1985), it is safe to 
assume he does attribute special importance to institutions to meet health needs. 
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health needs as much as he does, Daniels opens himself up to the criticism that just about 
anything can be conceived as a health need, from organic food over a Harvard education 
to Peloton exercise bikes. 
That leaves the question, “What is so important about normal species 
functioning?”106 In other words, why give such moral importance to health needs simply 
because they preserve normal species functioning?107 Daniels answers the question by 
developing the relationship between normal functioning and opportunity, for now under 
the assumption that protecting opportunity matters, as the argument that opportunity 
ought to be protected is to follow (see 4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the Special Moral Importance 
of Health Care). Daniels defines “normal opportunity range” as the “array of life plans 
reasonable persons are likely to develop for themselves”108 within a given society, which 
implies the concept is socially relative.109,110 As such, facts about social organization, 
among others, the conception of justice designed into a society’s institutions, determine 
how the normal opportunity range is distributed among the population.111 Leaving aside 
the issue of societal distribution, normal functioning “offers a clear parameter affecting 
the share of the normal range open to a given individual.”112 The distribution of health 
care and the meeting of other health needs affects precisely this parameter. Thus, the 
                                                          
106 Daniels, Just Health, 43. 
107 Daniels, Just Health, 43. 
108 Daniels, Just Health, 43. 
109 Daniels, Just Health, 43-44.  
110 Daniels’s socially relative definition of the normal opportunity range is interesting, 
because it seems to allow for pluralism. However, the pluralism applies to the normal 
opportunity range and not to the theory of justice and its principles. 
111 Daniels, Just Health, 44. 
112 Daniels, Just Health, 44. 
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special importance attributed to meeting health needs can be explained by the 
significance attached to protecting people’s normal range of opportunity against 
departures from normal functioning.113 Daniels points out it is illuminating to contrast the 
way in which social practice protects opportunity in case of pathology but not in case of 
variations in talents and skills.114,115 Any impairment from normal functioning due to 
significant pathology (e.g., disease, injury, disability) limits people’s opportunity relative 
to the normal range that would have been available to them were they healthy.116 “If 
individuals’ fair shares of the normal range are the life plans they may reasonably choose 
[…] then disease and disability shrink their shares from what is fair.”117 Of course, some 
pathologies have a more severe impact on the opportunity range than others (e.g., flu, 
cancer, broken leg, blindness). Moreover, given the normal opportunity range is socially 
relative, the same illness may influence opportunity differently in two societies (e.g., 
dyslexia in a highly literate society compared to a generally illiterate society).118 
To summarize Daniels’s argument thus far: (1) Health care and health must cannot 
only be thought of in terms of preferences, but must also be thought of in terms of needs. 
(2) Health needs are special because they ensure normal species functioning. (3) In turn, 
                                                          
113 Daniels, Just Health, 44. 
114 Daniels discusses the difference between protecting the normal opportunity range 
against ill health and protecting it against variations in talents and skills in more detail. 
(Daniels, Just Health Care, 33-34; Daniels, Just Health, 44-45.) 
115 Increasingly, societies do try to correct for differences in talents and skills if those 
variations are the consequence of social conditions (e.g., socioeconomic background, 
institutionalized racism). However, such interventions are more controversial than 
protecting opportunity against ill health. 
116 Daniels, Just Health, 44-45. 
117 Daniels, Just Health, 45. 
118 Daniels, Just Health, 45. 
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normal functioning allows people to pursue their life plans by providing them with a 
normal range of opportunities. However, merely explaining the special moral importance 
ascribed to meeting health needs does not amount to a justification of existing moral 
beliefs and practices in health care. Daniels’s search for justification, relying on Rawls’s 
theory of justice as fairness, is the topic of the next section (see 4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the 
Special Moral Importance of Health Care). 
Daniels’s explanation of the special moral importance of health seems to apply to 
at least some commons institutions,119 namely those governing resources that meet 
needs required for normal species functioning. When these needs are not met, members 
of the commons experience a reduction in the range of opportunities open to them in 
pursuing their life goals. As I mentioned before, many natural resource commons as well 
as artificial commons seem to be of special moral importance, as they satisfy needs that 
are prerequisites for normal functioning, i.e., they ensure a normal range of opportunities 
is open to their users, whether locally (e.g., forests, irrigation systems,120 urban commons) 
or globally (e.g., oceans, climate, knowledge commons).121 Much like Daniels explores the 
notion of health in order to elucidate the relationship between health needs and needs 
of special moral importance, a full account of the special moral importance of a given 
commons would likely require a discussion of the particular CPR and the need that is being 
                                                          
119 Again, Rawls’s theory of justice may apply to certain commons without having to 
extend the theory in the way Daniels does for health care (see footnote 35). 
120 The Spanish huertas (see 2.4 A Common Scenario) are a good example. 
121 In the case of many natural resource commons in particular it is easy to see how they 
fulfill course-of-life needs (see footnote 86), often centering on resources that (in)directly 
provide nutrition to the commoners.  
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fulfilled. However, at least some commons can be included in Daniels’s health needs 
broadly conceived, since they are necessary to “maintain, restore, or provide […] normal 
species functioning.”122 Many natural resource commons fulfill a need for adequate 
nutrition (e.g., fisheries, irrigation systems), the first health need identified by Daniels. 
Global natural commons, like oceans and the climate, plausibly fit with the need for 
“sanitary, safe, unpolluted living and working conditions”123 broadly conceived. The same 
need is fulfilled by at least some urban commons, which can also play a role in providing 
“nonmedical personal and social support services.”124 Of course, Daniels’s inclusion of “an 
appropriate distribution of other social determinants of health”125 opens up possibilities 
to include other commons.126 Knowledge, for example, can be conceived as a key social 
determinant of health,127 which can be used to explain the special moral importance of 
knowledge commons, at least for knowledge pertaining to medicine and health care.128,129 
Alternatively, it may be possible to formulate a more general argument for the special 
                                                          
122 Daniels, Just Health, 42. 
123 Daniels, Just Health, 42. 
124 Daniels, Just Health, 43. 
125 Daniels, Just Health, 43. 
126 Daniels’s inclusion of “other social determinants of health” in the list of health needs 
broadens our thinking about health care, but also seems to broaden the concept of health 
needs to the extent that too many things become needs of special moral importance, at 
a minimum requiring some sort of scale and/or process to determine the relative 
importance of different health needs. 
127 (Access to) epidemiological knowledge, for example, correlates with other 
socioeconomic determinants of health.   
128 The claim is supported by the push for open-access in the publication of medical 
research.   
129 Daniels sees Rawls’s argument for the importance of public education to ensure fair 
equality of opportunity as supporting his move to broaden the principle to health care. 
(Daniels, Just Health, 52-53, 60-61.) Public education can be thought of as the open-access 
distribution of knowledge. 
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moral importance of the commons, for example, based on the type of resource (CPR) or 
the institutional features. I briefly explore one such suggestion. By now, it should be clear 
that developing and maintaining commons institutions takes much time and effort on 
behalf of resource users. As Ostrom points out, until recently the prevailing sentiment 
was that an “orderer” (Leviathan) is needed to introduce social order (see 0.3 A Third 
Way: The Commons), precisely because so much time and energy are needed to develop 
and maintain institutions.130 Now the idea is that groups are only able to overcome the 
cost of institution building in those cases where the resource is of special (moral) 
importance to them, for otherwise they would not have invested the time and effort it 
takes to develop a cooperative governance scheme. On such an account, it is no 
coincidence that so many examples of the commons seem to be of special moral 
importance, because it requires a resource of special significance for resource users to 
bootstrap themselves into a commons institution in the first place.  
4.3.2.2.2 JUSTIFYING THE SPECIAL MORAL IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH CARE 
Until now, Daniels’s argument has focused on “describing and explaining certain features 
of our moral practice, not actually justifying that practice.”131 In other words, Daniels has 
yet to provide an argument to justify the use of an objective, truncated scale of well-being 
rather than a more complete measure of satisfaction.132 In addition, he has to show why 
                                                          
130 Of course, Ostrom is not the first to appreciate the possibility of meso-level 
institutional arrangements arising at the middle-level. Indeed, some of the proponents of 
pluralist liberalism already recognize the possibility of social order arising without the 
necessity for a Leviathan (see 3.4 Pluralism and Freedom in Health Care). 
131 Daniels, Just Health Care, 36. 
132 Daniels, Just Health Care, 36. 
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people’s fair shares of the normal opportunity range should be protected. Daniels 
provides such an argument by extending Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness so it can 
address health care issues.133 Daniels notes such an extension is nontrivial, as Rawls’s 
theory makes abstraction of variations among people (e.g., disease, disability), instead 
assuming they are idealized social contractors “who are fully functional over a normal 
lifespan.”134 Daniels strategy is to relax this simplification, thus increasing both the power 
of Rawls’s theory and its plausibility. That being said, Daniels does not argue for the 
overall acceptability of Rawls’s theory. Instead, he argues that if Rawls’s general theory 
of justice is correct, then it provides one plausible justification for using an objective scale 
of well-being that includes health needs and for the obligation to protect opportunity.135  
 While Daniels’s extension of Rawls’s theory increases its power and plausibility, 
thus making this prominent general theory of justice more practicable, both the original 
theory and its extension must nonetheless be situated at the theoretical macro-level (see 
4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). Consequently, the philosophical arguments that are to 
follow are far removed from the commons, both in theory and in practice. While detailed 
and at times abstruse, the arguments are still of interest to commons researchers, as they 
provide a possible route to a theory of justice for the commons, among others, grounding 
and providing content to justice as a criterion of institutional performance (see 4.3.2.1 A 
Theory of Justice for the Commons?). To use Ostrom’s vocabulary of levels of analysis, the 
                                                          
133 Daniels, Just Health, 46-47. 
134 Daniels, Just Health, 47. 
135 Daniels, Just Health, 47. 
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work Daniels does upstream potentially has important implications downstream for the 
commons and commons research.136 
 Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness settles upon two principles of justice:137 (1) 
“Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”138 (2) “Social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged […] and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity."139 The second principle can be conceived as two separate 
principles, called the “difference principle” and the “equal opportunity principle” 
respectively. Daniels’s adaptation of Rawls’s theory in order to make it applicable to 
health care centers upon the second principle. The extension of justice as fairness hinges 
on integrating Daniels’s account of health needs, and their relationship to opportunity, 
with Rawls’s index of primary social goods. The index of primary social goods is a key 
feature of Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. Rawls uses the index to determine “who 
is better and who is worse off for purposes of justice.”140 For the integration to be 
successful, the concept of opportunity will need to be modified.141 
                                                          
136 Daniels provides a similar apology and justification for taking his readers “[…] deep into 
the general theory of justice and beyond our focus on just health care.” (Daniels, Just 
Health Care, 36.) 
137 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on John Rawls provides a good 
introduction to, and overview of, Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. (Leif Wenar, “John 
Rawls,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), accessed June 8, 
2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls/.) 
138 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 266. 
139 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 266. 
140 Daniels, Just Health, 47. 
141 Daniels, Just Health, 47. 
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Daniels begins by explaining Rawls’s use of primary social goods, because it 
provides the justification for using an objective, truncated scale of well-being. As the 
second principle of justice highlights, Rawls is committed to give priority to improving the 
lives of those who are worst off. Within his theory, this has two parts: First, the social 
contractors choosing principles of justice in the so-called “original position,” behind the 
famous “veil of ignorance,” must think about what principles “make their lifetime 
prospects acceptable, regardless of their social position.”142 Second, the principles the 
contractors pick require them to know who are worst off and how the structure of society 
can work in order to make them as well off as possible.143 Both decisions require a basis 
for judging inequalities. In A Theory of Justice (1971), and again in later works, Rawls 
formulates arguments against using so-called “welfarist accounts of well-being” to judge 
inequalities, which figure prominently in utilitarian theory.144 Welfarist accounts are 
concerned with experiential states, like the satisfaction of preferences, making them 
subjective measures of well-being. Rather than focusing on Rawls’s criticisms of welfarist 
accounts, Daniels discusses Rawls’s defense of an objective, nonwelfarist approach.145 
Rawls bases his account on “what he takes to be a shared conception of rationality”146 
and certain “uncontroversial appeals to psychology and beliefs about human nature.”147 
                                                          
142 Daniels, Just Health, 48. 
143 Daniels, Just Health, 48. 
144 A well-known argument against welfarist accounts of well-being is the possibility of 
“social hijacking” by persons who cultivate expensive tastes, an objection that figures 
prominently in Just Health Care (1985). (Daniels, Just Health Care, 35-39.) 
145 Daniels, Just Health, 47-48. 
146 Daniels, Just Health, 49. 
147 Daniels, Just Health, 49. 
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The result is an index of primary social goods, which are “things it is rational to want 
whatever else one wants.”148 Rawls identifies the following types of primary social goods: 
“a set of basic liberties,” “freedom of movement and choice of occupations against a 
background of diverse opportunities,” “powers and prerogatives of office,” “income and 
wealth,” and “the social bases for self-respect.”149 To simplify matters, Rawls proposes to 
use income and wealth as a proxy for the index as a whole.150 The objectivity of the 
primary goods and of the index as a whole relies on a relatively uncontroversial account 
of rationality that does not depend on controversial preferences and values that shape 
persons’ conceptions of the good life.151 In his later work, Rawls strengthens his case for 
the index of primary social goods by discussing the role the goods play in rational plans of 
life.152 Persons have two basic moral powers: a sense of justice, meaning “they seek terms 
of fair cooperation to resolve conflicting claims,”153 and the choice to form and revise 
their conception of a good life, meaning they determine their own ends in life.154,155 This 
                                                          
148 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 223. 
149 Daniels, Just Health Care, 43. 
150 Daniels, Just Health Care, 43. 
151 Daniels, Just Health, 49-50. 
152 Daniels, Just Health, 50. 
153 Daniels, Just Health, 50. 
154 Daniels, Just Health, 50. 
155 I find it interesting to assess Rawls’s theoretical claims in light of Ostrom’s empirical 
work. (1) While Ostrom emphasizes that humans are not merely rational and self-
interested maximizers, her research heeds against dismissing strategic behavior 
altogether. In other words, her work provides support for Rawls’s claim that people seek 
fair cooperation to resolve conflicting claims, but simultaneously cautions against being 
overly optimistic about people’s inherent sense of justice. (2) Rawls’s emphasis on 
people’s power to choose and revise their plans of life conceives of people as free and 
equal individuals, which fits with the modern turn to the individual that permeates 
(political) philosophy, but also the humanities and social sciences, including economics 
(e.g., modeling humans as self-interested, rational maximizers). Commons research 
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political conception of persons as free and equal citizens is a shared feature of democratic 
culture and provides the basis for construing their needs in terms of an objective index of 
primary social goods. Primary goods “are what free and equal persons […] need as 
citizens,”156 as they support their capabilities to function as such (i.e., as free and equal 
citizens).157,158 To sum up, while Rawls’s justification for using primary social goods 
evolves over the years, throughout his work he remains committed to providing an 
objective basis to determine who has better and who has worse lifetime prospects. From 
the perspective of justice, a welfarist account of well-being is irrelevant.159 It is worth 
noting that the stark contrast between a needs-based account and a welfarist account 
can be resolved by situating allocation decisions at the institutional meso-level, making 
the decisions relative vis-à-vis a particular deliberative community and/or institution. The 
                                                          
emphasizes persons, and their life plans, as embedded in communities, which conceivably 
play a role in determining people’s conception of the good life, but also in shaping their 
sense of justice. In Rawls’s work, as in other modern and contemporary theories of justice, 
there exists a tension between the goal of developing a just society out of rational monads 
on the one hand, and the presence of a society of people that is made up out of existing 
communities on the other hand. The tension can in part be explained by the dominance 
of the rationalist liberal tradition vis-à-vis the pluralist liberal tradition (see 3.4 Pluralism 
and the Freedom of Health Care).  
156 Daniels cites Rawls’s Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). (John Rawls, Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 60.) 
157 Daniels, Just Health, 50. 
158 Rawls argues that people who hold very different conceptions of the good life 
stemming from differences in moral or religious worldviews nonetheless can agree on this 
political conception of the good, which can thus serve as the basis for comparing people 
for purposes of justice. (Daniels, Just Health, 50-51.) I think Rawls is too optimistic about 
the supposed consensus regarding his political conception of the good. He plausibly 
underestimates the robustness of certain worldviews and their incommensurability with 
modern political philosophy. Rawls happily endorses pluralism, but at the same time fails 
to acknowledge and allow for a more radical pluralism, which would undermine his 
theory. 
159 Daniels, Just Health, 47-48. 
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reason Daniels, following Rawls, opts for a needs-based account, and rejects a welfarist 
account, is that he wants an independent criterion for determining who is better and 
worse off to inform resource allocation decisions.160 This is also the reason Daniels relies 
on Boorse’s controversial definition of health as absence as pathology, because it 
provides a “scientific”161 and objective basis for his needs-based approach.162 Situating 
resource governance decisions at the meso-level, thus making them dependent on a 
particular institutional context, can protect Daniels’ account against certain criticisms, for 
example, by making Boorse’s definition of health relative to a particular community (e.g., 
reference values for his biostatistical theory of health become context dependent).163 In 
fact, situating allocation decisions at the institutional meso-level may provide Daniels 
with a path to abandon Boorse’s controversial definition altogether, and instead adopt a 
                                                          
160 The choice to reject welfarist accounts is not merely a pragmatic one, particularly for 
Rawls. Welfarist accounts are closely tied to utilitarianism, which Rawls sees as his 
principal opponent. In the first edition of A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls writes that one 
of the work’s main goals is to provide a “workable and systematic moral conception to 
oppose” utilitarianism. (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, xvii.)  
161 Biologists have rejected Boorse’s view because of the enormous genetic variation 
within species and population. Moreover, physiological functions change with the 
environment, meaning reference values are context-dependent (e.g., blood cell counts 
vary with altitude, metabolic rates change with temperature). (Wim J. van der Steen and 
P.J. Thung, Faces of Medicine: A Philosophical Study (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1988), 90.) Lennart Nordenfelt points out that on Boorse’s account infections 
cannot be seen as diseases, because they are the normal reaction to pathogens entering 
the body. (Lennart Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health: An Action-Theoretic Approach 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987), 30-31.) 
162 Boorse’s argument for defining health as “absence of pathology,” meaning a departure 
from normal functioning, is considered problematic by many except for some analytic 
philosophers and someone like Daniels, who adopts Boorse’s definition because it fits his 
overall project. Boorse provides a comprehensive overview of the most important 
criticisms of his “biostatistical theory of health,” and a defense thereof, in the lengthy A 
Rebuttal on Health (1997) and again in A Second Rebuttal on Health (2014). 
163 See footnote 161. 
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welfarist account, as some such accounts provide sufficient objectivity to inform decision-
making at the middle-level.164 Vice versa, and more plausibly, welfarists can adopt 
Daniels’s theory of justice for health care. To give a concrete example, Lennart Nordenfelt 
defines health as the ability to achieve vital goals, which can be considered relative to 
“standard circumstances,” among others, one’s community.165 Nordenfelt’s account can 
provide a stable basis for making resource allocation decisions within an institution. 
Interestingly, Sridhar Venkatapuram has criticized Nordenfelt precisely for making vital 
goals “relative to each community or context.”166 As such, “Nordenfelt's conception of 
health faces problems with both socially relative concepts of health and subjectively 
defined wellbeing.”167,168 This inspires Venkatapuram to develop his own welfarist 
approach based on Nordenfelt’s vital goals account combined with Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum’s well-known capabilities approach.169 Venkatapuram’s criticism of Nordenfelt 
highlights the tension between the theoretical search for an objective account of health 
                                                          
164 Whether or not Daniels is willing to go this route depends in part on his philosophical 
commitment to Rawls, which may lead Daniels to reject welfarist accounts on principle. 
165 Nordenfelt defines health as follows: “A is in health if, and only if, A has the ability, 
given standard circumstances, to realize his vital goals, i.e. the set of goals which are 
necessary and together sufficient for his minimal happiness.” (Emphasis mine.) 
(Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health, 97.)  
166 Sridhar Venkatapuram, “Health, Vital Goals, and Central Human Capabilities,” 
Bioethics 27, no. 5 (June 2013): 272. 
167 Venkatapuram, “Health, Vital Goals, and Central Human Capabilities,” 272. 
168 In response, Nordenfelt has denied that the contents of vital goals are community- or 
context-dependent. (Lennart Nordenfelt, “Standard Circumstances and Vital Goals: 
Comments on Venkatapuram's Critique,” Bioethics 27, no. 5 (June 2013): 280.) 
Nordenfelt’s response shows his project is close to both Boorse’s in that they both seek 
to provide a coherent account of health related concepts within health care and everyday 
language. 
169 Venkatapuram, “Health, Vital Goals, and Central Human Capabilities.” 
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and the institutional practice of making resource allocation decisions. While the former 
can inform the latter, the question is whether the sort of objectivity pursued by Boorse 
and Venkatapuram-type welfarists is workable,170 or even desirable, when making real-
world resource allocation decisions, which inevitably are going to be context-dependent. 
Situating the governance of health care resources at the meso-level of health care 
institutions allows organizations to operationalize the different approaches to health 
(e.g., Boorse, Nordenfelt, Venkatapuram) in order to guide allocation decisions at a level 
of analysis where the tensions between the approaches dissipates, and they will plausibly 
result in the same resource allocation decisions being made in practice. To have Ostrom 
weigh in on the issue, the desire to have one objective account of health guide resource 
allocation decisions across the board is a worthwhile pursuit, but the bioethical 
equivalent of blueprint thinking (see 2.2 The Ostrom Approach). Of course, this does not 
mean the objective accounts are meaningless or negligible. On the contrary, the original, 
non-institutional approaches with their strong claims of objectivity remain important at a 
higher-level of analysis. Not only can they inform context-dependent, meso-level 
decision-making; but they can also conceivably play a role in upstream conflict-resolution 
mechanisms (see 2.2.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms). I briefly discussed a key issue in 
Daniels’s theory of justice for health care and suggested that making resource allocation 
decisions at the meso-level of health care institutions may be able to solve the problem. 
                                                          
170 Given Nordenfelt’s denial that vital goals are context-dependent, his approach also 
belongs with the Venkatapuram-type welfarist approaches.  
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A more thorough discussion, which must draw on a large body of background literature, 
is a promising avenue for future research. 
 Before integrating his account of health needs with Rawls’s primary social goods, 
Daniels elaborates on Rawls’s concept of opportunity and his justification of the equal 
opportunity principle. “The concept of equal opportunity is meant to ensure that the 
terms of competition are fair,”171 that society overall attains procedural justice, which 
assures outcomes are fair, even if they are unequal.172 As such, equality of opportunity 
functions as a constraint on procedural justice. “If the basic structure of society works to 
the advantage of all and in a way that is open to all, then the distributions of goods and 
the resulting life prospects for individuals will be the outcome of a fair process.”173 Rawls’s 
goal is for the “basic structure of society”174 to work to everyone’s advantage and be open 
to everyone. Daniels emphasizes the importance of seeing that Rawls invokes equal 
opportunity within a procedural rather than an allocative account of justice. The 
principles of justice as fairness apply to society’s basic structure, “constraining its design 
and how it works as a process that distributes goods independently of needs.”175 It is 
worth noting that Rawls is keenly aware that his development of a theory of justice is 
simultaneously an exercise in institutional design (see 4.7 Conclusion).176 Throughout A 
                                                          
171 Daniels, Just Health, 51. 
172 Daniels, Just Health, 51. 
173 Daniels, Just Health, 51. 
174 Daniels, Just Health, 51. 
175 Daniels, Just Health, 51. 
176 Rawls uses a nontrivial and narrowly defined notion of institution: “Now by an 
institution I shall understand a public system of rules which defines offices and positions 
with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify 
certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain 
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Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls talks about designing “institutions,”177 “rules,”178 “social 
arrangements,”179 “systems,”180 “social systems,”181 and “organizations.”182,183 Daniels 
stresses the relationship between Rawls’s theory of justice and institutions more heavily 
in Just Health Care (1985) than in Just Health (2008), which fits with the overall de-
emphasis of institutions in the later work (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). Rawls 
calls for fair rather than formal equality of opportunity, the former requiring stronger 
measures to mitigate the impact of inequalities than the latter.184 He combines the fair 
equality of opportunity principle with the difference principle and names the combination 
“democratic equality,” as it ensures access to jobs and offices is open to all and allowable 
differences between citizens work to everyone’s advantage.185 Rawls argues fair equality 
of opportunity and the difference principle together correct for the moral arbitrariness of 
                                                          
penalties and defenses, and so on, when violations occur. As examples of institutions, or 
more generally social practices, we may think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments, 
markets and systems of property. An institution may be thought of in two ways: first as 
an abstract object, that is, as a possible form of conduct expressed by a system of rules; 
and second, as the realization in the thought and conduct of certain persons at a certain 
time and place of the actions specified by these rules.” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 47-48.) 
Rawls discusses institutions and their relationship to justice in detail. (Ibid., 47-52.)   
177 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 77, 188, 229, 377. 
178 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 49, 75, 314. 
179 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 49. 
180 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 149. 
181 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 74, 243, 247.  
182 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 53. 
183 In addition, Rawls talks about designing the “basic structure of society,” “societies,” 
“social order,” “legal order,” “policies,” “laws,” and “a system for the constitutional 
powers of government and the basic rights of citizens.” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 28, 32, 
49, 56, 89, 131, 146-147, 155, 157, 172, 258, 327.) 
184 Daniels, Just Health, 52. 
185 Daniels, Just Health, 53. 
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social contingencies (“social lottery”186), such as birth in one family rather than 
another.187 Moreover, there is a “natural lottery” for talents and skills, like diligence and 
determination, which shapes people’s prospects in life that must also be mitigated, at 
least in part.188,189 Even with mitigation, the winners of the social and natural lottery are 
likely going to be among the best off, while the losers are likely going to be among the 
worst off.190 Nevertheless, the combined force of the equality of opportunity and 
difference principles produces a strong “tendency to equality.”191,192 Of course, the 
question remains whether Rawls’s arguments carry over to the protection of normal 
functioning, i.e., to health and health care?193 
 As a reminder, Rawls relies on an objective index of primary social goods to 
determine who is better and who is worse off for the purposes of justice, but he assumes 
people are fully functional over a normal lifespan, thus ignoring variations in health 
between people.194,195 How can Daniels’s health (care) needs be integrated with Rawls’s 
                                                          
186 Daniels, Just Health, 53. 
187 Daniels, Just Health, 53-54. 
188 Daniels, Just Health, 53-55. 
189 Rawls’s difference principle treats the distribution of talents and skills as a common 
asset, meaning “the benefits people gain from exercising their talents are determined by 
rules that distribution of talents work to everyone’s advantage, with priority to those who 
are worst off.” (Daniels, Just Health, 54.) In other words, he seems to treat human capital 
broadly conceived as a common-pool resource. 
190 Daniels, Just Health, 54. 
191 Daniels, Just Health, 55. 
192 Daniels cites Rawls’s section titled “The Tendency to Equality.” (Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice, 86-93.) 
193 Daniels, Just Health, 56. 
194 Daniels, Just Health, 56. 
195 Both Arrow and Sen point out the index is problematic in light of real-world variations 
in health status. (Daniels, Just Health, 56.) 
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index of primary social goods? One possibility is to add an entry, i.e., health (care), to the 
index. However, such a strategy risks generating a long list of primary goods, thus 
weakening the shared political conception of the needs of citizens.196 Moreover, adding 
items to the index makes it difficult to avoid the problems of interpersonal comparison 
faced by broader measures of satisfaction, i.e., welfarist accounts, which is precisely what 
Rawls wants to avoid.197 Daniels suggests a more plausible and altogether simpler 
approach to integrate health needs with the index of primary social goods, namely 
broadening the notion of fair equality of opportunity. Since meeting health (care) needs 
has an important impact on the distribution of opportunity, health care institutions 
should be governed by “a fair equality of opportunity principle.”198 The proposal ensures 
the primary social goods remain general and abstract properties of social arrangements 
(e.g., liberties, opportunities, income and wealth). The special importance of health (care) 
needs stems from their role in providing equal opportunity, which is the relevant primary 
social good. Rawls’s argument to guarantee equality of opportunity in light of the social 
and natural lotteries also applies to health:199 the impact of the morally arbitrary “health 
lottery” on opportunity ought to be mitigated.200 Therefore, resources must be used to 
                                                          
196 Daniels, Just Health, 56. 
197 Daniels, Just Health, 56-57. 
198 Daniels, Just Health, 57. 
199 Daniels, Just Health, 58. 
200 Daniels does not use the term “health lottery,” but the idea fits with his overarching 
argument. The health lottery is part social, part natural (e.g. genetic), and part a game of 
chance of its own (e.g., the role luck plays in getting cancer or into a car accident). While 
Daniels does not explicitly discuss the latter, he briefly touches upon the interplay 
between pathology and the social and natural lotteries. (Daniels, Just Health, 58.) 
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meet health (care) needs and counter the disadvantages induced by pathology.201 As 
Daniels notes, the expansion of the scope of fair equality of opportunity to include health 
does not imply a commitment to eliminating all health differences between persons. 
“Meeting health needs has the goal of promoting normal functioning: It concentrates on 
a specific class of obvious disadvantages and tries to eliminate them.”202 In other words, 
it is not necessary to correct all differences in functioning between people, but only to 
keep people functioning normally and ensure them the range of opportunity they would 
have in the absence of pathology.203 Daniels goes on to consider several objections 
against broadening the notion of opportunity, but they need not be of concern here.204 
Daniels shows several key features of justice as fairness are preserved when the 
theory is extended to health: (1) Daniels’s extension of justice as fairness to health (care) 
elicits an interesting parallel to education, as both are critically important to ensuring fair 
equality of opportunity.205 This suggests that Rawls’s argument for public education as a 
means to ensure fair equality of opportunity can be broadened to include health (care),206 
as the justification for the former extends to the latter, thus preserving “a central line of 
argument in justice as fairness.”207 (2) Daniels identifies health needs at a level of 
abstraction that fits with Rawls’s theory. The theory of justice as fairness is grounded on 
                                                          
201 Daniels, Just Health, 58. 
202 Daniels, Just Health, 58. 
203 Daniels, Just Health, 58. 
204 Daniels, Just Health, 58-60. 
205 Daniels, Just Health, 60. 
206 Daniels, Just Health, 52-53. 
207 Daniels, Just Health, 61. 
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an account of persons as “essentially free and equal”208 moral agents, the underlying 
intuition being that persons are free to revise their life plans. Thus, persons have a vital 
interest in maintaining conditions that allow them to revise their plans over the course of 
their lives, which means health care should focus on maintaining normal functioning to 
allow for such revisions. Daniels concludes, “Protecting fair share of the normal 
opportunity range is the reference point compatible with Rawls’s view of persons as free 
and equal citizens.”209 (3) Integrating health needs in Rawls’s account of fair equality of 
opportunity fits with the original idealization grounding Rawls’s theory, i.e., the concern 
with persons “who are fully functional over a normal lifespan.”210 One can conceive of 
health policies and institutions as correcting for departures from Rawls’s idealized, fully 
functioning persons.211 
While Rawls’s early work does not take into consideration health problems, he 
later endorses the approach advocated by Daniels.212 Rawls writes, 
  
Provision for medical care, as with primary goods generally, is to meet the needs 
and requirements of citizens as free and equal. Such care falls under the general 
means necessary to underwrite fair equality of opportunity and our capacity to 
take advantage of our basic rights and liberties, and thus to be normal and fully 
cooperating members of society over a complete life.213,214 
 
                                                          
208 Daniels, Just Health, 61. 
209 Daniels, Just Health, 61-62. 
210 Daniels, Just Health, 47. 
211 Daniels, Just Health, 62. 
212 Daniels, Just Health, 62. 
213 Daniels, Just Health, 63. 




 What does Daniels’s normative argument mean for a theory of justice for the 
commons? I do not want to repeat the descriptive suggestions about the special moral 
importance of certain commons (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the Special Moral Importance of 
Health Care). However, the key move of Daniels’s argument can likely be replicated in the 
case of the commons and can be considered a defining feature of common-pool 
resources, regardless whether they are natural or artificial. Daniels broadens the notion 
of fair equality of opportunity to encompass health care, arguing that meeting health 
needs has an important impact on the distribution of opportunity, therefore resources 
must be used to counter the disadvantages induced by pathology, which results from the 
social, natural, and health lotteries. In the same way, many commons resources impact 
the distribution of opportunity, which is the relevant primary social good in Rawls’s 
theory. Moreover, the distribution of these resources is often the result of morally 
arbitrary natural and social lotteries. Two classic examples being farmers who are lucky 
to be upstream in the irrigation system, thus having an abundance of water, and anglers 
who are fortunate to fish the richest fishing grounds, thus having an abundance of fish.215 
Both examples plausibly fit with Daniels’s health needs, as these communities depend on 
                                                          
215 The examples are interesting, because real-world commons institutions designed to 
govern such resources often are concerned with ensuring access to the resource to all 
members of the commons, thus displaying a concern with justice (and ensuring equality 
of opportunity). This concern is reflected in the design of the institutions, which have rules 
to mitigate the unfair distribution of resources, among others, an obligation for irrigators 
upstream to first let water flow downstream and strictly enforced rotation systems for 
fishing grounds (see also 2.4 A Common Scenario). (Elinor Ostrom, Understanding 
Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 303.) While the 
commons literature discusses these arrangements extensively, they are not considered in 
terms of justice.  
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water and fish for adequate nutrition (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the Special Moral 
Importance of Health Care).  
4.4 A4R IN PRACTICE 
The argument now changes pace, moving from Daniels’s general theory of justice for the 
commons to the accountability for reasonableness (A4R) approach, which he develops in 
collaboration with Sabin. I investigate the relationship between Daniels and Sabin’s four 
principles of A4R and Ostrom’s eight design principles of successful commons institutions, 
suggesting Ostrom’s principles can provide guidance when putting A4R into practice, i.e., 
when designing just health care institutions. While Ostrom’s design principles are based 
on the research of commons institutions, they can be adopted by other institutional 
arrangements (i.e., state, market, and hybrid institutions). The proposed fit between A4R 
and the design principles makes it especially attractive for institutional designers to do so 
when moving toward more just health care institutions. After introducing the A4R 
approach, I discuss some preliminaries, then explore the congruence between A4R and 
Ostrom’s design principles, and finally discuss the principles from A4R in tandem with the 
design principles for successful commons. 
4.4.1 ACCOUNTABILITY FOR REASONABLENESS (A4R)  
While Daniels’s theory or justice for health care provides some “general guidance in the 
design of systems that meet health needs,”216 it does not explain how to meet health 
(care) needs fairly when they cannot all be met.217 The theory of justice operates at the 
                                                          
216 Daniels, Just Health, 103. 
217 Daniels, Just Health, 103. 
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theoretical macro-level, making it “too general and too indeterminate”218 to be of much 
practical use when making decisions about the fair governance of health care resources. 
Daniels points out the issue of the fair allocation of health care resources cannot be 
avoided, as it arises in all health care systems.219 This then leads him to ask: “Under what 
conditions do decision-makers have the moral authority to set the limits they impose?”220 
To solve the so-called “legitimacy problem,”221 the theory of justice for health care, and 
its general principles of justice, must be supplemented with a fair process to setting limits 
in such a way that decision makers are held “accountable for the reasonableness of the 
limits they set”222 (see also 4.5.6 Solving the Legitimacy Problem). Daniels notes the fair 
process must be general enough to apply to different institutional arrangements and 
contexts,223 while the details must be worked out on a case-by-case basis.224 A remark I 
return to when discussing the fit between Daniels and Sabin’s approach on the one hand 
and Ostrom’s research on the other hand (see 4.4.3 Daniels and Ostrom: A Natural Fit?). 
Daniels and Sabin summarize their account as follows, 
 
Accountability for reasonableness is the idea that the reasons or rationales for 
important limit-setting decisions should be publicly available. In addition, these 
reasons must be ones that “fair-minded” people can agree are relevant to 
pursuing appropriate patient care under necessary resource constraints.225  
                                                          
218 Daniels, Just Health, 103. 
219 Daniels, Just Health, 103. 
220 Daniels, Just Health, 103. 
221 Daniels, Just Health, 103. 
222 Daniels, Just Health, 103. 
223 Daniels talks about “public, private, and mixed organizational forms.” (Daniels, Just 
Health, 104.) 
224 Daniels, Just Health, 103-104. 
225 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 44. 
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Within the scope of Daniels’s discussion of a theory of justice for health care in Just Health 
Care (1985), Daniels and Sabin’s approach raises the following question: Given the special 
moral importance of health care, why should limits be imposed to begin with?226 Daniels 
and Sabin discuss four reasons to set limits: (1) “health care competes with other 
goods,”227 (2) “the limits to resources are real,”228 (3) the existence of inefficiencies does 
not remove the need to set limits,229 and (4) the need to set limits does not disappear by 
pointing out the presence of profits in health care.230,231 The discussion of the tragedy of 
the health care commons complements Daniels and Sabin’s reasons for the need to set 
limits (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons).232 Vice versa, Daniels and Sabin’s 
reasons to set limits are applicable to many commons.233 Since setting limits is 
unavoidable, decisions have to be made about the allocation of resources. These 
decisions have two features in commons, “they all rest on value judgments about which 
reasonable people may disagree”234 and the ensuing controversies cannot be resolved by 
                                                          
226 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 18. 
227 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 18-19. 
228 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 19-20. 
229 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 20-21. 
230 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 21-22. 
231 Daniels summarizes these arguments in Just Health (2008). (Daniels, Just Health, 104-
105.) 
232 The tragedy of the health care commons can be conceived as a more intricate take on 
Daniels and Sabin’s second reason for setting limits, i.e. that resource limits are real (see 
4.4.3 Daniels and Ostrom: A Natural Fit?).  
233 Bioethicst Willard Gaylin, in an interview with Bill Moyers, argues that Americans have 
more difficulty coming to terms with limitations than Europeans because they were raised 
“in a tradition shaped by an open frontier,” whereas “Europeans are raised with 
boundaries.” (Bill Moyers, “Willard Gaylin: Ethics, Biology and Economics,” September 20, 
1988, https://billmoyers.com/content/willard-gaylin/.) As a result, the risk of a tragedy of 
the health care commons looms larger in the United States. 
234 Daniels, Just Health, 105. 
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general principles of justice, like the opportunity principle (see 4.3.2.2.2 Justifying the 
Special Moral Importance of Health Care).235 As there is no consensus on principles to 
resolve resource allocation problems in health care, a fair process must be found that 
leads to outcomes that are accepted as just or fair.236 This appeal to procedural justice 
supplements Rawls’s opportunity principle, addressing disputes about the governance of 
health care resources that are not resolved by the more general principle.237 Daniels and 
Sabin’s account of procedural justice (A4R) relies on four conditions to ensure fair 
process: (1) the “publicity condition,”238 (2) the “relevance condition,”239 (3) the “revisions 
and appeals condition,”240 and (4) the “regulative condition.”241 Before discussing the 
conditions in detail, and relating them to Ostrom’s design principles, I consider some 
preliminaries and explore some reasons A4R and Ostrom’s research are a good fit.   
4.4.2 A4R AS DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
I have already mentioned the four conditions of A4R can be conceived as institutional 
design principles (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). I argue this point in some more 
detail by exploring four preliminaries: the interpretation of the four conditions of A4R as 
                                                          
235 Daniels, Just Health, 105. 
236 While the argument for fair process seems self-evident, it raises the question how far 
this should go. Must all the resource-allocation rules throughout the entire health care 
system/organization be fair? Or is there room for accidental and arbitrary decisions? If 
the latter are allowed, then the question becomes whether there are additional criteria 
specifying these accidental and arbitrary decisions? If there are no such criteria, then this 
opens up room for more pluralistic accounts.  
237 Daniels, Just Health, 109-110. 
238 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45. 
239 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45. 
240 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45. 
241 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45. 
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design principles, the relative status of the four conditions of A4R vis-à-vis the other 
design principles, the relationship between A4R and Daniels’s theory of justice for health 
care, and the possibility of using A4R as principles for the design of procedurally just 
commons institutions. 
 First, while Daniels and Sabin discuss the four conditions of A4R in detail, they do 
relatively little in terms of explaining their status qua conditions, i.e., what does it mean 
for them to be “four conditions [to] make more precise the notion of accountability for 
reasonableness?”242,243 Daniels and Sabin present the conditions as “the central 
necessary elements”244 to solve the legitimacy and fairness problems by placing health 
care organizations in the role of “contributors to a broader deliberative process that they 
embrace.”245 While the explanation clarifies the role the conditions play in ensuring 
procedural justice, it does not explain how the conditions operate, or are to be 
operationalized. I argue the conditions must be interpreted as institutional design 
principles for promoting procedural justice. Such an interpretation is plausible not only 
from the perspective of NIE, but also appears justified based on Daniels and Sabin’s work.  
As a reminder, Ostrom characterizes the design principles as “an essential element or 
condition that helps account for the success of [enduring, self-governing] institutions in 
sustaining CPRs.”246 (Emphasis mine.) In addition, she describes the design principles as 
                                                          
242 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45. 
243 Daniels, Just Health, 118. 
244 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 46. 
245 Daniels, Just Health, 119. 




“a set of general principles that increase the performance of an institutional design”247 
(see 2.6 The Design Principles for Successful Commons Institutions). Much in the same 
way, the conditions of A4R can be thought of as features of just health care institutions 
and recommendations for their design, particularly when it comes to resource allocation 
decisions.248 Such an interpretation seems justified on the basis of Daniels and Sabin’s 
work for several reasons: (1) They state the goal of Setting Limits Fairly (2002) is “to show 
in a practical way how institutions can be shaped to make them more accountable for 
reasonableness,”249 describing their project as an exercise in institutional design. In Just 
Health (2008), Daniels explicitly links the conditions to institutions again, albeit without 
explicitly referencing institutional design. He writes,  
 
                                                          
247 Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” in The Commons 
in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptation, eds. Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 22. 
248 The argument disregards some of the conceptual unknowns surrounding design 
principles (e.g., the fact they were conceived as descriptive conditions rather than 
normative design principles), which I discuss in more detail in the second chapter (see 2.6 
The Design Principles for Successful Commons Institutions). Much like Ostrom’s design 
principles, which she calls “conditions,” Daniels and Sabin’s four conditions seem to be 
primarily descriptive in nature, as they go on to describe how the conditions are 
instantiated in a host of examples. Still, there are strong normative overtones, i.e., 
implementing the conditions results in just organizations. As with Ostrom’s design 
principles, A4R’s conditions have been interpreted and used as concrete 
recommendations for designing just health care organizations. To give an example, 
Mohammed Moosa and his colleagues have used A4R to improve fairness in accessing 
dialysis in South Africa. (Mohammed Rafique Moosa, Jonathan David Maree, Maxwell T. 
Chirehwa, and Solomon R. Benatar, “Use of the ‘Accountability for Reasonableness’ 
Approach to Improve Fairness in Accessing Dialysis in a Middle-Income Country,” PLoS 
ONE 11, no. 12 (October 2016), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0164201.) A more 
thorough analysis of the analogy between Ostrom’s design principles and the conditions 
of A4R is a promising avenue for future research. 
249 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 11. 
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Taken altogether, the four conditions bring decision making about meeting health 
needs out of a mysterious black bog […] and make it possible to assess health plan 
and public agency decisions in the light of wider societal view about fairness. The 
four conditions connect decisions at any institutional level to a broader educative 
and deliberative democratic process.250 (Emphasis mine.) 
 
Moreover, Daniels and Sabin’s framing of the conditions as a solution to the legitimacy 
and fairness problems makes it plausible to interpret them as design principles, as the 
conditions suggest rule changes with the aim of achieving better outcomes (i.e., more just 
health care organizations).251 (2) Describing the four conditions in terms of rules may 
seem like a cheap trick to move A4R closer to NIE, but in an interesting passage in Setting 
Limits Fairly (2002) immediately following the definition of the A4R approach, Daniels and 
Sabin compare the delivery of health care to a game with rules, like football, an analogy 
that is commonly used in NIE to describe institutions.252,253 The passage brings Daniels and 
Sabin’s work uncannily close to NIE, certainly when considered in combination with 
Daniels’s remarks from Just Health Care (1985), but nowhere are A4R’s conditions framed 
                                                          
250 Daniels, Just Health, 119. 
251 Daniels also describes the conditions as connecting internal decisions to broader public 
deliberation. (Daniels, Just Health, 119.) 
252 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 44. 
253 The full passage reads, “In the “game” of delivering health care, whether in public or 
private insurance schemes, fair-minded people will seek reasons (“rules”) they can accept 
as relevant to meeting consumers’ or citizens’ needs fairly under resource constraints. As 
in football, the rules shape a conception of the common good that is the goal of 
cooperation within plans, even when plans compete. In health care delivery, as in football, 
some will seek mere advantage by ignoring the rules, or by seeking rules that advantage 
only them, and there will be disagreement about how to apply the rules. Still, the fair-
minded search for mutually acceptable rules narrows the scope of disagreement and 
provides the grounds on which disputes can be adjudicated.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting 
Limits Fairly, 44-45.) A few sentences earlier, they talk about the choice fair-minded 
people have to either accept or change the rules of the game. (Ibid., 44.) 
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in terms of institutional design (see also 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). (3) While the 
conditions are not presented as institutional design principles, much of the remainder of 
both Setting Limits Fairly (2002) and Just Health (2008) reads like the field studies 
discussing Ostrom’s design principles in commons research, as Daniels and Sabin cite a 
host of cases that illustrate how the four conditions function. In other words, they discuss 
how the conditions of A4R are implemented in concrete health (care) organizations, as 
such they resemble the design principles in that they are general conditions and/or 
recommendations for setting limits fairly. 
 Second, while I treat the design principles and the conditions of A4R as 
conceptually equivalent, there are questions about their relationship, particularly their 
relative status. (1) The conditions can straightforwardly be conceived as four additional 
design principles addressing issues of justice in institutional design. As such, they are on 
par with the design principles and must simply be integrated with them. (2) Because of 
their focus on ensuring fair process, the conditions of A4R must be understood as higher-
level design principles that govern the implementation of the other design principles (i.e., 
the institutional design process as a whole). As such, the four conditions of A4R operate 
at the collective-choice or constitutional level (see 0.5.3 Rules). There is an additional 
reason to designate the conditions of A4R as higher-level design principles, as a concern 
for (procedural) justice may enjoy the primacy over other criteria when evaluating 
institutional performance and designing institutions (e.g., on the assumption there is a 
tradeoff between the institutional performance criteria (see 0.3 A Third Way: The 
Commons), designers are only willing to sacrifice so much equitability in striving for 
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increased efficiency and effectiveness). (3) There is the possibility that the first three 
conditions (i.e., publicity condition, relevance conditions, and revisions and appeals 
condition) must be situated at the operational or collective-choice level, while the fourth 
condition (i.e., regulative condition) operates at the collective-choice or constitutional 
level respectively (see also 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition). (4) The conditions of A4R 
are higher-level design principles, but they do not neatly fit within the distinction between 
operational, collective-choice, and constitutional rules (see 0.5.3 Rules). They are meta-
level principles for the design of design principles. (5) The relationship between the design 
principles and the conditions is dynamic and dependent on the context. To give an 
example, the conditions can operate alongside the other design principles when 
implemented at the operational level, but can also function at a higher level when 
institutional changes are made. So which one of the five interpretations is the most 
plausible? Given the characterization of the revised A4R approach as split between the 
macro- and meso-level (see 4.2.2 A Meso-Level Approach), the former anchoring the 
approach theoretically and the latter implementing the approach in practice, the 
conditions must likely be interpreted along the lines of (2), (4), or (5). 
Third, the preceding discussions of Daniels’s theory of justice for health care and 
A4R raise the following question: to what extent does the A4R approach depend on the 
theory of justice for health care? Answering the question is important, because if the 
former does not heavily depend on the latter, then A4R can function as a standalone 
approach to promote fair process in institutions, which greatly increases its applicability. 
Among others, commons institutions can then use A4R as an approach to implement 
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procedural justice. In Setting Limits Fairly (1985), as well as Just Health (2008), A4R is 
presented as flowing from Daniels’s theory of justice for health care, but neither work 
claims any strong dependence of A4R on the theory of justice.254,255 Moreover, both works 
go on to discuss A4R with hardly any reference to the theory of justice for health care. In 
Setting Limits Fairly (2002), for example, the theory of justice for health care and fair 
equality of opportunity, the theory’s key feature, are not mentioned once after their 
initial discussion.256 The same division appears to exist in the extensive literature 
commenting and building on Daniels and Sabin’s work, which for most part engages with 
either the theory of justice or the A4R approach, treating the latter as independent from 
the former. While this is hardly a satisfactory discussion of the relationship between 
Daniels’s two most influential intellectual achievements,257 it at least supports the 
possibility of treating A4R as a standalone approach to procedural justice, as A4R does 
not depend on the theory of justice, even though it certainly is inspired by it. 258  
 Finally, I return to the suggestion that Daniels’s work may be able to provide a 
theory of justice for the commons (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice for the Commons?). If 
A4R can indeed operate independently from the theory of justice for health care, then 
                                                          
254 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 14-18. 
255 Daniels, Just Health, 103-104, 108-110. 
256 Neither the definition of A4R nor its further development rely on, or even reference, 
elements from the theory of justice for health care. 
257As a side note, while A4R follows from the theory of justice for health care, the 
relationship is not as clear in the other direction, i.e., does A4R as an account of 
procedural justice lead to fair equality of opportunity? Daniels certainly seems to believe 
this is the case, but I do not think he presents a satisfactory argument to support this 
relationship.  
258 Daniels would likely argue A4R has to be grounded in some theory of justice, but that 
theory of justice need not be his Rawlsian theory of justice for health care.  
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the approach may offer a straightforward account of fair process that can be adopted by 
commons institutions, without committing to any particular theory of justice. There are 
several virtues to such a strategy: (1) While Ostrom lists equity as one of the criteria to 
evaluate institutional performance, she does not elucidate on the criterion (see 0.3 A 
Third Way: The Commons). A4R as an account of procedural justice can provide content 
to Ostrom’s criterion of fairness, both to evaluate institutional performance and to guide 
institutional design. (2) A4R as an account of procedural justice seems to be a particularly 
good fit for cooperative governance regimes (see 4.4.3 Daniels and Ostrom: A Natural 
Fit?). (3) The four conditions of A4R can be added to Ostrom’s design principles for 
successful commons institutions as recommendations for developing fair institutions. 
Ostrom is open to new additions to the design principles. The addition of design principles 
aimed at developing more just institutions would be an important contribution to 
commons research. (4) Daniels and Sabin’s four conditions show that some of Ostrom’s 
design principles already address issues of procedural justice, even though they are not 
discussed in terms of fairness in the literature, and thus may not have been consciously 
developed as improving equitability. The most straightforward example is Ostrom’s sixth 
design principle, which suggests the need for conflict-resolution mechanisms, and is 
similar to the revisions and appeals condition of A4R (see 4.4.4.3 Revisions and Appeals 
Condition). (5) The suggestion that the sixth design principle addresses fairness raises a 
different question altogether: how do the design principles relate to the criteria for 
institutional performance (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons)? While Dolšak and Ostrom 
describe the principles as “general principles that increase the performance of an 
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institutional design,”259 commons research does not detail the relationship between the 
criteria for institutional performance and the design principles (i.e., the implementation 
of which design principles leads to an improvement in what criteria for institutional 
performance?). (6) Finally, under the assumption that A4R must be grounded in some 
theory of justice, the adoption of the approach by commons research once again draws 
attention on the need for a theory of justice for the commons (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of 
Justice for the Commons?), or maybe theories of justice for the commons.  
4.4.3 DANIELS AND OSTROM: A NATURAL FIT? 
The fact that the four conditions of A4R can plausibly be interpreted as design principles 
is not the only congruence between the work of Daniels and Ostrom. I briefly highlight a 
few other points of agreement between their research projects. In a later section, I briefly 
discuss several other ways in which Ostrom’s work can contribute to Daniels and Sabin’s 
approach to procedural justice (see 4.5 The Further Institutionalization of A4R).  
 The primary concern of both commons research and A4R is the governance of 
resources. While the former emphasizes the sustainable management of resources, the 
latter focuses on the just allocation of resources, but by now it should be clear those 
concerns are inextricably linked. Moreover, Ostrom highlights the need for the equitable 
governance of resources and Daniels is concerned about sustainability.260 The concern for 
                                                          
259 Dolšak and Ostrom, “The Challenges of the Commons,” 22. 
260 While Daniels and Sabin do not frame the A4R approach in terms of sustainability in 
Setting Limits Fairly (2002), Daniels talks about sustainability a number of times in Just 
Health (2008). (Daniels, Just Health, 165, 185, 244.) That being said, Daniels is not 
primarily concerned with the sustainability of health care resources, or at least he does 
not explicitly frame the issue of setting limits in those terms, even though the concern is 
always at play in the background. The closest Daniels comes to explicitly talking about the 
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resource management runs deeper, however, as Daniels and Sabin underline the fact that 
“many publicly financed health care systems operate under global budgets,”261 resulting 
in tradeoffs between health care expenditures and other public spending (see 1.2 A 
Tragedy of the Health Care Commons?).262,263 In other words, they recognize that many 
health care resources are CPRs, even if they do not use the term.264 Of course, whether 
or not particular health care resources are CRS remains dependent on the context or level 
of analysis.  
 A second commonality is Daniels and Sabin’s focus on institutions, which I discuss 
in detail above (see 4.3.1 Daniels the Institutionalist). While Daniels’s use of the concept 
is up for debate, the underlying focus on health care institutions in his work is undeniable, 
especially in Just Health Care (1985). Interpreting the conditions of A4R as institutional 
design principles (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles), which is how the conditions are 
used by Daniels (and Sabin) in practice, further strengthens the case for a shared 
institutional approach to solving resource governance issues.  
 Third, Daniels and Sabin frame their approach in terms of cooperation. After 
summarizing the A4R approach (see 4.4.1 Accountability for Reasonableness), they go on 
                                                          
sustainable management of health care resources is in his discussion of the sustainability 
of institutions and the competition for resources in the context of aging and 
intergenerational equity. (Ibid., 166-168.) See also 4.5.4 Institutional Sustainability. 
261 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 19. 
262 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 19. 
263 They also talk about “shared resources from cooperative schemes […] as in public or 
private insurance.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 67.)  
264 However, Daniels and Sabin do describe copays as “incentives to conserve collective 
resources.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 114.) As such, copays are rules to 
regulate the behavior of resource users. 
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to characterize “‘fair-minded’ people” as persons “who in principle seek to cooperate 
with others on terms they can justify to each other,”265 whether they accept the rules of 
the game or seek to change them.266 The description is reminiscent of Ostrom’s project 
in general and of her description of human beings as conditional cooperators in particular 
(see also 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons). Ostrom would be sympathetic to Daniels and 
Sabin’s characterization of humans as fair-minded collaborators.267 Daniels and Sabin 
stress the importance of cooperation again in their discussion of managing access to 
pharmaceuticals.268 In this context, they characterize A4R as taking “the perspective of 
the covered population and all stakeholders in cooperative schemes intended to improve 
population health fairly within reasonable resource limits.”269 They also talk about the 
importance of open deliberation about the fair terms of cooperation in addressing 
tensions surrounding copays between employers offering health plans and their 
employees.270 While Daniels and Sabin frame their approach in terms of cooperation, they 
are skeptical, or unaware, of the possibility to solve resource governance issues at the 
meso-level and believe that in the end the state will have to step in to compel 
stakeholders to cooperate (see 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition). Commons research 
                                                          
265 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 44. 
266 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 44. 
267 In Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005), for example, Ostrom writes that one of 
the biggest challenges in the sustainable management of resources is to convince those 
participants who doubt the resource is limited or believe they will not benefit from 
cooperation that they need to limit their resource usage in a way that they agree is fair 
and workable. (Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 244.)  
268 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 105. 
269 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 108. 
270 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 114. 
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provides an alternate path to a cooperative solution to manage health care resources 
through emergent collaboration at the middle level, further developing the role of 
cooperation in Daniels and Sabin’s work.  
 Fourth, Daniels’s remark that fair process must be general enough to apply to 
different institutional arrangements and contexts, while the details need to be worked 
out on a case-by-case basis (see 4.4.1 Accountability for Reasonableness),271 fits with 
Ostrom’s emphasis on the use of general frameworks that can be adapted to particular 
contexts based on local knowledge (see 2.2 The Ostrom Approach).272 From a theoretical 
perspective, Daniels’s casual remark on these features of A4R find support in Ostrom’s 
research, while Daniels and Sabin’s arguments in favor of deliberative procedures to 
resolve resource allocation problems provide additional reasons to be wary of the 
uniform application of abstract models to resource governance issues. 
 Finally, both A4R and commons institutions are positioned vis-à-vis the market as 
alternative mechanisms for managing resources. While Ostrom situates her work in 
relation to the market-state dichotomy (see 0.2 Market and State: A False Dichotomy), 
Daniels and Sabin contrast their approach with market accountability.273,274 Without 
dismissing the market altogether, both bodies of research originate from a dissatisfaction 
with an overreliance on the market and the market failures resulting from it. While a 
                                                          
271 In the opening chapter of Setting Limits Fairly (2002), Daniels and Sabin note that 
accountability for reasonableness does not work like an algorithm delivering specific 
answers about what limits are fair. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 11.) 
272 Daniels’s suggestions can also be related to the second design principle (see 2.6.2 
Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local Conditions). 
273 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 28-30, 44. 
274 Daniels, Just Health, 110-111, 118. 
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detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this project, there are promising ways in which 
these literatures can inform each other. To give an example, Ostrom warns that exclusive 
reliance on rational, self-interested actors meeting in the marketplace can undermine 
cooperation and result in a tragedy of the commons, an argument that also applies to 
health care, and thus pertains to setting limits fairly (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care 
Commons). Similarly, Daniels’s argument showing there is a strong moral obligation to 
meet medical needs, which is absent when meeting other preferences,275 supports taking 
a procedural rather than a market approach to the governance of certain commons that 
may be of special moral importance (see 4.3.2.2.1 Explaining the Special Moral 
Importance of Health Care).    
4.4.4 THE FOUR CONDITIONS 
I now discuss the four conditions of A4R (i.e., the publicity condition, the relevance 
condition, the revisions and appeals condition, and the regulative condition) in relation 
to Ostrom’s design principles for successful commons institutions. While I initially 
envisioned a discussion of the ways in which commons research can inform the 
implementation of A4R, it quickly became clear the conditions of A4R also suggest 
important additions to and revisions of the design principles, similar to how the theory of 
justice for health care can plausibly inform a theory of justice for the commons. However, 
where the theory of justice for health care is located at the theoretical macro-level, 
making it difficult to draw conclusions for the commons without doing considerable work, 
the conditions of A4R qua design principles must be situated at the theoretical meso-
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level. Together with the fact they can function independently from the theory of justice 
for health care, this makes for a much more straightforward dialogue with commons 
research and the design principles.  
4.4.4.1 THE PUBLICITY CONDITION276  
Daniels and Sabin characterize the first condition as follows, 
 
The publicity condition requires that rationales for decisions such as coverage for 
new technologies or the contents of a drug formulary be publicly accessible to 
clinicians, patients, and would-be subscribers – or citizens in a publicly 
administered system.277,278 
 
In short, “decisions regarding both direct and indirect limits to care and their rationales 
must be publicly accessible.”279 They give the example of a health plan placing coverage 
restrictions on growth hormone treatments for children, disseminating their decision to 
clinicians by means of a letter from the medical director, but without providing a rationale 
for restricting coverage to certain categories of patients. This course of action may give 
the impression the decision is taken lightly, but this is not the case. The committee 
charged with taking the coverage decision deliberated carefully on the matter, relying on 
literature reviews and expert opinions to come to their conclusion. So why not make their 
reasoning public?280 As Daniels and Sabin note,  
                                                          
276 I rely on Daniels and Sabin’s discussion from Setting Limits Fairly (2002), which Daniels 
almost integrally repeats in Just Health (2008). (Daniels, Just Health, 119-123.)  
277 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 46. 
278 The first condition leaves open the level of analysis at which rationales for decisions 
must be made publicly accessible, which for certain decisions may only have to happen 
locally. 
279 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45. 
280 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 46-47. 
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[B]eing explicit about the underlying reasoning is a chance to demonstrate the 
coherence and consistency of an overall policy toward coverage. It is a chance to 
demonstrate that there is a commitment to an even-handed appeal to reasons 
and principles, so that relevant similarities and differences in particular cases are 
attended to.281  
 
In the case of growth hormone therapy, it provides the parents of a child of short stature 
who want the treatment but whose child does not fit the criteria with reasons for denying 
the treatment.282 Moreover, disseminating the rationale behind the decision provides 
clinicians with a readily available resource to discuss the coverage decision with the 
parents of young patients. In general, and employing the language of NIE, publicizing the 
rationale behind resource governance decisions provides resource users with reasons for 
the decision and the ensuing resource allocation rule(s). What counts as good reasons is 
the subject of the second condition (see 4.4.4.4 The Relevance Condition). 
Daniels and Sabin go on to draw an interesting analogy between making reasons 
for coverage decisions public and case law. Over time, they argue, publicizing coverage 
decisions will (1) lead “to more efficient, coherent, and fairer decisions”283,284 within 
                                                          
281 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 47. 
282 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 47. 
283 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 47. 
284 Daniels and Sabin do not seem to distinguish between effectiveness (i.e., producing 
the desired outcome) and efficiency (i.e., producing the outcome with the least waste in 
resources, say, time and money). While discussing efficiency, they point out that case law 
“improves the quality of decision making,” an improvement in effectiveness, while also 
pointing out an increase in the ease and speed of making decisions (e.g. possibility to 
develop checklists), an improvement in efficiency. Thus, both efficiency and effectiveness 
belong on this list, which leads to considerable overlap between Daniels and Sabin’s 
perceived benefits of publicity (i.e., efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, fairness) and 
Ostrom’s criteria to evaluate institutional performance (i.e. efficiency, effectiveness, 
fairness, sustainability or robustness). I later argue Ostrom’s emphasis on sustainability is 
of interest to Daniels and Sabin (see 4.5.4 Institutional Sustainability). Inversely, Ostrom 
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institutions committed to the publicity condition and (2) “strengthen broader public 
deliberation and contribute to the perceived legitimacy of decision makers.”285 Daniels 
and Sabin discuss both points in some detail. (1) Establishing a publicly available body of 
resource allocation decisions will plausibly lead to more coherent, and thus fairer, 
outcomes as the same reason-based deliberation can be applied to similar cases (i.e., if a 
rationale is given to make a certain decision in one case, then it sets a precedent for 
subsequent cases).286 Of course, sometimes a subsequent case should not be treated in 
the same way, either because it differs “in relevant and important ways”287 from the 
precedent(s) or because the rationale given in the earlier case(s) needs revision.288 The 
publicity condition leads to more efficient and effective decision making,289 among 
others, because the need to formulate explicit reasons makes for more focused decision-
making deliberations and the sequence of cases may allow for the development of “a 
checklist of key features of coverage decisions.”290,291 Finally, fairer decisions ensue from 
                                                          
likely values coherence in the rules and their outcomes, an interesting point I do not argue 
further here.  
285 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 47. 
286 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 48. 
287 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 48. 
288 Daniels and Sabin call the need to revise the rationale a “much more disruptive 
rebuttal” of the presumption that subsequent cases should be treated similar to earlier 
ones. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 48.) Commons research provides a new 
way to think about and support their assessment, as a revision of the rationale (i.e., a rule 
change) requires a move from the operational level to the collective-choice level. In 
contrast, arguing that a new case differs from the precedent(s) should be possible entirely 
at the operational level, given rules to do so are in place. 
289 See footnote 284. 
290 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 48. 
291 Daniels and Sabin do relatively little in terms of exploring the relationships between 
the four conditions (see also 4.5.2 Institutional Interactions). To give an example, the 
increase in fairness that presumably follows from the publicity condition will likely lead to 
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a case law approach as publicity promotes the “consistent treatment of similar cases”292 
(i.e., more coherence) and the process of specifying reasons in relation to cases promotes 
their thoughtful evaluation.293 If the publicity condition leads to fairer decisions, then over 
time people will better understand the moral commitments of the institutions making 
them.294 Daniels and Sabin write, 
 
If an institution is committed to arriving at fair decisions in a publicly accountable 
way, we can expect that people will come to recognize this commitment and will 
see the institution as acting (more) fairly.295 
 
(2) Apart from benefits internal to the institutions committed to the publicity condition, 
Daniels and Sabin hypothesize there is an external benefit to publicizing the rationale 
behind resource allocation decisions. Providing stakeholders with the opportunity to 
understand how and why limits are being set offers them the chance to participate in a 
“fundamental piece of social governance – the allocation and rationing of services so 
important for a fundamental human good.”296,297 As such, 
 
Transparency has the potential for enhancing democratic process by helping our 
society learn how to deal more thoughtfully and fairly with health care resource 
allocation.298 
                                                          
fewer unjustified appeals (see 5.4.3.4.3 The Revisions and Appeals Condition), thus 
increasing efficiency.  
292 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 49. 
293 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 49. 
294 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 49. 
295 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 49. 
296 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51. 
297 The level of participation that ensues from the publicity condition is limited, especially 
when compared to the level of participation that is the norm in commons institutions. 
298 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51. 
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 I now explore the relationship between the publicity condition and Ostrom’s 
design principles, considering ways in which they may inform each other. While the design 
principles do not explicitly include publicity as a feature of successful commons 
institutions, Ostrom is nonetheless concerned about publicity, as is evidenced by several 
of the design principles. First, however, it is worthwhile to consider why Ostrom does not 
specify a publicity condition?299  A possible explanation is that the design principles are 
based on a limited number of case studies of relatively small commons institutions in 
which publicity can be assumed based on the size of the institutions and the broad 
participation of their members in the rule- and decision-making process. In a small and 
active commons, resource allocation decisions are by default going to be public.300 Thus, 
one may speculate that transparency is a feature of commons institutions by virtue of 
their basic design as governance systems managed by their members through collective-
choice arrangements (see 2.3 Commons Institutions and 2.6.3 Collective Choice 
Arrangements).301 As such, incorporating commons in health care may automatically lead 
to more public decision making.  
                                                          
299 Remember, Goodin does include a publicity principle in his shortlist of desirable design 
principles (see 2.6 The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions), which may 
indicate concerns about publicity primarily originate in political philosophy. 
300 To repurpose Daniels and Sabin’s distinction between the internal and the external 
benefits of publicity, while resource allocation decisions are transparent for the members 
of a small and active commons (i.e., internally), they may be opaque to outsiders (i.e., 
externally). 
301 If publicity is indeed a feature of (almost) all commons institutions, this may provide 
another explanation as to why there is no design principle recognizing the feature, as 
decisions will be public in both successful and unsuccessful commons, thus publicity does 
not appear to differentiate between success and failure. Of course, and this points toward 
a possible issue with the design principles in general, the fact a feature does not appear 
to make the difference between success and failure does not imply that feature is not 
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While Ostrom’s list of design principles does not include a publicity condition, 
several of them echo a concern about publicity. The first design principle that can be 
related to the publicity condition is the need for clearly defined boundaries (see 2.6.1 
Clearly Defined Boundaries). The design principle can be understood in two ways, which 
roughly align with Daniels and Sabin’s distinction between the internal and external 
importance of publicity. (1) The rules must clearly define who has the right to use the 
resource (e.g., rules defining coverage restrictions on growth hormone treatment).302,303 
To clearly define who is authorized to use the available resources implies publicity, for 
otherwise the right to use the resource is not apparent to or understood by resource 
users. On this first reading, the design principle operates internally, specifying which 
members have a right to withdraw resources and under what circumstances. (2) The 
principle states the boundaries of the CPR themselves must be well defined, meaning 
users must have a clear understanding of the resource system and its boundaries.304 In 
other words, the design principle aims to clarify what is meant by a particular resource 
                                                          
crucial to the success of commons institutions. In other words, there may be design 
principles that are key to the success of commons institutions, like publicity, but that go 
unnoticed because they do not appear to impact institutional success, however, in 
absence of the feature the institution would fail.   
302 Elinor Ostrom, “Common-Pool Resources and Institutions: Toward a Revised Theory,” 
in Handbook of Agricultural Economics. Volume 2. Part A, eds. Bruce Gardner and Gordon 
Rausser (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2002),1330. 
303 Coverage restrictions on growth hormone therapy for children are an example of 
technology rules, which are a kind of boundary rule (see 2.6.3 The Challenge of 
Technological Change). In Just Health (2008), Daniels uses the example of NICE when 
discussing the publicity condition, which I also use in the context of technology rules. 
(Daniels, Just Health, 120-121.) 
304 Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold, Sergio Villamayor Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles 
for Community-Based Natural Resource Management,” Ecology and Society 15, no. 4 
(2010). http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/ art38/. 
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system.305 A broader understanding of the resource system and its boundaries embeds 
concrete resource allocation decisions in an overall resource governance approach. As 
such, the second reading of the design principle may also be linked to Daniels and Sabin’s 
suggestion that providing stakeholders with the opportunity to understand how and why 
resource limits are being set offers them the chance to participate in the social 
governance process that is the allocation and rationing of health care services. In 
summary, Ostrom’s first design principle shows that publicity requires a clear definition 
of the resource and its boundaries, which, among others, translates in the need for well-
defined boundary rules (e.g., technology rules). Vice versa, Daniels and Sabin’s discussion 
of the publicity condition illustrates that Ostrom’s first design principle must also be 
understood as ensuring publicity.      
 Publicity also pertains to monitoring and sanctioning (see 2.6.4 Monitoring and 
2.6.5 Graduated Sanctions). While closely related to the resource usage decisions 
themselves (e.g., coverage decisions), monitoring and sanctioning are separate activities 
to make sure resource users comply with the resource allocation decisions and are 
sanctioned when they do not. First, the rationale behind monitoring and sanctioning 
processes must be publicly available. While it is clear monitoring and sanctioning take 
place to prevent unauthorized use of resources, thus ensuring the sustainability of the 
resource and the governance regime, reasons must also be given for the monitoring and 
sanctioning practices themselves. Who are the monitors? How does monitoring take 
                                                          
305 Elinor Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What Have 
We Learned?” in Property Rights and Land Policies, ed. Gregory Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong 
(Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2009), 32. 
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place? Who determines the sanctions? Why are the sanctions what they are? And so on. 
Second, there must be a publicly accessible record of monitoring and sanctioning 
activities. Not only does such a record ensure the coherent application of monitoring and 
sanctioning rules, but it also serves as a reminder that resource usage is being monitored 
and unauthorized activity is sanctioned, which leads to continued compliance with 
resource allocation rules.306 Ostrom’s statement that monitors should be accountable to 
resource users, or should themselves be resource users, can be interpreted in terms of 
publicity.307 Even though accountability does not equate to or imply publicity, the latter 
is one way to keep monitors accountable. Moreover, Ostrom’s suggestion to close the 
loop between monitors and resource users, requiring the latter to audit the former (see 
2.6.4 Monitoring),308 can be realized by subjecting monitoring and sanctioning to a 
publicity requirement. Conversely, Daniels and Sabin’s publicity condition can be enacted 
by closing the loop between monitors and resource users. 
                                                          
306 Ostrom discusses the importance of sharing information about compliance rates in 
Governing the Commons (1990). “If no one is discovered breaking the rules, the 
appropriator-monitor learns that others comply and that no one is being taken for a 
sucker.” (Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 97.) If information about compliance is shared 
with others in the commons, then the resource users can continue “a strategy of quasi-
voluntary compliance.” (Ibid.) If the monitor discovers a rule violation and a sanction 
ensues, then everyone knows the monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms work, which 
again reinforces compliance. 
307 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 94. 
308 Arun Agrawal, “Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule 
Systems and Resource Use,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, eds. Elinor 




 Finally, Ostrom notes that the activities and outcomes of conflict resolution 
mechanisms should be “generally known in the community,”309 i.e., publicly available (see 
2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms). Not only does the publicity of the conflict 
resolution process assure resource users that the institution works, but it also provides 
users with information about the interpretation of the rules, thus resolving the ambiguity 
surrounding the rules that (often) lies at the basis of conflicts. Ostrom’s argument for the 
publicity of conflict resolution mechanisms also applies to the revisions and appeals 
condition as envisioned by Daniels and Sabin (see 4.4.4.3 The Revisions and Appeals 
Condition). 
 In general, Ostrom’s remarks concerning publicity in her discussions of the design 
principles highlight the role the publicity condition can play in helping resource users to 
improve their understanding of the resource and its governance. Experiments and field 
studies have shown that a better understanding of the resource system and the governing 
institution increases acceptance of and compliance with allocation rules. Thus, Daniels 
and Sabin’s publicity condition does not only lead to more effective, efficient, coherent, 
and ultimately fairer resource allocation decisions, but likely also increases compliance 
with these decisions. In turn, Daniels and Sabin highlight that fairer decisions lead to a 
better understanding of the moral commitments of the institutions making them,310 
therefore increasing the likelihood of compliance among those affected by the resource 
                                                          
309 Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions,” 35. 
310 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 49. 
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allocation rules.311 Unfortunately, organizations all too often take the opposite approach 
and obscure resource allocation decisions by hiding them deep in the set of rules.312,313 
 Beyond the design principles, the publicity condition can build trust. While a 
detailed exploration of the relationship is beyond the scope of the current project, 
publicizing resource allocation decisions and other institutional processes (e.g., 
monitoring and sanctioning, revisions and appeals) plausibly increases trust among 
participants. As Daniels and Sabin write, 
  
Our view is that, as health plans begin to address the legitimacy and fairness 
problems by demonstrating that they base limit-setting decisions on a concern for 
meeting the needs of patients in a covered population under reasonable resource 
constraints (our Publicity and Relevance Conditions), trust will increase, and 
litigation – if anything – will go down.314 
 
 Daniels and Sabin admit their empirical claim is speculative, as they lack real 
evidence.315,316 While commons research does not provide support for this particular 
claim either, it does provide general support for their conjecture. To reuse Daniels and 
Sabin’s distinction between the internal and external benefits of publicity, the broad 
                                                          
311 Daniels and Sabin do not explicitly recognize the possible increase in compliance with 
resource allocation decisions that follows from an increase in (perceived) fairness. They 
merely point out that resource users recognition of an institutional commitment “to 
arriving at fair decisions in a publicly accountable way” leads them to see the institution 
as acting more fairly. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 49.) 
312 Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), 111. 
313 If a controversial resource allocation decision does become public, then the complexity 
of the rules allows policymakers to diffuse blame more easily.  
314 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 50. 
315 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 50. 
316 As Daniels and Sabin point out, some suggest the publicity condition leads to a 
decrease in trust. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 50.) 
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adoption of the publicity condition likely increases trust within each institution, i.e. 
bonding, and in society at large, i.e. bridging, thus helping society “deal more thoughtfully 
and fairly with health care resource allocation.”317 Moreover, publicity has the potential 
to generate trust “across power or authority gradients,”318 in this case between those 
making the resource allocation decisions and the users of the resources.  
4.4.4.2 THE RELEVANCE CONDITION 
The second condition qualifies the rationales that health care institutions can use, or 
ought to use, to explain their resource allocation decisions.319 As such, Daniels and Sabin’s 
second design principle operates in tandem with the publicity condition. They specify the 
relevance condition as follows, 
 
Specifically, the rationales for coverage decisions should aim to provide (a) a 
reasonable construal of (b) how the organization (or public agency) seeks to 
provide “value for money” in meeting the varied health needs of a defined 
population under reasonable resource constraints.320 
 
I explain both constraints in more detail and discuss their relationship to commons 
research. (a) A rationale is considered reasonable when “it appeals to evidence, reasons, 
and principles that are accepted as relevant” by fair-minded people who are seeking to 
find mutually acceptable terms of cooperation.321,322 In Just Health (2008), Daniels adds 
                                                          
317 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51. 
318 Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock, “Health by Association? Social Capital, Social 
Theory, and the Political Economy of Public Health,” International Journal of Epidemiology 
33, no. 4 (August 2004): 655. 
319 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45. 
320 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 50. 
321 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45. 
322 Daniels stresses the cooperative nature of the relevance condition several times.  
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that where possible “the relevance of reasons should be vetted by stakeholders in these 
decisions.”323 A constraint he believes is easier implemented in public than in private 
institutions.324 This remark is particularly interesting, because it directly relates the 
second condition to institutions, and thus to institutional economics. While Daniels does 
not provide support for his claim,325 research suggests public institutions may indeed have 
an edge on market institutions when it comes to the broad engagement of stakeholders. 
Ostrom’s research suggests that commons institutions may be even better suited to allow 
stakeholders to partake in the process of reviewing “reasonable rationales.” As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the commons can be integrated in market and state institutions 
to create governance regimes amenable to stakeholder input, among others, polycentric 
governance regimes (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). In addition, 
Daniels and Sabin explicitly characterize the fulfillment of the second condition as a 
cooperative endeavor, opening another avenue to relate their work to commons 
research.326 They write, 
                                                          
323 Daniels, Just Health, 118. 
324 Daniels, Just Health, 118. 
325 In Just Health (2008), Daniels points out that public agencies, i.e., state institutions, 
often are required to solicit stakeholder input “as part of the administrative process.” 
(Daniels, Just Health, 128.) However, the expectation or requirement of stakeholder 
participation in and of itself does not make the process any easier. While Daniels regularly 
suggests that public institutions are better placed to implement his approach to setting 
limits, he does little in terms of providing argument to support his belief. This is a 
particularly promising intersection between Daniels’s work and NIE, as institutional 
economics provides a more sophisticated way to think about health care institutions as 
complex sets of rules. While rules facilitating cooperation may be more common in state 
institutions, and an essential feature of commons, they can plausibly be adopted by other 
governance regimes (i.e., market).    
326 As such, Daniels’s emphasis on the role of stakeholders in the vetting of relevant 
reasons in Just Health (2008) builds on earlier ideas in a straightforward manner. 
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We may think of the goal of meeting the varied needs of patients or citizens under 
reasonable resource constraints as a characterization of the common or public 
good pursued by everyone engaged in delivering and receiving this care or risk 
protection.327,328,329   
 
However, reasoning about this goal must be a cooperative enterprise as well, undertaken 
by people disposed to collaborate with one another who accept certain reasons as 
relevant (e.g., values, principles).330 The process of giving reasons must respect the moral 
diversity of everyone involved in making resource allocation decisions, especially of the 
persons affected by the decisions. Thus, the reasons offered must be recognized as 
relevant and appropriate by all stakeholders. Put differently, health care institutions must 
have an ongoing “conversation” with stakeholders about the suitable reasoning and 
reasons for making resource allocation decisions.331 But how should this cooperative 
vetting of relevant reasons be implemented? In Setting Limits Fairly (2002), Daniels and 
Sabin do little in terms of detailing the envisioned cooperative enterprise of providing 
reasons for resource allocation decisions, apart from referencing their discussion of 
                                                          
327 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51. 
328 It is worth noting that Daniels and Sabin’s enumeration of those involved in 
characterizing the common good (i.e., “everyone engaged in delivering and receiving this 
care or risk protection”) is analogous to the resource users identified in the introduction 
(see 0.5.4 Resource Users). While potential or future patients are not currently receiving 
care, they are nonetheless engaged in the “risk protection” scheme, to use Daniels and 
Sabin’s words. 
329 Interestingly, Dardot and Laval relate the development of the commons to the notion 
of the common good in their monograph on the commons. (Pierre Dardot and Christian 
Laval, Commun. Essai sur la Révolution au XXIe Siècle (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2014), 
21-51.) 
330 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51. 
331 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51-52. 
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deliberative democracy in the chapter prior,332 which hardly provides an adequate answer 
to the problem of “vetting the relevance of reasons.”333,334 Instead, they tacitly shift focus 
from the process of producing relevant reasons to the reasons themselves. Daniels and 
Sabin go on to discuss several examples of reasons they consider relevant. In particular, 
they spend a lot of time discussing the criteria used by the medical advisory panel at Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield to assess new medical technologies (e.g., technology has received final 
approval from the appropriate government regulatory body, technology must improve 
net health outcomes).335 While the criteria used by Blue Cross/Blue Shield involve “a 
publicly accessible method of reasoning,”336 which falls under Daniels and Sabin’s first 
condition, it is not clear the rules are the result of a cooperative enterprise. The same is 
true of the two types of reasons that Daniels and Sabin argue everyone should consider 
relevant when making comparative resource allocation decisions:337 First, the rules 
should consider and protect against “morally objectionable arbitrariness,” i.e., the 
dissimilar treatment of patients who are similar in all relevant ways (see also 4.3.2.2.2 
Justifying the Special Moral Importance of Health Care). Second, if a resource allocation 
                                                          
332 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 34-36. 
333 Daniels, Just Health, 128. 
334 Daniels and Sabin’s discussion of deliberative democracy is summary, focusing on the 
shortcomings of using “a procedural appeal to majority rule” in health care. (Daniels and 
Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 34.) Moreover, the short section concludes by referencing the 
four conditions of A4R as ensuring fair process, resulting in an argument that is (at least 
in part) circular. (Ibid., 36.) 
335 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 52-53. 
336 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 52. 
337 Comparative decisions are those in which the needs of one set of patients is weighed 
against, and found more important than, those of another set of patients. (Daniels and 
Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 51.) 
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decision disadvantages someone more than they need to be disadvantaged under 
available alternatives, this also should be considered relevant by all. However, simply 
stating “these criteria are ones that all stakeholders should accept as relevant and 
appropriate”338 is precisely the sort of top-down decision-making (i.e., “exercise of 
authority”339) about relevant reasons that Daniels and Sabin seem to resist earlier in their 
discussion of the relevance condition. In Just Health (2008), Daniels adds a section 
addressing the vetting of relevant reasons, possibly in an attempt to remedy the 
shortcomings of the earlier work.340 The section is odd in that it promotes stakeholder 
participation in determining which reasons count as relevant wherever possible, because 
it contributes to the legitimacy of limit-setting decisions by increasing “the likelihood that 
a broader range of relevant reasons and rationales will be aired in the decision-making 
process”341 and by enhancing transparency, but only in so far that it improves A4R.342 In 
other words, stakeholder participation is of instrumental rather than intrinsic importance 
to resource allocation decisions.343 Several remarks are in place: (1) In theory, the 
relevance condition can be implemented through collective-choice arrangements 
specifically aimed at vetting reasoning processes and reasons for resource allocation 
decisions (see 2.6.3 Collective Choice Arrangements). Such an implementation of the 
                                                          
338 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 53. 
339 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 52. 
340 The section fits with, and elaborates on, Daniels adding to the relevance condition that 
where possible “the relevance of reasons should be vetted by stakeholders in these 
decisions.” (Daniels, Just Health, 118.) 
341 Daniels, Just Health, 130. 
342 Daniels, Just Health, 130-131. 
343 Daniels, Just Health, 131. 
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relevance condition can happen locally, i.e., within a given institution or community. (2) 
That being said, I am not sure Daniels envisions the broad and consistent vetting of 
rationales through deliberative mechanisms that is inherent to commons institutions, 
despite their professed emphasis on cooperation and deliberation. After all, processing 
stakeholder input is essential to commons institutions, as it is a determining feature of 
their design,344 and stakeholder participation is likely of intrinsic value to many 
proponents of the commons.345 Such a strong commitment to stakeholder participation 
seems to be at odds with Daniels’s view of participation as instrumentally important in 
furthering A4R. (3) Daniels’s concerns about institutional deliberation certainly have 
merit. For one, he points out that stakeholder participation in general, and consumer 
participation in particular, does not ensure the legitimacy of resource allocation 
decisions.346 He also worries about organizational deliberation as an inadequate 
substitute for broader democratic deliberation.347 As such, Daniels’s concerns can inform 
a criticism of the deliberative processes at the heart of the commons, and fit with 
rationalist-liberal concerns about local tyrannies (see 3.4.3 The Dangers of the Middle 
Level). (4) At the same time, the strong commitment to bottom-up deliberation that sits 
at the center of the commons elicits a criticism of Daniels and Sabin’s work, which is 
                                                          
344 Of course, the pervasiveness of deliberative processes does not imply broad 
stakeholder participation, as deliberation often does not include all those affected by the 
decisions, but is limited to the members of the commons institution. 
345 Commons researchers do not explicitly state or argue their belief in the intrinsic value 
of deliberation, but the commons literature is permeated by a strong implicit belief that 
broad and consistent participation are intrinsically valuable.  
346 Daniels, Just Health, 129. 
347 Daniels, Just Health, 130. 
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characterized by a tension between an avowed commitment to stakeholder participation, 
and an apparent distrust of broad deliberation. Daniels and Sabin seem to want to have 
their cake and eat it too when it comes to deciding upon reasonable rationales for 
resource allocation decisions. On the one hand, they suggest the process ought to be a 
cooperative enterprise involving all stakeholders, because it shows respect for persons 
and “opens a conversation.”348,349 In addition, there are pragmatic reasons to cooperate 
on the vetting of reasons for resource governance decisions, as collaboration leads to 
increased acceptance and compliance, a hypothesis supported by commons 
research.350,351 On the other hand, Daniels and Sabin seem to have already decided upon 
certain rationales that they themselves deem reasonable and simply state these are the 
criteria all stakeholders should accept as relevant and appropriate. In short, while I 
believe Daniels and Sabin’s commitment to broad stakeholder participation is genuine, 
they provide enough argumentative ammunition to discredit deliberation when the 
                                                          
348 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 52. 
349 The mention of respect for persons and the opening of a conversation makes it seem 
like Daniels (and Sabin) do attribute intrinsic value to deliberation, but they are 
referencing the work of Harvard Law Professor Frederick Schauer. Moreover, Schauer 
discusses the giving reasons rather than the process of deliberating about the reasons. 
Interestingly, Schauer presents the act of giving reasons itself as “a way to bring the 
subject of the decision into the enterprise.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 52.) 
While giving reasons does engage stakeholders, it only does so in the most superficial, or 
maybe passive, of ways when compared to having them participate in the deliberative 
process. Given Daniels’s emphasis on the instrumental value of deliberation in Just Health 
(2008), he seems to take a similar approach to Schauer: there is intrinsic (and 
instrumental) value to giving reasons, but only instrumental value to broadly deliberating 
about them.   
350 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 52. 




outcomes of the process are not the reasons they themselves deem relevant,352 making 
their prior support for broad stakeholder participation appear like lip service. (5) While 
the tension discussed in the previous point is particularly clear in Daniels and Sabin’s 
discussion of the relevance condition, it is present throughout their work. (6) Of course, 
none of these critical remarks rule out the use of commons-like deliberation mechanisms 
in the way that Daniels and Sabin envision, i.e., in service of A4R rather than as 
indispensable processes of intrinsic value. Much like the commons can be integrated with 
other governance regimes, the rules that allow for deliberation can be incorporated in 
the A4R approach. 
 I now move to the second constraint stipulated by the relevance condition. (b) 
Organizations must seek to provide value for money in meeting the health needs of a 
population under reasonable resource constraints. How should the claim that a treatment 
is (not) cost-effective be evaluated as a reason?353 Daniels and Sabin note that while 
researching their book during the late 1990s there was little explicit discussion of costs, 
at least in the United States (e.g., the aforementioned BlueCross/Blue Shield criteria do 
not include costs or cost-effectiveness). On the contrary, some organizations avoided to 
consider cost-effectiveness even when explicitly asked to weigh costs and benefits.354 
                                                          
352 Daniels and Sabin would likely reply that they provide a criterion to determine relevant 
reasons, namely those rationales appealing to evidence, reasons, and principles that are 
accepted as relevant by fair-minded people who are seeking to find mutually acceptable 
terms of cooperation. However, fair-minded people seeking to find mutually acceptable 
terms of cooperation may decide upon relevant reasons that Daniels and Sabin would 
disagree with, which seems to be precisely what Daniels wants to guard against in Just 
Health (2008).   
353 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 55. 
354 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 55. 
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Their remark is of more than mere anecdotal value, because it indicates that health care 
institutions are suspicious of using cost-effectiveness as a reason for making resource 
allocation decisions.355 The claim that a certain technology is too costly almost 
automatically invites a demand for clarification from those affected by the decision (e.g., 
patients, physicians, potential patients, and even the public at large).356 That being said, 
some cases of cost-effectiveness are more straightforward than others, for example when 
weighing one treatment against another with comparable benefits at lower cost, but 
outside of that simple case any appeal to cost is controversial, for example when slightly 
better benefits come at considerably higher costs.357 The prevailing sentiment among 
medical directors and managers of health plans was that decisions about cost-
effectiveness must be made at the societal rather than the organizational level.358 As 
Daniels and Sabin note, “The result is the continued rapid dissemination of technologies 
and treatments and escalating costs, which ultimately make the need for comparative 
decision-making and rationing greater.”359 In the language of the commons, the result is 
an ongoing and creeping tragedy of the health care commons (see 1.2 A Tragedy of the 
                                                          
355 Of course, the widespread refusal to deal with costs, and the resulting deficiencies in 
the rules governing resource usage, is precisely what leads to the tragedy of the health 
care commons (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons).  
356 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 55. 
357 Daniels, Just Health, 127. 
358 The sentiment provides another illustration of the logic that lies at the basis of the 
tragedy of the commons, as individual resource users defer any responsibility for the 
overuse of the available resources to society at large. The objection that most medical 
directors and health plan managers in the United States are only responsible for their own 
CPR falls short, as the attitude still leads to the overuse of the available resources, which 
are not their own but ultimately those of their members with as a result, among others, 
higher premiums and copays for patients.  
359 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 56. 
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Health Care Commons?). In Just Health (2008), Daniels discusses NICE as an example of 
the use of cost-effectiveness reasoning when making coverage decisions within the NHS, 
an approach that is also used by other public systems (e.g., Health Care Knowledge Center 
(KCE) in Belgium, Haute Autorité de Santé (HAS) in France). In the United States, however, 
both private health plans and the CMS remain reluctant to publicly embrace cost-
effectiveness reasoning in making resource allocation decisions.360 Of course, the de facto 
reluctance of health plans to engage in such reasoning does not imply that appeals to 
relative cost-effectiveness do not meet the relevance condition. On the contrary, Daniels 
and Sabin argue that “appeals to relative cost-effectiveness or to opportunity costs, such 
reasons, appropriately supported, would meet the Relevance Condition.”361 They clarify, 
 
If people share in the goal of meeting the varied medical needs of a population 
covered by limited resources, as well as a commitment to justifying limitations by 
reference to reasons all can consider appropriate and relevant, then they would 
be interested in a reason that said a particular intervention had fallen below some 
defensible threshold of cost-effectiveness or relative cost-worthiness.362 
 
While the logic Daniels and Sabin project onto users of health care resources may be 
correct, thus justifying the use of cost-effectiveness as a relevant reason, resource users’ 
realization of the need to accept reasons referencing cost is not sufficient to change 
resource governance practices, i.e., the use of cost-effectiveness as a reason when 
allocating resources, for the collective-action problem remains.363 Much like the herders 
                                                          
360 Daniels, Just Health, 127-128. 
361 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 56. 
362 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 56. 
363 While the population of users of health care resources as a whole, as well as many 
individual members of the population, would benefit from accepting cost-effectiveness 
379 
 
in Hardin’s scenario, the mere realization that the pasture is being overgrazed does not 
lead to a solution of the problem, on the contrary (see 1.3 The Tragedy of the Commons). 
The challenge can be understood in terms of the second design principle (see 2.6.2 
Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local Conditions). 
Remember, the principle suggests the need for correspondence between appropriation 
and provision rules, which means there must be congruity between the benefits that 
members receive and the costs they incur from collective action.364 If members find they 
bear considerable costs but enjoy few benefits, then more and more of them become 
unwilling to follow the resource allocation rules,365 as the inequity leads them to find the 
rules unfair.366 The use of cost-effectiveness as a basis for resource governance decisions 
is one way to ensure congruity between benefits and costs. After all, cost-effectiveness 
entails the weighing of benefits against costs, ensuring they are proportionate. If 
                                                          
as a relevant reason, the widespread reliance on cost-effectiveness as a criterion carries 
an implementation cost that no individuals in the health care arena are willing to bare. To 
repurpose an example used by Daniels, private health plans in the United States are 
unwilling to publicly rely on cost-effectiveness as a reason, because they do not want to 
be the first-mover when it comes to rationing, which carries a cost in terms of bad 
publicity and a loss of members, to name just a few. (Daniels, Just Health, 128.) Any 
collective action is further complicated by the large number of participants with diffuse 
interests in health care. While many resource users each gain a little by considering costs 
in some way or another when allocating health care resources, there are influential 
groups who would incur significant losses from the inclusion of cost-based reasoning (e.g., 
manufacturers of health care technology, severely ill patients seeking out last-chance 
therapies). The former group does not have a strong incentive to push for the 
implementation of cost-effectiveness as a reason, while the latter group has a strong 
impetus not to implement cost-effectiveness reasoning. The same issue arises in the 
context of health care reform.  
364 Cox, Arnold, and Tomás, “A Review of Design Principles.” 
365 Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 150. 
366 Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Institutions,” 34. 
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members perceive the set of rules overall balances benefits and costs, they are more likely 
to see the rules as legitimate and to comply with them. In order to reap these benefits, 
most participants must perceive the institution as a whole to balance benefits and costs 
at a given level of analysis (e.g., health care system, health plan, hospital). To achieve this, 
however, policymakers must design and implement rules that ensure the resource 
allocation rules are indeed cost-effective.367 Moreover, policymakers should make sure 
that resource users are aware of the rationales being used to allocate resources, and the 
reasoning behind those rationales, for the publicity of reasons shapes members’ 
perception of the institution and communicates its efforts to ensure congruity (see 4.4.4.1 
The Publicity Condition). Vice versa, the second design principle provides additional 
support for using cost-effectiveness as a relevant reason, for the latter is a way to ensure 
resource users perceive the rules as fair, among others, ensuring compliance and 
increasing legitimacy.  
 
 
                                                          
367 As I noted in the discussion of the second design principle, what matters is the 
perception of the resource users. As long as the members of the institution perceive the 
rules as ensuring congruity between benefits and costs, they are more likely to find 
allocation decisions legitimate and comply with the rules, even if the rules are not in fact 
balancing benefits and costs. In other words, policymakers could focus on convincing 
resource users there is congruity rather than actually building it into the institution. While 
such an approach may be attractive, say, because presenting an image of congruity 
through marketing is cheaper than actually implementing the design principle, it is 
nonetheless ill-advised. The tactic will backfire when members find out reality differs from 
their perception, resulting in a loss of legitimacy and a decline in compliance. Moreover, 
resources spent on deceiving resource users could have been better spent on designing 
rules that balance benefits and costs. 
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4.4.4.3 THE REVISIONS AND APPEALS CONDITION 
The revision and appeals condition, also called the “revisability and appeals condition,”368 
states mechanisms must be in place “for challenge and dispute resolution regarding limit-
setting decisions, and, more broadly, opportunities for revision and improvement of 
policies in the light of new evidence or arguments.”369,370 In short, these mechanisms are 
“dispute resolution procedures.”371 The aim of the condition is threefold: (1) To provide 
members affected by a resource allocation decision with an opportunity to challenge it 
(e.g., a patient whose treatment is not covered, a hospital that is denied funds to build a 
new facility for proton therapy).372 As such, revisions and appeals rules are “a form of due 
                                                          
368 Daniels, Just Health, 131. 
369 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45. 
370 If the two former conditions can be viewed as mere conditions rather than institutional 
design principles, which I believe is too limited a reading (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design 
Principles), then the third principle is undeniably an institutional design principle. The 
term “mechanisms,” regularly used in NIE and by Ostrom, references institutional 
features, i.e., rules, that allow for the revisability of resource allocation rules and the 
appeal of limit-setting decisions. 
371 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58. 
372 To give a concrete example, two centers for proton therapy were being built in Belgium 
at the time of writing, one in Leuven and the other in Charleroi. While a study by the KCE 
acknowledges the usefulness of proton therapy for certain cancers (e.g., children with 
brain tumors), the Belgian equivalent of NICE does not recommend extending coverage 
of the treatment to six other cancers. The Belgian minister of health follows the 
recommendation of the KCE. As a result, the therapy will only be covered for a relatively 
small number of patients, all of whom can be treated at the facility in Louvain, while 
treatments at the facility in Charleroi, which is being built with private funds, will not be 
covered. (Jasper D’Hoore and David Adriaen, “Overheidsadvies haalt beloftevolle 
kankertherapie onderuit,” De Tijd, January 24, 2019, https://www.tijd.be/ondernemen/ 
farma-biotech/Overheidsadvies-haalt-beloftevolle-kankertherapie-nderuit/10090407.) 
Based on the revisions and appeals condition, mechanisms should be in place for 
stakeholders to challenge the minister’s resource allocation decision. In this case, 
stakeholders that immediately come to mind are patients suffering from (one of) the six 
cancers treatable by proton therapy that will not be covered, the owners of the facility in 
Charleroi, and the company IBA, who are the Belgian world leader in developing the 
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process through which to attempt to reverse adverse decisions.”373 (2) To improve policy 
when it comes to the governance of health care resources,374 as it provides participants 
with an opportunity to present their point of view, with the potential for altered and 
improved decisions.375 (3) To educate society about the need for resource allocation 
decisions in health care and the ways in which they can be taken fairly.376 Daniels and 
Sabin distinguish between internal and external roles of the third condition.377 The first 
two roles of revisions and appeals procedures are internal to the institution, while the last 
role of these mechanisms is external to the organization.378 That being said, their 
distinction is not a hard and fast one, as the first two roles can transcend the bounds of 
the organization (e.g., litigation to appeal an organizational limit setting decision, 
legislative action based on organizational decisions),379 and the last function can also be 
fulfilled within the bounds of the organization. Thus, it may be better to think of the roles 
                                                          
technology and who disagree with the conclusions of the report by the KCE. (David 
Adriaen, “IBA: ‘Effectiviteit van protontherapie staat niet ter discussie',” De Tijd, January  
24, 2019. https://www.tijd.be/ondernemen/farma-biotech/iba-effectiviteit-van-proton 
therapie-staat-niet-ter-discussie/10090820.html.) It is worth noting the recommendation 
of the KCE is not based on cost-effectiveness, but rather the effectiveness of proton 
therapy regardless of costs.  
373 Daniels, Just Health, 131. 
374 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58. 
375 Daniels, Just Health, 131. 
376 Daniels, Just Health, 131. 
377 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58-59. 
378 Daniels, Just Health, 131. 
379 I adopt the two examples from Daniels and Sabin’s discussion of members seeking out 
external authorities or organizations to pursue their interests. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting 
Limits Fairly, 59.) Their discussion makes their earlier distinction between the internal and 
external roles of dispute resolution mechanisms moot, as they implicitly acknowledge the 




as more fluid, taking place at different levels of analysis and moving between them. The 
third condition operates in tandem with the publicity and relevance condition (see 4.4.4.1 
The Publicity Condition and 4.4.4.2 The Relevance Condition). As the reasoning behind the 
original decision is publicly accessible and decisions are constrained by relevant reasons, 
participants using revisions and appeals mechanisms understand the basis on which the 
resource allocation decision was made, and therefore can more effectively and efficiently 
engage in dispute resolution.380 Daniels and Sabin’s discussion focuses on the 
effectiveness of the dispute resolution procedures.381 They argue the revisions and 
appeals condition provides “a visible and public route back into the policy formulation 
process,” thus enriching the policy-making process, among others, increasing legitimacy 
and leading to fairer outcomes, and contributing to the improvement of quality of 
resource allocation decisions.382 Daniels and Sabin do little in terms of discussing the 
efficiency of the conflict-resolution process.383 However, Ostrom’s sixth design principle 
(see 2.6.6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms) emphasizes the need for efficiency, as she 
argues for “rapid access to low-cost local arenas in which to resolve conflict among users 
or between users and officials.”384 As such, Ostrom’s design principle complements 
Daniels and Sabin’s third condition, and vice versa, since Ostrom does not discuss how 
                                                          
380 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58. 
381 As a reminder, Daniels and Sabin do not seem to make a clear distinction between 
effectiveness and efficiency (see footnote 284). 
382 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 59. 
383 Daniels and Sabin do point out that deferring conflict resolution to external authorities 
is costly, thus acknowledging the importance of efficiency. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting 
Limits Fairly, 58.) 
384 Ostrom, “Design Principles of Robust Property Institutions,” 35. 
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conflict-resolution mechanisms can lead to higher quality decision-making. According to 
Ostrom, conflict-resolution procedures should have the following features: (1) They 
should be rapid, both in allowing members access to the procedures and the ensuing 
process of resolving the conflict, as lingering conflicts undermine trust and legitimacy.385 
It is worth noting the publicity and relevance conditions contribute to the rapidity of 
conflict resolution, as any prior reasoning is publicly available and vetted according to 
relevance, making it easier to appeal resource allocation decisions. (2) The conflict 
resolution mechanisms should be low-cost, because participants will not bother making 
use of the procedures when the cost to enter into the process, and to resolve it, is 
prohibitively high. The speed of the revisions and appeals process is only one aspect of 
low-cost procedures. However, when the costs of entering into the revisions and appeals 
process are too low, this holds the risk of a flood of challenges to resource allocation 
decision, which results in significant costs that, in turn, drive up the costs of making an 
appeal. Health care, with its impact on life and health, likely is particularly susceptible to 
a deluge of challenges. Thus, a balance must be found between ensuring access to the 
dispute resolution process on the one hand, and making sure the mechanism is not 
overwhelmed on the other hand. Daniels and Sabin’s second condition possibly provides 
a way to put constraints on challenges, as it may be able to function as the basis for a 
criterion to separate legitimate and futile challenges. As Daniels and Sabin note, the 
                                                          
385 Daniels acknowledges the importance of timeliness in Just Health (2008): “These 
mechanisms – whatever their specific forms – must function in a timely way so that errors 
can be corrected and specific harms to individuals or groups remedied or avoided.” 
(Daniels, Just Health, 132.) 
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trifecta of the publicity, relevance, and revisions and appeals conditions does not imply 
that every challenge leads to a reconsideration of the resource allocation decision in 
question.386  “It does, however, mean that good arguments that plausibly challenge the 
original decision are provided a visible and public route back into the policy formulation 
process.”387 That being said, Daniels and Sabin do not detail how to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate appeals. (3) Dispute resolution mechanisms should be “local,” 
which can be interpreted as being situated at the appropriate level of analysis. For one, 
this means revisions and appeals of resource allocation decisions should first take place 
internal to organizations. Daniels and Sabin support resolving disputes internally for a 
host of reasons: the broad engagement of stakeholders affected by the decision, the cost 
of external procedures, and the fact courts are ill equipped to handle limit-setting 
decisions.388 Well-functioning internal dispute resolution mechanisms lead to more 
effective and efficient deliberation if a conflict is escalated to an external authority. Then 
there is the question of where dispute resolution procedures should be situated within 
organizations. There should likely be a variety of mechanisms, both formal and informal, 
throughout the organization.389 Commons research suggests that more formal 
mechanisms and “last-step internal procedures”390 are best located at the middle-level, 
among others, to avoid elite capture and ensure accessibility.391  As always the concrete 
                                                          
386 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 59. 
387 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 59. 
388 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58-59. 
389 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58. 
390 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58. 
391 Linda Emanuel makes a similar remark discussing the position of ethics offices in health 
care organizations: “The reporting structure of the system is also important. This system 
386 
 
answer differs from one organization to the next, since any solution resource users 
develop is dependent on the institutional and environmental details (see 2.2 The Ostrom 
Approach). For large institutions, a polycentric approach to revisions and appeals, with 
nested dispute resolution mechanisms at multiple levels, is likely necessary (see 3.5 
Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).392 Local conflict-resolution mechanisms may 
lead to more effective (Daniels and Sabin) and more efficient (Ostrom) decision-making, 
as they ensure easy access and broad stakeholder input. The lack of accessible, low-cost, 
                                                          
is likely to receive information about unethical activities. The ethics office must be careful 
to avoid investigation and compliance functions that do not belong to it, but the office 
may receive relevant information that needs to be reported. In order that the entire 
organization is held to standards of integrity, reporting needs to be able to go to all levels 
directly. It is unlikely and usually undesirable that the ethics office exist at the highest level 
of an organizational reporting chart; this would engender a top-down culture of ethics 
that is not conducive to good relations or to involving everyone in friendly, supportive, and 
rigorous standards of integrity. A better process and structural counterpart might be to 
have the ethics office exist at an intermediate level, with normal reporting processes for 
routine matters, but have additional reporting rights and obligations that can go to any 
place in the organization according to the needs of the case.” (Emphasis mine.) (Linda 
Emanuel, “Ethics and the Structures of Healthcare,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics 9, no. 2 (April 2000): 162.) The same reasoning can be applied to the 
implementation of the revisions and appeals condition.  
392 A polycentric approach to resolving disputes and conflicts may also consist of an 
independent mediator. The mediator can function as an independent body within an 
organization or be conceived as an external body. Weaving a mediator into the 
institutional fabric may provide a solution to one of Daniels and Sabin’s main qualms, 
namely the escalation of disputes to ill-equipped courts, as the mediating body can 
specialize in processing revisions and appeals. The approach is similar to arbitration, 
which in recent years is increasingly used in health care settings, but would rely more 
heavily on member participation. (Olga Khazan, “How Arbitration Affects Health Care,” 
The Atlantic, November 2, 2015. https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/11/ 
arbitration-medical/413641/.) A possible worry about traditional arbitration is that the 
arbitrator will side with the health care organization, as they build a longtime and 
mutually beneficial relationship, rather than with the participant filing a dispute. So-called 
“arbitration clauses” may be used negatively, i.e., to force participants into arbitration, 
rather than positively, i.e., to provide a fair and low-cost conflict-resolution mechanism. 
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and fair conflict-resolution procedures threatens the long-run sustainability of health care 
organizations, as lingering or unresolved conflicts undermine trust and the willingness to 
cooperate. “If the only kind of conflict-resolution mechanisms available are either so 
costly or so biased that most self-governed common-pool resources cannot make use of 
them, these conflicts can themselves destroy even very robust institutional 
arrangements.”393,394 
 Daniels and Sabin’s revisions and appeals condition and Ostrom’s design principles 
interface in several other ways. I already pointed out the possibility of nested conflict-
resolution mechanisms in the previous paragraph. Ostrom’s recommendation to organize 
governance activities within “multiple layers of nested enterprises”395 is applicable to the 
implementation of the revisions and appeals condition in large health care institutions 
(see 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises). As Daniels and Sabin point out, in practice such layering of 
dispute-resolution mechanisms already takes place, 
 
Typically, internal dispute resolution procedures in health plans range from 
informal complaints to ombudsmen, to more formal grievance procedures with 
well-defined stages of appeal, to final appeals to panels of medical directors or 
other last-step internal procedures.396 
 
                                                          
393 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 279. 
394 Ostrom’s turn of phrase is a bit odd, as “self-governed common-pool resources” are 
unlikely to make use of much of anything at all. The users of the resources are the ones 
who must make use of conflict-resolution mechanisms. 
395 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 101. 
396 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58. 
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Commons research stresses the need to “match” rules at different levels, both vertically 
and horizontally, in order to produce integrated, or “complete,”397 mechanisms for 
revisions and appeals.398 An integrated approach to conflict resolution also requires the 
minimal recognition of the right to establish and operate dispute-resolution procedures 
(see 2.6.7 Recognition of Rights to Organize), both internally and externally. Within 
institutions, mechanisms situated at higher levels in the organization should recognize 
conflict-resolution procedures functioning at lower levels. In much the same way, 
external revisions and appeals procedures should respect efforts to resolve disputes 
internally, which implies building on internal efforts when conflicts are escalated to 
external authorities. While the recognition of the right to set up conflict-resolution 
mechanisms at lower levels is important, mechanisms must be in place to pass issues on 
to higher-level authorities if necessary, which is part of creating an integrated approach 
to dispute resolution. However, there are benefits to allow those stakeholders involved 
in the conflict to try to resolve it locally first (e.g., local knowledge, common interest, 
lower cost). Finally, Daniels and Sabin make the following remark, 
 
Internally, the Revisions and Appeals Condition closes the loop between decision 
makers and those who are affected by their policies. Done well, it engages a 
broader segment of stakeholder in the process of deliberation.399 
 
Their suggestion tags on to Ostrom’s discussion of closing the loop between monitors and 
users, in effect turning users into the auditors of the monitors (see 2.6.4 Monitoring), 
                                                          
397 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 101-102. 
398 See 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises for a discussion of the notion “completeness.” 
399 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 58. 
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which highlights that conflict-resolution mechanisms are also a form of monitoring, as it 
allows participants to appeal resource allocation decisions made at higher-levels in the 
organization.400 
4.4.4.4 THE REGULATIVE CONDITION 
The fourth and final condition states, “There is either voluntary or public regulation of the 
process to ensure that conditions 1-3 are met.”401 In other words, the purpose of the 
regulative condition is to make sure that institutions meet the conditions of publicity, 
relevance, and revisability.402 Daniels and Sabin’s discussion of the fourth condition is 
short and does not go much further than suggesting that, ultimately, public regulation will 
be required to ensure the implementation of the three prior conditions.403 I find it odd 
that the final condition is discussed so briefly.404 After all, it concerns the implementation 
of the three preceding conditions, and thus of the A4R approach as a whole. While Daniels 
and Sabin acknowledge the final condition is difficult to implement, they attribute this to 
the presence of a coordination problem, but otherwise they present the fourth condition 
as straightforward to fulfill. I will argue Daniels and Sabin underestimate the problems 
surrounding the implementation of the regulative condition, but first I look at their 
argument in a bit more detail. 
                                                          
400 Agrawal, “Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking,” 275. 
401 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 45. 
402 Daniels, Just Health, 133. 
403 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 60. 
404 The discussion takes up one page in Setting Limits Fairly (2008) and less than a page in 
Just Health (2008). 
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 Daniels and Sabin assert there may be private regulatory mechanisms that can 
ensure that institutions abide by the publicity, relevance, and revisions conditions. They 
give the example of the standards issued by the National Committee for Quality Insurance 
(NCQA) for technology assessments,405 which can conceivably be modified to include the 
conditions of A4R.406 By voluntarily adopting A4R, health care institutions would receive 
an accreditation that shows they have “incorporated steps toward addressing fairness 
and legitimacy problems.”407 A failure to adopt the conditions of A4R voluntarily could 
result in public regulation. While Daniels and Sabin’s analysis is neutral between voluntary 
private enforcement and public regulation of the conditions they outline, they believe 
that, “ultimately, public regulation will be required,”408 due to the presence of a 
coordination problem.409 As individual health care organizations rightfully fear to be the 
first to take action (e.g., exposure to litigation, bad publicity), they are unwilling to adopt 
A4R. All health care organizations, and their members, are worse off as a result.410 
Therefore, all organizations need to agree on adopting A4R in order to mitigate the risk 
to eliminate the risk for first-movers and to reap the benefits of collective action.411 
Strangely enough, Daniels and Sabin conclude the paragraph by stating that health care 
                                                          
405 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 60. 
406 Daniels, Just Health, 133. 
407 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 60. 
408 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 60. 
409 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 60-61. 
410 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 61. 
411 The challenge is akin to the collective-action problem haunting the governance of 
scarce health care resources in general (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons). 
In fact, Daniels and Sabin relate the problem to the prisoner’s dilemma in the chapter’s 
endnotes. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 66.) 
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organizations can gain a competitive advantage by “being open about reasons,”412 which 
means early adopters of A4R may in fact benefit from their decision to implement the 
approach.413 The statement is at odds with their defense of the claim that public 
regulation is likely necessary.414 Moreover, the claim downplays the strengths and 
advantages of A4R argued for throughout Setting Limits Fairly (2002) and Just Health 
(2008), almost as if Daniels and Sabin do not believe in their own approach. Assuming that 
health care organizations and their members indeed benefit from A4R, the voluntary 
adoption of the approach by individual organizations to gain a competitive edge may not 
be as farfetched as Daniels and Sabin make it seem.415 Consequently, public regulation to 
implement the A4R approach might not be a necessity, a suggestion I return to when 
discussing a cooperative approach to implementing the regulative condition. 
 Leaving aside the tension between voluntary and public regulation, Daniels and 
Sabin’s argument is short and straightforward, highlighting the coordination problem as 
                                                          
412 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 61. 
413 The suggestion that organizations can adopt A4R in a way that gives them a 
competitive advantage is missing from Just Health (2008), possibly because Daniels 
realized it did not sit well with the rest of the discussion. (Daniels, Just Health, 133.) 
414 Of course, there is the possibility that individual health care organizations can indeed 
benefit from adopting A4R, but wrongly believe that they will not. As a result, 
organizations choose not to voluntarily adopt A4R, as they estimate it is not in their best 
interest. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 66.) 
415 One way to test whether the gradual, voluntary adoption of A4R can be successful is 
by measuring and comparing the performance of organizations that have adopted A4R 
with the performance of organizations that have not. Of course, both the measurement 
and the comparison of institutional performance are nontrivial. To raise just a few issues: 
What variables are good measures of institutional performance? How to measure 
improvements in justice? How to isolate the influence of A4R? Moreover, are 
comparisons between health care institutions even possible? Nonetheless, quantitative 
evidence showing the benefit of A4R to health care institutions may lead more 
organizations to adopt the approach voluntarily.  
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the main difficulty toward implementation. Whether they are correct in presenting the 
final condition as relatively easy to fulfill depends on the interpretation of the regulative 
condition. Daniels and Sabin seem to think of regulation in an uncomplicated manner, 
simply requiring organizations to adopt the three prior conditions, whether voluntarily or 
through public regulation. Since they believe that public regulation will eventually be 
required, the condition can presumably be implemented simply by passing regulations 
forcing organizations to adopt A4R. In their view, the regulative condition does not seem 
to differ much qualitatively from the three prior conditions. I argue, however, that the 
regulative condition can plausible be interpreted as operating at the collective-choice 
level (see 2.6.3 Collective Choice Arrangements), while the publicity, relevance, and 
conflict-resolution conditions must be situated at the operational level (see 4.4.2 A4R as 
Design Principles).416 Simply put, the first three conditions detail the rules for the fair, day-
to-day resource allocation decisions; but the regulative condition is concerned with the 
making and changing of the operational rules. The final condition operates at a higher 
level than the other three conditions, but also serves as their foundation. The publicity, 
relevance, and dispute-resolution conditions are instituted and governed over by the 
regulative condition. As such, the latter does not simply entail the requirement to 
implement the other conditions, but itself is a complex set of rules that must be 
developed in detail. To give some examples, what regulations are in place to monitor and 
sanction the implementation of A4R? How can the A4R approach be amended if the need 
                                                          




arises? And what freedom do institutions have to fill in the institutional details of the prior 
conditions? In addition, interpreting the regulative condition as a complex set of rules 
operating at the collective-choice level highlights the presence of a second-order 
institutional issue, or a recursive meta-level application, since the regulative condition 
itself plausibly has to meet the publicity, relevance, and conflict-resolution conditions to 
ensure the fairness of the A4R approach. A more detailed exploration of these issues, and 
their possible solution, is beyond the scope of the current project. The goal is to show 
that Daniels and Sabin may be too optimistic about both content and implementation of 
the regulative condition, which likely requires much more than simply stating there is a 
need for public regulation. 
 Several remarks are in place: First, Daniels and Sabin may argue that a more 
complex interpretation of the regulative condition is unproblematic, or even superfluous, 
because they have laid out the prior conditions in sufficient detail, especially the publicity 
and relevance condition. Therefore, the first three conditions indeed are simply in need 
of “regulation” in the narrow sense in which they seem to interpret the last condition. 
However, Daniels and Sabin have not specified the institutional details, which differ on a 
case-by-case basis, and must be decided upon at the collective-choice level through a set 
of rules that goes beyond simply requiring the implementation of their approach. This is 
especially true of the revisions and appeals condition, which requires a more elaborate 
set of rules at the collective-choice level in order to effect institutional change in response 
to disputes. Second, and closely related to the previous remark, the regulative condition 
can plausibly be situated as operating at several levels of analysis simultaneously. At a 
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lower level of analysis, the regulative condition functions in conjunction with the other 
conditions as a collective-choice arrangement governing over them. At a higher level of 
analysis, the final condition operates as a requirement to implement A4R, much in the 
way that Daniels and Sabin envision the regulative condition.417 Third, Daniels and Sabin’s 
argument in favor of public regulation hinges on the presence of a coordination problem 
precluding the voluntary adoption of A4R. However, coordination problems also arise in 
the context of public regulation, health care reform being a prime example. While it may 
be easier to implement A4R once there is political agreement, the challenge is to reach 
political agreement on the adoption of the approach. In other words, in case of public 
regulation the coordination problem shifts from the economic to the political arena, but 
it does not disappear. Finally, Daniels and Sabin’s discussion of the regulative condition 
falls within the market-state dichotomy, contrasting the voluntary adoption of A4R with 
the public regulation of the approach. While they do not explicitly equate voluntary 
regulation to the market, their broader argument works within the confines of the 
dichotomy (see 4.5.1 Breaking Open the Dichotomy), making it plausible to interpret their 
discussion of the regulative condition in terms of market, i.e., voluntary regulation, versus 
state, i.e., public regulation. An interpretation that is further supported by the fact Daniels 
and Sabin associate voluntary regulation with the idea of competition and the possibility 
of gaining a competitive advantage. However, voluntary regulation can also take place 
                                                          
417 That being said, even when operating as a high-level requirement, I still think the 
regulative condition requires much more institutional details than provided by Daniels 
and Sabin in order to perform its function of “ruling in” the three prior conditions. 
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within a cooperative rather than a competitive structure.418,419 Individual health care 
organizations can organize themselves into commons institutions in order to jointly adopt 
the A4R approach. While getting such a collaboration off the ground requires the actors 
involved to overcome a coordination problem in its own right, this may be an easier 
obstacle to overcome than the coordination problem highlighted by Daniels and Sabin, 
i.e., the fear of individual organizations to be the first-mover and the possible competitive 
disadvantage associated with it.420 Thus, individuals and organizations convinced of the 
merits of A4R may be able to adopt the approach locally after which their efforts can be 
scaled up overtime through nesting (see 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises).421 If the goal is to 
institute A4R throughout the health care system, then a bottom-up approach offers a 
complementary path to achieve system-wide adoption. Of course, and in conclusion, the 
implementation of A4R is not a story of either/or, as any of the three institutional models 
                                                          
418 The present contrast between cooperation (commons) and competition (market) as 
two instances of voluntary regulation provides a good opportunity to once again point 
out that, while the three institutional models are often talked about in terms of mutually 
exclusive ideals, real-world institutions are mixed and must be situated on a continuum 
between the ideals of market, state, and commons (see Figure 0.1: The Institutional 
Plane).   
419 Moreover, the choice between voluntary and public regulation, as presented by 
Daniels and Sabin, is a false dichotomy. Voluntary and public regulation can be blended 
in what one might call “coordinated competition,” where the voluntary adoption of A4R 
by market actors is facilitated from the top-down, albeit without instituting a hard 
requirement (see also 5.5.1 Breaking Open the Dichotomy). 
420 Daniels hints at such a cooperative approach in Just Health (2008). He suggests that in 
“an intensely competitive environment” associations of organizations may have an easier 
time adopting A4R than individual organizations. (Daniels, Just Health, 119.) 
421 Moreover, the local adoption of A4R by a range of organizations in a variety of contexts 
would result in a large number of parallel institutional experiments, allowing proponents 
of the approach to learn what works and what does not when implementing A4R as well 
as to refine the approach itself (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments).  
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(i.e., market, states, and commons) may prove successful in promoting the approach. The 
best bet to implement A4R successfully is to pursue the approach along the lines of the 
three institutional paradigms simultaneously, among others, in the form of hybrid 
institutional arrangements (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?).422 
 
Both this chapter and section are titled A4R in Practice, but the preceding discussion of 
the conditions of A4R in relation to commons research raises the following question: How 
practical does Ostrom’s work make Daniels and Sabin’s approach? Commons research 
adds to the practicability of A4R by conceiving of the approach’s four conditions as design 
principles that must be specified in order to be implemented in concrete organizations 
operating in dissimilar local conditions (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles), as is argued 
by Ostrom as well as Daniels and Sabin (see 4.4.3 Daniels and Ostrom: A Natural Fit?). 
Commons research provides an abstract framework and technical language to think and 
to talk about the A4R approach. Moreover, Ostrom’s work provides a theoretical toolkit 
rooted in empirical evidence to avoid certain pitfalls when implementing A4R, while at 
the same time suggesting new solutions to put the approach in practice. Ultimately, the 
                                                          
422 Much depends on the institutional context, public regulation seems the obvious path 
to implement A4R in single-payer systems, while a mixed health care system, like that of 
the United States, likely requires a multipronged approach (see also 2.2 The Ostrom 
Approach). That being said, even in single-payer systems other institutional arrangements 
can play a role in promoting A4R. For example, when there is no broad political agreement 
on the adoption of A4R, individual organizations or groups of organizations may still be 
able to move ahead with the adoption of the approach voluntarily. Of course, more often 
than not organizations are not allowed to do so within the confines of a centralized health 
care system. Commons research suggests central authorities should grant some 
autonomy to subsidiaries (see 2.6.7 Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize), among 
others, to promote innovation (see 3.3 Parallel Experiments). 
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adoption of A4R must be conceived as a continuous process of institutional change within 
a dynamic health care landscape, striving for an as-fair-as-possible allocation of resource 
through institutional trial-and-error. The following section highlights some more ways in 
which Ostrom’s work is relevant to Daniels and Sabin’s approach beyond elucidating the 
four conditions of A4R.  
4.5 THE FURTHER INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A4R  
NIE in general and commons research in particular interface with the A4R approach in 
more ways than can easily be discussed within the confines of the four conditions. I 
highlight a few other key ideas from institutional thought and their potential value to 
Daniels and Sabin’s work. It is important to note that while the following discussion is 
systematic, it is not exhaustive. 
4.5.1 BREAKING OPEN THE DICHOTOMY 
A4R does not depend on any one institutional arrangement. From the outset, Daniels and 
Sabin note the legitimacy problem is common to all health care systems, regardless of the 
institutional details, and so is their proposed solution.423 In other words, market, state, 
commons, and hybrid institutions alike can adopt the A4R approach. Nevertheless, 
Daniels and Sabin’s work is framed by the market-state dichotomy (see 0.2 Market and 
State: A False Dichotomy), which exerts a considerable influence on their writing and the 
ideas expressed therein. To give just a few examples: Both in the original preface of 
Setting Limits Fairly (2002) and in the preface to the second edition (2008), Daniels and 
Sabin discuss limit setting in the context of private (market), public (state), and mixed 
                                                          
423 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 4. 
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(market-state) health care systems.424 Of course, their argument is that limit setting must 
inevitably take place in all these systems, but the dichotomy nonetheless figures 
prominently in the prefaces. The influence of the dichotomy is also noticeable in the first 
chapter, where Daniels and Sabin discuss the legitimacy problem in terms of market and 
state.425,426 Their discussion of the regulative condition is another example of how the 
dichotomy defines their work. The latter example is particularly interesting, because it 
shows that while the institutions of market and state often function as mere guide marks, 
they nonetheless influence certain key concepts, among others, the regulative condition, 
which is construed in terms of voluntary and public regulation, with a clear preference for 
the latter (see 4.4.4.3 The Regulative Condition). 
 As Daniels and Sabin are stuck in the dichotomy’s institutional straightjacket, they 
fail to see the possibility of cooperation at the meso-level of health care institutions.   
Commons research breaks open the discussion of A4R by introducing an institutional 
arrangement that is especially amenable to accounts of procedural justice in general and 
the A4R approach in particular. Integrating commons research with A4R retains the 
institutional flexibility that Daniels and Sabin are looking for in the development of their 
approach, while at the same time providing an adaptable set of concrete institutional 
                                                          
424 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, vii-xiii. 
425 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 6-10. 
426 Daniels and Sabin contrast the public health care systems of Europe with the mixed 
health care system of the United States. Interestingly, they also frame the challenge of 
setting limits in health care systems in the developing world in terms of the institutions 
of market and state. (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 6-10.) While I have not paid 
special attention to health care in the developing world, because of particular issues that 
arise in the context, the relative weakness of the status quo institutions may make it 
easier to set up health care commons in developing countries (see 5.3 Future Research). 
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design principles for the fair allocation of health care resources. The integration of both 
approaches is promising, but if this chapter has shown anything, it is that more work must 
be done to incorporate the ideas of Ostrom with those of Daniels and Sabin into a 
coherent approach. Pending a more complete integration of both approaches, NIE can 
provide another interesting, albeit more modest contribution to A4R by supplying 
theoretical tools to think about health care organizations more intricately and 
systematically, even within the confines of the market-state continuum. 
4.5.2 INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS 
Commons research emphasizes the presence and importance of rule interactions, which 
matter to Daniels and Sabin’s approach in at least two different ways. First, the four 
conditions of A4R are interrelated.427 Moreover, the provisions of A4R interact with 
Ostrom’s design principles when combined into an integrated approach. Discussions of 
the design principles often underline interactions between them.428 For example, often 
the third design principle is discussed in relation to the second design principle, which 
suggests the need for congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements). Similarly, the nesting principle is 
                                                          
427 Of course, a relationship between rules does not necessarily imply an interaction, but 
often rules do interact with one other. For example, nesting rules influence the 
boundaries of the CPR, while any change to the boundary rules will have repercussions 
for the nesting of the institution (see 2.6.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries and 2.6.8 Nested 
Enterprises).  
428 While discussions of individual design principles often mention their relationship to 
other principles, the commons literature does not provide a detailed analysis and 
mapping of the interactions between the principles. A more systematic treatment of 
institutional interactions is a promising avenue for future research, as such interactions 
plausibly contribute to the success and failure of institutions. 
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at least in part motivated by the first design principle, which calls for clearly defined 
boundaries (see 2.6.8 Nested Enterprises). The four conditions of A4R interact with one 
another in much the same way. Daniels and Sabin implicitly acknowledge the conditions 
are interrelated in their discussion of the regulative condition, which ensures the 
adoption of the publicity, relevance, and revisions conditions. However, commons 
research suggests the conditions interact with one another beyond the influence exerted 
by the regulative condition on the three prior conditions. For example, the publicity 
condition must also apply to the regulation of A4R. In the same way, the revisions and 
appeals condition, which must allow for institutional change, interacts with the regulative 
condition (see 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition). Combining A4R with the design 
principles for successful commons institutions results in additional and more complex 
interactions, as the number of variables increases. To give just one example, the 
regulative condition must include rules for monitoring and sanctioning (see 2.6.4 
Monitoring and 2.6.5 Graduated Sanctions), which in turn influence the regulative 
condition.  
Second, interactions occur between rules operating at different levels of analysis 
(see also 2.5 The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework).429 Adopting a set of 
rules in one place within an institutional arrangement likely has implications for rules 
downstream, upstream, and laterally. To give an example, if one of Kaiser Permanente’s 
                                                          
429 Interactions sit at the center of the IAD framework (see Figure 2.1: The IAD framework). 
However, the IAD framework primarily focuses on the effect of interactions between 
participants within an action situation on the situation’s outcomes. Granted, the rules-in-
use shape the action situation, but interactions between the rules are not the focal point 
of the framework or discussions thereof.  
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Medical Groups would adopt the A4R approach, then this would have implications for the 
rules within that Medical Group (downstream), but it could also affect the rules of other 
Medical Groups and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (lateral). In addition, the rules of the 
overarching Permanente Foundation impact the adoption of A4R by one of the Medical 
Groups (upstream), but these higher-level rules could also change under the influence of 
important rule changes with one of the Medical Groups.430 It is worth noting that even in 
cases where the relationship between the rules seems unidirectional, say the 
downstream implementation of A4R, interactions can still be bi- or multidirectional. To 
illustrate, downstream institutional arrangements can resist the introduction of the new 
rules, which may result in the need to change the rules during or after implementation. 
Moreover, institutions are not closed systems, but are embedded in environments in 
which they interact with other discrete institutional entities (e.g., competitors, 
stakeholders).431 Thus, rule interactions take place between institutions that at first sight 
appear independent from one another. For example, a health care system’s resource 
allocation rules are likely influenced by the rules-in-use at competing health care systems. 
The last two design principles (see 2.6.7 Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize and 
2.6.8 Nested Enterprises) are meant to regulate the relationship between rules at 
different loci of analysis, whether vertically or horizontally.  
                                                          
430 The example makes abstraction of the intricacies of Kaiser Permanente’s 
organizational structure. For example, the Medical Groups are self-governed entities, and 
thus they are not full subsidiaries of the Permanente Federation in the way the term is 
usually understood (i.e., subordinate to and controlled by). The aim of the example is to 
illustrate rule interactions within complex organizations. 
431 Institutions are also embedded in, and thus impacted by, more encompassing social, 
political, and legal institutions. 
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  While I have focused on two particular types of institutional interactions, it is 
worth keeping in mind that rules interact in a multitude of ways, some of which may be 
unexpected. To give an example, the adoption of A4R to set fair limits on resource usage 
may influence rules for human resource management, or interfere with norms used by 
health care providers when communicating with their patients. When implementing the 
A4R approach, or when introducing any other major rule changes, institutional designers 
should be conscious of the possibility of rule interactions to ensure institutional success 
and sustainability.  
4.5.3 THE COST OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
NIE draws attention to the cost of rule changes. While Daniels and Sabin are fully aware 
of the difficulty of implementing A4R, they do not explicitly discuss the cost of institutional 
change as a significant challenge to the implementation of their approach. This is 
especially interesting because Daniels and Sabin’s work centers on the issue of cost in the 
context of resource allocation, which motivates their research and figures prominently in 
some of their proposed solutions (i.e., a deliberative approach to cost-effectiveness 
analysis).432,433 In short, Daniels and Sabin are intimately familiar with the issue of cost in 
health care. However, they fail to apply their extensive experience with of cost-based 
reasoning to their own approach, particularly the implementation thereof. Any change to 
the rules implies costs. This is particularly clear in the case of health care reform, which is 
no other than a large-scale overhaul of the rules governing health care. In order to effect 
                                                          
432 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 12, 37-39, 55-57. 
433 Daniels, Just Health, 105-106, 114-117. 
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institutional change, a large enough group of actors must see the benefits of adopting the 
new set of rules as outweighing the costs of doing so.434 The same cost-benefit reasoning 
applies to the implementation of A4R, regardless of whether the approach is adopted by 
a local hospital or by a national health care system. I provide three illustrations of how 
cost-based reasoning matters when implementing A4R: (1) Institutional design requires 
time, effort, and money (e.g., meetings to decide upon the new rules, changes to 
guidelines and IT systems, training). Whether the aim is to introduce new rules or to 
modify existing ones, institutional change implies considerable upfront costs that are 
higher the more complex the institutional setting (e.g., health care system, large 
hospital).435 The upfront costs of changing the rules may be so high that they prove 
difficult to overcome, even when there are benefits to adopting the new rules. (2) Even 
though Daniels and Sabin provide rigorous theoretical arguments and considerable 
empirical evidence to support their approach, it is not at all certain the adoption of A4R 
by a concrete organization will be successful in terms of the benefits that follow from the 
rule change. This uncertainty must be discounted when weighing the costs and benefits 
of adopting A4R, making it less likely the approach is implemented. (3) For the sake of the 
argument, consider a concrete organization that is in a unique position to adopt A4R 
without incurring any of the upfront costs associated with doing so. Moreover, assume 
                                                          
434 To say a “large enough group of actors must see the benefit of adopting the new set 
of rules” is an oversimplification, as the size of the group of actors is not the only relevant 
variable. The influence actors can exert on the decision-making process also matters. 
More often than not, a small but powerful group of decision makers are the ones who 
decide upon the rule change. 
435 The presence of rule interactions adds to the cost of implementing rule changes (see 
4.5.2 Institutional Interactions). 
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the implementation with certainty would result in a fairer allocation of resources, and 
even to a more efficient use of resources.436 Thus, the benefits of adopting the approach 
outweigh the costs. Even under these assumptions, the approach still may not be 
implemented if the cost-benefit analysis works out differently for key decision-makers 
who are disadvantaged by changing the rules, say, because they benefit financially from 
the current state of affairs.  
 NIE’s emphasis on the cost of institutional change is valuable when putting Daniels 
and Sabin’s approach into practice, as it can help to guide rule changes. To give an 
example, while the benefits of A4R might not outweigh the costs of implementing the 
approach at one scale, the cost-benefit calculus may be in favor of the approach at 
another scale (e.g., the approach may successfully be implemented within a department 
or unit, but not system-wide). Moreover, the focus on the cost of rule changes can enrich 
some of Daniels and Sabin’s arguments. For example, the high upfront costs associated 
with implementing A4R suggests the need for public regulation (see 4.4.4.3 Regulative 
Condition). At the same time, however, NIE’s cost-benefit analysis highlights the challenge 
of effecting institutional change from the top down when those at the top do not stand 
to benefit from the new rules.   
4.5.4 INSTITUTIONAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Ostrom’s work draws attention to the importance of institutional sustainability and the 
sustainable management of scarce resources. The two are inextricably linked, as the 
                                                          




former is a prerequisite for the latter (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons).437 Moreover, 
the sustainability of both the available resources and the institutions managing them is a 
precondition for fair resource allocation.438,439 Therefore, institutional sustainability is 
relevant to Daniels and Sabin’s work.  
 To be sustainable, institutions must be adaptable, i.e., able to respond to changing 
circumstances. For the A4R approach, as for any set of rules, provisions must be made to 
alter the rules in response to changes. Daniels and Sabin foresee a mechanism to change 
the operational rules through the inclusion of the revisions and appeals condition (see 
4.4.4.3 The Revisions and Appeals Condition). However, they do not discuss the need for 
the A4R approach itself to be changeable, at least when put into institutional practice. 
Remember, the four conditions themselves are concrete, but high-level requirements 
that must be made specific when the approach is implemented (see 4.4.4.4 The 
Regulative Condition), i.e., the institutional details need to be filled out. A4R, as an 
                                                          
437 I leave aside uncommon scenarios in which the institution collapses and the resource 
flourishes as a result. For example, the disappearance of a coastal culture relying on 
fishery may lead to an increase in the number of fish. Two remarks are in place: (1) The 
example may come across as counterintuitive, because commons research focuses on 
situations where the absence of rules leads to the overexploitation and, ultimately, to the 
destruction of the resource. (2) Scenarios like the one above may be limited to natural 
resources, as it is difficult to imagine artificial resources flourishing in an institutional 
vacuum. There may be certain outlandish examples, like a self-sustaining artificial 
intelligence or a colony of nanobots, even though those are unique in that they can 
plausibly be conceived as corporeal sets of rules (i.e., institutions). For the purpose of the 
present discussion, it is sufficient to note that health care resources do not thrive in the 
absence of governing institutions. 
438 Of course, sustainability in and of itself is not a sufficient condition for equity, but in 
order to ensure the fair allocation of resources, the resources and the rules-in-use cannot 
collapse. 
439 Daniels acknowledges this in his discussion of aging and intergenerational equity. 
(Daniels, Just Health, 166-168.) 
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approach to deliberative justice, is general enough to remain the same over time, so the 
four conditions can remain the same in light of changing circumstances.440 This is not true, 
however, of real-world applications of the approach, which must be able to respond to 
change. To give a straightforward example, resource allocation decisions can be made 
public by sending a physical letter to patients and providers, but technological innovations 
allow such decisions to be communicated via email or even social media (e.g., Twitter). 
The same applies to the appeals condition, which can require petitioners to file an appeal 
in person, or allow them to fill out and submit a form online. In both cases, technological 
developments suggest changes to the way in which the publicity and appeals conditions 
are implemented respectively. Institutions that utilize the A4R approach must make sure 
their implementation is dynamic, allowing changes to be made to the set of rules as 
circumstances change.    
 Interestingly, the idea of institutional sustainability also highlights an unexplored 
feature of A4R, as the approach can help to ensure the sustainability of health care 
institutions and resources. After all, if their members perceive health care institutions as 
unfair, then this can adversely impact the sustainability of rules and resources alike in that 
inequity leads to free-rider behavior. In other words, institutions that adopt A4R may, by 
doing so, change incentives in a way that discourages free-riding behavior and boosts 
sustainability. This is not just true of health care institutions, but of any organization 
                                                          
440 Of course, the level of abstraction of their approach may also explain why Daniels and 
Sabin do not deem it necessary to discuss the adaptability of their approach, as the 
conditions of A4R as design principles of equitable health care institutions stand 
regardless of changes in circumstances. I argue this inalterability does not apply to 
concrete A4R implementations, which need to be flexible in light of changes. 
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managing scarce resources, whether natural or artificial. This once again highlights the 
potential relevance of Daniels and Sabin’s work to commons research (see also 4.3.2.1 A 
Theory of Justice for the Commons?).  
4.5.5 (RE)ESTABLISHING THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION 
Procedural accounts of justice, like A4R, can help to (re)establish the spirit of cooperation 
throughout the American health care system.441 As I have discussed at length, 
cooperation is advantageous in institutional design, as rules developed with considerable 
input of stakeholders result in better performing institutions, among others, because the 
set of rules is better adapted to local circumstances and compliance rates are higher.442,443 
Beyond the realm of institutions, cooperation can result in improved quality of care and 
patient safety, to name just a few potential benefits.444 Then again, an institutionalist 
would argue these benefits too are due to improvements in the rules. Regardless, reaping 
the benefits of cooperation is difficult when members are primarily committed to the 
                                                          
441 To say the spirit of cooperation must be “reestablished” makes it seem like health care 
must return to some bygone era rife with collaboration. Nostalgia for such a mythical age 
of cooperation in health care is misguided, as it likely never existed. In the past, health 
care was much less of a collaborative endeavor, among others, due to technological 
limitations and a more limited need for resources. That being said, there are reasons why 
collaboration on certain health care issues (e.g., health care reform) may have been easier 
in the past, for example, because the population was more homogeneous or economic 
growth larger. 
442 Elinor Ostrom, “Do Institutions for Collective Action Evolve?” Journal of Bioeconomics 
16 (2014): 13. 
443 William Blomquist, Edella Schlager, Shui Yan Tang, and Elinor Ostrom, “Regularities 
from the Field and Possible Explanations,” in Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 
eds. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2006), 304. 
444 Lyndon Morley and Angela Cashell, “Collaboration in Health Care,” Journal of Medical 
Imaging and Radiation Sciences 48, no. 2 (June 2017): 208-210. 
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pursuit of their self-interest. Strategic behavior results in prospective collaborators being 
stuck in the Nash equilibrium of the game, and unable to move toward a mutually 
beneficial outcome (see also 1.4 Argument II: Game Theory). Breaking out of such a 
vicious circle of defection is a tall order, as is evidenced by the difficulties of effecting 
comprehensive health care reform in the United States. Daniels and Sabin’s approach, 
and other accounts of procedural justice, can help to (re)establish a spirit of cooperation 
in health care through the emphasis on deliberation in making and changing the rules for 
allocating health care resources. 
 Of course, procedural accounts of justice are themselves subject to existing 
barriers to collaboration. Daniels and Sabin are implicitly aware of the presence of this 
second-order collective-action problem, as is evidenced by, among others, their 
acknowledgment of a coordination problem when implementing the regulative condition 
(see 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition). Potentially the challenge can be overcome by 
reestablishing collaboration from the bottom up, relying on small-scale deliberative 
initiatives to build a spirit of cooperation. Such small initiatives can create the social 
networks and trust required to collaborate on a larger scale. Both parallel experiments 
and polycentric governance systems may play a role in scaling up small institutions for 
deliberative justice (see 3. The Polycentric Experiment), or in levering these initiatives to 
launch other collaborative endeavors (e.g., health care reform).   
 A further challenge in establishing cooperation is the threat of elite capture, i.e., 
the possibility that a small group of influential actors hijacks the decision-making process 
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and shapes the rules to its.445 Applied to accounts of procedural justice, elite capture 
means that a small group of actors takes over and steers the deliberative process to 
allocate health care resources. For A4R specifically, the risk is particularly pressing in the 
context of the appeals condition and the regulative condition.446 So even if actors 
successfully establish cooperation at a lower level of analysis, their efforts can be 
thwarted by the self-interested behavior of higher-level actors. In other words, small-
scale experiments in deliberative justice may be difficult to expand beyond their 
institutional confines, or operate as a basis for expanded collaboration. While 
administrators and politicians are the usual suspects when discussing the issue of elite 
capture in health care, it is worth noting the threat of elite capture also comes from within 
bioethics, as philosophers and bioethicists may want to push their approach to fair 
resource governance in the belief that it is correct.447 By virtue of their emphasis on 
deliberation when making resource-allocation decisions, accounts of deliberative justice 
provide some safety against elite capture, but they are not immune to the threat. In the 
case of A4R, for example, experts can limit access to the deliberative process or restrict 
                                                          
445 Rawls acknowledges the risk of elite capture in A Theory of Justice. (Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice, 207-208.) 
446 I touched upon the risk of elite capture in the discussion of the third condition (see 
4.4.4.3 The Revisions and Appeals Condition). 
447 While not familiar with the notion “elite capture,” Lawson highlights the risk of ethics 
experts taking over decision-making processes, for example, through ethics committees. 
She cites Myra Christopher, the head of the Midwest Bioethics Center, “"the ethics 
committee model empowers a small group of people with knowledge and authority so 
that they become a resource pool for others to consult." (Catherin Lawson, “The Second 
Stage of Bioethics and Institutional Economics,” Journal of Economic Issues 32, no. 4 
(December 1998): 988.) Lawson’s example shows the risk of elite capture in biomedical 
beyond the issue of fair resource allocation. 
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what counts as relevant reasons in making decisions about resource allocation. I argue 
the A4R approach is susceptible to these criticisms elsewhere in the chapter (see also 
4.4.4.2 The Relevance Condition).448 The challenge posed by elite capture suggests the 
need for broad deliberation and collaboration from the bottom up. Moreover, the issue 
once again highlights the need for good institutional design (e.g., monitoring loops)449 in 
order to mitigate the threat of elite capture and to promote deliberation and 
cooperation.450  
4.5.6 SOLVING THE LEGITIMACY PROBLEM 
The legitimacy problem is central to Daniels’s argument in favor of A4R, as the approach 
aims to legitimize decisions about the governance of health care resources (see 4.4.1 
Accountability for Reasonableness). Even though Ostrom is not especially concerned with 
legitimacy, she does highlight the importance of legitimacy in making resource allocation 
decisions on a number of occasions.451,452 Legitimacy is primarily of instrumental value to 
                                                          
448 Commons institutions are not immune to the threat of elite capture either. An elite 
group of actors can capture the decision-making process within a commons institution 
and powerful commons can take over decision-making within larger institutional 
arrangements. A possible, albeit imperfect solution is to situate deliberative processes at 
the middle-level of the organization. 
449 See 2.6.4 Monitoring for a more detailed discussion of monitoring loops. 
450 While the details of “good” institutional design differ from case to case, Ostrom’s 
design principles and the conditions of A4R can serve as the basis to design institutions 
with a reduced risk of elite capture and an increased incentive for cooperation. 
451 Apart from the citations below, see also: Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. 
Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Policansky, “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, 
Global Challenges,” Science 284, no. 5412 (April 1999): 280. 
452 Ostrom lists equitability as one of the criteria to evaluate institutional performance 
(see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons). While she does not specify the criterion, the 
remarks that follow suggest that legitimacy is a key component of an equitable institution. 
Tradeoffs between benefits and costs may be another indicator of equitability (see 2.6.2 
Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local Conditions). 
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Ostrom, as it leads to better performing institutions and improved resource management. 
She writes,  
  
When appropriators monitor and enforce boundary and authority rules they 
consider to be legitimate and effective, they are likely to improve performance in 
the CPR. While legitimate and effective rules can come from external sources, our 
studies suggest that a more effective source is the appropriators themselves.453 
 
While the passage focuses on monitoring and sanctioning rules, the same argument 
applies to rule making in general, as Ostrom notes when discussing collective-choice 
arrangements in Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005).454 Ostrom’s remarks on 
legitimacy matter to the A4R approach in at least two ways: First, commons research 
provides additional empirical evidence for the claim that stakeholder participation in the 
process of allocating resources increases legitimacy, thus backing up Daniels and Sabin’s 
approach as well as other deliberative accounts. The evidence suggests more stakeholder 
involvement leads to more legitimacy, which is an argument for broad participation in the 
decision-making process, despite the issues that arise from involving a large number of 
actors (e.g., logistics, disagreement). While Daniels and Sabin argue in favor of broad 
participation in the deliberative process, it does seem that they want to limit participation 
by certain low-level actors, particularly patients. Second, Ostrom’s discussion of 
legitimacy provides another argument in favor of implementing A4R. To recapitulate, 
participation in the deliberative process increases legitimacy, which results in rules that 
                                                          
453 Blomquist, Schlager, Tang, and Ostrom. “Regularities from the Field and Possible 
Explanations,” 304. 
454 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 263. 
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resources users perceive as fair. Consequently, participants are more willing to comply 
with the resource-governance rules, leading to increased institutional performance.455 In 
other words, the adoption of deliberative justice approaches in general and A4R in 
particular may lead to better performing health care institutions, an important reason for 
introducing procedural accounts. This argument also supports Daniels and Sabin’s claim 
that health care organizations may be able to gain a competitive advantage by “being 
open about reasons”456 and thus may be willing to adopt A4R under a regimen of 
voluntary regulation (see 4.4.4.4 The Regulative Condition).457  
 In order to increase the legitimacy of resource allocation decisions, it is likely 
beneficial to pursue legitimacy for its own sake, i.e., to recognize the intrinsic value of 
legitimacy.458 Within the context of deliberative approaches to resource governance, 
allocation decisions in large part derive their legitimacy from the opportunity actors have 
to participate in the decision-making process, even if a decision does not go their way 
                                                          
455 An increased willingness to comply with rules that are perceived as fair and legitimate 
is plausibly the most important contributor to improved institutional performance, but it 
is not the only reason institutional performance may improve. Actors may be more willing 
to report rule breaches by others if they perceive the rules as fair and legitimate (see 2.6.4 
Monitoring). Moreover, rules developed by actors should be better adapted to local 
conditions and thus result in improved institutional performance. 
456 Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, 61. 
457 The question remains what it means for an institution to perform better. Presumably, 
improvements in performance mean that an institution does better in regards to the 
criteria used to evaluate institutional performance (i.e., justice, sustainability, efficiency, 
effectiveness, and robustness). See 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons. 
458 While Ostrom does not explicitly discuss the intrinsic value of legitimacy, a deep 
concern for deliberation and its impact on legitimacy that goes beyond its value in 
improving institutional performance permeates her work. 
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eventually.459 This implies participants should be offered an opportunity to be heard. As 
Largent notes, 
 
Expressing one’s views has instrumental value to the extent that this input results 
in a better policy. It also has intrinsic value because even if the opportunity to 
speak does not ultimately change the outcome, the very existence of the 
opportunity implies that one’s opinion is respected and worth hearing.460 
 
At the end of the day, the opportunity to have one’s opinion heard and respected may 
contribute most to the legitimacy of resource allocation decisions. A concern for hearing 
actors because their input deserves to be taken seriously may go further in legitimizing 
resource allocation decisions than hearing actors because doing so would lead to 
improved institutional performance, even if the desired outcome were a more equitable 
distribution of resources. In other words, institutions that explicitly recognize the intrinsic 
value of deliberation may be more likely to reap the benefits of deliberative procedures 
than those that adopt such an approach for the sake of improvements in performance. A 
few remarks are in place: First, the above claim is hypothetical, as I have no evidence to 
back it up. Second, there is the question of how an institution would show that it is 
committed to hearing actors’ input? Presumably, an institution can set up its rules to 
communicate its commitment to deliberation, e.g., by committing a considerable amount 
of resources to deliberative processes in the implementation of the procedural 
                                                          
459 By now, it should be clear that an opportunity to participate is not the only factor in 
legitimizing resource allocation decisions, even in deliberative accounts. The procedure 
to arrive at resource governance decisions matters beyond providing participants an 
opportunity to voice their opinion. The A4R approach, for example, stipulates the relevant 
reasons and the need for revisions and appeals mechanism.  
460 Largent, “Health Care Organizations and the Power of Procedure,” 51. 
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approach.461 Even then, the commitment can be inauthentic or perceived as inauthentic 
by participants. 
4.6 TOWARD AN ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS  
The foregoing discussion suggests that one path to the fair governance of health care 
resources is through the development and implementation of deliberative resource 
allocation mechanisms at the institutional meso-level. While I have focused on Daniels 
and Sabin’s A4R approach, which I show can fruitfully be integrated with Ostrom’s work 
on the commons, other procedural accounts exist (e.g., Emanuel, Eddy, Fleck), and they 
can plausibly be integrated with NIE as well (see 2.6.3 Collective-Choice Arrangements).462 
However, resource-allocation decisions are not the only type of decision that institutions 
must make a ruling on that is moral in nature. A host of other decisions is taken at the 
                                                          
461 The amount of resources committed to deliberation can plausibly be used as a proxy 
to test the hypothesis that a strong commitment to deliberation leads to gains in 
legitimacy over a more superficial commitment. For example, a study could compare the 
perceived legitimacy of resource-allocation decisions between organizations that expend 
a considerable amount of resources on deliberation and organizations that do not. 
462 To give an example, Fleck’s account, which draws heavily on Daniels and Sabin’s 
approach, appears amenable to integration with commons research, among others, 
because he bases his work on that of Daniels and Sabin. He argues “rational democratic 
deliberative practices” bring together three moral considerations: (1) For resource 
allocation decisions to be fair, they must be rationally justified (see 4.4.4.2 The Relevance 
Condition). (2) The deliberative process must be “public, visible, and transparent” (see 
4.4.4.1 The Publicity Condition). (3) “[T]he primary virtue of this deliberative democratic 
model […] is that all rationing decisions would be self-imposed in a very morally 
substantive sense.” The example Fleck provides of this “self-imposed rationing model,” a 
thousand factory workers defining a health benefit package, is (similar to) a health care 
commons. (Leonard Fleck, Just Caring: Health Care Rationing and Democratic Deliberation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 15-18.) Moreover, Fleck discusses “constitutional 
principles of health care justice” that “define the legitimate space of democratic 
deliberation,” which closely resemble constitutional-choice rules (see 0.5.3 Rules). (Ibid., 
184-194.) Whether these principles are indeed constitutional-choice rules or meta-
principles for the formulation of constitutional rules is up for debate. 
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level of health care institutions that have an ethical component, among others, 
surrounding billing practices and the marketing of health care services.463 Moreover, 
there are issues like the seemingly arbitrary variations in clinical practice (and outcomes) 
between providers, which lie outside of the scope of either economic decision-making 
(e.g., resource governance, billing) or research questions, but nonetheless raise ethical 
concerns at the institutional level.464 Still other moral issues surround population-based 
practice (i.e., gearing health care services to specific populations) and the use of new 
health care technologies beyond their cost narrowly conceived (e.g., administrative 
coordination of services).465 Each of these issues involve administrative and 
organizational considerations that raise new ethical issues, which ought to be addressed 
within the scope of a meso-level ethics of health care institutions.466 
 Interestingly, while bioethics, clinical ethics, professional ethics, and health care 
ethics have all become mature and well-developed fields of applied ethics, the ethics of 
health care institutions has received surprisingly little attention, especially given the fact 
that health care has become increasingly institutionalized since the second half of the 
twentieth century.467 The turn of the century saw a brief spike of interest in the ethics of 
health care institutions in response to an initiative by Khushf in HEC Forum (1999) in 
tandem with a complementary push by Patricia Werhane and Mary Rorty in a special issue 
                                                          
463 George Khushf, “The Scope of Organizational Ethics,” HEC Forum 10, no. 2 (June 1998): 
127. 
464 Khushf, “The Scope of Organizational Ethics,” 128-129. 
465 Khushf, “The Scope of Organizational Ethics,” 129-130. 
466 Khushf, “The Scope of Organizational Ethics,” 131. 
467 Patricia H. Werhane and Mary V. Rorty, “Organization Ethics in Health Care,” 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9, no. 2 (April 2000): 145. 
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of the Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics (2000).468,469 Around the same time, 
Werhane and Rorty, together with Edward Spencer and Dan Mills, published a book titled 
Organization Ethics in Health Care (2000).470 Since then, however, efforts to develop a 
full-fledged ethics of health care institutions have largely stalled, while the task of 
developing a meso-level ethics of health care institutions remains far from complete, and 
arguably has only become more urgent. On the contrary, one might say that researchers 
have only just commenced with the development of such an ethics, which will require a 
long-term and interdisciplinary effort. 
 Throughout the project, I have explored issues relating to the development of an 
ethics of health care institutions, particularly to regulate resource governance (see 4. A4R 
in Practice). While the development of a full-fledged ethics of health care institutions is 
beyond the scope of the current project, I briefly want to discuss some further 
recommendations to develop such an ethics inspired by NIE: (1) An ethics of health care 
institutions must roughly be situated at the meso-level, in between the more traditional 
and well-developed areas of micro-ethics (i.e., concerned with relationships between 
individuals) and macro-ethics (i.e., broad issues of social and economic policy).471 Hence, 
Khushf uses the term “inter-ethics.”472 Of course, by now it should be clear that 
                                                          
468 George Khushf, “Struggling to Understand the Nature of Organizational Ethics,” HEC 
Forum 11, no. 4 (December 1999). 
469 Werhane and Rorty, “Organization Ethics in Health Care.” 
470 Edward M. Spencer, Ann E. Mills, Mary V. Rorty, and Patricia H. Werhane, Organization 
Ethics in Health Care (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
471 George Khushf, “The Two Sides of Inter-Ethics,” HEC Forum 12, no. 3 (September 
2000): 187. 
472 Khushf, “The Scope of Organizational Ethics,” 133. 
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distinctions between the micro-, meso-, and macro-level are seldom clear-cut in practice, 
but this conceptual trifecta provides a useful language to think about health care ethics 
in the broadest possible sense, including an ethics of health care institutions. (2) The levels 
of health care ethics are interdependent. Micro-, meso-, and macro-level ethics interact 
with one another in complex ways, much like the actors that these levels represent (i.e., 
individuals, organizations, health systems/states). Fleshing out the conceptual 
relationships between these levels is one of the key challenges of the development of a 
meso-level ethics of health care institutions, which does not only have to find an ethical 
space for itself in between the micro- and macro-level, but has the potential to bridge 
these levels.473 To give a concrete example, the tension between the fiduciary duties 
providers have towards their patients (micro-level) and the concerns of health care 
systems to set fair limits on resource usage (macro-level) can potentially be resolved by 
implementing A4R through commons-like arrangements (meso-level) (see 4.4 A4R in 
Practice). (3) Any ethics of health care institutions will have to be easily adoptable and 
adaptable by concrete health care organizations, among others, because such an ethics 
has to be able to operate at different levels of analysis (e.g., group practice, hospital, 
health plan) and cope with variations in local context (e.g., religion, design of health care 
system). As Pellegrino and Thomasma note, “[I]nstitutional ethics does not imply a single 
                                                          
473 As Pellegrino and Thomasma point out, “The problems of institutional morality, those 
which emerge from the actions of organized groups, are more complex than those of 
individual ethics.” (Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of 
Medical Practice. Toward a Philosophy and Ethic of the Healing Professions (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1981), 246.) The increase in complexity becomes clear at the 
macro-level and only increases further with the introduction of a meso-level ethics. 
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rigid set of principles, uniformly practiced by all hospitals. This is manifestly impossible in 
a society with such a wide range of values as ours. Indeed, our moral pluralism may itself 
require some declaration by the institution of its values, if the patient’s own values are to 
be fully protected.”474,475 In other words, an ethics of health care institutions has to be 
sufficiently flexible to account for institutional diversity. (4) That being said, “certain 
commonly applicable principles will undoubtedly emerge,”476 which can plausibly be 
formulated in terms of design principles for ethical health care institutions (see 2.6 The 
Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions and 4.4.2 A4A as Design Principles). 
To illustrate, the requirement to be transparent, the presence of conflict-resolution 
mechanisms (cf. revision and appeals condition), and the reliance on collective-choice 
arrangements (i.e., democratic deliberation) when developing rules can be such 
principles. (5) Commons research describes in detail one type of institutional 
arrangement that possesses certain features that are amenable to be used as the basis 
for, or as a key component of, ethical health care institutions. (6) NIE can provide a 
language and conceptual tools that can help bioethicists, philosophers, and others active 
in the field of health care ethics with the development of a meso-level ethics of health 
care institutions (see 0.4 The Double Aim of the Project). The field’s focus on rules as the 
foundational concept an ontology of institutions can serve as the basis for a renewed 
attempt to establish an ethics of health care institutions (see also 0.5.2 Organization). 
                                                          
474 Pellegrino and Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice, 249.  
475 Of course, Pellegrino and Thomasma understand institution as synonymous to 
organization (see 0.1.2 NIE, Bioethics, and Philosophy), but their plea for “institutional 
flexibility,” and their example of moral pluralism, apply nonetheless. 
476 Pellegrino and Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice, 249. 
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 In conclusion, I would like to extend a renewed invitation to develop a meso-level 
ethics of health care institutions in the knowledge that, since the previous attempts, new 
areas of research have come to the forefront that can aide ethicists in the development 
of such an ethics. While establishing an inter-ethics remains a nontrivial task, NIE and 
commons research suggest new avenues to take up the challenge.  
4.7 CONCLUSION 
Throughout the chapter, Ostrom’s work on the commons has served as the basis to 
interpret, criticize, and enhance Daniels and Sabin’s A4R approach. Ultimately, commons 
research has the potential to facilitate the implementation of A4R by conceiving of the 
approach’s four conditions as institutional design principles for just health care 
institutions. Vice versa, Daniels’ theory of justice has the potential to supply commons 
research with a much-needed path to conceptualize and develop justice as a key 
component of institutional performance. In addition, Daniels provides a justification for 
thinking of certain artificial resources as common-pool resources, bringing them within 
the scope of commons research. The synergy between the work of Ostrom and Daniels is 
remarkable and deepens our understanding of both bodies of research. 
 The chapter suggests a few avenues for future research: First, the research of 
Ostrom and Daniels overlaps in ways that I have not explored here, but fit within my 
project’s overarching argument. For example, Daniels’ lengthy discussion of possible 
conflicts between liberty and equality in Just Health Care (1985) can be related to the 
discussion of the role of middle-level institutions in ensuring the freedom of health care 
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(see 3.4 Pluralism and the Freedom of Health Care).477 Second, the prior discussion 
suggests that it is worthwhile to revisit Rawls’ work because he treats institutions and 
their design in a way that is richer than Daniels’ usage of the concepts and closer to NIE 
(see footnotes 15 and 176). Rereading Rawls with the confluence between the work of 
Ostrom and Daniels in mind may allow for a tighter integration of their respective work. 
The recently published monograph Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond 
(2012) is a promising secondary source to further integrate the work of Ostrom, Daniels 
and Rawls.478 Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009), which provides a critique and revision of 
Rawls’ magnum opus, is another possible source, given its focus on institutions.479 
 
                                                          
477 Daniels, Just Health Care, x, 114-220. 
478 Martin O’Neill and Thad Williamson eds., Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and 
Beyond, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2012. 
479 Indeed, Sen explicitly recognizes the similarities between the projects of Rawls and 
Ostrom. (Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 




TOWARD THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS 
 
“The reasonable man adapts himself to the world;  
the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt  
the world to himself. Therefore all progress  
depends on the unreasonable man.”1 
- George Bernard Shaw -  
 
5.1 PHILOSOPHIZING THE COMMONS, INSTITUTIONALIZING BIOETHICS  
The project has taken a twofold approach. On the one hand, I have argued that NIE in 
general and commons research in particular are valuable to bioethics, because they 
supply a language to talk about health care institutions, and can shed new light on the 
issue of allocating scarce health care resources. On the other hand, I have shown the value 
of bioethics to commons research, as it can provide the basis for a philosophical reflection 
on the commons, and can aide in the development of undertheorized areas of commons 
research. Bioethics enables commons researchers to explicitly theorize and justify the 
normative commitments integral to the commons framework. In several instances, the 
two theses have overlapped, resulting in an interplay between commons research and 
biomedical ethics within the same chapter or argument. I hope that the current project is
                                                          
1 George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman (London: Penguin Books, [1903] 2000), 260. 
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only the beginning of a flourishing dialogue between commons research and bioethics, as 
I believe a continued back and forth can benefit both of these vibrant fields of inquiry. 
The conclusion provides a brief summary of the project emphasizing its most 
important contributions (see 5.2 Finding Common Ground: A Summary), followed by a 
discussion of four especially promising avenues for future research (see 5.3 Future 
Research), and a final reflection on the future of the commons in health care (see 5.4 
Toward the Health Care Commons?).  
5.2 FINDING COMMON GROUND: A SUMMARY 
The project has been the first large-scale, systematic effort to bridge NIE/commons 
research and biomedical ethics. The effort has been driven by the conviction that 
providing such bridgework can further key debates in both of these areas of inquiry. In 
the preceding chapters, I have shown the value of NIE/commons research to bioethics, 
and vice versa (see 0.4 The Double Aim of the Project). I summarize the project’s main 
contributions to both bodies of literature. 
 I have argued that NIE in general and commons research in particular are valuable 
to biomedical ethics, because they can supply a theoretical language to talk and think 
about health care institutions, organizations, and commons (see 0.5 A Glossary of 
Commons Terms). Bioethics currently lacks such a language, making it difficult to discuss 
institutional issues, as is evidenced by the issues surrounding the development of an 
ethics of health care institutions (see 4.6 Toward an Ethics of Health Care Institutions). I 
discussed the central strands of Ostrom’s work in relation to health care: First, I suggested 
the IAD framework and the design principles of successful commons institutions can be 
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used as tools for the design of successful health care institutions (see 2. Ostrom’s Black 
Bag). Second, I showed the value of consciously, simultaneously, and continuously 
experimenting with different sets of rules in order to find the best possible institutional 
arrangement(s) to organize health care in general and to allocate resources in particular 
(see 3.3 Parallel Experiments). Third, commons research suggests that health care 
commons can play a key role in promoting pluralism in health care, and empowering 
actors at the meso-level of the health care system, thus ensuring individual and 
institutional liberty in health care (see 3.4 Pluralism and Freedom in Health Care). Finally, 
I explored the possibility of developing polycentric governance systems in health care; 
arguing in favor of commons, state, and market as complementary institutions rather 
than as alternatives (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). Building on these 
ideas, I showed that commons research has the potential to further longstanding debates 
in biomedical ethics, particularly when it comes to the governance of scarce health care 
resources. The project contributed to two arguments: First, I showed that health care is 
at risk of suffering from a tragedy of the commons, providing arguments in favor of such 
a tragedy and objections against it. Taking seriously the possibility of a tragedy of the 
health care commons makes apparent the necessity for setting limits on the use of health 
care resources (see 1. The Tragedy of the Health Care Commons). Second, I applied 
Ostrom’s work to Daniels’ theory of justice for health care and the accompanying A4R 
approach, arguing that, while Daniels recognizes the need to cooperate when governing 
health care resources, he does not fully appreciate the role the institutional meso-level 
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can play in doing so. I argued that commons institutions are particularly suitable to put 
Daniels’ approach to resource allocation into practice (see 4. A4R in Practice). 
 I have also provided a philosophical and normative analysis that advances NIE and 
commons research. I analyzed some of the central concepts of commons research, 
especially the notions of institution, organization, and resources (see 0.5 A Glossary of 
Commons Terms). I critically and systematically assessed Ostrom’s principles for the 
design of successful commons institutions, which are all too often taken piecewise (see 
2.6 The Design Principles of Successful Commons Institutions). Third, I relied on Jacob 
Levy’s work on the role of intermediate groups to argue for the importance of commons 
institutions in ensuring the freedom of health care, both at the personal and the 
institutional level. I argued that commons institutions are particularly well suited to fulfill 
the role of bulwark against overbearing state and market institutions (see 3.4 Pluralism 
and Freedom in Health Care). Finally, I assessed Ostrom’s proposal to develop mixed 
governance regimes, looking at the advantages of such polycentric institutions (see 3.5 
Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?). Apart from critical reflection on the commons 
and commons research, bioethics can help provide an explicit justified normative 
framework implicitly assumed by commons researchers. Bioethics also enables us to 
clarify and justify the equity criterion that Ostrom and colleagues use to evaluate success 
of a given commons institution. Ostrom lists fairness as one of the criteria for the 
evaluation of institutional performance, but she does not develop the criterion in her 
work. I showed how Daniels’ theory of justice for health care, based on the work of John 
Rawls, could provide Ostrom with an account of justice that is a good fit for her project, 
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thus remedying a key shortcoming of commons research (see 4.3.2.1 A Theory of Justice 
for the Commons?). I suggested the possibility of using the four conditions of the A4R 
approach as additional design principles for the development of just commons 
institutions (see 4.4.2 A4R as Design Principles). 
 The project made two more general contributions: First, I discussed the potential 
of NIE and commons research to improve the performance of all institutions governing 
scarce health care resources, among others, by improving monitoring (e.g., closed 
monitoring loops) and sanctioning (e.g., use of small, but visible sanctions). While 
commons research has been developed in the context of resource governance, 
recommendations like these have the potential to change and improve the design of 
health care institutions in ways that impact other aspects of the organization and delivery 
of health care (e.g., improve quality of care). Second, I extended an invitation to “learn to 
see the commons” in health care. Much like Ostrom did not develop commons 
institutions out of thin air, instead basing her analysis primarily on field studies of real-
world commons institutions, the health care commons is not a novel idea, but a concept 
that is applicable to a host of existing institutional arrangements (e.g., Gawande’s 
example of physicians in Grand Junction, collaborative initiatives with Kaiser 
Permanente). As such, the health care commons are not new. Commons research simply 
helps policymakers, bioethicists, and others to see the commons in health care. 
Recognizing existing health care commons is important because it allows researchers to 
study them in order to determine what makes them (un)successful, and draw 
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generalizable conclusions that potentially can be adapted and applied to other contexts 
(see 5.3 Future Research).  
 Finally, the project has been characterized by a large number of cross-references, 
and an even larger number of footnotes. The function of the footnotes has been to clarify, 
but also to qualify claims in the body of the text, this in an attempt to do justice to the 
complex reality of analyzing and solving institutional puzzles. I want to stress again that 
institutional design is a messy affair! The “messiness” of commons research, and by 
extension of at least some of the arguments presented here, is the result of tensions 
inherent to institutional design in general and to the design of commons institutions in 
particular. To give an example, the tension between allowing resource users to extract as 
many resources as they need, without having them extract so many it destroys the 
resource pool sits at the heart of any commons dilemma, and at any institutional effort 
to solve it. The fact that Ostrom tries to do justice to the complexities of institutional 
design problems must be regarded as a virtue. To quote Martha Nussbaum, “In general, 
tension within a theory does not necessarily show that it is defective; it may simply show 
that it is in touch with the difficulty of life."2 
5.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Since this project is the first large-scale effort to bridge two developed bodies of 
literature, the prospects for future research are legion, but my work suggests a few 
concrete avenues for further inquiry into the health care commons. I briefly discuss four 
                                                          
2 Martha Nussbaum, “The Future of Feminist Liberalism,” Proceedings and Addresses of 
the American Philosophical Association 74, no. 2 (November 2000): 78. 
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particularly promising strands: (1) explore how the commons can improve quality of care, 
(2) perform empirical studies of existing health care commons, (3) broaden the scope to 
health care in the developing world, and (4) expand the philosophical reflection on the 
commons. 
 First, the project has focused on the issue of allocating scarce resources with the 
aim of averting a tragedy of the health care commons and setting fair limits. The emphasis 
on resource allocation narrowly conceived has shifted attention away from the challenge 
of improving quality of care, but the two issues are inextricably related. Ideally, 
improvements in resource governance go hand-in-hand with improvements in quality of 
care, but the relationships between institutional design, resource management, and 
quality of care are complex. Future research should attempt to map these relationships. 
A first step is to explore the ways in which commons institutions can positively affect 
quality of care, much in the same way I have argued that commons can improve the 
governance of health care resources. To give an example, organizing care within small-
scale, cooperative institutions may improve health outcomes by improving the 
relationship between providers and patients, among others, through increases in trust 
and “patient-centeredness.”3,4 In short, the discussion of the health care commons must 
be broadened beyond the sphere of resource governance to include improvements in the 
quality of care. 
                                                          
3 Mary Catherine Beach, Jeanne Keruly, and Richard D. Moore, “Is the Quality of the 
Patient-Provider Relationship Associated with Better Adherence and Health Outcomes for 
Patients with HIV?” Journal of General Internal Medicine 21, no. 6 (June 2006): 661. 
4 Johanna Birkhäuer et al., “Trust in the Health Care Professional and Health Outcome: A 
Meta-Analysis,” PLoS ONE 12, no. 2 (2017), https://doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0170988. 
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 Second, Ostrom repeatedly stresses the need to base policy on theory that is 
supported by empirical evidence.5 While I have provided examples throughout the 
project, the study of the health care commons would benefit greatly from the 
comprehensive study of one or more existing health care commons institutions. The study 
of real-world health care commons can shed light on the functioning of these institutions 
as compared to the natural resource commons at the center of Ostrom’s research. Among 
others, such fieldwork would be able to establish empirically to what extent the design 
principles for successful commons institutions (see 2.6 The Design Principles of Successful 
Commons Institutions) and the challenges faced by the commons carry over to health care 
(see 2.7 Challenges Faced by the Health Care Commons), possibly suggesting new design 
principles and identifying new challenges. In addition, the study of existent health care 
commons can help to determine where and how such institutions fit within the health 
care system as a whole (see 3.5 Polycentricity: The Best of Many Worlds?), suggesting 
ways to better integrate them in health care’s status quo institutions. Fieldwork is 
indispensable to pave the road for the successful large-scale implementation of health 
care commons institutions.6 As field studies are the only way to provide sufficient 
empirical data to answer the question, “What is the evidence that health care commons 
                                                          
5 Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool 
Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 18. 
6 A thorough analysis of the failure of the Obamacare cooperatives also fits within such 
an empirical approach to the health care commons, much in the same way that Ostrom 
discusses both successful and unsuccessful commons to determine the institutional 
features that determine whether an institution thrives or fails. 
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improve resource allocation decisions and quality of care?”7 At the same time, studying 
health care commons in the field can serve as the basis for further theoretical reflection 
in the commons literature, among others, regarding the application of the paradigm in 
the context of artificial resources. 
 Third, while health care commons can be adopted by and integrated in developed 
health care systems, commons may be a particularly suitable institutional arrangement 
for organizing health care in the developing world. In the absence of large and complex 
health care institutions, commons have the potential to establish robust institutions for 
the local provision of care through emergent, bottom-up cooperation. In such a context, 
health care commons may be able to rely on communities’ existing institutions for their 
development.8 Moreover, the lack of mature health care institutions means commons 
may have an easier time grounding themselves in the institutional landscape, as the status 
quo institutions tend to crowd out alternative institutional arrangements chapter (see 1.7 
Averting the Tragedy of the Health Care Commons).9 This opens perspective for health 
                                                          
7 The question is inspired by a similar one at the end of Daniels and Sabin’s Setting Limits 
Fairly (2008). They recount how a provincial minister of health in China asked them the 
following, “What is the evidence that accountability for reasonableness improves the 
quality of decision making or leads to greater legitimacy for priority-setting decisions?” 
(Norman Daniels and James Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
[2002] 2008), 231.) It is worth pointing out that Ostrom’s laboratory experiments provide 
some evidence that approaches like A4R indeed increase the legitimacy of resource 
allocation decisions, but more evidence is needed from health care practice.  
8 The fact that many of the natural resource commons still existing today, and studied in 
the commons literature, are located in the developing world likely is no coincidence. 
Successful examples from developed countries are often situated within small, tight-knit 
communities (e.g., lobster fisheries in New England, mountain meadows in Switzerland 
and Japan). 
9 Daniels and Sabin make a tangential point in Setting Limits Fairly (2002) when they point 
out the legitimacy problem poses itself more urgently in developing countries, where 
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care commons research, as there is the possibility to design health care commons from 
scratch, conduct institutional experiments (see 3. The Polycentric Experiment), and build 
up an evidence base. Of course, much of the evidence may not transfer to the context of 
developed health care systems, but it does not need to.10 Health care commons have the 
potential to serve as the basic institutional building block for health care systems across 
the developing world, but much work needs to be done before they can fulfill that role.  
 Finally, as a nascent area of inquiry, commons research can benefit from more 
philosophical reflection. Two issues immediately come to mind: (1) While I have provided 
a tentative solution to the issue of conceptualizing the contrast between institutions and 
organizations, the problem is deserving of a more systematic philosophical discussion 
given that this is a key criticism of NIE as a whole. A matter of social ontology, 
philosophers may be able to further ongoing debates surrounding the institution-
organization distinction. (2) Commons institutions raise questions of collective 
responsibility, itself a controversial notion, that are not considered in the literature. To 
give just a few examples, to what extent can commons institutions be held morally 
                                                          
“public authorities are widely perceived to be untrustworthy and riddled with corruption” 
and “the private sector remains unregulated, is itself riddled with corruption, and often 
competes with and undermines the public sector.” (Daniels and Sabin, Setting Limits 
Fairly, 10.) Health care commons can potentially fill the institutional void identified by 
Daniels and Sabin. 
10 Two remarks: (1) Conducting institutional experiments in developing countries with the 
sole aim of building an evidence base that can serve for the development of health care 
commons in the developed world is exploitative and would likely lead to more extreme 
(i.e., riskier) institutional design. (2) The implementation of health care commons in 
developed health care systems faces particular challenges (e.g., integrating them in other 
institutional arrangements given the presence of health care’s status quo institutions and 
the institutional complexity).  
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responsible for the maintenance of the commons? A matter of so-called “forward looking 
collective responsibility.”11 What responsibility does the group of resource users have to 
bring about a fair allocation of the available resources? And how does this collective 
responsibility translate to the responsibility of individual moral actors within the context 
of the commons? Vice versa, the vast literature on collective responsibility may be able 
to benefit from the commons literature, not only for examples, but also for theoretical 
tools. Such intellectual cross-pollination between commons research and philosophy can 
benefit both fields beyond questions of collective responsibility, as they can draw on each 
other’s conceptual and theoretical apparatus. 
5.4 TOWARD THE HEALTH CARE COMMONS? 
Avenues for future research abound, the question remains what are the prospects for the 
large-scale integration of commons institutions in health care? While I have touted the 
advantages of introducing commons in health care at length, I have spent almost as many 
words discussing the difficulties of doing so. The challenges that must be overcome are 
indeed formidable, from the issue of size over the problem of coordinating cooperation 
to the hijacking of the institutional design process by elites, to name just a few. The failure 
of the Obamacare cooperatives stands as a testament to the difficulty of introducing a 
“new” institutional arrangement into a complex health care system dominated by status 
                                                          
11 Marion Smiley, “Collective Responsibility,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 




quo institutions.12 That being said, health care’s existing institutions likely have a key role 
to fulfill in making the health care commons a success. In commons experiments, in the 
absence of institutions to foster cooperative behavior, the commons are destroyed in 
each scenario where there is a nonnegligible probability of destruction.13 In the time it 
takes actors to learn about the resource and how to collaborate, the resource is already 
destroyed.14 A result that is not particularly encouraging for real-world commons settings, 
which are much more complex. Therefore, health care’s status quo institutions should 
foster emergent cooperative initiatives at the meso-level, assisting them with building 
knowledge and stimulating collaboration when it is at risk of breaking down. Ultimately, 
the goal is to develop polycentric governance systems, which combine features of market, 
state, and commons institutions into robust health care institutions able to allocate scarce 
resources in a fair, efficient, and sustainable manner.  
As a first step toward such an institutional (r)evolution, health care actors must 
recognize that resources are limited, and setting limits is necessary in order to avoid a 
tragedy of the health care commons, whether a catastrophic collapse or a creeping 
                                                          
12 The Obamacare cooperatives are a particular sort of commons institution in that the 
ownership of the resources is shared among all the users. Commons, however, are not 
an ownership system, but a governance regime (see 0.3 A Third Way: The Commons).  
13 In the context of commons experiments, institutions that foster cooperation are not 
full-fledged market- or state-like institutions, but rather minimal changes to the rules that 
promote cooperation (e.g., allowing communication, instating a penalty system). 
Experiments show that even such minimal rule changes can encourage cooperation. Of 
course, these small changes to the rules are implemented by the organizers of the 
experiment, and often “forced” upon the participants (e.g., specific amount of time 
during which participants must communicate), thus collaboration is fostered from the 
top-down, much in the same way that market or state organizations can stimulate 
cooperation.  
14 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 141-142. 
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failure. The second step requires actors to realize the key role institutions play in 
governing resources, and the part they can play in designing these institutions. Neither of 
these steps is the responsibility of the few, but requires a broad effort from patients, 
providers, hospitals, insurers, governments, and so on. The problem is that the current 
set of rules hides the problem of scarcity, and the allocation decisions that are willy-nilly 
being taken. Moreover, the status quo institutions preclude many actors (e.g., citizens, 
patients, physicians) from directly participating in the rule-making process. Relying on 
commons institutions operating at the meso-level makes the necessity for setting limits 
more palpable, while at the same time offering a much broader range of actors the 
opportunity to participate in the design of the allocation rules through deliberative 
processes, among others, increasing the legitimacy of and compliance with resource 
allocation rules.  Commons research can help health care actors move past previously 
learned “institutional heuristics,”15 stimulating the development of new approaches to 
the design of health care institutions that do justice to the complex realities of health care 
as well as to relevant differences in local context.16    
 To end on an optimistic note, health care’s status quo institutions have been 
remarkably successful in delivering high-quality care at an altogether reasonable cost to 
countries’ entire populations, or broad swaths thereof, since World War II. The success of 
                                                          
15 A concrete example of an institutional heuristic is Daniels and Sabin’s decision to 
ultimately point toward the state as responsible for the implementation of A4R. 
16 The remark is based on a similar remark in Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources 
(1994), when Ostrom and her colleagues note that individuals often approach 
appropriation situations “armed with an array of previously learned heuristics.” (Ostrom, 
Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources, 217.) 
434 
 
the status quo institutions serves as evidence that humans are capable of designing set 
of rules that generate substantial benefits over an extended period of time, and are able 
to change the rules over time in response to changing circumstances. Of course, health 
care institutions are not perfect, the health care system in the United States being a prime 
example, but it is worth to keep in mind that optimally designed institutions are an 
illusion. Instead, the aim is to develop as-good-as-possible institutions, which is a moving 
target. The financial impact of new health care technologies, and increasingly the problem 
of ageing populations, make the target move faster, putting a strain on the available 
health care resources. Thus far, the status quo institutions have proven relatively 
successful at meeting the challenges posed by a rapidly changing environment, but for 
the past decades health care spending across the developed world has slowly begun to 
spiral out of control, a creeping evolution that may turn into a catastrophic tragedy. 
Health care institutions have been slow to respond to these developments, among others, 
due to the size and complexity of both the challenges and the sets of rules that need to 
be changed to mitigate them. While it is possible the status quo institutions will be able 
to formulate an adequate response over time, the institutional toolbox could benefit from 
a new set of ideas to formulate institutional answers to today’s health care challenges. 
Commons institutions, relying on emergent cooperation between resource users to tackle 
resource governance issues at the meso-level, are a promising institutional solution to 
manage health care resources. Not only do commons confront resource users with the 
fact resources are finite, and then engage them in formulating an institutional solution to 
allocate the available resources fairly, but they also break down large and unwieldy 
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institutional challenges into smaller and more manageable problems to be resolved with 
respect to a local context. Of course, the commons paradigm is no silver bullet, but adding 
commons institutions to the institutional toolbox increases the likelihood of designing 
robust health care institutions. Given the special moral importance of health care, there 
is a strong moral obligation to design institutions that govern resources in a sustainable 
manner in order for health care’s institutions to continue to provide accessible, high-
quality care. While this project ends here, the hope is that it can serve as a starting point 
for everyone who is committed to cooperate with the aim of improving health care 
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